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Abstract 
 
A growing dissatisfaction with established explanatory frameworks of welfare state 
developments such as functional explanations (internal and external problem pressure), 
institutionalist accounts (path dependency) and political factors (parties) has made scholars 
apply ideational perspectives to understand recent reforms. Although family policy reforms 
have been investigated through idea-based explanations, scholars have neglected the role of 
international organizations in the ´idea game` of collecting and disseminating family policy 
advice. This thesis seeks to fill this void throughout its three main parts which are: a 
theoretical investigation of ideational factors in policy-making as well as how this can be 
studied; an empirical investigation of the family policy ideas of the two international 
organizations EU and OECD; and an empirical investigation of the influence of these ideas on 
German and Norwegian family policy reforms. The thesis, whose disciplinary home is the 
comparative welfare state literature, thus contributes to the literature on the role of ideas, 
social policy in international organizations and national family policy reforms. Each part does 
this by informing theoretical, methodological and/or empirical parts of this body of literature: 
How, why, when and with what impact do family policy ideas cross borders? 
First, the thesis argues that ideational frameworks provide valuable insights into 
policy-making on welfare. It contributes by documenting how policy failure and international 
comparisons and rankings are conducive to the impact of policy ideas. Moreover, a particular 
set of ideas, referred to as malleable ideas or family policy as a productive factor, meaning 
ideas that are capable of solving many problems at the same time, is shown to be particularly 
influential. Another finding with theoretical implications is that while ideational literature has 
identified conditions favourable for ideas to gain ground (i.e. become imported), the reasons 
why actors try to export ideas have hardly been investigated. Wishes to “shine” in 
international comparisons combined with a hope of gaining general influence are two such 
reasons the thesis identifies through the analysis of German and Norwegian family policy 
reforms.  
Second, the thesis presents family policy ideas of the EU and OECD. It shows that 
these add up to a rather comprehensive set of policy recommendations with the potential of 
influencing national reforms. The recommendations are employment-imprinted, but more than 
neo-liberal advice as they for instance ask for strong public funding for childcare. Another 
finding that is just as important in the discussion of international family policy, and this 
applies especially to the OECD, regards the way policy advice is developed. The thesis 
documents how such advice to a large extent may be up loading of national policy to the 
international arena and that countries to a large extent decides themselves whether they are 
evaluated or not. This ensures countries substantial possibilities of strategic use of 
international actors to avoid unpleasant critique or lend authority and legitimacy to reforms.  
 Third, the thesis analyzes German and Norwegian family policy reforms and 
concludes that the advice from EU and OECD is well known among policy actors, but has not 
been crucial for the changes that took place. However, it finds that international comparisons 
have been important in Germany and that foreign policy ideas have influenced both Norway 
and Germany, implying that ideational factors have played a role. The policy ideas 
dominating national debate and reform preparations are similar to the ideas promoted by the 
EU and OECD, but bilateral learning is still more important than international organizations 
in this field of social policy.  
Overall, this dissertation shows how paying attention to family policy ideas of 
international actors improves our understanding of welfare developments in Norway and 
Germany. The findings are substantiated by comprehensive data in the form of policy 
documents, parliamentary debates and expert interviews.  
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Sammendrag 
 
Ideer som teoretisk innfallsvinkel anvendes i økende grad i studier av velferdspolitiske 
reformer. En årsak er at teorier som vektlegger funksjonelle (eksempelvis indre og ytre 
reformpress), institusjonelle (eksempelvis stiavhengighet) og politiske (eksempelvis partier) 
forklaringsvariabler ikke gir tilstrekkelig svar på når, hvorfor og hvordan velferdsordninger 
endres. Familiepolitiske ordninger har tidligere blitt analysert med utgangspunkt i et slikt 
ideperspektiv, men forskere har ikke sett på rollen internasjonale organisasjoner kan spille i 
det såkalte ide spillet; spredning av familiepolitiske anbefalinger. I denne avhandlingen 
studeres dette gjennom tre hoveddeler; a) en teoretisk diskusjon av betydningen av ideer for 
politikkutvikling samt hvordan slike prosesser kan studeres, b) en empirisk presentasjon av 
hvilken type familiepolitikk organisasjoner som EU og OECD fremmer, og c) hvorvidt slike 
ideer øver innflytelse på norsk og tysk familiepolitikk. Avhandlingen utgår fra disiplinen 
komparative studier av sosialpolitikk og bidrar til litteraturen om betydningen av ideer, 
sosialpolitikk i internasjonale organisasjoner og nasjonale familiepolitiske reformer. I 
avhandlingen drøftes hvordan, hvorfor, når og med hvilken innflytelse familiepolitiske ideer 
krysser grenser, spørsmål som til nå er viet liten oppmerksomhet.  
 Det argumenteres først for at ideperspektivet øker vår forståelse av velferdspolitikk. 
Avhandlingen dokumenterer hvordan faktorer som feilslått politikk og internasjonale 
sammenligninger og rangeringer øker sannsynligheten for at internasjonale ideer vinner frem. 
Tilpasningsdyktige ideer av typen familiepolitikk som produktivfaktor, det vil si ideer som 
kan løse flere problemer samtidig og er åpne for ulike begrunnelser, har størst gjennomslag. 
Et annet funn med teoretisk betydning er at mens litteratur om ideer har fokusert på faktorer 
som øker ideers kraft og dermed sannsynlighet for å importeres og implementeres av stater, 
har litteraturen oversett hvorfor ideer eksporteres. Ønsket om å fremstå som eksempel til 
etterfølgelse kombinert med et håp om å vinne generell innflytelse er blant årsakene som 
avdekkes i avhandlingen gjennom analysen av tyske og norske reformer.  
 I del to presenteres familiepolitiske ideer i EU og OECD. Det vises at slike ideer 
utgjør en relativ omfattende samling av anbefalinger med potensial for å påvirke nasjonale 
reformer. Anbefalingene er i stor grad økonomisk og sysselsettingsorienterte, men likevel mer 
enn neoliberale råd når det eksempelvis etterspørres offentlig finansierte barnehager. Et annet 
funn som er vel så viktig som undersøkelsen av eventuelle effekter av disse anbefalingene er 
samspillet mellom det nasjonale og internasjonale i utviklingen av råd. Det dokumenteres 
hvordan slike råd kan være nasjonale prioriteringer løftet opp på internasjonalt nivå av 
medlemsstatene selv samt at hvorvidt politikken i enkeltland evalueres i stor grad bestemmes 
av landene selv. Det siste funnet gjelder spesielt for OECD. Begge forhold gir 
medlemsstatene omfattende muligheter til å bruke internasjonale aktører strategisk for å 
unngå ubehagelig kritikk eller gi autoritet og legitimitet til nasjonale reformer.  
 I tredje del analyseres tyske og norske familiepolitiske reformer. Det konkluderes med 
at nasjonale aktører er kjent med anbefalinger fra EU og OECD, men at disse har vært lite 
viktige i reformprosessene. Internasjonale ideer har likevel spilt en viss rolle i både Tyskland 
og Norge. Sammenligningene EU og OECD utarbeider har vært spesielt viktig i Tyskland for 
å overbevise om og underbygge behovet for reformer. Ideene som dominerer nasjonale 
debatter i begge land er også svært lik ideer og argumentasjon spredt av EU og OECD, men 
bilateral læring synes viktigere enn internasjonale organisasjoner i familiepolitikken.  
 Samlet viser avhandlingen hvordan en analyse av familiepolitiske ideer i 
internasjonale organisasjoner forbedrer vår forståelse av velferdspolitisk utvikling i Tyskland 
og Norge. Funnene underbygges av omfattende datamateriale i form av dokumenter, 
parlamentsdebatter og ekspertintervju. 
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Zusammenfassung  
 
Unzulänglichkeiten etablierter Erklärungen sozialstaatlicher Entwicklung, darunter 
funktionale Ansätze (interner und externer Reformdruck), institutionelle Ansätze 
(Pfadabhängigkeit) und politische Ansätze (Parteien), erklären das wachsende Interesse der 
Sozialwissenschaften an Ideen als Faktor des Wandels. Obwohl Reformen der Familienpolitik 
durch Ideen schon untersucht worden sind, haben Wissenschaftler die Rolle von Ideen in der 
Sammlung und Verbreitung familienpolitischer Empfehlungen in internationalen 
Organisationen übersehen. Die Dissertation will die umfangreiche Literatur um diesen bis 
jetzt nicht untersuchten Zusammenhang bereichern. Die Studie ist in drei Hauptteile 
untergegliedert: a) Eine theoretische Diskussion von Ideen und Politikentwicklung sowie die 
Frage, wie diese sich empirisch untersuchen lässt, b) eine empirische Untersuchung der 
familienpolitischen Ideen zweier internationaler Organisationen (EU und OECD), und c) eine 
empirische Analyse des möglichen Einflusses dieser Ideen auf deutsche und norwegische 
Familienpolitik. Die Dissertation, beheimatet in der Literatur vergleichender Sozialpolitik, 
trägt demnach zur Forschung über die Bedeutung von Ideen, Sozialpolitik internationaler 
Organisationen und nationaler Reformen der Familienpolitik bei. Wie, warum, wann und mit 
welchem Einfluss überschreiten familienpolitische Ideen Grenzen? Diese Fragen markieren 
Forschungslücken.  
 Erstens wird in der Dissertation der Standpunkt vertreten, dass die Ideenperspektive 
wichtige Einblicke in sozialstaatliche Politikentwicklung bietet, indem sie aufdeckt, unter 
welchen Bedingungen Policy-Übertragung statt findet; Rankings, internationale Vergleiche 
und das Scheitern von Policy verstärken den Einfluss von Ideen. Des Weiteren hat die 
Kategorie anpassungsfähige Ideen – Ideen, die mehrere Probleme gleichzeitig beseitigen 
können, beispielsweise Familienpolitik als produktiver Faktor – einen besonders großen 
Einfluss. Ein weiteres Ergebnis der Analyse ist, dass Ursachen des bewussten Exportes von 
Ideen kaum untersucht worden sind, obwohl in der Ideenliteratur mehrere Faktoren für den 
Import von Ideen identifiziert wurden. Der Wunsch, sich in internationalen Vergleichen 
hervorzuheben, und die Hoffnung, allgemeinen Einfluss zu gewinnen, gehören zu den in 
dieser Dissertation durch die Analyse von deutschen und norwegischen Reformen 
identifizierten Ursachen solchen Exportes. 
 Zweitens stellt die Dissertation die familienpolitischen Ideen der EU und OECD vor. 
Sie zeigt, dass diese Ideen eine umfangreiche Sammlung von Vorschlägen bilden, die das 
Potenzial haben, nationale Reformen zu beeinflussen. Die Empfehlungen sind häufig 
wirtschafts- und beschäftigungsorientiert, gehen aber dennoch über neo-liberale 
Empfehlungen hinaus: Indem sie beispielsweise die öffentliche Finanzierung von 
Kindergärten fordern. Ebenso wichtig wie die Analyse internationaler Einflüsse auf nationale 
Politikentwicklung ist die Untersuchung der auf der internationalen Ebene statt findenden 
Entwicklung von Empfehlungen. In der Dissertation wird veranschaulicht, wie 
Nationalstaaten ihre eigene Politik zu international empfohlener Politik machen können, und 
dass diese Staaten in hohem Maße selbst entscheiden können, inwiefern ihre Politik von den 
internationalen Organisationen überhaupt evaluiert wird. Dieser letzen Fund trifft besonders 
auf die OECD zu. Beides erlaubt den Staaten, internationale Akteure strategisch zu benutzen, 
um ungewünschte Kritik zu vermeiden oder Unterstützung für eigene Reformen zu gewinnen. 
 Drittens zeigt eine Analyse deutscher und norwegischer familienpolitischer Reformen, 
dass die Empfehlungen der EU und OECD den nationalen Akteuren bekannt, aber nicht 
besonders wichtig für politische Veränderungen gewesen sind. Trotzdem kann die Bilanz 
keineswegs nur negativ ausfallen: Bemerkenswert ist vor allem die nicht geringe Bedeutung 
von internationalen Vergleichen. Darüber hinaus sind die in der nationalen Debatte 
dominierenden Ideen den von der EU und OECD verbreiteten Ideen ähnlich, aber in diesem 
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Bereich der Sozialpolitik ist bilaterales Lernen immer noch wichtiger als internationale 
Organisationen.  
Insgesamt wird in der Dissertation demonstriert, dass die Berücksichtigung 
familienpolitischer Empfehlungen internationaler Organisationen unser Verständnis von 
norwegischer und deutscher Sozialpolitik verbessert. Die Betrachtung der Reformen aus 
dieser Perspektive rückt Akteure und deren Ideen in den Mittelpunkt. Diesen 
Schlussfolgerungen liegt die Analyse umfassender Daten wie Dokumente, Parlamentsdebatten 
und Interviews zu Grunde.  
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Glossary 
 
This is an alphabetical list of terms with explanations used in the dissertation. These central 
terms are explained in English, but most often the corresponding German and Norwegian 
term is given since these occur in the data material and sometimes in the thesis. When no 
source is given the definitions and explanations are my own. All webpages referred to were 
accessed 28.10.2008. 
 
Gathering terms like this and finding equivalents in all the three languages is not an easy task. 
Many of the translations must be considered approximate and would have needed much more 
than a few lines of explanation to be really thorough. For instance, the Norwegian and 
German translations of gender equality and gender equity or parental and paternity leave are 
problematic. For such terms the dictionary falls short when it only provides the reader with a 
Norwegian and German word and not a more comprehensive explanation about national 
characteristics. However, the list is meant to help the reader and serve as such even in this 
short form.  
 
Activation = Aktivierung = Aktivering 
The term characterises “a type of programme which aims at transferring welfare recipients to 
the labour market (“welfare-to-work strategies”)” (Barbier 2005: 419).  
 
(Local) Alliance for the Family = Allianz für die Familie = Allianse for familien 
Since 2003, this initiative of the German government in cooperation with the social partners 
promotes family-friendly work environments, for instance concerning working time.  
 
Application = Antrag = Forslag (Dok 8-forslag) 
An application is a proposal from one or more MPs, for instance to change or amend a bill.  
 
Benefit in cash = Geldleistung = Kontantytelse 
Family cash benefits for instance include child benefit, maternity and parental leave. 
 
Benefit in kind = Sachleistung = Tjeneste 
Family services for instance include childcare. 
 
Bill (draft law, legislative proposal) = Gesetzentwurf = Odelstingsproposisjon 
(lovforslag) 
 
Best practice (English term used both in German and Norwegian, although it is 
sometimes referred to as beste praksis in Norway) 
Best practice refers to a policy or institutional arrangement that is thought to offer good 
solutions to a challenge. By presenting this to others it could result in learning and transfer.  
 
Betreuungsgeld = Cash-for-care benefit = Kontantstøtte 
A German programme planned introduced in 2013. Its details are unclear, but it will probably 
have similarities with what is referred to as kontantstøtte in Norway and Hemvårdsstöd in 
Finland.  
 
Business case for family-friendly work practices  
“There is potentially a “business case” for employers to introduce family friendly policy 
measures. This is because such measures can contribute to the quality of the enterprise 
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workforce by retaining some workers who would otherwise quit (and increase the likelihood 
that mothers return to the same firm upon expiry of maternity leave), and by attracting those 
workers who value family-friendly workplace support. Both these factors contribute to a 
reduction in recruitment and training costs” (OECD 2007c: 185). 
 
Cash-for-care benefit (home-care leaves, home care allowance, cash benefit for families 
with small children) = Betreuungsgeld = Kontantstøtte 
”Leaves to care for children until they are about three years old. These leaves can be a 
variation of parental leaves, and payments are not restricted to parents with a prior work 
attachment. In Norway and Finland relevant income support payments are contingent on not 
using public day-care facilities. In general, payments are intended to supplement family 
income while one parent is at home or to purchase private care” (OECD 2007c: 105). 
 
Child (family) allowance (child benefit more common in Northern Europe) = Kindergeld 
= Barnetrygd: 
A transfer payment from governments to parents to cover expenses of having children. The 
benefit may be taxable or non-taxable and is often universal. Sometimes there are means-
tested components, e.g. in Germany where parents can receive child benefits for children in 
higher education until they are 25 years old instead of the normal 18 year old limit.  
 
Childcare = Kinderbetreuung = Barnehage 
Childcare is “services that provide daytime care of pre-school children, often while their 
parents are working“ (Alcock et al. 2002: 30). When the term childcare is used one often 
means what is also referred to as daycare centres/institutions/ facilities. This is the way I use 
childcare in this disseration. See also daycare below. 
 
Childminder (day mother/father) = appr. Tagesmutter/-vater 
(Kindertagespflege/Tagespflege) = Dagmamma 
A childminder provides care for children, usually at home, while the child’s parents are at 
work as an alternative to care in an institution and is sometimes referred to as family daycare. 
In Germany, Tagespflegepersonen are increasingly professionalized (demands of pedagogical 
qualifications, skills in first aid etc). 
 
Child poverty = Kinderarmut = Barnefattigdom 
”The child poverty rate is defined as the share of children with equivalised incomes less than 
50% of the median for the entire population” (Babies and Bosses 2007). 
 
Child-rearing benefit = (Bundes)Erziehungsgeld = (appr.) Foreldrepenger: 
Erziehungsgeld, replaced by Elterngeld 1.1.2007, was paid for the two first years after giving 
birth in Germany. In some states, a Landeserziehungsgeld was paid in the third year.  
 
Commodification = Kommodifizierung = Kommodifisering  
According to Esping-Andersen (1990: 35), after labour power became a commodity, “our 
well-being came to depend on our relation to the cash-nexus”. Commodification "describes 
the process whereby formerly independent producers have been transformed into wage-
earners who must sell their labour power on the market in order to survive and to satisfy their 
needs" (Morel 2006: 176). 
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Community method/hard law: 
“The Community Method is thought of as “hard law” because it creates uniform rules that 
Member States must adopt, provides sanctions if they fail to do so, and allows challenges for 
non-compliance to be brought in court” (Trubek and Trubek 2005a: 83). Examples of hard 
law are directives and regulations. 
 
Daycare/daycare facilities/daycare institution (Nursery) = Kindergarten = Barnehage 
In Norway, the term barnehage covers all age groups until they reach school age. In 
Germany, different terms are used. Kinderkrippe usually applies to children aged 0-3 years 
while Kindergarten is for three to six year olds. The latter is often referred to as a nursery in 
English and the former as a day nursery for the under threes. For simplicity, I refer to public 
services for all age groups as childcare or childcare facilities and then specify if it only 
applies to a specific subgroup. 
 
Day Care Law/Daycare Expansion Act = Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz (TAG; Gesetz 
zum qualitätsorientierten und bedarfsgerechten Ausbau der Tagesbetreuung für 
Kinder) = Lov om barnehageutbygging 
The German Daycare expansion Act was passed in 2004 during the red-green coalition 
government. It came into force in January 2005 and aims at providing 230 000 extra places, 
mainly in former West Germany, which is estimated to correspond approximately to a 
countrywide coverage of 20 percent. 
 
De-commodification = Dekommodifizierung = Dekommidifisering  
“the degree to which social rights permit people to make their living standards independent of 
pure market forces” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 3).  
 
De-familisation = Entfamilisierung = Defamilisering 
Defamilisation is “policies that lessens individuals’ reliance on the family” (Esping-Andersen 
1999: 45) and concerns “the degree to which households´ welfare and caring responsibilities 
are relaxed -either via welfare state provision, or via market provision” (Esping-Andersen 
1999: 51). While de-commodification can be described as the lack of individual dependence 
on the market, de-familization can be described as the lack of individual dependence on the 
family (Jensen 2008a: 157).  
 
De-institutionalisation of family life 
De-institutionalisation of family life involves “high levels of divorce and growing rates of 
unmarried cohabitation as an alternative to marriage, entailing rising levels of extramarital 
births and lone parenthood” (Hantrais 2004a: 195). 
 
(Old-age-)dependency ratio = Altenquotienten = Forsørgingsbrøk  
I rely on the following definition: “the population aged 65 years and older divided by the 
working age population” (Eurostat 2008b: 2). However, since this term is used so differently 
in different publications, I include other terms and definitions for illustration:  
Demographic dependency ratio: The ratio of the population aged 0-14 and over 65 to the 
population aged between 15 and 64 years (EU Commission 2005b). 
The age dependency ratio “is defined as the number of persons of an age at which people are 
economically inactive for every 100 persons of working age, usually taken to be the 
population aged either 15-64 or 20-59“ (Hantrais 2004a: 18) 
Dependency ratio is "the rate of people aged 65+ over those aged between 20 and 64" 
(Pestieau 2006: 160). 
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Early Childhood Education and Care Policy (ECEC) = Betreuung, Bildung, Erziehung = 
Barnehage 
“includes all arrangements providing care and education for children under compulsory 
school age, regardless of setting, funding, opening hours, or programme content” (OECD 
2001b: 14). 
 
Ehegattensplitting = Tax splitting (spouse splitting) = (ektefelle-)sambeskattning 
“Spouses can choose between separate taxation of their income and collective assessment. 
Under the joint assessment principle normally applied, the income of both spouses is added 
together. To determine the joint tax burden, the income is halved and the tax resulting from 
the halved income is doubled. In this way, the basic personal allowance incorporated into the 
income tax rate is, in practical terms, doubled for spouses and the progression of the income 
tax rate slowed. This provides relief for single-income marriages, in particular” (EU 
Commission 2002: 21). 
 
European Alliance for Families = die Europäische Allianz für Familien = Europeisk 
allianse for familier 
„The Alliance hopes to create impulses for more family-friendly policies through exchanges 
of ideas and experience in the various Member States and to foster cooperation and fruitful 
learning from each other in the European Union” (EU webpage of the European Alliance for 
Families). 
 
European legal instruments = Europäische Rechtsakte = Europeiske rettslige instrument 
The EU has many legal instruments at its disposal: 
 
Communication = Mitteilungen = Meddelelse 
Communications are documents with no legal significance, sent by the Commission to 
the other European institutions which set out new programmes and policies (EU 
summaries of legislation). 
 
Conclusions = Schlussfolgerungen = Konkluksjoner 
“Resolutions and conclusions only express the views and intentions of the Council 
and/or the European Parliament. They are close to the recommendations and opinions 
(…). In principle, neither recommendations and opinions nor resolutions and 
conclusions have legal consequences” (EU summaries of legislation). 
 
Decision = Entscheidung = Beslutning 
Decisions ”are binding and any measures required to implement them at Union level 
are adopted by the Council, acting by a qualified majority” (EU Glossary). 
 
Declaration = Erklärung = Uttalelse 
”The Declaration is the general expression of a political line, but is not legally binding. 
It is used frequently in connection with the common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP). Declarations are issued by the Presidency of the Council on behalf of the 
European Union and, where necessary, on behalf of the Presidency” (EU Glossary). 
 
Directive = Richtlinie = Direktiv 
Directives are one of the four types of decisions reached by the Council. They are 
”legislative instruments that specify the aims to be achieved, but which generally leave 
the question of how to achieve those ends up to national governments or their agents” 
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(Cini 2007: 458). Directives which concern areas of the EEA agreement are 
incorporated into Norwegian legislation. 
 
Opinion = Stellungnahme = Uttalelse 
An “opinion contains the point of view of an institution. In principle, neither 
recommendations and opinions nor resolutions and conclusions have legal 
consequences” (EU Glossary). 
 
Recommendation = Empfehlung = Anbefaling 
The term recommendation is only directly found in the field of employment (and the 
Stability and Growth Pact) where the Council has issued recommendations based on 
the proposals of the Commission since 1999. The Commission may propose that the 
Council adopts country-specific recommendations (by a qualified majority). These are 
not binding. 
 
Regulation = Verordnung = Forordning 
”Regulations are directly effective, spelling out not just the aims of legislation, but 
what must be done and how” (Cini 2007: 464). 
 
Resolution = Entschließungen = Resolusjon 
“Resolutions and conclusions only express the views and intentions of the Council 
and/or the European Parliament. They are close to the recommendations and opinions 
(…). In principle, neither recommendations and opinions nor resolutions and 
conclusions have legal consequences” (EU summaries of legislation). 
 
Europeanization = Europäiserung = Europeisering 
 “Processes of a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalization of formal and informal 
rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ´ways of doing things`, and shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics 
and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and 
public policies” (Radaelli 2003: 30). 
 
Europeanisation of social protection: 
“Europeanisation of social protection concerns the relationship between the national and EU 
levels in social protection” (Kvist and Saari 2007: 229). It is meant to describe how national 
and EU levels become more interwoven (Kvist and Saari 2007: 1). 
 
Familialism = Familismus = Familisme 
Welfare obligations are assigned the family (Esping-Andersen 1999: 45). 
 
Family-friendly policies = Familienfreundliche Politik = Familievennlig politikk 
“those policies that facilitate the reconciliation of work and family life by fostering adequacy 
of family resources and child development, that facilitate parental choice about work and care, 
and promote gender equality in employment opportunities” (OECD 2002a: 10). 
 
Family policy = Familienpolitik = Familiepolitikk 
Family policy is defined narrowly as those public policies that consist of benefits and services 
aimed at parents with children (Lindén 2007a: 8). 
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Family policy idea game 
Based on Marcussen (2002, 2004), I define the “family policy idea game” as how IOs such as 
the OECD and EU participate in the collection, formulation and transfer of family policy 
ideas across borders. 
 
Father´s quota (paternal quota) = Partnermonate/Vatermonate = fedrekvote, also 
known as "pappaperm” or “pappapermisjon”, although these last two terms usually 
refers to paid leave for the father in addition to the weeks of the father´s quota 
Part of the parental leave reserved the father on a “use-it-or-lose-it” basis. The father’s quota 
is often mixed with paternity leave, but I separate between the two terms. This arrangement 
is meant to ensure that both parents take leave and is called father´s leave because in practice 
it is often fathers who do not take leave if some weeks are not contingent on sharing the leave. 
 
Gender equality = Gleichberechtigung = Likestilling 
Gender equality “refers to the world of work and constitutes a right that in principle should be 
enforceable by law: equal treatment in recruitment and access to work; equal remuneration for 
equal work; equal advancement in work careers based on merit (vs. the “glass ceiling”)“ 
(Starting Strong II 2006: 30). 
 
Gender equity = Gleichstellung = Kjønnsrettferdighet (rettferdig arbeidsdeling mellom 
kjønnene) 
“Gender equity (…) refers to an equal sharing of child rearing and domestic work“ (Starting 
Strong II 2006: 30). 
 
Globalization = Globalisierung = Globalisering 
”Globalization is a process of interaction and integration among the people, companies, and 
governments of different nations, a process driven by international trade and investment and 
aided by information technology. This process has effects on the environment, on culture, on 
political systems, on economic development and prosperity, and on human physical well-
being in societies around the world” (the Levin Institute). Often the term is used in the sense 
of economic globalization, that is the integration of national economies and the possible 
pressure resulting from this.  
 
Green paper = Grünbuch = Grønnbok/offentlig utredning/høringsnotat 
“Green Papers are documents published by the European Commission to stimulate discussion 
on given topics at European level. They invite the relevant parties (bodies or individuals) to 
participate in a consultation process and debate on the basis of the proposals they put forward. 
Green Papers may give rise to legislative developments that are then outlined in White 
Papers” (EU Glossary). Green papers are discussion papers comparable to NOU (Norges 
offentlige utredninger) in Norway. 
 
Innstilling til Stortinget = Recommendation to the Storting 
The relevant committee of the Storting is often asked to consider a new bill and submit a 
recommendation to the Storting called instilling til Stortinget.  
 
Instrumental approach to family policy = Instrumentelle Annäherung an 
Familienpolitik = Instrumentell tilnærming til familiepolitik 
An instrumental approach to family policy means that goals like female employment, fertility 
or children´ s early learning rather than the well-being of families are the goals and reasons 
behind public policy. The emphasis on family policy is then for instrumental reasons. Such 
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instrumental use of family policy to promote economic growth and employment rests on a 
clear subordination of social to economic policy. 
 
Interpellation (parliamentary question) = (appr.) Anfrage = (appr.) Spørsmål i 
parlament, interpellasjon 
Question from MP(s) to the government presented in the parliament. 
 
Joint Report = Gemeinsamer Bericht über Sozialschutz und soziale Eingliederung 
”The Joint Reports assess progress made in the implementation of the OMC, set key priorities 
and identify good practice and innovative approaches of common interest to the Member 
States on the basis of the National action plans submitted by the Member States. It is adopted 
by the Council on a Commission proposal. The Joint Reports also set key priorities and 
identify good practice and innovative approaches of common interest to the Member States” 
European Commission Glossary).  
 
Kinderförderungsgesetz (KiföG) = Bill on the promotion of children = Lov som fremmer 
barns stilling 
The bill on the promotion of children was passed in November 2008 during the black-red 
coalition government. KiföG is a bill on a further expansion of childcare for children less than 
three years old and aims at providing 500 000 extra places by 2013, mainly in the former 
West Germany, which is estimated to correspond to approximately 35 percent coverage all in 
all. The bill also introduces a legal right to childcare and a cash-for-care benefit.  
 
Kontantstøtte = Cash-for-care benefit = Betreuungsgeld 
The Norwegian kontantstøtte is similar to the Finnish Hemvårdsstöd; cash-for-care. 
 
Lebensstandardsicherung = Securing the achieved living standard/status maintenance = 
Statusbevarende/levestandardsikring: 
The principle of living-standard maintenance guarantees the former living standard for 
recipients of welfare by linking benefits to previous labour market status and thus reproducing 
status differentials. 
 
Maternity leave = Mutterschaftsurlaub = Svangerskaps- og fødselsermisjon 
”Employment-protected leave of absence for employed women at around the time of 
childbirth, or adoption in some countries” (OECD 2007c: 105). 
 
Minutes of plenary proceedings (stenographic record) = Plenarprotokoll = 
Stortingstidende 
Sittings of the Bundestag and Storting are reported verbatim and made available in the form 
of minutes of plenary proceedings.  
 
National Action Plans / National Reform Programm = Nationaler Aktionsplan/ 
Nationales Reformprogramm = Nasjonal handlingsplan/Nasjonal handlingsprogram 
”Every Member State draws up a National Reform Programme (until 2005, National Action 
Plans) which describes how the Employment Guidelines are put into practice at the national 
level. They present the progress achieved in the Member State over the last 12 months and the 
measures planned for the coming 12 months: they are both reporting and planning 
documents” (EU Commission website on the EES).  
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Negative integration = Negative Integration = Negativ integrasjon 
Negative integration is “a form of European integration which involves the removal of 
barriers between the member states” (Cini 2007: 462). 
 
Neo-liberalism = Neoliberalismus = Nyliberalisme 
”The neo-liberal criticism of the welfare state concentrates on prohibitive costs and the 
harmful effects of welfare provisions on dependent individuals; according to this view these 
provisions produce another perverse effect: they encourage a culture of dependency instead of 
independency. The remedy is a return to individual responsibility and less regulation, 
allowing the play of the market to regulate economic and social life. In addition, citizens 
should be encouraged to bear responsibility for their own lives” (Bussemaker 1998: 86). 
 
Open Method of Coordination = Offene Methode der Kordinierung (OMK) = Den åpne 
koordinerings-/samarbeidsmetode 
“The process whereby common goals are laid down and progress is measured against jointly 
agreed indicators, while best practise is identified and compared” (Pestieau 2006: 162). 
 
Paternity leave = Vaterschaftsurlaub (there is no real German equivalent, the term 
Vaterschaftsurlaub is also used when referring to the father´s quota) = Farspermisjon/ 
omsorgspermisjon for far i forbindelse med fødsel 
“Employment-protected leave of absence for employed fathers at the time of childbirth” 
(OECD 2007c: 105). The paternity leave is often mixed with father’s quota, but I separate 
between the two terms (see father’s quota). 
 
Parental leave = Elternzeit (Elternurlaub) = Foreldrepermisjon 
“(…) leave from employment that can be granted to fathers and mothers to allow them to take 
care of a young child over a rather long period” (OECD 1995: 171). 
 
Parental benefit (on the birth of a child) = Elterngeld = Foreldrepenger 
Earnings-related or flat-rate benefit paid during parental leave. 
 
Peer review (English term used both in German and Norwegian):  
”The Peer Review is a mutual learning process involving the scrutiny of specific policies on 
the basis of proposals volunteered by Member States. A "host country" presents a policy or 
institutional arrangement (good practice) or a policy reform to a selected group of decision-
makers and experts from other countries ("peer countries") and to stakeholders' 
representatives and European Commission officials. Peer Reviews are a key instrument of the 
OMC” (EU Commission glossary). Different kinds of peer reviews exist.  
 
PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) = PISA = PISA 
Every three years, the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
assesses the skills of 15-year-olds in more than 40 countries.  
 
PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study) = IGLU (Internationale 
Grundschul-Lese-Untersuchung) = PIRLS 
Every five years, the PIRLS assesses the reading literacy skills of pupils in the fourth grade of 
schooling in more than 40 countries. 
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Policy transfer = Policy Transfer = Overføring av politikk 
Dolowitz defines policy transfer as “the occurrence of, and processes involved in, the 
development of programmes, policies, institutions, etc. within one political and/or social 
system which are based upon the ideas, institutions, programmes and policies emanating from 
other political and/or social systems“ (2000a: 3). 
 
Positive integration = Positive Integration = Positiv integrasjon 
Positive integration is “a form of integration which involves the construction of policies 
and/or institutions” (Cini 2007: 463). 
 
Pronatalism (or natalism) = Pronatalismus (Natalismus) = Pronatalisme 
Policies which promote and encourage childbearing. 
 
Reconciliation of work and family life = Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf = Forene 
arbeids- og familieliv/kombinere arbeid og familieforpliktelser 
Reconciliation policies are usually understood as policies for childcare, parental and childcare 
leave; “All those measures that extend both family resources (income, services and time for 
parenting) and parental labour market attachment” (OECD 2002a: 10). As Lewis et al. argue, 
terms like reconciliation or balance of work-family or work life are used meaning much of the 
same, but still having specific nuances (2008: 279). I rely mainly on the term reconciliation of 
work and family life.  
 
Soft law = (English term used both in German and Norwegian, although it is sometimes 
referred to as målstyring in Norway) 
”documents that are not formally or legally binding but which may still produce political 
effects“ (Cini 2007: 465). “´Soft´ politics, which is primarily done by the Commission (and, 
to a lesser extent, the European Parliament) mainly consists of non-binding inciting and 
agitation on matters of common concern that treaties do not clearly cover” (Ross 2001: 178).  
 
Social exclusion = Soziale Ausgrenzung = Sosial ekskludering 
Socil exclusion characterises the processes that keep certain people out of mainstream society. 
(...) Sometimes social exclusion substitutes for the concept of poverty" (Abrahamson 2006: 
1250). 
 
(Principle of) subsidiarity = das Subsidiaritätsprinzip = Nærhetsprinsippet 
“The idea that support should be provided at the most appropriate level, which is the agency 
closest to the person in need in the first instance. (…) Within the European Union subsidiarity 
has also become an important reference point, underpinning decisions in favour of retaining 
competencies at national (or sub-national) rather than EU level” (Alcock et al. 2002: 250). 
 
Stortingsforhandlinger = Proceedings of the Storting (parliamentary records)  
Stortingsforhandlinger “is a comprehensive parliamentary series in 9 volumes containing 
bills, white papers and documents from most areas within governmental enterprise. It also 
contains the minutes of the debates in the Storting” (Legal Information in Norway).  
 
Stortingsmelding = White paper = Weißbuch 
Report to the Storting, similar to White paper. 
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Stortingstidende = Minutes of plenary proceedings (stenographic record) = 
Plenarprotokoll 
Sittings of the Bundestag and Storting are reported verbatim and made available in the form 
of minutes of plenary proceedings.  
 
Stortingsproposisjon = Proposition to the Storting 
Stortingsproposisjon (St.prp.) are used when the government asks the Storting to make a 
decision which does not involve new laws.  
 
Sustainable family policy = Nachhaltige Familienpolitik = Bærekraftig familiepolitikk 
„Sustainable family policy (Nachhaltige Familienpolitik), …, conceives of children as 
society’s future assets; it seeks to encourage childbearing by supporting parents to balance 
work and family responsibilities, and attempts to reduce child poverty by increasing maternal 
employment” (Leitner, Ostner and Schmitt 2008: 175, Abstract). A sustainable family policy 
has two key aims: to provide a sufficient level of births and increase female employment 
participation (Rürup and Gruescu 2003: 9). 
 
Social policy as a productive factor = Sozialpolitik als produktiver Faktor = 
Sosialpolitikk som produktiv faktor: 
“Economic growth and social cohesion are mutually reinforcing” (Kvist and Saari 2007: 252).  
 
Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz (TAG; Gesetz zum qualitätsorientierten und 
bedarfsgerechten Ausbau der Tagesbetreuung für Kinder) = Lov om 
barnehageutbygging = See Day Care Law/Daycare Expansion Act 
 
TIMSS (Trends in Mathematics and Science Study) = TIMSS = TIMSS 
TIMSS is an international test of schoolchildren’s´ mathematics skills by the International 
Association for Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). 
 
White paper = Weißbuch = hvitbok/stortingsmelding:  
“Commission White Papers are documents containing proposals for Community action in a 
specific area. In some cases they follow a Green Paper published to launch a consultation 
process at European level. When a White Paper is favourably received by the Council, it can 
lead to an action programme for the Union in the area concerned” (EU Glossary). White 
papers are orientation documents comparable with a Stortingsmelding (report to the Storting) 
in Norway. 
 
 
 
Some glossaries available on the internet: 
 
Bundestag: Terminology database: http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/info/database.html  
 
EU Commission glossary: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/glossary_en.htm  
 
EU delegation : http://www.europakommisjonen.no/info/ordliste.htm  
 
EU Glossary : http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/index_en.htm  
 
EU summaries of legislation: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/da/lvb/l14535.htm  
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Europaveien: EU-leksikon http://www.europaveien.no/lex.asp?cat=144  
 
Helsebiblioteket: The welfare state: a glossary for public health:  
http://jech.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/62/1/3 
 
Legal Information in Norway: 
http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/publikasjoner/skriftserie/13/index.html  
 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP): http://plato.stanford.edu/  
 
Stortinget: http://www.stortinget.no/Stottemeny/Ordbok/Norsk-Engelsk-ordliste/  
 
Sozialterminologie: http://transvienna.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Sozialterminologie_01.pdf  
 
Utdanningsdirektoratet: Norsk-engelsk ordbok for utdanningssektoren: 
http://www.utdanningsdirektoratet.no/upload/ordbok_no_eng.pdf  
 
 
Other sources which often are helpful when translating social policy terms: 
 
OECD Babies and Bosses, OECD Thematic Review of Early Childhood Education and Care 
Policy (ECEC), Background reports from Norway and Germany for the OECD ECEC (BFD 
1998, BMFSFJ 2004). 
 
Cini (2007) and Pestieau (2006) have glossaries in their books on the European Union.  
 
Blackwell Dictionary of Social Policy (Alcock et al. 2002) is a general dictionary. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
“Family is in. Reading the newspaper or watching television, it is almost impossible to avoid 
the flood of ideas which are presented, considered, rejected and presented again. Parental 
leave benefit. Cash-for-care. Childcare coverage. Tax splitting” (Spiegel special 2007a: 7, 
author’s translation). 
 
 
Family policy has received less attention in the literature on welfare state 
developments than ”hard” fields like pensions or unemployment benefits. However, as 
the quotation at the head of this chapter suggests, this is not the case anymore. Today, 
family policy enjoys great and growing attention among welfare researchers and 
politicians. From being left to experts and political novices it has now moved centre 
stage and become “wahlentscheidend”; determining elections (Spiegel special 2007b: 
111). If family issues used to be weak, for instance in the German political debate 
(Kaufmann 2002: 463), this is definitely not the case anymore. Welfare schemes for 
families are being expanded all over Europe. Ellingsæter and Leira (2006) refer to this 
increased attention towards and debate surrounding families as the politicization of 
childhood and parenthood. Even international organizations (IOs) like the European 
Union (EU) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), which used to care little about family policy, increasingly focus on this field 
of social policy. The OECD has just published a review on its Member States´ family 
policy (Babies and Bosses, volume 1-5, 2002-2007), and continues to focus on this 
field through its database on family issues, and work on the well-being of children. 
The EU, still without a treaty base and clear mandate for interfering in its Member 
States´ family policies, is currently discussing an extension of its directive on parental 
leave and how to make countries speed up the process of extending childcare 
coverage. A recent initiative called the European Alliance for Families might be a first 
step towards the exchange of best practice and experiences at the EU level within 
family policy. There is also a trend towards holding many EU conferences on this 
topic.  
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Both at the national and international level there is much focus on which kind of 
family policies states should have, and what one can learn from experiences in other 
countries. Reconciliation of work and family life is particularly emphasized. The 
OECD defines reconciliation-policies as ”measures which extend both family 
resources (income, services and time for parenting) and parental labour market 
attachment” (OECD 2004b: 10). Scandinavian countries figure highly in this debate, 
as possible models, due to the combination of extensive family policies, relatively high 
levels of fertility, female employment rates and gender equality, as well as low child 
poverty. To what extent do ideas on family policy travel from one country to another? 
What is the role of international organizations like the EU and OECD in this 
transmission of family policy ideas across borders?  
A growing dissatisfaction with established explanatory frameworks of welfare 
state developments, such as functional explanations (internal and external problem 
pressure), institutionalist accounts (path dependency), and political factors (parties), 
has made scholars apply ideational perspectives to understand recent reforms. Ideas 
are theories, models, views or policy paradigms which influence the perception and 
choice of political actors. Such analysis of ideas and welfare state change may take 
different directions. My work relates to this growing body of literature by asking what 
kind of ideas are shaping current family policy reforms? More precisely, I am mainly 
interested in one set of actors in the development of family policy, namely 
international organizations. This stems from an interest in seeing if such organizations 
play a role even in a field where they have little formal competence. However, I do not 
consider organizations like the EU and OECD to be the most important actors in 
family policy reform processes, and have no intention of explaining recent national 
reforms solely with reference to IOs. This chapter presents research questions, the 
research design, and gives an overview of the dissertation but first I give a short 
introduction to the family policy field. 
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1.1 What is family policy and what is its purpose?  
 
What is a family and what is family policy? Is family policy meant to serve the 
interests of children, parents or society or all three? In debates on social policies, 
politicians, bureaucrats and other stakeholders justify their views on family policy with 
a great spectre of arguments (Hantrais 2004a: 2). Family policy benefits may be 
intended to redistribute resources (reward or compensate for costs, increase equality 
between couples with and without children), or affect behaviour (pronatalism, timing 
and number of children, lifestyle) (Hantrais and Letablier 1996). Here are some of the 
goals attributed to this policy field (see e.g. BMFSFJ 2006a): 
   
x ensure the well-being and interests of children and parents (e.g. to avoid 
poverty) 
x foster child development 
x ensure equality of opportunity for children (e.g. to ease integration of 
immigrant-children by ensuring language skills) 
x prevent child mistreatment 
x ensure freedom of choice for families 
x be work-friendly by allowing parents to work (reconciliation of work and 
family life) 
x improve competitiveness and growth (make high skilled workers available for 
trade and industry) 
x increase gender equality 
x increase fertility rates (pronatalism) and reduce the problems of population 
ageing 
x promote certain types of families, e.g. the nuclear family 
 
Of these goals, or family policy ideas, the obvious first goal of securing the well-being 
of children and parents is not the one referred to most often in documents explaining 
the need for German or Norwegian family policy reforms. It seems as if family policy 
in many contexts is more a means to achieve something else than an aim in itself 
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(“hidden objectives”). There is a growing debate and criticism of what is referred to as 
the social investment strategy, which makes social policy instrumental in emphasizing 
how children are future workers, instead of being family and child-centred (e.g. 
Esping-Andersen 2002 and 2006a-b, for critics, see e.g. Lister 2006 or Grødem 2008). 
Trudi Knijn and Arnoud Smit have for instance criticized the EU for focussing 
strongly on labour market integration of parents whilst saying almost nothing on the 
labour market obstacles for family relationships caused by increased flexibility and 
temporariness of jobs (2007: 11). Similarly, reconciliation could mean that people get 
more time with their family. Some critics would, however, say that reconciliation 
policies are only meant to increase the employability of mothers. Equally, flexibility 
could mean that work is adjusted to peoples needs, or that people adjust more to work. 
This will be elaborated on in chapters 5 and 6 in the presentation of EU and OECD 
family policy ideas. 
Due to this multitude of aims, there is also a multitude of indicators to measure 
whether family policy is successful or not. Take up rates of benefits, childcare 
coverage, fertility rates, female employment participation rates and poverty rates are 
all indicators used by countries evaluating their family policy. As a result, terms like 
family-friendly, work-friendly, or reconciliation of work and family life are also 
unclear, and their content might vary from context to context.  
What family policy should include is a normative question and consequently 
also a contentious issue. More often than not, politicians making proposals in this area 
are met by allegations of prescribing how people should live their lives. And reading 
how the OECD deals with family policy shows that policy in this area, as in any other 
area, is never uncontroversial:  
 
“Family policies are defined as those policies that increase resources of households with 
dependent children; foster child development; reduce barriers to having children and 
combining work and family commitments; and, promote gender equity in employment 
opportunities” (OECD webpage on family policy, accessed 10.11.2008). 
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This OECD definition illustrates the considerations above. For instance, people 
preferring a one-earner model would probably not be completely satisfied with this 
definition as it is quite focussed on two incomes. 
The EU and OECD do not have a distinct family policy and it is far from certain 
that they will develop such a policy. What they have are ideas about national family 
policy. Compared with national family policy it is still very limited. One might even 
argue that the term family policy should not be used. Instead one could call the 
policies in question employment related policies or perhaps reconciliation policies. I 
choose to keep the family policy concept because, first, at the national level this is 
where we find policies framed as reconciliation and employment related at the level of 
international organizations. Second, there seems to be a growing use of terms like 
“international family policy” when referring to the international level.1 Third, there are 
even some developments that could suggest that a sort of family policy is emerging 
within IOs, admittedly of a special and limited kind (cf. the European Alliance for 
Families or EU Presidency conferences on family matters, discussed in chapter 5, and 
family policy studies and databases by the OECD, discussed in chapter 6). The term 
family policy captures this growing attention to, and possible emergence of, more 
family policy within IOs (Lindén 2007a).  The concept of family policy is further 
discussed in chapter 2. 
 
1.2 Research design and case selection 
 
At the European level, the EU and OECD are two important international 
organizations. Compared to other international actors like the ILO (International 
Labour Office) or World Bank, their functions are to a certain extent limited to the 
exertion of moral pressure, in contrast to regulatory or financial means, to influence 
the behaviour of national actors. The OECD possesses no means of getting its goals 
and advice directly onto national agendas. Its primary tool is the best practice of 
naming and shaming, which leaves national parliaments and governments free to 
                                                 
1 Cf. for instance the home page of the German Ministry of Family policy on “Internationale Familiepolitik” 
(BMFSFJ 2006b). 
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disregard OECD advice. Hence, the OECD makes use of a kind of soft regulation and 
is left with the possibility of playing what Marcussen (2002) has coined the “idea 
game”. The EU has, since 2000, relied on a similar mechanism for international policy 
coordination called the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).2 
Other organizations also focus on family issues. UNICEF (United Nations 
Children's Fund) publishes reports on family policy from time to time, and their 
reports on children’s well-being have, for instance, received much attention in 
Germany (Bertram 2006) and the UK (UNICEF 2007). The ILO has several 
conventions on family policy.3  The same applies to the Nordic Council and Council of 
Europe, which are mentioned by some of my interviewees4 and have organized several 
conferences on reconciling working and family life.5 The EU and OECD are, however, 
IOs with particular authority, growing importance and membership, and with 
increasing activity levels within social and family policy. 
Many scholars  argue that European social policy in general is not well 
developed (e.g. Leibfried 20056), and that the EU has no family policy in the sense of 
a coherent set of objectives for government activity in this policy area, but several 
policies that affect the situations of families (Hantrais 2007). Family policies are cross-
sectoral policies and there exists several traces of family policy in other EU social 
policy fields. One implication of this is that when searching for EU influence in the 
area, the search cannot be restricted to what is named family policies, but must include 
other fields of social policy. Regarding the second organization I study, the picture is 
somewhat different. The OECD issues direct family policy recommendations through 
its Babies and Bosses series, a study which will be presented in subsequent chapters. 
However, with some exceptions for the EU, both organizations can only address 
                                                 
2 Pestieau offers a short definition of the OMC: “The process whereby common goals are laid down and progress 
is measured against jointly agreed indicators, while best practise is identified and compared” (2006: 162). In 
addition, the EU has potentially more power through the European Court of Justice and the fiscal discipline 
connected to the monetary union (EMU). 
3 See http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/, among them C156 (Workers with family responsibilities) and C183 
(Maternity Protection). 
4 Informants are anonymized. I describe the interviews, data and methodology in chapter 4. 
5 See e.g. http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/youthfamily/enfance/2001portorozFC_en.asp 
6 Leibfried acknowledges that the EU plays an important indirect role in delimiting what kind of policies states 
can choose, but still considers the overall EU social policy initiatives weak. 
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family policy through soft law.7 For the EU there exist many social policy studies, but 
for the OECD there are only a few. We know little about how the OECD decides 
which fields and topics to review and what impact it might have (Leibfried and 
Martens 2008).  
Two national cases will be compared. Norway is internationally seen as having 
a family policy leading to high levels of female employment and fertility rates as well 
as low poverty rates (Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen 2007a). It is a representative of the 
“social democratic welfare regimes”8 and the only one from this group which is not a 
member of the EU.9 Still, relations to the common market are strong through the 
European Economic Area (EEA), which covers Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
This makes Norway an interesting case to investigate in its relation to the EU’s social 
policy processes. True, the EEA-agreement does not give access to the Open Method 
of Coordination processes whereby this organization is now mainly developing social 
policy (Dølvik and Ødegård 2004: 155), but Norway is allowed to participate in some 
of the programmes connected to this method.10 In OECD social policy studies, Norway 
is included on equal terms as any other member country. Norway is also interesting as 
a potential “family policy export country”, something both the media and authorities at 
least like to claim and express through articles and press releases,11 and which is 
supported by research (see Ostner and Schmitt 2008: 9 for references).   
Germany has for long experienced a dramatic demographic decline and 
relatively low employment rates among mothers as well as more general reform 
pressure through financial difficulties and unification.12 Since the early 2000s, 
governments have introduced substantial changes in its family policy. From being a 
                                                 
7 As chapter 5 will outline, there exists a few EU minimum directives within parental leave and protection of 
mothers.  
8 This is based on the typology of Esping-Andersen (1990). Arts and Gelissen (2002) provide a useful overview 
of this typology as well as the critique and debate it has initiated. “Social democratic” is perhaps not the best 
term as these particular welfare regimes have not only developed under social democratic governments. If used, 
it should at least be understood more broadly than as a party political label (Kuhnle 1983: 78, 163). However, a 
term such as “Scandinavian” would also be inadequate as this policy is not exclusive to this geographic cluster 
(Kuhnle 2007). See Korpi and Palme (1998) for an example of classification with other terms. Classifications of 
welfare regimes and how these fit family and gender policy are further discussed in chapter 2.  
9 See Njáls (2007) for a discussion of the Icelandic welfare state compared to other Nordic countries.  
10 Examples are the Lifelong Learning or PROGRESS programmes, cf. Ervik, Kildal and Nilssen (2008). 
11 See for instance ”Gender equality policies as export article” (“Likestilling som eksportvare”, Regjeringen 
2007) or “Learning Germans Norwegian daddy leave arrangements” (“Skal lære tyskere norsk pappaperm”, 
Aftenposten 2007, author’s translations).  
12 Female employment rates were high in former East Germany (see e.g. Klammer and Letablier 2007: 674). 
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paradigmatic representative of a “conservative welfare regime” (Esping Andersen 
1990), recent reforms have moved Germany towards a family policy usually 
associated with Scandinavian countries. Also, the united Germany merged two very 
different approaches to family policy, where the eastern part had a much more 
comprehensive and state organized family policy than the western Federal Republic. 
Another reason for the case selection is that Germany takes part in voluntary EU and 
OECD – led policy exchanges, thus laying itself open to influence. More generally, 
Germany is interesting as Europe’s most populous country (disregarding Russia) and 
definitely one of the most influential EU-members.  
Since the new German family policy has allegedly so many similarities with 
Scandinavian policies it practically invites an analysis of possible ideational influence 
and learning. Does the conceptual tool of ´ideas` contribute to our understanding of 
how national family policy is developed? Policy ideas are “specific policy alternatives 
(…) as well as the organized principles and causal beliefs in which these proposals are 
embedded” (Béland 2005: 2). Analytically this approach, emphasizing how policy 
makers import policies embraced abroad, seems interesting for several reasons. 
Germany is often accused of being unable to reform the welfare state (“Reformstau”; 
Kitscheldt and Streeck 2004, Green and Paterson 2005, Streeck and Trampusch 
2005a), implying that other explanatory approaches than path dependency and 
institutionalism are needed to understand the recent wide ranging change that has 
taken place. An idea-based approach is also useful when there is only voluntary 
exchange of ideas and no sanctions involved, as is the case regarding advice from IOs. 
The EU and OECD are actors in an “idea game” (Marcussen 2002, 2004). They collect 
and diffuse ideas without enforcement: “The objective is not to achieve a common 
policy in selected issue areas, but rather to institutionalise processes for sharing policy 
experience and the diffusion of best practices” (Esping-Andersen et al. 2001: 256). 
Moreover, as my study includes the EU non-member Norway, ideas are especially 
interesting as they can spread across borders independently of membership of 
organizations. According to Bøås and McNeil (2004), we know very little about the 
role ideas play in international organizations and whether, how and why they spread, 
and with what impact. Stone (1999), Dolowitz (2000), Berman (2001), Henninger et 
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al. (2008) and Schiller and Kuhnle (2008) have called for research on why, when and 
how ideas are discussed, discredited, accepted and advocated.  
Moreover, family policy is a fairly “new”, less saturated field in a phase of 
expansion rather than retrenchment (Bleses 2003, Gatenio-Gabel and Kamerman 2006, 
Kamerman and Gatenio-Gabel 2007, Lundqvist 2007, Morel 2007, Fagnani and Math 
2008, Pfau-Effinger 2008). It is thus less likely to be understood by exclusively 
focussing on economic constraints or predetermined paths. It is less institutionalized 
than more traditional areas such as pensions, implying for instance that there are few 
interest organizations and other veto players in this area. This should make it 
particularly interesting in a study occupied with the impact of ideas on social policies, 
but family policy reforms have rarely been studied from this perspective before.13 
Ideational approaches are, however, now increasingly applied in studies of family 
policy reforms (e.g. Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004, Larsen 2005, Kübler 2007, 
Krüger 2007, Knijn and Ostner 2008, Pfau-Effinger 2008, Stiller forthcoming 2009). 
Hardly anyone pays attention to international organizations. 
Family policy is, furthermore, a field characterised by much change, even path 
departure (Pfau-Effinger 2008), continuous development of new arrangements and has 
gained steadily more importance in elections and everyday politics (Dienel 2002). 
Every citizen is or has been part of a family and most people intend to establish one of 
their own. Consequently, most people have an opinion when family issues are on the 
agenda, making family issues both popular and controversial. Also, the traditional 
family as a unit is changing (lone parents, women’s employment, dual income 
families) and family policies are cross-sectoral and thereby say much about the welfare 
state as a whole (Daly and Lewis 2000, Clasen 2005, Klammer and Letablier 2007, 
Morel 2007). Actually, the family is pivotal for social welfare but until recently it has 
not been considered economically important (O’Connor 2004: 193).And, as Jensen 
(2008a-b) argues, benefits in kind, e.g. childcare services, have so far not received 
much attention in welfare state research.  
As Armingeon argues, “international ´best practices` and the role of 
international organizations as policy brokers” has been an under-researched topic 
                                                 
13 Bussemaker (1998) is one example of an analysis with a similar perspective.  
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within the literature on social policy (2007: 907). There have been some studies in the 
last years of the effect of recommendations of international organizations on domestic 
social policy, e.g. the World Bank (Orenstein 2006), OECD (Armingeon and Beyeler 
2004) or EU (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber 2005). The impact on family policy 
has barely been addressed by this literature, with some exceptions (e.g. Hantrais 
2003a).14 Since IOs have been less willing or interested in issuing advice in this field it 
has been too early to analyze their possible influence.  
It might seem strange to ask whether family policy advice from IOs can have an 
influence when these IOs do not have a strong Treaty base or competence in this area 
of social policy. I find this issue interesting due to a number of reasons. First, the very 
same IOs have limited competence within areas like pensions, health care, social 
inclusion, and employment as well, and here it has still become common to discuss 
possible supranational influence. Family policy ideas, just like other social policy 
ideas disseminated by IOs, may have an influence even though there is no possibility 
for sanctions. Second, Deacon and his colleagues claimed some ten years ago: 
 
"The social policy of a country or locality is no longer wholly shaped (if it ever was) by the 
politics of the national government. It is increasingly shaped, (...), by the implicit and explicit 
social policies of numerous supranational agencies, ranging from global institutions like the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, through supranational bodies such as the 
OECD and the European Commission, to supranational, non-government agencies like 
OXFAM" (Deacon et al. 1997: 10). 
 
Thus, whether and how German and Norwegian family support, one particular field of 
social policy, is influenced by the supranational level, becomes an interesting question 
and researchers have called for studies of this (e.g. Goul Andersen 2001 [2007]: 125, 
Berven 2005: 178-179). Third, Kaufmann stated that: 
 
"To this day competence on family matters is lacking on the European level. However 
spillover from the principle of gender equality and children’s rights are to be expected. This 
                                                 
14 While there is limited research on the possible influence on national family policy, quite a few theories and 
much research on general social policy could be identified (e.g. Falkner et al. 2005). Chapter 2 provides a more 
comprehensive review of literature on social and family policy of the EU and OECD. 
  
34 
could enhance the influence of the Scandinavian type of implicit family policy on other 
nations and might also promote modernizing effects on family relationships" (Kaufmann 
2002: 419).  
 
As of today (2008), there is still no such Treaty base allowing the EU to develop its 
own family policy. However, whether some sort of family policy stance has been 
developed indirectly through other policy areas may be investigated and Kaufmann’s 
statement ought to be considered for both the EU and OECD. An obvious question is, 
then, how these actors are welcomed. Do national actors use international reviews and 
advice to introduce new policies? What kind of international studies do national actors 
refer to? Do ideas from IOs result in new policies or are they used more as justification 
for decisions made on other grounds?  
All in all, knowing that these two international organizations take an increasing 
interest in family policy related issues, it seems pertinent to study whether the OECD 
and EU, traditionally seen as being without competence and importance in the area, 
now play a role in its Member States search for optimal domestic policy. It is 
interesting in itself to get a picture of what these organizations do in this field. A key 
goal is thus to identify the family policy stance taken by these two organizations. This 
content, as well as the process of developing family policy ideas, may be quite as 
interesting as focussing on the question of influence, which in any case is a very 
demanding task. I am thus not only interested in the impact of supranational 
organizations, but rather in examining how the national and the international level 
work together and draw on each other. As underlined already, when I choose to study 
family policy ideas of IOs and their reception at the national level, it is not based on 
the expectation that national policy is decided by the international level. My interest 
and focus are how the two levels interact. This leads to the question of what should be 
understood by “influence”. The influence concept, what it includes, how it cannot 
easily be measured, and how searching for it might make the researcher focus on the 
wrong thing, is further elaborated upon in the chapter on methodology.  
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1.3 Research questions, contributions and expectations 
 
I seek to address three sets of questions:  
a) Theoretically and methodologically: how and why can ideas matter for national 
family policy reforms?  
b) Empirically: how much and what kind of family policy ideas exist in 
international organizations, and how are these ideas developed?  
c) Empirically: to what extent can recent reforms in Norwegian and German 
family policy be understood as being a result of ideas promoted by international 
organizations? 
 
The first set of questions will be treated in the theoretical and methodological chapters. 
The theory chapter seeks to give an overview of the ideational theories which can be 
useful in a project on family policy ideas. It argues that an ideational analysis can shed 
light on reform processes in Germany and Norway. This issue will be elaborated on in 
the two empirical chapters on family policy developments in Norway and Germany 
(chapter 7 and 8). As Béland argues, “ideas only become a decisive causal factor under 
particular institutional and political conditions” (2007: 4). Consequently, one 
important aim for the analysis is to gain insight into how, why and when ideas gain 
support. The global diffusion of ideas, or what Brooks (2007: 3) refers to as 
”internationally-transmitted information”, is understudied and must be given greater 
attention (Béland 2007: 4, 22). 
 The question about how much, and what kind of family policy international 
organizations have will be treated in chapters 5 (EU) and 6 (OECD). Arguably, there 
exist more family policy ideas among IOs than is usually assumed and acknowledged 
in the literature (e.g. Kari 1998, Kaufmann 2002, Dienel 2004, Gerlach 2004, Deacon 
2007, Falkner et al. 2005, Hantrais 2007), especially within the fields of parental leave 
and childcare. Thus, these chapters contribute by describing the content of family 
policy ideas at the international level, and by claiming that an empirical study thereof, 
and its possible influence, is needed. It is a paradox well worth exploring that countries 
seem to learn much from other countries in their family policy reforms when formal 
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exchange systems hardly exist. Additionally, the process of developing policy advice 
is interesting. 
Deacon et al. (1997), Stone (1999) and Yeates (2001) have emphasized how a 
full understanding of national social policy challenges often presupposes a look at 
other factors than national institutions and relations. Although this is an empirical 
question, it seems to have become more common to look at foreign experiences before 
reforming a domestic arrangement. As stressed by Brooks (2007), policy makers 
usually draw on selected parts of the available experiences, more precisely on the parts 
they consider most relevant for them. What I shall explore is to what extent 
organizations like the EU and OECD play a role in identifying this “relevant part of 
available information”. 
The study of the relation between international organizations and national 
governments within family policy is new, and as such it fills a gap in the literature. 
International organizations may play a role, but we lack systematic comparative 
knowledge on what this role is. International family policies are in the making and it is 
of interest to see how the field is emerging. As such, I also seek to contribute to the 
debate on the future direction of international organizations’ social policy. 
 This thread is picked up in two chapters on German (7) and Norwegian (8) 
reforms. In these chapters I ask whether reforms in Norwegian and German family 
policy can be better understood by investigating the ideas promoted by IOs. Although I 
do not intend any rigid testing of hypotheses, I develop assumptions based on my 
theoretical perspective, which I will examine (see below). These should be understood 
as “general conceptions rather than definite hypotheses” (Berven 2005: 20).15 Even if 
the examination is limited to two cases I argue that the findings can have more far 
reaching applicability. An attempt to strengthen the investigation of whether ideas 
matter for social policy reforms is made by presenting in advance expectations of what 
will be indicative of such ideational influence (Berman 2001: 243). Still, it should be 
emphasized that my study mainly compares international disseminated policy ideas 
with actual national reform activity and is thus not able to determine the question of 
causality (Armingeon and Beyeler 2004).  
                                                 
15 For an example of investigation on learning based on strict testing of hypotheses, see Nedergaard 2007.  
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First, I assume that social policy ideas supported by IOs have greater likelihood 
of being implemented than ideas not enjoying this support, since such organizations 
may both convince political actors of the need to reform and provide legitimacy for 
reformers (Marcussen 2002). In line with existing research (Marcussen 2002, 
Armingeon and Beyeler 2004, Zeitlin, Pochet and Magnusson 2005, Kvist and Saari 
2007), I thus expect to find at least some concordance between international advice 
and national policy. I assume that the power of ideas is strengthened if they are 
accepted by and further disseminated by influential international organizations. 
Second, since the EU has no family policy in the sense of a coherent set of objectives 
for government activity in this policy area, but rather several policies that affect the 
situation of families, the influence on Germany and Norway is probably not very 
evident. This holds also for the OECD, even though its family policy statements are 
more coherent. Third, belonging to the welfare policy regime that is often seen as 
promoting best practice within family policy, I expect Norway to show less sign of EU 
and OECD influence than Germany, which is often referred to as having substantial 
challenges within its family policy. I thus expect Norway to be more of an exporter 
than an importer. However, other Scandinavian countries (Sweden) are thought to be 
even stronger paradigmatic representatives of the “social democratic” welfare regime 
(Esping-Andersen 1990), and since Norway is not part of the social policy initiatives 
in the European Union, such as OMC-processes, this export role is, fourth, not 
surmised to be very comprehensive. These expectations are further specified in 
chapters 7 and 8. 
A crucial source of policy change may be the process whereby governments 
learn from other governments. For my two countries it is here thus assumed that one 
looks abroad when reforming family policies, and to a higher degree in Germany than 
in Norway. Arguably, this would hardly be a new or surprising finding. Political 
scientists have for long referred to systems and experiences in other countries when 
understanding policy change (e.g. Collier and Messick 1975, Kuhnle 1981, 1983, 
2007). However, this kind of external influence has probably accelerated and might 
have been pushed by the founding of IOs in the 20th century. My main contribution is 
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to see whether and how the EU and OECD play a role in transmission of family policy 
ideas. 
 
1.4 Summary and outline  
 
Through the comparative analysis of possible family policy learning processes in the 
EU and OECD, my study will contribute to literature on learning and ideational 
influence, and to the literature on social policy in international organizations. Figure 1 
gives an overview of the dissertation.  
Chapter 2 provides a discussion and delimitation of the concept of family 
policy, presents the two IOs and reviews literature on international social and family 
policy. Chapter 3 discusses the relationship between ideas and policy-making. It does 
so by reviewing literature in the field, placing the idea perspective within the overall 
literature on welfare state change, as well as developing a theoretical approach on 
which later empirical chapters are based. I draw on literature on Europeanization, 
discourses and ideas, learning, policy transfer, and contributions on how states make 
use of foreign experiences. 
Chapter 4 is on methodology. It discusses issues such as defining, isolating the 
effect of, measuring, and empirically applying ideas in studies of family policy 
reforms. In this chapter, different types of ideas will be described and data sources 
introduced.  
The empirical analysis is carried out in chapters 5 through 8. Chapters 5 and 6 
provide an overview of existing family policy advice in the EU and OECD, as well as 
discussing the development of these ideas. Since the OECD has an official review 
series on family policy around which a discussion can be structured and the EU does 
not, part two of chapters 5 (section 5.2) and 6 (section 6.2) are organized somewhat 
differently. Chapters 7 and 8 are devoted to family policy reforms in Germany and 
Norway respectively. My main interest is whether IOs play a role and thus I focus on 
the possible role of IOs in these processes than on discussing the content of the 
reforms. Chapter 9 summarizes the findings and concludes.  
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I have gathered terms and policies I refer to throughout the analysis in a 
glossary (“dictionary”). Each term is explained, and, as far as possible, translated into 
both German and Norwegian. The appendices provide additional information on data 
collection, data analysis and of the family policy advice spread by the EU and OECD. 
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Chapter 2 National and international family policy 
 
“At first sight, then, discussing EU family and childcare policy is fruitless, since there is likely 
to be none. However, it turns out not to be true. Although it has had very little treaty power in 
the area, the EU (and the European Community (EC) before it) has made a number of forays 
into family policy“ (Ross 2001: 177). 
 
 
Family friendliness ranks high on the political agenda. The OECD defines family-
friendly policies as “policies that facilitate the reconciliation of work and family life 
by fostering adequacy of family resources and child development, that facilitate 
parental choice about work and care, and promote gender equality in employment 
opportunities” (2002a: 10). The OECD considers such policies as benefitting both 
families and the society in general. A closer discussion of the concept of family policy 
is the first aim of this chapter. This will clarify what kind of policies the thesis is 
about. Second, I briefly introduce some important socioeconomic developments and 
give a short overview of German and Norwegian family policies that are supposed to 
meet such challenges. Third, I introduce the organizations whose policy ideas are the 
point of departure for my study, the EU and OECD, as actors in the social policy field. 
Fourth, a review of literature on family policy and international organizations will 
show which studies my own work relies on, as well as how my study can contribute to 
existing literature on family policy and international organizations.  
 
2.1. Delimitation of family policy: definitions and classifications 
 
Family policy is a term that lends itself to conceptual debate. What is a family? What 
is a policy? There is no definition of family at the EU level and nor do all Member 
States provide a definition (European Commission 2002, see Hantrais 2004a for an 
instructive discussion). While what constitutes a family used to be pretty 
unproblematic in the post war period; a nuclear family consisting of mothers, fathers 
and children as well as grandparents, this is much more difficult today, among other 
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things due to the increased number of lone parents, same sex relationships, and the 
trend of being “single” for long periods (Hatland 2001: 119).16 Moreover, what is 
referred to as family policy in one country may be called something else in another 
(Strohmeier 2002: 324). In Germany, for instance, pro-natalist policies, that is policies 
which promote and encourage childbearing, are always difficult to address due to the 
experiences from the Nazi-period (Ostner and Knijn 2008). In Norway they are more 
or less unproblematic (but, as noted by Grødem 2008, also not important). And in the 
UK, there is no explicit family policy. Until recently there was no ministry for family 
affairs, something the new Department for Children, Schools and Families, established 
in 2007 (Lister 2008: 383), partly changes, but inhabitants have still enjoyed benefits 
labelled as family policy in other countries for quite some time.  
How the family should be defined is not of central importance to this study. 
However, how family policy is defined is important. This guides the analysis in 
several respects, for instance where I look for family policies, which again decide 
whether I claim that the EU and OECD have family policies or not, and whether these 
international organizations (IOs) may have an impact on national reforms. As 
Wilensky argues,  
 
"Although the entire range of government action in some way or another impinges upon the 
family, programs comprising "family policy" function specifically and directly to replace or 
supplement household income (such as family allowances, pensions, and social assistance), 
offer services to families (such as family- planning services, family counselling, and child 
care), or serve in lieu of the family (such as home help for the aged and supplementary meals 
programs)" (2002: 275). 
  
In other words, it is possible to delimit a family policy field. Figure 2.1 provides 
some examples of wide and narrow definitions.17 Skevik states that family policy is a 
contested term without any agreed upon definition (2006: 454). Hantrais and Letablier  
                                                 
16 See Stephanie Coontz (1992) for a discussion of whether families earlier really were so stable and different. 
17 According to Bay (1988: 91) public transfers to families with small children can be made in three ways; 
1. benefits in cash; e.g. child benefit, cash-for-care, parental leave  
2. deduction schemes in the taxation system  
3. benefits in kind; e.g. publically operated and/or subsidised kindergarten places 
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(1996) offer a much-used definition. They define family policies as social policies 
where “the family (…) is the deliberate target of specific actions, and the measures 
initiated should be designed so as to have an impact on family resources, and, 
ultimately, on family structure" (1996: 139). This is a rather wide definition. 
Figure 2.1: Some definitions of family policy: 
 
Hantrais and Letablier define family policies widely as social policies where “the family (…) is the deliberate 
target of specific actions, and the measures initiated should be designed so as to have an impact on family 
resources, and, ultimately, on family structure" (1996: 139). 
 
Mary Daly and Sara Clavero (2002: 18) also have a rather wide definition: 
“cash payments and tax allowances for the family as a unit; 
- benefits for parents, spouses and children in different kinds of families; 
childcare programmes; 
- provision for the care needs of elderly and ill adults; 
- services for the support of families” 
 
Strohmeier (2002: 325) provides us with yet another wide definition:  
“policies intended and implemented to affect family life in one way or the other way, and we may also 
consider such policies that, by impact, do affect the life situation of families”. 
 
According to Kaufmann this kind of definition is too broad and he suggests calling policies having more 
indirect affects family related policies (2002: 431). Kaufmann finds the whole concept of family policy 
unclear and distinguishes instead between:  
a) political motives for policies affecting the family 
b) official legitimizations for policies affecting the family 
c) measures or instruments of public intervention affecting the family; 
d) the impact of such interventions 
 
Gauthier adopts a rather narrow definition of family policy, restricting family policy to “measures directly 
targeted at families with dependent children, either as part of social security benefits or other social policy 
sectors” (1996: 3). Gauthier includes:  
“direct and indirect cash transfers for families with children (e.g. family allowances, means-tested 
family benefits, tax relief for dependent children); benefits related to work and granted to workers 
with family responsibilities (e.g. maternity and paternity leave, child care leave); services to families 
(e.g. day-care centres, after-school care); other services and benefits for families with children in the 
field of housing, education and health; and legislation directly affecting families (e.g. abortion, 
divorce, child alimony)” (1996: 3).  
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I restrict family policy further, and in the present study, family policy is defined 
narrowly: those public policies that consist of benefits and services aimed at parents 
with children (Lindén 2007a: 8). This is what most definitions cover, and it includes 
benefits and services regulated by law (e.g. paid parental leave) and not enacted into 
law (e.g. provision of childcare facilities). It does not include general benefits aimed at 
the entire populace like unemployment compensation, although these fields often have 
special rules for recipients with children. Furthermore, the EU regulates to what extent 
people can bring with them national benefits when moving within the EU, but I will 
not look at such issues. Neither will I look at education, housing, elderly care or tax 
issues, even though I recognize that such measures are of great importance to the 
everyday life of families and the way of organising family life, for instance whether 
both parents have incentives to work. I focus on reconciliation issues when I say 
family policy, meaning; “measures that extend both family resources (income, services 
and time for parenting) and parental labour market attachment” (OECD 2002a: 10). 
How the state regulates what a family is, which kind of families we accept, obligations 
of children and parents towards the rest of the family and how long this responsibility 
lasts, are all issues outside my focus of attention. More specifically, I chose to restrict 
my analysis to what I argue are two major fields within the field of family policy: 
parental leave schemes and childcare, hereunder also cash-for-care benefits. These 
fields influence everyday life of European families, they are large and important 
enough for IOs to take an interest in, a number of reforms have taken place in the last 
decades and they still figure high on the political agenda. 
Following the OECD, and for the purpose of my analysis; “parental leave refers 
to leave from employment that can be granted to fathers and mothers to allow them to 
take care of a young child over a rather long period” (1995: 171). Parental leave 
together with childcare and (in some countries) cash-for-care benefits are seen as 
reconciliation measures. When the term childcare is used one often means daycare 
centres. This definition underlines this: Childcare is “services that provide daytime 
care of pre-school children, often while their parents are working“ (Alcock et al. 2002: 
30). It includes what is called barnehage in Norway (children aged 0-6), Kinderkrippe 
(children aged 0-3) and Kindergarten (children aged 3-6) in Germany, and for instance 
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nurseries in other countries. This is the way I use childcare in this dissertation. Cash-
for-care benefits, known in Norway as kontantstøtte and Betreuungsgeld in Germany, 
is defined by the OECD as ”Leaves to care for children until they are about three years 
old. These leaves can be a variation of parental leaves, and payments are not restricted 
to parents with a prior work attachment. In Norway and Finland relevant income 
support payments are contingent on not using public childcare facilities. In general, 
payments are intended to supplement family income while one parent is at home or to 
purchase private care” (OECD 2007c: 105). Table 2.1 summarizes some central 
Norwegian and German family policies that will be discussed further in chapters 7 and 
8.18 
Paternity leave and father’s quota are sometimes mixed and used 
interchangeably. I separate between the two, as does for instance Ellingsæter and Leira 
(2006) or Ostner and Schmitt (2008). The father’s quota is the part of the parental 
leave reserved the father on a “use-it-or-lose-it” basis. Paternity leave, however, refers 
to “Employment-protected leave of absence for employed fathers at the time of 
childbirth” (OECD 2007c: 105). This may be outside the general parental leave 
arrangement, as it for instance is in Norway. 
 In the literature on family policy the comparison of welfare states and 
classifications of different profiles of state support for families figure prominently. 
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) is by far the best-
known and used typology of welfare states. Esping-Andersen identified what he 
labelled the “liberal”, “conservative” and “social democratic” welfare regimes. His 
classification has sparked a debate that is still going on. Scholars have criticized 
several aspects of his analysis such as having too few categories (missing the 
Mediterranean welfare states in Spain and Portugal) and neglecting the gender-issue.19 
The last point is of some importance for my study. I will not elaborate much on this 
critique (see Arts and Gelissen 2002, Künzler 2002, O’Connor 2004 or Guo and 
Gilbert 2007 for excellent overviews), but what was questioned was the neglect of 
                                                 
18 For a recent discussion on the family policy packages (cash benefits, tax breaks, exemptions from charges, 
subsidies, services in kind) in Germany, Norway and other European countries, see Fagnani and Math (2008). 
19 Later Esping-Andersen (1999) recognized that family issues should be given more emphasis and introduced 
the concept of familisation and de-familialisation (cf. glossary) to describe the role of families in welfare 
provision. Moreover, his later work has shown a very strong interest in family policy matters (2002, 2006a-b). 
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Table 2.1: German and Norwegian family policy in 2008 
 
Family policy/country Germany Norway 
Welfare regime “Conservative”  “Social-democratic” 
Paid parental leave 60 weeks (14 + 8 + 38) at 67 % wage 
replacement* 
44 weeks (9 + 6 + 29) at full wage 
replacement or 54 (9 + 6 + 39) weeks 
at 80 % wage replacement** 
Of this reserved for mothers 
(maternity leave) 
14 weeks (6 weeks before, 8 weeks 
after birth) 
9 weeks (3 weeks before, 6 weeks 
after birth) 
Of this reserved for fathers 
(Father’s quota) 
8 weeks 6 weeks 
Part of the parental leave 
mothers and fathers may 
decide how to share 
38 weeks 29 weeks or 39 weeks 
Paternity leave (in addition 
to the parental leave) 
No statutory paternity leave 2 weeks (paid or unpaid decided by 
employers) 
Cash-for-care benefit Betreuungsgeld is planned introduced 
in 2013 and the amount € 150 a month 
has been suggested 
Kontantstøtte (€ 400 a month) for 
children 1-3 years old 
Legal right to childcare 
services 
Legal entitlement for a part time 
kindergarten place for children aged 3 
– 6 since 1996, for 1-3 year olds 
planned introduced in 2013 
A statutory right will apply for 
children aged 1-6 from August 2009 
Childcare coverage 1.12.2007 
a) children 1-2 years 
b) children 3-6 years 
 
a) 13,3 % (West: 7,2 %, East: 43%) 
a) 87,1 % 
 
a) 69,2 % 
b) 94,3 % 
Child benefit; age limit and 
monthly amount  
Universal until the child is 18, means 
tested until 25 years old/ € 154 month 
(increasing with number of 
children)*** (partly taxable) 
Universal until the child is 18 years 
old/€ 122 month (non-taxable) 
Sources for childcare coverage: Asplan 2008, Bundesregierung (2008), Destatis (2008). *The duration of the 
German parental leave is not stated in a fixed number of weeks but rather 12 + 2 months. The special system of 
calculating the period of leave means that the total leave is sometimes not exactly 60 weeks as I have written in 
the table. **From July 2009 the Norwegian father’s quota will be 10 weeks. Two of these are taken from the 
mother´s leave; two more are added, making the total parental leave period 46 or 56 weeks. ***From January 
2009, the German child benefit will increase by € 10 for the two first children and slightly more for the next.  
 
gender sensitivity and the role of families in the provision of care and welfare (e.g. 
Orloff 1993, Sainsbury 1996, O’Connor 2004, see also chapter 7). In the words of Jane 
Lewis, Esping-Andersen “misses one of the central issues in the structuring of welfare 
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regimes: the problem of valuing the unpaid work that is done primarily by women in 
providing welfare, mainly within the family, and in securing those providers social 
entitlements” (1992: 160).20 This and similar critique has resulted in new 
classifications of welfare states. Figure 2.2 provides an overview of some of these 
classifications. As is clear from the figure, the number of “regimes”, in which 
countries are grouped together, as well as their labels (and, of course, characteristics if 
I had included these), vary substantially.21 France is for instance placed within many 
different welfare regimes. Duvander, Ferrarini and Thalberg (2008) argue that a recent 
trend in Europe in order to meet challenges of low fertility and ageing societies is that 
states add new policies to older ones instead of replacing them, thus generating models 
with seemingly contradictive elements (2008: 22). Hacker refers to such strategies as 
layering (2004: 248). One could thus hypothesise that there is still work to be done on 
classification of models. I return briefly to this issue, as well as the question of welfare 
regimes and convergence, when discussing the introduction of the cash-for-care-
benefit in Germany (chapter 7) and Norway (chapter 8) and in chapter 9 (conclusions). 
If family policy is an ambiguous term in itself and if classifications are so different and 
controversial, family policy in connection with international organizations is even 
more unclear. Scholars writing on international family policy, e.g. Linda Hantrais, 
stress how the EU has no real family policy but rather policies on reconciliation of 
work and family life22 and other social policies with an impact on families (Hantrais 
2004a: 133, 166, 167, Hantrais 2007: 115-116). And Mary Daly argues that in Europe 
of today, family policy is more or less combined with employment policy into one 
policy field while it used to be a distinct domain of social policy (2004: 147). 
                                                 
20 The importance of unpaid work is still often not recognized. Cf. for instance Borchorst and Goul Andersen 
(2006) who accuse the members of the recent Danish welfare commission of neglecting gender in their analysis 
of challenges of the welfare state. 
21 For an overview of multinational comparative research on family policies in Europe, cf. Kaufmann (2002: 
443). Since then, quite a few studies have followed, e.g. Hantrais (2004), Abrahampson et al. (2005), Bradshaw 
and Hatland (2006), and Ostner and Schmitt (2008). Another source is the project ”Improving Policy Responses 
and Outcomes to Socio-Economic Challenges: changing family structures, policy and practice” (IPROSEC), 
funded by the European Commission and led by Linda Hantrais (cf. http://www.xnat.org.uk/). 
22 Often only the short form reconciliation is used. And lately, the term conciliation (Norwegian: forsoning, 
megling) is sometimes used rather than reconciliation and could be replacing it (see e.g. Leira and Saraceno 
2008: 8). This must not be confused with family conciliation understood as conflict resolution in connection with 
separation or divorce etc. Reconciliation is also sometimes substituted by balance, e.g. ´work-life balance` or 
´work and family balance`. The terms may have different meanings and implications, e.g. for gender equality (cf. 
Lewis and Campbell 2008). I mainly use reconciliation of work and family life since the EU, OECD, Norway 
and Germany seem to rely mostly on this term. 
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Figure 2.2: Overview of typologies for different profiles of state support for families 
Esping-Andersen (1990):  
1. Social-democratic; Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland 
2. Liberal; UK, Ireland, US, Canada, New Zealand 
3. Conservative; Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy 
NB: Esping-Andersen (1999) identifies a fourth regime – Southern Europe.  
 
Kamerman and Kahn (1978): 
1. Explicit and comprehensive family policy; France, Norway, Sweden 
2. Explicit, but narrow family policy; Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland 
3. Implicit and reluctant family policy; Canada, UK, US 
 
Lewis (1992), Lewis and Ostner (1995, 1994): 
1. Strong male breadwinner countries: Britain, Germany and the Netherlands  
2. Moderate male breadwinner countries: France and Belgium 
3. Weak male breadwinner countries: Sweden, Denmark 
 
Siaroff (1994): 
1. Protestant social democratic welfare states; Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway 
2. Protestant liberal welfare states; Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US 
3. The advanced Christian Democratic welfare states; Austria, Belgium, France, West 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
4. Late female mobilization welfare states; Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, 
Switzerland 
 
Gauthier (1996): 
1. The pro-family/pro-natalist model; e.g. France 
2. The pro-family, but non-interventionist model; e.g. US, Ireland 
3. The pro-egalitarian model; e.g. Denmark, Sweden 
4. The pro-traditional model; e.g. Germany 
 
Hantrais (2004): 
1. Defamilialised; Denmark, Finland, Sweden, France, Luxembourg, Belgium 
2. Partially defamilialised; Ireland, UK, Austria, Germany, Netherlands 
3. Familialised; Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Malta 
4. Refamilialised; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Poland 
NB: Hantrais identifies four clusters with subgroups. For simplicity, I have not listed the subgroups here. 
However, this illustrates the tradeoffs between parsimonious and “exact” classification.  
 
Abrahamson, Boje and Greve (2005): 
1. The Parental Welfare Model: France 
2. The Male Breadwinner Model: Germany 
3. The Residual Poverty Oriented Welfare Model: The UK 
4. The Municipal Social Service State: Denmark and Sweden 
 
Pfau-Effinger (2006): 
1. Dual breadwinner/external care model: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, France, East Germany, 
Poland 
2. Male breadwinner/female part-time care provider model: West Germany, the UK 
3. Dual breadwinner/dual care provider model: the Netherlands, Norway 
 
There are numerous other typologies, e.g. Kaufmann (1982), Kuijsten et al. (1994), Schunter-Kleemann 
(1994), Hantrais and Letablier 1996, Korpi (2000), Pfenning and Bahle (2000) and Leitner (2003) to 
mention just a few.  
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The idea of “reconciliation of work and family life” is the dominating idea at both 
national and EU level. According to Hantrais; 
 
 “Due to a lack of consensus among member states over social policy until the late 1990s, 
most of the proposals for measures with a potential impact on family life were enacted under 
the auspices of the treaty provisions for equality, or for health and safety at work, including 
the directives on equal pay (75/117/EEC), equal treatment in social security (79/7/EEC), 
maternity (86/613/EEC) and parental leave (96/34/EC), and the recommendation on childcare 
(92/241/EEC)” (2003c: 250). 
 
Other concepts and aspects of family policy could have been discussed here. However, 
these are introduced in the relevant chapters, and instead of elaborating on concepts 
and other issues, I give a short overview of socioeconomic developments relevant for 
my study.23 
 
2.2 Family change and public policy 
 
Table 2.2 provides an overview of some important social trends relevant for family 
policy. Without going into detail, the EU and OECD family policy advice and reforms 
I discuss later are partly answers to these developments. Based on such indicators, 
both organizations make comparisons and rankings of their members, an issue 
discussed further in chapters 5-8. 
Many of these challenges speak for themselves and do not need comprehensive 
explanation. Women postponing having children often have fewer children than 
women who are younger at the birth of their first child. The lower fertility rates in 
combination with steadily increasing life expectancy and population ageing change the 
old age dependency ratio. This is the ratio between people in working age to 
economically inactive people. According to a recent press release from Eurostat  
(2008b), this ratio will go from 1-4 in 2008 to 1-2 in 2060. This worries policy makers 
all over Europe, as there will be less people to finance an increased number of people 
relying on welfare schemes (e.g. pensions and health). Konrad Adenauer, chancellor in 
                                                 
23 In the glossary I provide definitions of all major terms and concepts used. 
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Table 2.2 Overview of some socioeconomic trends relevant for family policy in Europe 
 
Trends Germany Norway 
Female employment rates 
(OECD statistical profiles) 
1975: 47,3 % 
1995: 55,3 % 
2006: 61,5 %  
1975: 50,2 % 
1995:  68,8 % 
2006: 72,3 % 
Fertility rate (Eurostat 2008a) 2006: 1,3  2006: 1,9 
Old age dependency ratio in 2008 – 
2030 (Eurostat 2008b) 
2008: 30, 3%  
2030: 59,1 % 
2008: 22,1 %  
2030: 43,9 % 
Child poverty (around 2000) 
(Babies and Bosses 2007) 
12,8 %  3,6 % 
Marriages (per 1000 persons) 
(Eurostat 2008a) 
1995: 5,22   
2007: 4,48 
1995: 5,29  
2007: 4,98 
Mean age of women at first birth  
(Babies and Bosses 2007) 
1970: 24  
2004: 29 
1970: … (unavailable) 
2004: 27,6 
Mean age of women at first 
marriage  (Babies and Bosses 2007) 
1980: 22,9  
2004: 28,4  
1980: 23,5  
2004: 29,1 
Sources in brackets.  
Female employment rates: “Share of women of working age (15 to 64 years) in employment” (OECD country 
statistical profiles 2008). 
Old age dependency ratio: “the population aged 65 years and older divided by the working age population” 
(Eurostat 2008b).  
Child poverty: ”The child poverty rate is defined as the share of children with equivalised incomes less than 50% 
of the median for the entire population” (Babies and Bosses 2007). 
 
post war Germany, is reported to have said that people will always have children, thus 
making it unnecessary for the authorities to intervene in family issues (Abrahamson 
2007: 198). Having had a fertility rate around 1, 3 for a long time, well below the 
average of 2,1 children per women needed to avoid population decrease, proves 
Adenauer wrong. As such, the sustainability of the welfare state is under pressure. 
Moreover, growing female labour market participation means that women are no 
longer available as unpaid care workers, and that new welfare demands develops, e.g. 
the demand for childcare institutions.24 Lone parenthood, increased unmarried 
                                                 
24 According to Hantrais (2004: 196), higher female employment participation rates could be seen as both part of 
a challenge and part of the solution. They contribute to the sustainability of the welfare state by making often 
highly educated persons available for the labour market and increase tax revenues. At the same time they create 
new demands for care. Interestingly, it is seldom discussed how men could increase their share of domestic work 
to compensate for women’s increased labour market participation. According to Larsen;  “equal opportunities 
policies have received much less attention than the work-family life reforms. It is mainly policies driven by 
economic concerns, which primarily enable women rather than men to reconcile work and family life that 
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cohabitation and high divorce rates, what Hantrais refers to as de-institutionalisation of 
family life (2004a: 195), also create changed expectations towards the public provision 
of welfare. Child poverty, often in connection with lone parenthood, is a major 
challenge for many European countries today and yet another problem family policy 
may be expected to respond to. Changes in attitudes towards gender roles or child-
raising also affect what kind of policies families ask for, and often imply a wish for 
more services such as childcare or care for other dependent family members: “Those 
who in the past perceived women’s desire for childcare outside the home as a 
dangerous expression of self-interest now view it as a valid economic choice. (…) 
childcare has moved from being a private responsibility to a more public economic 
issue“ (Bussemaker 1998: 90).  
Whether or not public policies at all are able to influence such developments is 
a discussion in itself (Hantrais 2004a: 198). Does family policy affect fertility, family 
structure and individual behaviour or is “the family a policy-resistant and autonomous, 
self-determining social system” (Strohmeier 2002: 324)? For instance, the incentives 
provided by governments in the form of benefits in cash and kind may influence if and 
how many children people get, but public attitudes and the general economic situation 
are only two of many other aspects that also are important for such decisions. This 
topic is somewhat outside the scope of my analysis and will hardly be discussed in my 
thesis. Both the policy advice of the EU and OECD as well as the German and 
Norwegian reforms take the efficiency of public policy more or less for granted and 
implement such policies out of an expectation to be able to influence behaviour. I 
briefly return to this issue in chapter 9. 
My study will investigate what role family policy ideas play for national 
reforms. Socio-economic trends such as delayed marriage and family formation, 
decreasing fertility rates and population ageing, new attitudes towards work and family 
and changes in parental employment rates of course also matter. The empirical 
chapters 5 through 8 will discuss some of these trends. However, I refer the reader to 
Bradshaw and Hatland (2006) or Ostner and Schmitt (2008) for excellent, 
                                                                                                                                                        
predominate the political agenda” (2005: 76). Men’s rights and obligations are hardly discussed (2005: 77). For 
further interesting contributions on this matter, see e.g. Nancy Fraser (1994) and Ann Orlof (1993). 
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comprehensive and up to date sources on such data. I now continue this chapter by 
giving a presentation of the EU and OECD, as well as an overview of literature on 
their social and family political ideas. 
 
2.3. Presentation of the EU and OECD 
2.3.1 EU social policy25 
 
The European Coal and Steel Community, founded in 1951 by six countries, became 
the European Economic Community (EEC) after signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 
Growing and developing continuously, the European Union consists of 27 Member 
States in 2008. Securing peace, economic integration and trade have been the main 
goals since the beginning and social policy has received less attention (Kleinman 
2002). However, as the number of Member States has grown and the common market 
has become ever more comprehensive, the topic of social policy has gained 
importance. The EU has some social policy in the form of binding directives, above all 
on workers’ rights, but in accordance with the subsidiarity principle the national level 
is left with most of the responsibility for social issues. When describing EU’s social 
policy role it is common to distinguish between positive and negative integration. 
Positive integration is about constructing common EU social policies (market-
correcting policies, common social standards), while negative integration is about 
promoting free trade and competition which may limit Member States´ social policies 
(market-making policies) (Scharpf 1999). Research indicates that the former is less 
developed than the latter (Leibfried 2005, Kvist and Saari 2007, Scharpf 2002, Streeck 
1995).  
The EU has used the Community Method to develop and implement integration 
since 1957. This method relies on transfer of competence to the EU level, demands of 
compliance associated with the threat of sanctions and enforcement, and legal 
standardisation across Member States. Results from the Community Method include 
directives and regulations. However, the last decade or so, the EU has increased its use 
                                                 
25 Cini (2007), Hantrais (2007), and Wallace, Wallace and Pollack (2005) provide excellent introductions to the 
EU and its role within social policy. 
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of soft governance through the Open Method of Coordination. This method does not 
involve transfer of competence, sanctions or similar laws. Instead, the OMC is similar 
to the peer review method applied by the OECD (Schäfer 2006), where setting of 
goals, spreading of best practice and monitoring are stressed. The OMC varies within 
the fields it is applied and is best developed within employment and social inclusion 
and less within pensions and health. Common for all OMCs are “its legal non-
bindingness (…) and its dependence on the will of national governments to comply 
with OMC standards” (Kröger 2007: 566). Some authors still argue that the EU is 
different from the OECD in this respect through its political rather than scientific 
character, which means that political interests become important in addition to 
persuasion and arguments (Armingeon 2007, Noaksson and Jacobsson 2003). Other 
scholars consider these organizations to share the same characteristics and kind of 
recommendations (Kildal forthcoming 2009, Casey 2004, Dostal 2004). Some studies 
of the OMC on employment and social inclusion conclude that learning processes have 
yet to result in much change (e.g. Scharpf 2002, Chalmers and Lodge 2003) while 
others draw a more positive picture (cf. the summary in Zeitlin 2005a: 450-452, 457-
458).26 
The EU consists of different institutions with different mandates.27 The 
European Council and the Council of the European Union represent national 
governments while the European Commission and the European Parliament are 
supposed to represent the EU as a whole. The European Court of Justice is an 
independent institution. As explained by Stratigaki (2000), the different institutions 
may have different opinions on what is the appropriate level of EU social policy. 
The EU can forward social policy in two ways: “through a process of ´levelling 
up` existing national social policies or through a specifically European (supranational) 
social policy” (Kleinman 2002: 22). The first possibility invites a study of the impact 
of the EU although there is no such thing as an EU social policy and even less an EU 
family policy. The second one is, however, also relevant for my study since, as I will 
argue throughout the analysis, some steps towards a more comprehensive EU approach 
                                                 
26 For an overview of studies of the influence of the OMC in Germany, especially the EES, see for instance 
Büchs (2006, 2007), Büchs and Friedrich (2005), Büchs and Hinrich (2007) or Heidenreich and Bischoff (2008). 
27 On different stakeholders within EU family policy development, see Dienel (2004).  
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to family policy can be identified. What is the status of family policy within the EU so 
far according to the literature?  
 
2.3.2 A European family policy?  
 
Whether EU-membership strengthens or weakens national welfare policy is a disputed 
topic, particularly in countries debating whether to join the Union or not, such as 
Norway. Scholars discussing these questions mainly conclude that the EU is currently 
not having direct social policy competences to substantially imprint national policy, 
but that it indirectly through the advancement of the common market may change 
national policies, and that developments and impacts in the long run are more difficult 
to assess (Kuhnle 2000, 2001, Kleinman 2002, Scharpf 2002, Korpi 2003, Leibfried 
2005, Hagen 2006, Hantrais 2007). The EU influences what kind of policies states can 
have (negative integration), but EU social policy initiatives (positive integration) are 
still weak (Kleinman 2002, Scharpf 2002, Falkner et al. 2005, Leibfried 2005, Bailey 
2008).28 This applies particularly to competence in family policy (Hantrais 2007), even 
though researchers acknowledge that EU regulations are increasingly attentive to 
families through policies on reconciliation of work and family life (e.g. Weiss 2000, 
Stratigaki 2000, 2004, Ross 2001, Dienel 2002, 2004, Duncan 2002, Kaufmann 2002, 
Hantrais 2003a, 2004a, 2007, Gerlach 2004, Kildal and Kuhnle 2006, Lewis 2006b, 
Mahon 2002, Abrahamson 2007). The EU has no family policy in the sense of a 
coherent set of objectives for government activity in this policy area, but several 
policies that affect the situation of families. Family policies are cross-sectoral policies 
and there exists several traces of family policy in other EU social policy fields. 
                                                 
28 Some authors credit the EU with somewhat more importance, e.g. Threlfall (2007) and Kvist and Saari (2007), 
acknowledging both increased competence and focus on social policy, but still in a delimited and incremental 
way. According to Kvist and Saari (2007: 19), social protection is Europeanized, meaning that national and EU 
levels become increasingly interwoven: “…, we also find significant developments at the EU level, including 
developments driven by politics (that is, not by courts or markets) that amount to more than ´fragmented EU 
social policy`. The point here is that positive integration in social protection is no longer geared towards a 
transfer of sovereignty from the national to the EU level, but rather to facilitate collaboration among sovereign 
Member States” (2007: 233). Cf. Büchs for a different view on the OMC and negative/positive integration 
(2006: 50). 
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 Hantrais stresses how family policy is mainly a national policy field and there is 
not an OMC for family policy (2004a: 206). However, Hantrais speaks of the family 
impact of other social policies. This could be exemplified by the need for childcare 
facilities and parental leave identified as part of the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) of getting more mothers into paid work (2004: 167). Still, “The interest shown 
in family matters at EU level has generally been confined to issues concerned with 
working conditions and arrangements that impinge on family life, rather than family 
policies per se“ (2004a: 211). Authors like Mahon (2002) or Stratigaki (2004) share 
this analysis of how family policy related issues at EU level are by and large 
interpreted in an economic perspective. 
Recent studies of the effect of EU recommendations on domestic social policy, 
e.g. Zeitlin et al. (2005), have not paid attention to the possible  impact on family 
policy, with some exceptions (e.g. Hantrais 2003a, 2004a). Falkner et al. (2005) focus 
on directives, i.e. partly forced influence, while Kvist and Saari (2007) only look 
briefly at family and demographic issues. Plantenga et al. (2008) provides a short 
discussion of the effect of the EU childcare provision goals. Mahon (2002), Stratigaki 
(2004), Hantrais (2007) and Knijn and Ostner (2008) do not investigate whether EU 
policies influence national family policy, but state that such impact is possible, 
providing a good  rationale to follow my research question of whether domestic 
reforms are inspired by actions and advice from IOs.29  
I will subject this claim about EU family policy neglect to scrutiny and offer an 
analysis that runs counter to arguments that the EU is uninvolved in the family field. 
Analyzing different fields of EU social protection policy suggest that they contain 
potential EU family policy and recent EU initiatives might increase its influence, a 
finding that extends the existing literature on EU social policy. Subsequent empirical 
analysis of German and Norwegian policy-making will check whether policy actors 
are aware of, interested in and influenced by this. 
 
                                                 
29 Cf. Leaman (2003) for an overview of useful sources on the European family policy process and Hantrais 
(2003c) for an overview of research on family and welfare issues funded by the European Commission.  
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2.3.3 The OECD30 - more than one single institution 
 
In 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
replaced the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which had 
been set up in 1948 to administer the Marshall Plan. Since 2000, the organization has 
30 members. It is a forum for policy dialogue, peer review and surveillance of country 
policy (Deacon 2007: 57). The OECD homepage lists 6 aims:31   
1. Support sustainable economic growth,  
2. Boost employment,  
3. Raise living standards,  
4. Maintain financial stability,  
5. Assist other countries' economic development,  
6. Contribute to growth in world trade 
 
The focus on economy is clear from this list. My focus is on social policy, and 
according to Deacon (2007: 57), the OECD is, based on its policies and 
recommendations in the 1970s and 1980s, associated with viewing the welfare state as 
a burden. The Welfare State in Crisis (OECD 1981), based on a conference collection 
of different papers, is a mile-stone publication from this period which advised Member 
States to decrease social spending. In the two following decades, this has partly 
changed, as indicated by the publication Extending Opportunities: How Active Social 
Policy Can Benefit Us All (OECD 2003b).32 Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs argued in 1997 
that “Social considerations enter if they are regarded as a help or a hindrance to 
economic growth” (1997: 70, see also Deacon 2001). The following discussion will 
show that this is very much the case. As Deacon et al. (1997), McBride and Williams 
(2001), Mahon (2006) and Schulz-Nieswandt and Maier-Rigaud (2007) bring forth, 
though; there is a debate within the organization on what goals should be prioritised. 
The Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (DELSA) and the 
                                                 
30 Marcussen (2004) provides an excellent introduction to the OECD and its role within social policy. Readers 
interested in a more comprehensive account are referred to Marcussen (2002).  
31 www.oecd.org, retrieved 15.05.2008.  
32 One section on the OECD in Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs (1997: 70) is called ”from welfare as a burden to 
welfare as an investment?”. See also Mahon (2006: 174) or Schulz-Nieswandt and Maier-Rigaud (2007: 415). 
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Economics Department (ECO) appear to have different positions. Interviews bring 
forth that the DELSA is sometimes referred to as the left-wing of the right-wing 
organization (OECD interview 2, 3 and 6) and this is where the work on family policy 
is done. The ECO is often considered the “hardliners”, being among other things 
responsible for the country surveys (OECD interviews 2, 3, 6, Ervik forthcoming 
2009). Transferred to a national context this equals disputes between a ministry of 
social affairs and a ministry of finance. The Economics Department is more powerful 
than DELSA, something that for instance is reflected in staff and resources 
(Marcussen 2002: 46, 200). While ECO produces several important publications at set 
times, e.g. the Economic Survey and Economic Outlook, which are probably the two 
most important OECD reports, DELSA is mostly project oriented and has the 
Employment Outlook as its only report on a regular basis. This power-bias might be 
one of the reasons why one interviewee describes his work within DELSA as 
employment-oriented social policy (OECD interview 3). Still, the different directorates 
do of course also cooperate (OECD interview 2, 3, 5, 6). 
 
2.3.4 The family policy of the OECD  
 
Compared to the scholarly literature on EU social policy, there seems to be a small, 
but growing literature on OECD social policy. This literature contributes also to our 
understanding of the power of ideas because these organizations´ impacts depend on 
the quality of their advice (Kildal 2005: 54). This also applies to EU-literature, but 
having even less possibilities to make binding decisions than the EU, the OECD relies 
totally on persuasion and the power of arguments. 
Deacon et al. (1997) and Deacon (2001, 2007) cover the OECD in their 
discussions of global social policy, but not in great depth and only as one of many 
other international actors. They hardly mention family policy. Neither do Schulz-
Nieswandt and Maier-Rigaud (2007), who instead discuss the content of OECD advice 
on employment and pensions, describe its neo-liberal imprint and criticize the strong 
focus on employment as a solution to most social problems. Martens (2007) has 
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focussed on the education policy of the OECD. Kaasch (2006, forthcoming) discusses 
OECD health policy. 
Schäfer compares the EU and OECD and concludes that their working 
procedures (OMC, peer review) constitute a similar form of multilateral surveillance 
(2006: 71, see Bisopoulos 2003 for a similar argument). Schäfer concludes that this 
approach is not very effective in reaching policy goals because it cannot “oblige 
reluctant governments to change their policies” (2006: 85). 
Marcussen (2002) has identified different roles the OECD can play in order to 
influence national policy-making, including developing new ideas and spreading old 
(cf. section 6.1). In doing this, Marcussen sheds light on how Member States have an 
important say in the development of OECD advice on their own policies. This means 
that the question of whether Member States are influenced by the OECD becomes a 
less straightforward issue to investigate. I will draw on his concepts and approach in 
chapter 6 on the development and content of OECD family policy ideas. 
Armingeon and Beyeler (2004) provide a comprehensive study of the OECD 
and its impact on national policies. Scholars from 14 countries analyze whether OECD 
recommendations are consistent over time and space (consistency), and whether the 
policy models and ideas it promotes result in reforms (efficacy). In the country 
chapters, interactions between the international and national level are discussed in 
the social policy fields of pensions, employment, health and education. In the 
concluding chapter Armingeon reports that the consistency has been high while the 
efficacy has been low (2004: 228). Armingeon (2007) reaches a similar conclusion in 
an analysis of active labour market policy. 
The country chapters on Germany (Zohlnhöfer and Zutavern 2004) and Norway 
(Kildal and Kuhnle 2004a) are helpful to my study when developing assumptions on 
the possible influence of the OECD as will be shown in chapters 7 and 8. The two 
introductory chapters (Beyeler 2004, Marcussen 2004) as well as the concluding one 
(Armingeon 2004) include extensive discussion of theoretical issues and 
methodological implications. However, for my purpose the study has two limitations; 
family policy is not covered and the study relies only on document analysis of 
Economic Surveys. The former is not strange since family policy is a new field for the 
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OECD and the latter is probably because the study covers such a long time period 
(1970-2000). Still, sources such as interviews with key national and international 
actors and parliamentary debates can provide a fuller picture. 
If there are not so many studies of the OECD and its general social policy role, 
there are even fewer taking issue with its family policy. There is hardly any literature 
on this subject.33 Jenson (2008) and Lister (2008) criticize the EU and OECD family 
policy stance, particularly on childcare, because they consider it an instrumental 
approach focussed on employment and economy rather then promoting a good 
childhood. Deacon briefly states that the Babies and Bosses project is not neo-liberal 
(2007: 59), but like Jenson (2008) and Lister (2008), he does not engage in any 
detailed examination of content or impact. Mahon (2006) is one further exception. She 
focuses on the work/family reconciliation agenda of the OECD and provides the reader 
with an insightful comparison of the Babies and Bosses and the Starting Strong series. 
Mahon concludes that the Babies and Bosses series (2002, 2003, 2004) is characterised 
by an instrumental view of children and a more work-oriented approach than Starting 
Strong I (2001) where children’s well-being is central. Her analysis is based on 
document analysis. However, important reports (volumes 4 and 5 of Babies and 
Bosses as well as Starting Strong II) were published after her analysis was conducted. 
Kildal and Kuhnle (2006) constitute yet another exception as they summarize both EU 
and OECD family policy initiatives and examine how the recommendations have been 
welcomed. Based on document analysis they conclude that neither of the two 
organizations has been important for family policy reforms in Norway and Denmark.  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
This background chapter has clarified and delimited the family policy field and my 
research interests. I have emphasized how I take a narrow approach to family policies, 
                                                 
33 Three new books will help filling the gap for both OECD social and family policy: McBride and Mahon 
(2008), Ervik, Kildal and Nilssen (forthcoming 2009) and Martens and Jakobi (forthcoming). When writing this, 
only two conference papers by Mahon (2007a-b) that will be part of McBride and Mahon (2008) and Martens 
and Jakobi (forthcoming) are available in addition to chapters from Ervik, Kildal and Nilssen (forthcoming 
2009). It is also possible to find very brief references to whether countries follow the OECD in other recent 
publications, e.g. Ostner and Schmitt (2008: 203) or Knijn and Ostner (2008:106). 
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defined here as public policies that consist of benefits and services aimed at parents 
with children. I will particularly look at parental leave, childcare and cash-for-care 
benefits. The first section also discussed comparisons of welfare states and referred to 
different authors´ classifications of national family policy models. Section two briefly 
discussed family and socioeconomic trends relevant for later discussions on reforms. 
Section three introduced the reader to the social policy roles played by the EU and 
OECD. The two organizations were presented briefly, followed by an overview of the 
few central contributions to the small, but growing literature on OECD social policy 
and family policy in particular, and the corresponding and somewhat larger body of 
literature on the EU. The short literature review showed that studies of OECD social 
policy initiatives remain few, that its work on family policy has barely been studied, 
partly because the OECD has a short history in this field, and that new data, e.g. in the 
form of interviews and parliamentary debates, could shed light on possible impact on 
national policy reforms. For the EU, scholars have focussed more on why it has so 
little competence in the area of family policy and less on whether it may inspire 
national policy makers to reform their family policies. Consequently, a new 
“inventory” is needed as well as an investigation of possible influence.  
Knowing that these two international organizations increasingly attend to 
family policy related issues, it is of interest to study whether the OECD and EU, 
traditionally seen as being without competence and importance in the area, now play a 
(central) role in their Member States´ search for optimal domestic policy. And it is 
interesting in itself to get a picture of what these organizations do in this field. What 
kind of family policy ideas international organizations really disseminate is important 
and will be discussed in detail in chapters 5 and 6. However, first theoretical (3) and 
methodological (4) chapters will clarify possibilities and limits of an ideational 
analysis of family policy. 
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Chapter 3 How ideas matter for social policy 
 
 “Steady increases in life expectancy, coupled with declining fertility rates, will bring about 
unprecedented demographic changes in Europe – demographic changes of a magnitude not 
seen since the Black Death ravaged the European continent in the Middle Ages” (Lisbon 
Council and IBM 2007: 5). 
 
 
Let me open this chapter with some thoughts on the possible influence of ideas in 
recent reforms in pensions, care and family policy. Countless reports describe how the 
populations of European countries are in steady decline. The quote above, from a 
Belgian based think-tank, even draws parallels to the Black Death, one of Europe’s 
worst catastrophes ever. Many actors consider demographic change as objective 
evidence of “problem pressure”, implying that they must reform the welfare state. 
However, as shown by Maier-Rigaud (forthcoming 2009), this is not as unambiguous 
as is claimed, which is illustrated by the different approaches of international 
organizations. Analyses of the World Bank, the EU, and the OECD, show that western 
welfare states are facing an old age crisis, forcing them to reform. The ILO, however, 
argues in a different way. According to the ILO, the pressure to reform is exaggerated, 
and the situation is not as hopeless as one might sometimes think when listening to 
those wanting fundamental reforms (ILO 2006). 
Traute Meyer has made a related observation. It is somewhat paradoxical that 
there has been an increase in care-related rights during times of austerity when people 
in need of care are a politically weak group (2005: 282-283). We witness a similar 
trend within family policy, where the state is less focused on cost containment than in 
other fields. How come there is expansion of care and family policies when economic 
reality seems to force politicians to reduce pensions and unemployment benefits?  
This puts emphasis on what Mark Blyth has noted; crises are not self - apparent 
phenomena, but on the contrary, have to be both narrated and explained (2002: 9). 
This is a good point of departure for shedding light on why ideas should be given a 
central place in understanding social policy developments. Blyth explains how a crisis 
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is not sufficient to promote change, because “no exogenous factor can in and of itself 
explain the specific forms that institutional change takes” (2002: 8).34 Both the kind of 
change, and the conditions under which institutions change, must be analyzed. 
Marcussen (2002, 2004) has coined the term ´idea game` to illuminate how an 
international organization like the OECD can play a role in national social policy 
reform processes. The ´idea game` is to be understood as “a question of formulating, 
transferring and authorising principled or causal beliefs with a view to constraining or 
enabling certain types of social behaviour within the OECD area” (2004: 16). Through 
this game, the OECD “collects, manipulates and diffuses data, knowledge, visions and 
ideas to its member countries and, to a still larger extent, to a series of non-member 
countries“ (2004: 29). Adjusting this to my field of social policy means that a ´family 
policy idea game` is about how IOs such as the OECD and EU participate in the 
collection, formulation, and transfer of family policy ideas across borders. The game is 
about “how actors strategically behave in order to make an idea dominant while 
playing with adversaries” (Noaksson and Jacobsson 2003: 34). 
In this chapter my aim is to elaborate theoretically on why and how ideas can 
matter for family policy reforms. This discussion will be the basis for the 
methodological and empirical chapters to follow. First I place the idea-perspective 
within the overall literature on welfare state change, and explain why I have chosen to 
rely on ideational theory rather than other perspectives (3.1). Then I present and 
review the relevant body of literature on ideas (3.2.1-3.2.4), before I explain how I will 
use these theoretical insights in my own empirical work (3.3). I do not offer a 
complete theory for how ideas originate and gain influence, but rather a study of how 
ideas within the family policy field can matter for policy change. As a connection to 
chapter 4 on methodology, I also provide an example of a study that highlights 
methodological challenges when relying on ideas in explanations of welfare reforms 
(3.4).  
At the outset it might be useful to stress what this chapter is not about. Applying 
concepts like ideas and discourses could make the reader think of discourse analysis. I 
am not applying a discourse analysis in the tradition of Foucault, and I am not 
                                                 
34 Cf. Hay and Rosamond (2002) for similar arguments. 
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concerned with language analysis.  I use the term discourse pragmatically as a pure 
analytical term; “as a general analytical tool rather than as a theoretical or 
methodological approach in itself” (Nilssen 2007: 23). Policy discourses are “coherent 
systems of ideas that link normative judgement about policy goals to practical 
accounts of the policies likely to reach them” (Taylor-Gooby and Daguerre 2002: 6). 
In other words, the policy discourse provides actors with a definition of both the 
problem and possible solutions, as well as normative content of the arguments. The 
concept of discourse sheds light on how actors view policy programmes, and their 
consideration of means and ends, by underscoring that discourse is a set of ideas and 
an interactive process, with the potential to overcome opposing interests and alter 
perceptions (Schmidt 2002: 169). Here I use the terms idea and discourse more or less 
interchangeably, because they both serve as sources for input in decision-making 
processes.35  
 
3.1. The idea-perspective within overall literature on welfare state 
change 
 
While the development and growth of welfare states, as well as the grouping of 
welfare regimes, have dominated research for quite some time (e.g. Esping-Andersen 
1990), much of the current literature on welfare policies focus on reforms and issues 
such as retrenchment or convergence (Starke 2006). This body of scholarship has 
identified several explanations for reforms that can be organized in different 
categories. A division in functional explanations (internal and external pressure), 
political factors, and institutionalist accounts, is not exhaustive, but sufficient here, 
since the main point is to place the idea-perspective, in relation to other literature on 
welfare state change, as an additional perspective.36 
                                                 
35 Beckman (2005) informs us about how an “idea-analysis” (idéanalys; idea-centred perspective) is different 
from a discourse analysis. The latter is concerned with structural phenomena while an idea-analysis focuses on 
motives of policy makers. The discourse analysis has more comprehensive aims. It assumes that the reality is 
socially constructed and possible to understand through discourse analysis. Still, both idea- and discourse 
analysis consider knowledge to play an important role in policy change.  
36 See for instance Schmidt and Radaelli and how they group factors of policy change somewhat differently 
when introducing their discourse perspective (2004a: 183, 186). See also Goul Andersen (2001) [2007], Bleses 
and Seeleib-Kaiser (2004) or Starke (2006). 
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Among the internal pressure factors, unemployment, population ageing, 
changes in family structure, and higher women employment rates are prominent 
(Huber and Stephens 2001, Esping-Andersen et al. 2002, Bonoli and Shinkawa 2005). 
Such structural social economic forces mainly challenge existing welfare policies, 
because the programmes are not capable of or have not enough resources to handle the 
kind of needs and number of recipients present today, or for a presumed future. 
Somewhat similar to this kind of argument, reform pressure is also seen as coming 
from welfare programmes themselves; welfare schemes commit the state to high 
expenses not foreseen when the programmes were developed and, in the opinion of 
some authors, reduce work incentives, or create poverty traps (Tullock 1983, Mead 
1992). As will be shown in later chapters, this attitude is very present within some IOs.  
There can be no doubt that financial problems, uncertainty about the 
sustainability of welfare arrangements, and population ageing, are worrying European 
governments. However, the family policy reforms I will analyze in the chapters to 
follow represent extension rather than cutbacks of the welfare state. As such, cost 
containment has obviously not motivated policy makers in Norway and Germany. 
Still, the same actors have beyond doubt searched for policy measures that at least to 
some extent are able to help secure the long term sustainability of the welfare state. As 
such, socio-economic variables and demographic developments have importance. It is 
important to stress, though, that politicians must identify such challenges before they 
have an impact. In the words of Castles, 
 
"As in the case of the crisis literature on the implications of globalization, one is forced to 
conclude that much of the rhetoric about the budgetary consequences of population ageing is 
motivated more by short-term considerations of containing or cutting back public budgets than 
by justified anxieties concerning the consequences of demographic change" (Castles 2004: 
139). 
 
Some scholars focus more on political factors (“parties matter”, power resources), 
such as political parties or institutions, to explain welfare policy developments (Hibbs 
1987, Esping-Andersen 1990, Korpi and Palme 1998). Leftist governments are 
considered to be less willing to enact cutbacks than centre-right governments (Castles 
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1982, 1998). However, this view has been challenged by authors pointing at how 
exactly leftist governments are able to reform without too much heavy criticism from 
groups opposing such change, e.g. labour unions (Ross 1997, 2000a-b, Kitschelt 
2001).  
Treib and Falkner (2004) and Falkner et al. (2005), for instance, find that 
German red-green governments have been keener on fulfilling the EU directives on 
parental leave, and complying with its soft-law provisions, than other governments. 
Armingeon and Bonoli (2003) consider reconciliation of work and family life to be a 
centre-left, rather than Christian Democratic, conservative, or liberal policy priority. 
This seems only partly to fit the family policy reforms in Germany and Norway. 
Norwegian extension of childcare is popular among all political parties while the cash-
for-care benefit is more of a conservative-liberal priority. In Germany, the same may 
apply to these two family policy programmes, but a conservative led government 
promoted the new Elterngeld-reform, something the traditional power resource theory 
would not predict. Therefore, theories on political factors will not suffice to understand 
the reforms I study.  
Institutions play a role for welfare reforms as well. They establish veto players 
that may or may not be conducive to change, and sometimes lead to path dependency, 
implying that changes in the welfare state are heavily influenced by their past (Pierson 
2001, Tsebelis 2002). Veto players are defined by Tsebelis as actors “whose 
agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo“ (2002: 19). The varieties of 
capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice 2001) focus on institutions, and mainly explain 
stability.  
However, family policy is less saturated and institutionalized than policy areas 
such as pensions. There are few interest organizations or other veto players (e.g. trade 
unions) in this field of social policy. Therefore, reforms cannot be understood by 
exclusively focussing on institutional constraints or predetermined paths. Moreover, 
the reforms I discuss include reforms so comprehensive that we can speak of path 
departure and paradigmatic change (the German Elterngeld). Thus, theories on veto 
players and path dependency, will not help us understand current reforms in an 
adequate manner. 
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Globalization and European integration are sometimes referred to as external 
pressure factors, and globalization has been one key concept in the debate on welfare 
restructuring. Mishra (1999) claims that globalization results in a growing economic 
interdependence, which again leads to pressure on welfare policies, because such 
policies are a disadvantage when competing for international capital (see also 
discussions in Scharpf 2000 or Palier and Sykes 2001). This argument has been widely 
criticized, e.g. by Castles (2004). Hirst and Thompson (1999), Yeates (2001), and 
Rieger and Leibfried (2003), even present social policy more as a prerequisite for, than 
threatened by, globalization. European integration may have a similar effect as 
globalization, increasing competition and making both EU Member States and other 
European countries less positive towards expensive welfare arrangements, but again, 
scholars diverge in their interpretation (e.g. Leibfried 2005, Kvist and Saari 2007).37 
The impact of globalization and Europeanization is disputed and if it plays a role, it is 
because politicians choose to understand it this way.  
Whether international organizations play a part in the development of national 
reforms is the topic of this thesis and will be discussed throughout the coming 
chapters. However, IOs only produce limited external political pressure in the form of 
recommendations and advice, not binding decisions. This makes Pfau-Effinger (2008: 
202) conclude that family policy change cannot be the result of EU policies. However, 
she does not mention the possible influence of soft law. As such, external pressure is 
absent, but ideas may have influence.  
Other, more country specific reasons for welfare reforms may be considered as 
well. For Germany, family policies of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
could be a source of influence, but Klammer and Letablier (2007: 674) state that East 
Germany has had little influence on the West German model. For Norway it is 
                                                 
37 Both the globalization and Europeanization concepts have been used in so many different ways that they are 
almost analytically empty if they are not defined and presented thoroughly. Daly for instance writes that 
globalization “is in danger of becoming little more than a general term to refer to exogenous economic 
developments” (2000: 79). Here I refrain from a conceptual discussion since my aim is only to list factors 
prominent in the debate on welfare reforms. Globalization can briefly be defined as “a process of interaction and 
integration among the people, companies, and governments of different nations, a process driven by international 
trade and investment and aided by information technology” (the Levin Institute).  Radaelli gives the following 
definition of Europeanization: “Processes of a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalization of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ´ways of doing things`, and shared beliefs and norms 
which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in 
the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies” (2003: 30). 
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reasonable to ask whether learning from Scandinavian neighbours has taken place. 
This would at least partly fit with an ideational approach occupied with voluntary 
transfer, and will be briefly returned to in chapter 8.  
A growing dissatisfaction with established explanatory frameworks of welfare 
state developments, such as functional explanations (internal and external problem 
pressure), institutionalist accounts (path dependency), and political factors (parties), 
has made scholars search for new perspectives to understand recent reforms.38 A 
considerable body of scholarship is now introducing ideas as important factors in 
understanding change in welfare arrangements (e.g. Campbell 1998, 2002, Schmidt 
2000, Cox 2001, Blyth 2002, Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, Béland 2005, Taylor-Gooby 
2005, López-Santana 2006). The importance of ideas, however, is of course not new – 
it suffices to mention Beveridge, Bismarck or Keynes, names which are associated 
with specific policy ideas, to illustrate that ideas always have played a part in social 
policy development. Authors also increasingly deal with IOs, their role in the 
spreading of ideas, as well as the possible impact (e.g. Armingeon and Beyeler 2004, 
Deacon 2001, 2007, Falkner et al. 2005, Mahon and McBride 2008, Ervik, Kildal and 
Nilssen forthcoming 2009, Martens and Jacobi forthcoming).  
Section 3.2 reviews this idea literature, which is thought to be both more open 
to agency and sensitive towards interaction between actors and structures than other 
theories (Berman 2001: 246).39 Literature about the power of ideas is, of course, not 
                                                 
38 For a closer discussion of this, see e.g. Lieberman (2002), Blomqvist (2007), Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein 
(2007). 
39 The choice of literature on ideas as the theoretical framework is motivated among other things by the light it 
can shed on how countries completely voluntarily embrace foreign social policy programmes. However, other 
bodies of literature such as literature on compliance, international organizations and management literature could 
have been used. Compliance literature often focuses on hard law like directives and is less relevant for my 
approach (e.g. Chayes and Chayes 1993, Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996, Börzel 2002, Falkner et al. 2005, 
2008, Linos 2007). There is a body of literature on international organizations that could be relevant to include, 
(e.g. Barnett and Finnemore 2004, Diehl 2005). However, these authors mainly deal with other organizations 
than the EU and OECD, and also focus less on social policy, so I hardly draw on this literature (Bøås and 
McNeil 2004 is one exception). Within management literature there is also a focus on ideas. The importance of 
reputation/image is stressed and there exists, for instance, a voluminous literature on Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Cf. Kvåle and Wæraas (2006) and Røvik (2007) for a Norwegian perspective. While this 
literature also focuses on ideas and their dissemination, it is mainly from the perspective of private business 
organizations, comprising ideas on management, strategy, design and structure of organization, and Human 
Resource Management. I thus do not draw much on this literature in my work. 
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without weaknesses. Some of these are addressed in the following review, e.g. the 
relation between ideas and interests.40 
 
3.2. Review of ideational based approaches 
 
Berman (2001) refers to the recent increase in approaches relying on idea-based 
explanations of policy-making as an ideational renaissance in political analysis. The 
role of ideas has been discussed in contributions on social learning (e.g. Heclo 197, 
Hall 1989, 1993), agenda-setting (e.g. Kingdon 1995), policy networks (e.g. Haas 
1992), diffusion (e.g. Kuhnle 1978, 1981, 1996, Weyland 2005), policy transfer (e.g. 
Dolowitz 2000b-c), globalization and europeanization (e.g. Featherstone and Radaelli 
2003), and discourses and ideas (e.g. Campbell 1998, 2002, Schmidt and Radaelli 
2004).41 
I examine whether advice from international organizations influences family 
policy reforms in Norway and Germany. In other words, I study learning, lesson 
drawing, diffusion or policy transfer, terms which I use interchangeably. This process, 
characterised by Karvonen (1981) and Dolowitz (2000a-b-c) as the use of ideas from 
abroad in the development of domestic policy, is illuminated in the different bodies of 
literature listed above. I shall first provide an overview of the findings in the most 
important literature (3.2.1 – 3.2.4) and then draw on these when I develop my own 
approach (section 3.3).  
Since there is not one specific theory on ideational influence in social policy 
(Evans and Davies 1999: 363, 364), I organize these first sections around a set of 
                                                 
40 Cf. Weiss and Carayannis (2001) for a useful discussion of different possible shortcomings of this literature.  
41 Scholars organize the literature discussed here in particular ways. For instance, Stone (1999) and Nedergaard 
(2007) argue that policy diffusion is a collective term of policy transfer and policy learning. Weiss and 
Carayannis (2001) differentiate between three groups of ideational literature; institutional, expert- and activist 
groups, and constructivist approaches. Schmidt (2006) provides us with an instructive discussion of different 
forms of institutionalism where discursive institutionalism, comprising scholars like Hall or Blyth, is a particular 
relevant category for my project. However, to me it is not so important how the literature is grouped. It is enough 
to say that there exists a great body of research that is relevant for my research questions, having as a common 
feature a focus on the role of beliefs and ideas, making Nedergaard calling this body of research “the belief 
approach” (2006: 425). It is more important to identify useful theories that can shed light on my research 
questions and serve as point of departure for assumptions than making categories of ideational literature. 
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questions.42 According to Rueschemeyer, there will never be a detailed theory on how 
ideas matter (2006: 249). However, drawing on the above mentioned contributions, I 
may present what adds up to theory on how ideas can matter for social policy 
development by answering the following questions: what does it mean when saying 
that ideas matter for social policy? Why, when and how do ideas matter for social 
policy? What is the relationship between ideas, interests and institutions? 
 
3.2.1 What does it mean that ideas matter for social policy? Why and how 
do ideas matter for social policy?  
 
The argument about how ideas play a role in policy-making is perhaps expressed in its 
most precise and shortest way like this: 
 
“Idea-based explanations identify ideas, or beliefs about the world, as having an independent 
influence during processes of policy change in that they affect how political actors form and 
reformulate their preferences. Thus, ideas help actors determine what they should do and what 
lies in their interest” (Blomqvist 2007: 5). 
 
I understand independent as implying that ideas add something that interests or 
problem pressure alone cannot deliver. As will become clear from the analysis; I do 
not think it makes sense to say that ideas alone change policies (section 3.2.3). 
Therefore I do not think that there is an inherent lack of logic in ideational theory, 
when claiming that ideas have an independent effect on policy-making, and then 
identifying policy failure, problem pressure, and supportive powerful actors as 
beneficent for the success of the very same ideas. And, as Beckman writes, it is not the 
idea that has impact on something; it is peoples´ understanding of ideas that is 
important (2005: 81). Thus, actors and ideas can hardly be separated from each other. 
Ideas alter the views of actors and open new perspectives, which may result in new 
perceptions as well as –ultimately- policy change. Dobbin et al. (2007) explains how 
this can happen:  
                                                 
42 This is a technique applied in some state of the art papers, see for instance Stone (1999), Dolowitz and Marsh 
(2000) or Berman (2001). 
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“The driving idea here is that changes in ideas drive policy diffusion. Policy makers derive 
ideas about how to bring about political justice and economic growth from the world around 
them. Given changing norms and uncertainty about which policies are most effective, policy 
makers copy the policies that they see experts promoting and leading countries embracing or 
policies that they see their peers embracing“ (2007: 454).  
 
Knill and Lehmkull (1999) provide an overview of how ideas at the level of the EU 
can influence domestic policy-making. They examine EU legislation, and not policy 
ideas without sanctions which I do, but their insights are still useful, because 
Europeanization can also be about the spread of unbinding advice. They give three 
ways in which European policies may promote national reforms: by providing 
legitimization, by providing specific solutions, and by altering or constraining the 
possibilities for opposition. The last way requires some explanation. Even if former 
opponents are not entirely convinced by the new ideas disseminated at the 
international level, they might change their strategy from rejecting a reform, which 
they now experience is given momentum by outside influence, to actively participating 
in the shaping of the reform. Europeanization can thus both change actors´ beliefs and 
alter domestic opportunity structures. 
This is the point in studies of policy transfer, diffusion, and lesson drawing. 
Ideas developed in one context are applied in another setting. Dolowitz defines policy 
transfer as  
 
“the occurrence of, and processes involved in, the development of programmes, policies, 
institutions, etc. within one political and/or social system which are based upon the ideas, 
institutions, programmes and policies emanating from other political and/or social systems“ 
(2000a: 3). 
 
Ideas may of course be transferred within a country, e.g. between two regional 
authorities, but the literature is mostly occupied with how ideas from abroad are used 
in domestic policy.  
From these introductory clarifications arises the question about what an idea is. 
Campbell (1998) differentiates between four kinds of ideas based on their level of 
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generality; paradigmatic ideas, programmatic ideas, frames, and public sentiments. His 
argument, which I share, is that each type exerts a different kind of influence on 
policy-making (1998: 384). Paradigmatic ideas are often referred to as ideologies. 
Such ideas are more overall views upon the functions of, in my case, social policies. 
Programmatic ideas offer concrete solutions to problems and include causal views. A 
third type of idea in Campbell’s typology is frames. Framing means making solutions 
acceptable. The last type is ideas as public sentiments. The point here is that ideas 
must be politically legitimate and acceptable in order to get necessary support in the 
electorate. Campbell’s and similar categorizations by Goldstein and Keohane (1993), 
Yee (1996) or Tannenwald (2005), summarize and specify the idea concepts in an 
instructive way, which I rely on when presenting the ideas relevant for domestic 
family policy reforms in chapter 4. However, as mentioned in chapter 1, Béland offers 
a clear and short definition, sufficient to illustrate what is most often understood by 
policy ideas, and is most interesting for my study of the spread of family policy 
advice: ideas are “specific policy alternatives (…) as well as the organized principles 
and causal beliefs in which these proposals are embedded” (2005: 2). 
 Two authors who have focussed upon ideas from the perspective of discourses 
are Schmidt and Radaelli (2004a-b). As noted by Nilssen (2007), the use of discourse 
and ideas imply the same analytical perspective, but the concept of discourse can be 
considered broader than that of ideas. Discourse, Schmidt and Radaelli state, “helps 
create an opening to policy change by altering actors´ perceptions of the policy 
problems, policy legacies and ´fit`, influencing their preferences, and, thereby, 
enhancing their political institutional capacity to change” (2004a: 188). While many of 
the studies and authors I have referred to have idea-based perspectives, which more or 
less consider ideas to be independent variables causing policy change, ideas and 
discourses are more like intermediate variables to Schmidt and Radaelli. Ideas and 
discourses are both new perspectives, shaping policy-making (discourse as a set of 
ideas), and a resource, useful when trying to convince others of its qualities (discourse 
as an interactive process). This is a fairly broad understanding of discourse, and 
Schmidt and Radaelli acknowledge this themselves in referring to it as an umbrella 
definition (2004a: 197). Schmidt (2000) draws a similar distinction: discourse as both 
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a means and a cause. The communicative discourse is constructed by government-
centred elites, directed toward the general public, whereas the coordinative discourse 
is constructed by wider elites and directed at the very same elite (2000: 232). Both are 
needed, according to Schmidt, to achieve change. In my approach I will focus more on 
the ideational (or coordinative discourse) and less on the interactive dimension (or 
communicative discourse). 
 Ideas and discourses contribute to policy learning (Schmidt and Radaelli 
2004a), and a framework based on discourses and ideas is very similar to approaches 
relying on concepts like learning and lesson drawing. Learning seems to be a common 
feature in all approaches dealing with the effect of ideas and discourse. In an article 
from 1993, Hall elaborates on the success and failure of Keynesianism, introducing 
concepts such as social learning, policy paradigm, and first/second/third order 
change. The latter three-level change measure is used in many studies trying to capture 
to what extent a particular welfare reform is changing the basis of the welfare state in 
question (e.g. Hinrich and Kangas 2003).43 To describe the degree of change caused by 
ideas is not my main aim. For my purpose, what Hall writes about social learning and 
policy paradigms is more interesting. Social learning is: "a deliberate attempt to adjust 
the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information. 
Learning is indicated when policy changes as the result of such a process" (1993: 278). 
This perspective must include learning from negative experiences, learning what not to 
do (Rose 1991), and learning without action; i.e. disregarding experiences and advice. 
However, as Hall notes, policymakers “work within a framework of ideas and 
standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that 
can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to 
be addressing” (1993: 279). This framework is a policy paradigm, and the role of ideas 
in this framework is to define what information, knowledge, and goals dominate the 
policy process. Policy paradigms are sometimes replaced by new policy paradigms, 
                                                 
43 A somewhat related, but different tool is found in Streeck and Thelen (2005b). They focus on how actors 
cultivate change and offer five modes of such change. Displacement, layering, drift, conversion and exhaustion 
are all processes that might result in institutional change. Some of these processes have been outlined by other 
authors, see e.g. Hacker (2004). They are processes of gradual change and emphasize different routes or 
strategies agents of change could follow. This is less useful for my purpose since I focus on the role played by 
international organizations. Cf. Schiller and Kuhnle (2008) for a useful discussion of policy change frameworks. 
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which are not in accordance with each other (1993: 280). Hall’s analysis of paradigm 
shifts offers us three important insights: a) the move from one paradigm to another is 
political rather than scientific since it is impossible to decide neutrally which one is 
best (cf. Blyth 2002 above), b) change is strongly connected to authority, implying that 
such paradigm shifts are usually associated with shifts in actors´ authority, c) shifts 
often occur after policy experimentation, or policy failure. By focussing on learning, 
Hall emphasizes the importance of ideas in policy-making, since policy makers always 
have to consider established and new ideas in their work; ideas condition policy-
making (1993: 290).44 
 
3.2.2. When do ideas matter for social policy? 
 
To identify factors that increase or decrease the likelihood for ideation, that is the 
causal effect of political ideas and beliefs upon policy-making, is a central topic in the 
literature dealing with ideas. Conditions that are important for the fate of a new idea 
can roughly be divided into characteristics of the idea itself and characteristics about 
the surroundings (the context). Starting with the latter, many scholars emphasize 
circumstances and structures within the political system that affects the idea’s chances 
of success. Authors agree that the success of new ideas relies on the existence of some 
kind of problem or crisis: dissatisfaction drives policy change (e.g. Rose 1991). 
Examples of such problems are economic recession or crisis, defeat in war, feedback 
about existing programmes (implementation problems, costs, unanticipated 
consequences, failure to meet goals), or policy failure in some way (Heclo 1974, Rose 
1991, Hall 1993, Kingdon 1995, Stone 1999, Berman 2001, Bönker 2001). To authors 
like Blyth (2002), this dissatisfaction creates uncertainty and opens what Kingdon 
(1995) refers to as a policy window, which offers opportunities for action on given 
initiatives. Related to this is the power of those who carry the idea. Epistemic 
community is a term coined by Haas (1992), and refers to groups of experts and 
influential actors whose ideas meet best reception in uncertain times when the need for 
                                                 
44 For a closer discussion of the differences between theories on and concepts of learning, see for instance 
Bennett and Howlett (1992) and Radaelli (2007).  
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knowledge and expertise is high. More generally and according to Rueschemeyer, “the 
strength of (…) ideas depends to a large extent on their grounding in groups and 
institutions” (2006: 249). Government turnover, changes in public opinion and 
national mood, new power relations, mobilization of interest groups, and the 
appointment of a commission of inquiry, are then, all examples of factors which are 
important for the degree to which an idea will gain influence (Heclo 1974, Goldstein 
and Keohane 1993, Levy 1994, Stone 1999, Berman 2001). The reputation thesis, 
focussing mainly on compliance with hard rather than soft law, says that a wish to 
keep a good reputation, for instance as being cooperative and progressive, can explain 
the import of policy ideas (Linos 2007). And as Büchs notes, institutionalism theory 
“suggests that voluntary policy exchange and policy transfer are more likely to take 
place between Member States with similar backgrounds and close relationships, 
because it would be too costly to adopt significantly different foreign models into a 
domestic framework” (2006: 46, cf. also Simmons and Elkins 2004: 175). 
Regarding the idea itself, the responsiveness of ideas to particular problems 
(Berman 2001) is crucial. Hall emphasizes this in saying that how policy makers 
respond to new ideas is influenced by economic viability (the solution must fit the 
problem), administrative viability (the agreement of civil servants as well as the 
resources of the state to implement change), and political viability (the idea must be 
attractive to politicians as well) (1989: 375). The central point about ideas is that they 
identify aims and offer solutions (Hall 1989: 390). To Hall, ideas mainly play a role in 
the process of convincing politicians to adopt a new policy. His aim is to understand 
how an idea becomes adopted, but also how an idea results in new policies. As such, 
ideas are both to be explained and to explain an outcome. Brooks (2007), Simmons 
and Elkins (2004), and Bönker (2005,) argue that the availability of successful foreign 
models makes the spread of ideas more likely, while negative experiences decrease or 
defer such spread. Similarly, governments are more likely to import a policy when a 
consensus exists on which policy is appropriate. If not, the government will “face 
reputational consequences that cast doubt on their approach to the economy and, 
potentially, the legitimacy of their governance” (Simmons and Elkins 2004: 173). 
Policy failure makes actors open to change, and successful ideas from other contexts 
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increases the chances of import. Also, and this is argued by Schmidt and Radaelli 
(2004a: 201), the chances for success are higher if the ideas and discourses include 
normative arguments that can be combined with the more cognitive arguments about 
relevance and efficiency. 
McNeill (2006) or Blomqvist (2007) underline another very important criterion 
for the success of an idea; the power of an idea increases if the idea is formulated in a 
way which makes it open to several interpretations. In the words of Palier, “(...), an 
important element for the acceptance of a new measure seems to be its capacity to 
aggregate different – and even contradictory – interests, based on different, and 
sometimes contrasting, interpretations” (2001 [2007]: 117). Schmidt’s observation is 
that ideas may change cognitive orientations and overcome interest-based opposition, 
by appealing to some common values or goals (2000: 308). Intuitive, straightforward 
and logical ideas spread easier than more complex ideas (Marcussen 2002). 
According to Brooks (2007), costs or risks associated with a new policy, e.g. 
financial expenses or political capital in the process of convincing others of the merit 
of the policy, are important as well. International organizations like the EU and OECD 
are known to be able to reduce these costs (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 7). Relying on 
advice from such organizations provides domestic policy makers with argumentation 
as well as legitimacy. Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001), and Börzel and Risse 
(2003), argue that a misfit between national and international (European) advice 
triggers change, the pressure to change depending on how big the mismatch 
(“goodness of fit”) is. The scope for new policy ideas is larger when the misfit is high. 
One should expect that “low costs ideas” have the highest probability of acceptance. 
Bennett focuses on how the interests of the importer, and not the quality of the 
ideas themselves, decide the use of policy evidence from abroad (1991: 31). Such 
motives may be to put an issue on the agenda, mollify political pressure, provide best 
practice, summarize options, and reinforce decisions already made. McNeill is 
concerned with related issues when he says that both the inherent merit of the idea (the 
power of the idea), and the status and resources of the promoters (the power of the 
promoter), influence the success of an idea (2006: 344). This is an illustration of how 
ideas, actors, institutions, and interests are closely related. 
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An insight from Weir and Skocpol (1985: 126) is that the presence of 
individuals or ideas is not enough to understand whether a particular set of ideas 
becomes influential. To what extent state agencies are open or closed to the new 
perspectives is just as important. In the case of advice disseminated by IOs, it is 
natural to consider this openness to be present, as such organizations consist of 
individual member countries, i.e. countries have voluntarily “joined” these 
organizations. This also is a sort of timing issue; the climate, or ideological context, as 
Kuhnle (1983) has referred to, must be favourable if a new idea is to be accepted. As 
Simmons and Elkins argue, learning may take place through communication and 
exchanges of information, something the IOs I study promote (2004: 175). 
This means that circumstances and structures within the political system, the 
status and resources of the promoters (the power of the promoter), as well as the 
inherent merit of the idea (the power of the idea), influence the success of an idea. This 
is not the same as saying that ideas have no independent influence. It merely means 
that different aspects of the idea itself and the surroundings always matter. By 
recognizing this, we are able to understand both when new ideas result in change and 
when they do not (Berman 2001). I elaborate on how to separate between actors, ideas, 
and interests in the following section. 
 
3.2.3. What is the relation between ideas, interests, actors, institutions 
and adaptation to external pressure? 
 
Realists and materialists, as well as some political traditions like Marxism 
(Rueschemeyer 2006: 235), do not ascribe much influence to ideas – to them it is 
power and material interests which are driving political change. Literature dealing with 
ideas acknowledges the importance of interests and institutions, but claim that ideas 
may have an independent effect on policy change. Ideas, interests and institutions 
intersect and influence each other (Béland 2005). This is what is described above when 
focussing on conditions favourable or non-favourable to the effect of ideas. As 
Campbell states, it is more productive to investigate how ideas and interest interact and 
affect one another than upholding “the old idealist versus materialist debate about the 
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nature of policy making” (2002: 34). This debate is more or less irresolvable 
(Tannenwald 2005: 24). Hochschild (2006) provides one example of how one instead 
of discussing which are most important of ideas and interest can study their 
interaction. In her view, ideas may override interests (actions could be based on ideas 
of morality, hope, or prudence rather than interests), ideas may justify interests 
(reinforcing interests), or ideas may create interests (actions are directed by an 
understanding of your interest derived from an idea).  
The same goes for adaptation to external pressure. Some would argue that recent 
welfare reforms are not the result of ideas about what to do, but simply a reaction to 
material conditions and challenges that needs to be addressed, e.g. population ageing.45 
There are several reasons to believe that this claim is too simple. First, as argued by 
Bönker;  
 
“The current renegotiation of the welfare state settlement in most OECD countries goes hand-
in-hand with substantial changes in the policy beliefs and positions of major actors. The 
reforms that have been discussed and/or adopted are more than just the execution of economic 
imperatives or the by-product of changes in government. Already the simple observation that 
large part of these reforms have been brought about by social democratic governments 
suggests that reforms have been guided by new views on the role of state and market and on 
the goals, possibilities and instruments of social policy“ (2005: 81).  
 
Second, and underlined by the references to Blyth (2002) in the introduction, no crisis 
is self-evident, and must be interpreted. Several of the scholars I have referred to stress 
this, e.g. Hall (1989, 1993). As Hay and Rosamond claim, “it is the ideas that actors 
hold about the context in which they find themselves rather than the context itself 
which informs the way in which actors behave” (2002: 148).46 Connected to this is that 
while certain situations may create a need to act, they do not automatically tell policy 
makers which measures they should take. As we know from the analyses of Castles 
(2004) or Hinrichs (2001) [2007], population ageing could be met by retrenchment 
                                                 
45 One could also ask whether a reaction to such factors at all can be without some relation to ideas.  
46 “This in turn suggests the importance of differentiating clearly between: (i) the effects of globalization itself; 
(ii) the effects of having internalized popular constructions of globalization; and, indeed, (iii) the strategic and 
disingenuous appeal to globalization as a convenient justification for unpalatable reforms. All too frequently the 
second is mistaken for the first; the third discounted altogether“ (Hay and Rosamond 2002: 150).  
  
78 
policies, like expenditure cutbacks and pension reforms or by measures which extends 
the welfare responsibilities of the state, such as new family policies and efforts to 
increase labour market participation rates. Third, researchers should not uncritically 
take economic and social challenges, e.g. population ageing, as the reason for a new 
policy. If, in a comparison of two units, the presence or absence of one feature is used 
to explain the outcome in question, then one risks drawing a wrong conclusion of 
causal relationships, if the decisive factor is not the particular feature but rather a 
process of diffusion and learning. This challenge is often referred to as Galton’s 
problem; an outcome cannot be explained by domestic variables, but rather by 
interaction between states (Jahn 2006: 409, see also Karvonen 1981, 1994). For 
instance, examining the possible influence of Bismarck’s social insurance policies, 
Kuhnle (1981) finds support for diffusion in the case of early Norwegian social 
insurance policies, less so for other Nordic countries. Fourth, the work of Weyland 
(2005) on diffusion processes shows that the adaptation-view cannot be entirely 
correct. Weyland starts out from the observation that “countries that are at very 
different levels of economic, social, and political development” (2005: 262) choose 
similar strategies, suggesting that domestic functional needs cannot explain reforms, 
because their very different points of departure should lead to different strategies. A 
similar point is that many of the problems, e.g. falling birth rates and low female 
employment rates, have existed for a long time, thus making it unlikely that reforms 
are due to problem pressure alone. 
Based on his observations, Weyland formulates research questions that are very 
similar to mine; what drives emulation decisions? What are the motives? How does it 
happen? This moves attention from allegedly forced adaptation, due to external 
pressure, to the voluntary use of foreign models, as described by Dobbin et al. (2007) 
(cf. section 3.2.1). One benefit of an idea-based approach is the possible improved 
understanding of why countries with very different economic situations exert similar 
policies, which cannot be explained by structural conditions like economy or 
demography alone. Should Norway, having almost no unemployment (around 2 
percent) and a budget surplus of 19,3 percent of GDP, apply the same unemployment 
policies as Germany, a country with a government deficit, an unemployment rate of 
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almost 7,5 percent and a public debt of 1 577 242 million Euro?47  Learning gains 
importance. It helps us understand why former defenders of welfare arrangements 
suddenly promote retrenchment or extension, as the quote above from Bönker (2005) 
draws attention towards. Moreover, ideational accounts of politics take as their point 
of departure that actors may “defy the constraints of political and social structures” 
(Lieberman 2002: 698). 
Still, it is important to recognize that learning from ideas can be based on different 
motives. Jack Levy (1994) underlines how learning and policy change is not the same 
thing, and that genuine learning must be differentiated from the rhetorical/strategic use 
of experience to “prove” a position. Levy also differentiates between causal and 
diagnostic learning. The former regards consequences and strategies, whereas 
diagnostic learning is about initial conditions; how the current situation, problems, and 
goals are to be understood. This may help us understand situations where actors facing 
similar problems choose different solutions; although diagnostic learning takes place, 
additional causal learning is not always the outcome of learning processes. Also, by 
telling us to separate learning from its causes, Levy points to a difference between a 
need for action caused by, for instance, an understanding of a rapidly ageing society, 
and the reaction of policy makers, for instance measures meant to increase fertility. 
This is, in my opinion, sometimes underemphasized in literature on welfare state 
change, since there is always more than one alternative available to politicians. 
Another issue is the question of the kind of learning which takes place. Is it 
rational and purposeful, or incidental? One could ask whether we witness a search for 
the best policy options offered by other actors (rational problem-solving), or is it more 
incidental as Kingdon (1995) shows that it can be when solutions wait for problems 
(“coupling”, cf. also Cohen, March and Olsen 1972). Moreover, Berman (2001) 
presents two views upon why actors support new ideas. It may be due to genuine 
conviction that the idea in question will benefit society in general (open), or more 
tactical to “justify and further self-interested agendas” (2001: 235). To separate 
                                                 
47 All figures refer to 2006, 2007, or 2008, and are taken from Eurostat Selected Principal European Economic 
Indicators, accessed 28.10.2008, available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1194,47773485,1194_47782287:1194_66724556&_dad=p
ortal&_schema=PORTAL  
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rational from tactical political learning regarding, for instance electoral success, is 
problematic (Radaelli 2007). Although an interesting discussion, Zutavern argues that 
it is of less analytical value to distinguish between tactical and “true” intentions, as the 
most interesting question is whether ideas play a role, and not for which reasons 
(2007: 3). Related to these questions is the one on how to disentangle the effect of 
ideas from other factors. Schmidt admits that this is a difficult undertaking but that this 
should not keep researchers from asking when ideas and discourses “serve to 
reconceptualize interests rather than just reflect them, to chart new institutional paths 
instead of simply following old ones, and to reframe cultural norms rather than only 
reify them“ (2006: 114). This important issue will be discussed in the methods chapter, 
focussing, among other things, on the importance of actors.  
 
3.2.4. What the review has showed 
 
I have reviewed and presented central contributions in the literature on ideas, 
discourses, policy networks, learning, diffusion, and transfer. More specifically, 
literature concerned with international sources for national policy has been identified 
providing particularly relevant theoretical perspectives for my project. The insights 
from this literature can be summarized as follows.  
 Ideas shape preferences and structure choices, thus under certain conditions, 
leading to new policies. The mechanism that explains this process in much of the 
literature is learning about existing policies, or cause-effect beliefs, transmitted from 
other actors. Ideas can be classified as belonging to different categories, and in studies 
of the impact of international organizations (IOs), policy advice or programmes are 
particularly interesting ideas. Furthermore, circumstances within the political system, 
the status and resources of the promoters, and the inherent merit of the idea, all 
influence the success of an idea. Finally, the review has shown that it does not make 
sense to think of ideas, interests, actors, and institutions as separate explanatory 
strategies, but more as being important to a large or less large extent. As argued by 
Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 26), an idea-approach does not disregard the 
importance of interests, but focuses on how variation in ideas affects political action. 
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These insights will be discussed further in the next section, which presents my own 
view on how ideas can illuminate the family policy reforms I take an interest in. 
 
3.3. The relationship between interests, institutions and ideas: a 
synthesis moving towards a new approach 
 
I shall draw upon the reviewed literature when developing the idea-based approach to 
be used. In the next chapter, I will elaborate on the approach by delving into the 
challenge of isolating, measuring, and empirically applying, ideas in studies of family 
policy reforms.  
I study the dissemination and possible impact of completely voluntary family 
policy advice. Learning is an important part of the approach I develop for several 
reasons. First, as the review above shows, learning is central in many of the 
approaches relying on ideational impact. Using ideas to understand change means that 
learning becomes the central mechanism, as actors must first become aware of and be 
persuaded by the new ideas. Second, there are institutionalized (and more informal) 
processes going on within international organizations, which are explicitly meant to 
generate learning. These may be hypothesised as having effects, thus warranting 
examination of learning mechanisms. Participation in such forums for the exchange of 
ideas, i.e. interaction through reviews, seminars, fact-finding-missions, and 
conferences, is the closest I may come to study the causal impact of a mechanism such 
as learning. 
My analysis directs particular attention towards what kind of influence 
international organizations may have on the development of national family policy. In 
doing this, I recognize that family policy is a rather new field for such organizations, 
and the EU does not even have a Treaty base for family policy. An important research 
question in itself is thus what kind of initiatives can be identified at the level of 
international organizations. I also briefly consider what role individual countries, 
Member States as well as Non-Member States, may have in the field. This leaves us 
with two possible agents of learning; international organizations, such as the EU and 
OECD, and individual countries. As Yee (1996: 92) notes, institutions control the 
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entry of ideas into policy-making, and the degree to which policy makers are exposed 
to these ideas. I examine the role of the EU and OECD in facilitating learning, by 
inviting Member States to the exchange of ideas, exposing them to updated research, 
best practice, and comparing their current performance with this; playing the “idea 
game”. In short, IOs make lessons available for Member States.48  
 Being aware of an idea is of course never a sufficient condition for policy-
adoption. Ideas must be mediated and reacted upon by actors. Actors play a crucial 
role, as they, for various reasons, e.g. persuasion, learning or self-interests, support or 
discard ideas. Also, ideas may obstruct just as much as they may foster policy change 
(Fleckenstein 2007: 15). As such, IOs may both promote and hinder policy reform. To 
try to distil the pure effect of an idea via one mechanism seems to me difficult, 
because actors and institutions will always matter for the effect of the idea in question. 
As noted by O’Connor (2005) and Béland (2005), ideational influence takes place 
within institutional arrangements, and actors must necessarily support ideas if they are 
to become influential. This might seem self evident and trivial, but it draws attention to 
an important point; without expecting to be able to establish “tipping points” (Berman 
2001: 240), or predict when ideas meet approval, and thus “succeed”, one important 
aim of my study is to shed light on which conditions are favourable for the influence 
of specific ideas.49 I will supplement the idea literature with some factors which 
increase our understanding of this issue. What I seek is an interaction between the 
level of ideas and the level of actual policy that may shed light on whether country A 
carries out welfare reforms based on specific ideas. 
 The object of learning, or “what is learned”, is ideas of policies and 
programmes. I include both very specific programmes, such as increase of childcare 
coverage for a certain age group, and more general policy ideas like reconciliation of 
work and family life and sustainability of the welfare state. I elaborate on this in the 
next chapter by way of a framework developed by Campbell (1998, 2002).  
The next part of my approach regards the actors who are learning. As seen in 
the literature review, different perspectives focus on different parts of the policy-
                                                 
48 In chapters 5 and 6, I elaborate on the learning processes mentioned briefly in this section.  
49 Tipping point means that an idea crosses a threshold and gets its own dynamics, independent of the policy 
makers that promoted the idea in the beginning (cf. Marcussen 2002: 172). 
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making process. Focussing on the persuasion of the public through e.g. a 
communicative discourse as found in Schmidt (2000), would make voters and citizens 
the learning actors. Instead I focus more on how policy makers, such as high level 
politicians and bureaucrats, learn. 
An important problem within the literature on ideas is the (insufficient) 
specification of causal mechanisms, or how ideas result in policy change. I focus on 
learning, which I understand as a result of exposure to ideas. The processes at 
international level, which bring together policy makers to discuss social policy, 
provide the environment where learning may take place. However, it is important to 
stress that I share the view of Beckman (2005: 86), arguing that when explaining 
policy change as a result of new understandings and motives, e.g. to learn how to 
improve a policy program, then more specific mechanisms than these understandings 
and motives are hardly possible to identify. The explanandum and explanans are so 
close already. Learning is thus a kind of intervening variable between the independent 
variable agency and the dependent variable policy change, which is difficult to observe 
(Bennett and Howlett 1992: 290). Still, it is not enough to explain learning by saying 
that an actor wanted to learn. How ideas gain influence and credit must be studied 
further. And as will be discussed in the chapter on methodology; if you cannot show 
that foreign information has been used, then the new policy might just as well stem 
from general or domestic social and economic development (Bennett 1991: 32). In the 
empirical chapters I will refer to reports, conferences, and formulation of policy ideas 
by the EU and the OECD as policy instruments which could be studied to see whether 
learning can account for domestic welfare reforms (Orenstein 2006: 5-6). 
The last part of my approach deals with the outcome of ideas disseminated by 
the agents of learning. This is the answer to why and when an idea causes change. It is 
impossible to develop a model which predicts the effect in any given case. Several 
important factors may be identified, however, emphasizing, in short, how the idea’s 
success is related to characteristics of the domestic agenda. Such factors include the 
perceived existence of a problem, power, and interests of different actors and 
institutions. Still, ideas may affect what actors view as their interests. In other words, 
focussing on learning does not mean that interests and structure are left out. As 
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stressed by Bennett and Howlett (1992: 290), learning must always take place within a 
given structure of power and authority. Moreover, the outcome may be anything from 
a pure copy to a loose synthesis of the idea in question (Rose 1991, Evans and Davies 
1999). Also, although ideas may convince actors, domestic economic, political, or 
bureaucratic constraints may prevent implementation of learning (Levy 1994: 290). 
Thus, one should also study learning that does not result in policy change. This view 
recognizes the two-step character of learning; learning takes place and then it might 
influence behaviour (Levy 1994: 291). 
Focussing on the role of IOs and the outcome of ideas, I limit my analysis to the 
stages Tannenwald (2005: 30) refers to as the transmission, reception, and 
implementation of ideas. This means that I pay less attention to her first stage, the 
origins and production of ideas. This is because this is both difficult and of less 
importance to my study: Tracing origins implies an infinite regress, since there is no 
logical place to stop the process of tracing an idea (Kingdon 1995: 73).50 Instead, 
Kingdon advises us to look at how ideas gain influence, and what they result in. 
As discussed in the review sections above, it is also a difficult task to separate 
ideas and interests. Imagine the introduction of a new welfare scheme which enables 
parents to stay at home with their new born child while still receiving salary. This 
might result in increased fertility rates, since it improves the situation for families with 
children, and as such it reflects an idea disseminated, for instance, by research 
communities. However, it may also reflect a more interest based action; family policy 
as an election-strategy to win support from voters with children. An article in Der 
Spiegel (2007a) presents the latter to be an important reason behind the newly 
legislated German Elterngeld-reform. Allegedly, the German conservative party, CDU, 
with the help of opinion poll researchers, identified family policy to be a strategic 
theme in the coming elections of 2009. What this example illustrates is that an idea 
sometimes coincides with an interest. Probably, exactly those ideas which both serve a 
public aim and the interest of one actor, stand the best chance of success. Related to 
                                                 
50 One could even ask whether it is fair, possible and/or relevant to demand ability to identify the source of an 
idea. The important fact is that once ideas become known and spread, they can serve an independent effect on 
thinking and action of actors. This is also a question of how far back in time you want to go to explain 
something.  
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this is the point made by McNeil (2006: 347), that malleable ideas are most successful, 
implying that ideas fitting different interpretations and interests have better chances 
than other ideas. In my analysis it is also assumed that the power of ideas is 
strengthened if they are accepted by, and further disseminated, by influential 
international organizations. This underlines the importance of the institutional setting 
(Hall 1989). 
As I have stated, to identify one single mechanism ideas work through is more 
or less impossible, but learning is central. I now move on by discussing a study which 
sheds light on the importance of ideas, but unfortunately not in an adequate manner.  
 
3.4 The challenge: Why some of the current studies inadequately 
explain welfare reforms 
 
In The Dual Transformation of the German Welfare State, Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 
(2004) provide an overview of the development within German unemployment 
schemes, old age insurance, and family policies, over the period 1975-2003. They 
conclude that Germany has gone through a “dual transformation”. On one side, there 
has been a substantial reduction of what is offered to the unemployed and retired. At 
the same time, family-oriented benefits have been substantially expanded.  
As I did in section 3.1, Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser argue that theories relying on 
political, institutional, and socio-economic explanations, e.g. party competition or 
financial difficulties, are insufficient. They are rejected as direct causes for the reforms 
because other policy responses than the ones chosen were possible. Instead they apply 
a constructivist approach. The hypothesis is that the main cause of the dual 
transformation was “the construction of new dominant interpretative patterns among 
the political elite – namely, that the policy change was primarily caused by a 
significant change in the political discourse” (2004: 4). 
Interpretative patterns are said to “combine various themes, set preferences 
among them, link the positions (pro or con) with the various themes, and set the 
various themes in relation to abstract values, which at the same time connect the 
themes on a generalised level“ (2004:  110). In their approach, causal beliefs about 
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socio-economic challenges enter into the political discourse, and out of this grow new 
interpretative patterns, leading to the reforms Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser describe as a 
dual transformation (2004: 111). The authors identify several interpretative patterns 
contradicting earlier principles of the German welfare state (2004: 127).  
As empirical validation of their hypothesis, they point to the interpretative 
patterns that became hegemonic. The way the Left has changed its mind is the main 
reason given for the reforms in the labour market and pensions (2004: 117). With 
regard to family policy, it is said that the Christian Democrats dropped some of their 
traditional views (2004: 135), and thereby became open to reforms. There are few 
references to more specific reasons. One exception may be how the modernisers 
among Social Democrats got the upper hand in the party, which is mentioned briefly 
once (2004: 125).  
While it is an important task to identify changes in the views of political parties 
and while the argument that parties have adopted new policies is compelling, this 
approach leaves us with little more knowledge about why the reforms really happened. 
It is a description of what took place and not how it came about. I share Bleses and 
Seeleib-Kaiser’s opinion, in claiming that “differences between the parties can be 
overcome over time and can lead to the construction of new interpretative patterns 
which will guide social policy development” (2004: 139), but in my opinion it is not 
enough to identify such interpretative patterns. One should try to explain where they 
stem from and why these new patterns gain hegemony. This explanation must include 
more than reference to changes in political actors’ opinions and line of argumentation 
(2004: 151). This is a good start, but how the ideas gain credence must be investigated 
further. When stopping here, the concordance between a new idea and reforms is not 
as convincing as it could be, and does not go beyond correlation, being only a 
beginning towards exploring change. The question becomes; what are the factors on 
which basis new ideas were constructed?  
Interpretative pattern has similarities with the discourse definition of Taylor-
Gooby and Daguerre (2002) presented earlier. However, how interpretative patterns 
affect policies is not clear enough. The content of interpretative pattern is rather vague 
and the sources for changes in interpretative patterns are lacking. Paraphrasing Albert 
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Yee (1996); there is a difference between showing that an interpretative pattern leads 
to a certain policy and understanding how this pattern arises and gains influence. The 
trust in the interpretative pattern-explanation is weakened when the second question is 
left unanswered. Instead of saying how the political discourse causes reforms, Bleses 
and Seeleib-Kaiser add another intervening variable called interpretative pattern.  
In sum, the point concerning causal mechanisms is that they, in a convincing 
way, should show how actors accept ideas, institutionalize and act on the basis of 
them. The mechanism must explain the gap between the idea and its implementation; 
why the idea leads to a certain domestic policy. As Elster emphasizes, it is not enough 
to cite the cause (1989: 4). Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser say that policy change results 
from the actors changing their minds, but do not explicitly discuss why the actors 
changed their minds, ending up with a preliminary description, more than explanation, 
as the main result. Such studies are not entirely successful, and their problem lies in 
the absence of depth, meaning that these studies are less interesting than they could 
have been if they had taken up the challenge of the now left unanswered “how-
question”. As emphasized already, I do not expect to be able to identify one 
determining causal mechanism, but I will investigate whether ideas behind national 
welfare reforms may stem from IOs. Let me now bring this chapter to a close by 
summarizing, before I propose a more fruitful approach to the study of ideas in the 
chapter on methodology.  
 
3.5 Summary and final remarks 
 
This chapter has reviewed literature which in various ways applies an idea-based 
approach, and outlined my own idea-based approach to family policy reforms, relying 
on elements from the reviewed literature. Summarized in one sentence, this approach 
argues that ideas have an independent influence on welfare reforms, by affecting views 
and preferences of political actors. This chapter has offered thoughts on why, how, and 
when ideas matter, the question of the effect of ideas versus pure economic challenges, 
and the relationships between actors, interests, and ideas. The answers to such 
questions contribute to theory on why and when politicians rely on what Brooks 
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(2007: 3) refers to as ”internationally-transmitted information”, an issue for which she 
calls for more research. 
An idea-based approach runs the risk of tautological reasoning (empty 
statements, knowledge derived from itself) of the type “welfare reforms happen 
because actors change their minds”. Arguably, this is a pitfall in the literature (Blyth 
1997: 236). As formulated by Hall;  
 
“(…) if we cannot say why one set of ideas has more force than another in a given case, we do 
not gain much explanatory power simply by citing ideas. In short, if we want to accord ideas 
an explanatory role in analysis of policy making, we need to know much more about the 
conditions that lend force to one set of ideas rather than another in a particular historical 
setting” (1989: 362).  
 
Theory on ideas is an analytical tool enabling us to identify how policies are formed. It 
is relevant to study ideas per se, because international debate might influence the 
thinking of actors. To avoid tautological inferences it is also necessary to study the 
process of how the new reform agenda is developed, and here actors become relevant. 
I will show this by investigating the role of one particular kind of actor; IOs.  
 This chapter has described some weaknesses of an idea-based approach, such as 
a weak focus on causal mechanisms, how ideas become prominent, and the 
relationship between ideas, interests, and actors. When this approach is still applied it 
is for the following reasons: I consider it to be particularly suitable since family policy, 
as elaborated on in the introductory chapter, is less dominated by institutional legacies 
and veto players, and more open to outside influence than other areas of social policy. 
Furthermore, when studying the possible influence of international organizations in 
this area, one is left with ideas since IOs can (with a few exceptions) only produce 
non-binding policy advice in the form of policy ideas. In addition, I will try to fill 
some of the voids identified in the existing literature. For instance, I will study the 
possible learning processes within IOs (chapters 5 and 6). In the next chapter I discuss 
issues such as isolating the effect of, measuring, and empirically applying ideas, in 
studies of family policy reforms. 
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Chapter 4 How to study the influence of ideas 
 
”Like subatomic particles, ideas do not leave much of a trail when they shift” (Hall 1993: 
290). 
 
 
I argue that family policy reforms may be driven by ideas just as much as socio-
economic factors such as budget deficits. Ideas seem to have an impact in spite of the 
fact that many family policy reforms increase costs. Economic considerations are not 
unimportant, but I claim that ideas, and in this specific case, from abroad, about what 
kind of family policies one should pursue, may be important to understand why 
reforms are carried out the way they are. To study such diffusion or cross-border 
adoption of ideas and international influences in social policy is a demanding task. 
This chapter discusses methodological challenges, and presents the approach used in 
the following analysis. The chapter also presents family policy ideas, and provides an 
overview of the data sources the study relies on.  
In short, the overall theme could be said to be concordance/non-concordance 
with internationally-transmitted policy ideas. If I should phrase my approach in the 
vocabulary of variables, it would be like this: change/non-change in national family 
policy, in terms of the provision of benefits in cash and kind, e.g. the introduction of 
new instruments, is what is being studied, and is thus the dependent variable.51 I seek 
to analyze whether advice from international or national actors (governments), being 
the independent variables, have resulted in changed policies. In other words, what 
degree of cross border ideational influence on national family policy is there? 
However, as Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000) argue, one should treat ideas and 
policy transfer as both dependent and independent variables: what kind of ideas exist, 
what it is about an idea that makes it effective, and how the ideas gain credit, must be 
investigated further. In the next two chapters, the family policy ideas of IOs are 
                                                 
51 Thus, changes in institutional characteristics and not overall level of social spending are chosen. For instance, 
retrenchment in terms of cutbacks alone does not cover the instances of expansion that we witness within family 
policy (Clasen 2005: 15). On the dependent variable problem in comparative welfare state analysis, see Green-
Pedersen (2004), Clasen (2005) and Clasen and Siegel (2007). 
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discussed, meaning that what is considered independent variables in chapters 7 and 8 
on country reforms are dependent variables in chapters 5 and 6. National family policy 
reforms are obviously not the sole result of cross border influence. Socio-economic 
features like demographic change (population ageing, low birth rates), the country’s 
economic situation, gender relations, values orientations, and public attitudes towards 
family life, as well as characteristics of the political system (e.g. centralized-unitary or 
decentralized-federal government), play a role. These are variables I do not analyze 
specifically, but, as discussed in chapter 2 and 3, acknowledge that matter a great deal.  
There exists no simple cause-effect relationship between ideas and policy 
decisions. Such relations can hardly be demonstrated fully. Still, influential actors can 
be identified, and the framing and dissemination of ideas as well as their content and 
reception can be studied. Following a discussion of the concept of ´influence`, I shall 
outline how I intend to study the framing, dissemination, and reception of ideas. 
 
4.1 What is influence? 
 
Terms like “influence”, or “impact”, are often used without being defined. This is 
problematic because such everyday concepts are not straightforward, and have several 
difficulties connected to them, for instance that they cannot easily be measured. Much 
the same may be said of concepts like “effect”, “outcome”, or “cause” (Barbier 2005: 
419), concepts used uncritically in many connections. Büchs (2006) stresses that 
several problems arise when examining the “influence” of unbinding policy processes, 
such as the Open Method of Coordination. “Influence” is not directly observable, only 
change, and rarely the reason why something changed, can be seen. Ascribing an actor 
influence to a matter is based only on indirect evidence. In addition, as Büchs (2006: 
57) reminds us, multi-causality is the rule rather than the exception in the social 
sciences. This observation is particularly relevant in studies of “soft” policy processes, 
since they have no claim of being followed up, and are thus reliant on voluntary action 
by national actors, who for different reasons may or may not refer to best practices, 
disseminated by IOs. A soft stimulus from the international level requires an active 
response at the national level to gain influence (Büchs 2006: 59). Also, the kind of 
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influence we are dealing with in such non-binding policy exchanges, are, according to 
Büchs, inherently concealed, implying that actors have tactical reasons for admitting 
or denying that such processes exert an influence on national policy-making (2006: 
59).  
Mörth argues that it is difficult to assess the impact of the EU because European 
and national processes are not separate processes; they depend on each other (2003: 
173, see also Zeitlin 2005a: 457).52 She also draws attention to another problem with 
“impact studies”. If the dependent variable is defined narrowly you might overlook 
change that takes place that is not completely identical to the EU-policy serving as the 
point of departure; “EU policies and legalizations do not travel as ready-made 
packages” (Mörth 2003: 160, cf. also Citi and Rhodes 2007: 10). It is not always 
obvious for policy makers what they need to do in order to comply  with, or obtain 
good results in a policy field.  
In line with what Büchs (2006) and Mörth (2003) point out, I expect to see little 
direct impact of supranational advice, but rather signs of how the international level 
has resulted in, or been used to start, debates and the provision of arguments. This is 
also an aspect of “influence”, although not of a direct and obvious kind. Such issues 
should be kept in mind when outlining the empirical research methods to be used in 
the study of cross border transmission of family policy ideas. Section 4.4 elaborates on 
such challenges, but let me first present my empirical approach, followed by a 
classification of ideas (4.3).  
 
 
                                                 
52 This also emphasizes how a variable oriented approach is difficult to apply since it is difficult to 
systematically keep independent and dependent variables apart when studying a policy-making process which 
has many phases before a final decision (i.e. a certain value in the dependent variable) is reached. Radaelli also 
refers to the issue of interlinked national and international processes (2003: 50). He proposes multi-causal 
analysis as the solution, in order to establish the relative impact of Europeanization. Unfortunately this is very 
comprehensive and time-consuming. But an analysis of alternative or complementary explanations to ideas, e.g. 
interests or perception of problem pressure, would increase the trust in the final conclusion on whether foreign 
ideas did matter for German and Norwegian family policy reforms. However, as I have argued in chapter 3, I 
have chosen ideational theory because I consider other explanatory approaches less promising for my cases. 
Thus I will not offer any comprehensive analysis of complementary explanations.  
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4.2 How can ideas exert influence? How can this influence be 
studied empirically?   
 
My study of cross-border influences in family policy is particularly concerned with the 
role of international actors such as the EU and OECD. The first step in an investigation 
of their possible influence is to identify what kind of policies Germany and Norway 
had when being exposed to international advice, and then present the views of IOs. 
Chapters 5 (EU) and 6 (OECD) will provide both an overview of, as well as a 
classification of, family policy ideas at the international level during (approx.) the last 
ten years (1998-2008), while chapters 7 (Germany) and 8 (Norway) will start by 
presenting country specific advice from IOs and recent reforms.  
 The approach to answer the research questions formulated might be considered 
a mix of the process-tracing and concordance methods: Concordance because I 
compare the policy advice issued by IOs with national reforms in Germany and 
Norway and see whether they are in concordance with each other or not. Similarities 
indicate (but in themselves only indicate) possible influence, while non-similarity 
indicates the opposite. Process tracing because I try to identify processes whereby 
ideas might have been transformed from one actor to another by searching for traces of 
influence in different sources. According to George and Bennett, process tracing is 
about tracing links between possible causes and observed outcomes (2005: 6). It is a 
method which enables the researcher to “eliminate some explanations and increase our 
confidence in others” (2005: 149). This is about as far as this analysis can take us. 
The discussion about cross border influence must be guided by some criteria, such 
as whether Germany and Norway participate in exchange of ideas, timing (whether 
reforms come (soon) after advice is issued), and whether national and international 
arguments for reform are similar. To establish these aspects, consultation (interviews) 
of key actors in the process and parliamentary debates are useful. In a classical 
diffusion study of Swedish legislation to Finland, Karvonen identifies three empirical 
challenges that must be tackled in a study such as mine (1981: 55). 53 These challenges 
resemble the criteria I have just mentioned: 
                                                 
53 The literature on ideas contains many suggestions for research designs. In addition to the researchers 
mentioned here, Levy (1994) provides eight criteria, Dolowitz three (2000a: 33) or four (2000b: 39). 
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1. Demonstrate a basis for learning; policy makers must be informed and 
interested in foreign experiences, 
2. Demonstrate similarity between the policy ideas and the reforms in terms of 
principles, benefit levels, administration, and so on, and 
3. Demonstrate contact between the influential actor and the influenced country 
 
Stone has a similar way of substantiating policy transfer, adding that one should be 
able to demonstrate that the policy adoption is not caused by domestic factors alone, or 
similar modernizing forces taking place in several countries (1999: 56). As we know 
from Bennett (1991: 32): if you cannot show that foreign information has been used, 
then the new policy might just as well stem from domestic social, economic, and 
political development. But, still, one can not rule out that foreign information and 
influence is at stake: national actors may, as mentioned, for various reasons not refer to 
foreign inspiration. Foreign influence can be real, but hidden. The occurrence of policy 
A in country X after country Y has introduced policy A does not prove that diffusion 
has taken place: whether diffusion has taken place can only be established by elaborate 
process-tracing, and even then it may not be clear-cut, because national actors 
sometimes refuse to admit inspiration or learning from outside. 
Taking the considerations of these scholars as my point of departure, I will 
move forth in the following way. First, ideational influence and the concept idea must 
be defined (Campbell 1998: 401). This was done in the previous chapter (section 
3.2.1). Ideas are the views upon, and advice related to, family policy, issued by 
international organizations or at least present in the discourse at this level. Ideas may 
be traced empirically if defined and operationalized as social policy views, advice, and 
specific programmes recommended by the EU and OECD.54  
According to Deacon (2007), there is a “global contest of ideas” on social 
policy taking place, in which different non-state actors participate. The ideas in 
                                                 
54 Since ideas are operationalized as programmes and specific policy prescriptions, one could ask why I apply 
literature on ideas instead of strictly focussing on the issue of compliance or non-compliance with international 
advice, i.e. whether reforms conform to prescribed policies (e.g. Falkner et al. 2005). The reason is that much of 
the ideas in question cannot be called programmes. Instead they reflect more overall ideas, e.g. reconciliation of 
work and family life, rights and duties, activation or sustainability of the welfare state (see chapters 5 and 6). The 
literature on ideational impact may illuminate the reception of such ideas. Also, compliance literature is more 
concerned with coercion and sanctions in focussing on instances of binding cooperation (Checkel 2001). 
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question are given different tags in the scholarly literature. For instance, Deacon 
(2007) writes about social policy prescriptions for national social policy, the OECD 
speaks of recommendations or policy lessons, Armingeon and Beyeler (2004) about 
ideas and recommendations. All of these are included when I use the term family 
policy ´idea game`, but in the main I choose to use the term idea, which is consistent 
with my theoretical approach as well as recent literature, applied for instance by Ervik, 
Kildal and Nilssen (forthcoming 2009). 
As alluded to above, the family policy ideas of international actors will be 
presented in the following chapters. The empirical investigation of German and 
Norwegian family policy reforms (chapters 7 and 8) shall thus start with a closer 
description of IOs´ specific advice to these two countries, a presentation of national 
reforms, and a comparison thereof (concordance method). In a second step, the 
question of timing needs to be considered. If reforms should be a result of foreign 
ideas they must come relatively soon after recommendations were issued, or at least 
not before.55 Third, it must be possible to find evidence of contact (processes allowing 
learning to take place) between the exporter and importer of ideas. This may be 
participation in international reviews and studies, voluntary exchange of best practice 
in conferences, and so on. I shall search for specific processes through which ideas 
may be transmitted, and study such processes.56 Whether the EU and OECD have 
played a role in pushing family reforms forward can be answered by investigating 
documents, parliamentary debates, and conduct interviews with people participating in 
specific learning processes. As Schmidt and Radaelli (2004a) ask; do best practice and 
benchmarking provide resources and cognitive drives, or are they irrelevant to national 
policy makers? I can hardly specify a causal mechanism between family policy ideas 
and subsequent reforms, but I may identify learning processes involving dissemination 
of ideas (process tracing). 
The OECD and EU can influence social policy, mainly through voluntary adoption 
at the national level of their advice. They are both applying peer reviews and OMC 
                                                 
55 Although ideas may spread before they are formulated as clear recommendations or advice.  
56 One note of caution should be made; ideas can be transmitted by means other than through meetings and 
physical contact. Reports, academic studies or newspaper articles are possible channels which are even harder to 
trace. 
  
95
similar-methods (Bisopoulos 2003, Schäfer 2006). Peer reviews can be considered 
organized learning processes where transmission of ideas is the goal. They open up for 
detailed studies since they, though admittedly to various degrees, encompass mutual 
meetings, drawing up of position papers and advice, descriptions of challenges and 
possible solutions – much of this available in writing as reports, minutes, and 
statements (Pagani 2002, European Commission 2006d, OECD 2007a). Here we 
should expect to observe the transmission of political ideas and value judgements 
between the participants.  
The reason why ideas presented in such peer reviews are thought to have an effect 
is simple: these ideas are spread both in writing and orally through direct dialogue and 
discussion. In EU peer reviews, written statements are prepared by each country 
dealing explicitly with the question of transferability within given deadlines. Actors 
must make statements on ideas, whether ideas are considered good or bad. Peer 
reviews could thus involve some sort of learning mechanisms. Since peer reviews on 
family policy have been applied to a limited extent, especially in the EU, I mainly 
draw on participation in international reviews and studies, as well as voluntary 
exchange of best practice at conferences. 
One probable effect of international organizations and their strong emphasis on 
family policies is that questions of necessity for such policies disappear. At the 
national level it is no longer necessary to argue that increased spending, or a stronger 
emphasis on family issue, are an advantage. Instead one can move straight to 
discussions of “what kind”, “how” and “when”. The set up of peer reviews (e.g. 
procedures, participating actors, and policy fields covered) is described in more detail 
in chapters 5 and 6. The chapters on Germany and Norway will open with some 
assumptions on the importance of these processes, which will guide the analysis.  
Finally, following Radaelli (2007), I will “regard references in policy documents 
and interviews to international organizations, other foreign experiences as well as 
explicit intentions to copy these as clear evidence of learning”. In addition to direct 
references, I look for problem diagnoses and cause-effect beliefs as signs of ideational 
influence. After all, policy transfer must be a conscious process (Evans and Davies 
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1999: 328). Based on David Dolowitz´ five sources of information (2000b: 32) I have 
listed altogether nine sources where references or signs of ideas can be identified: 
 
1. official references to media reports 
2. studies commissioned by the government  
3. official references to studies published by independent groups and 
organizations, e.g. the use of statistics or comparisons provided by such actors 
4. government records (e.g. press releases or policy papers which contain official 
references to ideas and concrete examples of foreign influence) 
5. personal interviews (e.g. self-statement as influential by representatives of 
international organizations or statements of such ideas as influential by 
stakeholders at national level) 
6. websites and newsletters of ministries 
7. media coverage, e.g. interviews with officials 
8. participation at international conferences and speeches in e.g. parliamentary 
debates 
9. bills (both description of and sometimes giving the reasons for the new law) 
 
The list can be further extended with some indicators mentioned by Seeleib-Kaiser and 
Fleckenstein (2007: 440-441);  
10. fact finding missions to countries/institutions 
11. dialogue with experts in corresponding countries 
12. workshops with academic experts and practitioners 
 
This list of 12 points will serve as a check list of factors to demonstrate the extent of 
policy transfer, and in an effort to link domestic reforms to foreign influence. The 
point in examining such sources is simple: “Demonstrating that there was information 
available, and that agents of change were aware of it, is a key aspect of any analysis of 
policy transfer because just showing that policies look alike is not evidence of 
transfer” (Dolowitz 2000b: 33). Thus, I let this list guide me when I look for traces of 
foreign influence, but I will not compare the list point by point, in a rigid manner, with 
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my empirical material. Also, since this list refers to a great spectre of data sources, I 
will not be able to investigate all in detail. My main data sources will be parliamentary 
debates, expert interviews, and government records.  
My approach may be referred to as an “idea-analysis”. According to Beckman 
(2005: 12), an “idea-analysis” can be separated into content and functional analysis. 
The former focuses on the quality of the arguments under scrutiny, while the latter is 
concerned with how one understanding meets approval, which is closer to the aim of 
my study.57 Beckman also distinguishes between analyses which are idea-centred and 
actor-centred (2005: 17). Since my analysis is concerned with what role ideas 
disseminated by international organizations play for domestic family policy, my 
analysis can be said to be both idea- and actor-centred.  
The list above provides an overview of data sources, and section 4.5 presents 
the data I use. However, finding traces of ideas in such sources does not, as 
emphasized, prove once and for all that the reform in question was the result of 
ideational influence. Methodological challenges involved in using this check list will 
be discussed, but, first I present a framework for ideational analysis that will be used 
in chapters 5 and 6 to identify the policy ideas promoted by the EU and OECD. 
 
4.3 Campbell and the classification of ideas 
 
Campbell’s typology of ideas is elaborated on in two articles that are slightly different. 
His article from 1998 identifies four categories based on two dimensions; the first, 
specific, concrete ideas versus more general and underlying assumptions and, the 
second, cognitive versus normative ideas. The four categories are paradigmatic ideas, 
programmes, frames, and public sentiments. In the second article from 2002, the two 
dimensions are used less explicitly and the number of categories is slightly changed, 
and extended to five, adding world culture and substituting sentiments with normative 
frameworks. Each type of idea exerts a different kind of influence on policy-making. 
Here I combine the two articles, but rely mostly on the 1998-version.  
                                                 
57 As referred to in chapter 3, this approach is different from discourse analysis. See Beckman (2005: 88) and 
Schmidt and Radaelli (2004a: 193 and 2004b: 365) for a longer discussion. 
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Paradigmatic ideas are often referred to as ideologies. Such ideas are overall 
views on the functions of social policies. Campbell (2002: 22) uses Esping-Andersen’s 
(1999) work as one way to exemplify this kind of idea; assumptions about the extent to 
which families have responsibility for helping family members have consequences for 
how much state activity the welfare state encompasses. Such ideas identify problems, 
and set agendas, by giving objectives (López-Santana 2006). Campbell explains how 
this type of idea can contribute to change in policies: “Paradigmatic effects are 
profound because they define the terrain of policy discourse. When programmatic 
ideas fit the dominant paradigm they appear natural and familiar and, as a result, are 
more likely to appeal to policy makers than alternatives that do not” (1998: 390, my 
emphasis). As Campbell states, and as will become clear from the following analysis 
of Germany (chapter 7), certain welfare reforms are more or less impossible if policy 
makers cannot rid themselves of one paradigm, and replace it with another view of the 
public responsibility and scope for activity towards families.  
The second category, programmatic ideas, offers concrete solutions to 
problems, and includes causal views. The idea of the benefits of a certain kind of 
parental leave scheme is an example of this. Another example is the idea of the 
provision of childcare to children aged 1-3 years. Common for both examples are that 
they have the potential to exert influence due to their offer of specific solutions to 
specific challenges. When solutions are available, problems seldom remain unchanged 
(Kingdon 1995). However, it is important to state that although ideas of this kind exert 
influence, by providing solutions to concrete challenges, this does not mean that these 
solutions are the only alternatives, or even the best alternatives. This insight can, as in 
chapter 3, be illustrated by reference to Castles (2004), and the debate on pension 
reforms. Labour market reforms, e.g. reducing early retirement, increasing female 
employment, and rising retirement age, are potential measures that can be taken before 
pension reforms that cut entitlement levels (Castles 2004: 124). 
Sometimes such concrete ideas originate in well established policies of one 
actor (country), making the organization in question more of a mediator than an 
ideational first mover (Marcussen 2002). The next chapters will show that in the field 
of family policy, Scandinavian policies often serve as such programmatic ideas. 
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According to Campbell, programmatic ideas are most commonly found in policy briefs 
or position papers. To this I would add various reports such as working papers and 
expert studies, and, importantly for my study; advice from the EU and OECD. Their 
ideas are expressed as concrete recommendations, more subtle advice and political 
objectives. 
A third type of idea in Campbell’s typology is frames. Framing means making 
solutions acceptable, and, as said by Campbell, such frames appear in speeches, press 
releases, and public statements (1998: 394). The frames used by politicians should 
correspond with public sentiments. One obvious example of a frame used in debates 
on welfare state reforms is the concept of economic globalization (Campbell 2002: 
27). As shown for instance by Yeates (2001), Rieger and Leibfried (2003) or Castles 
(2004), the presentation of an unavoidable, structural threat to national welfare has 
justified many (retrenchment) reform proposals over the last years. Typical ideas in the 
area of family policy would be the ideal of freedom of choice, how men should take 
responsibility for their children, or more general “evidence” of need for action 
expressed through studies, such as the OECD PISA-study (Programme for 
International Student Assessment), where lack of knowledge among school-children is 
documented. This category of ideas resembles the concept of discourse as an 
interactive process, as applied by Schmidt and Radaelli (2004), as well as 
communicative discourse (Schmidt 2002) (cf. chapter 3). 
The last type is ideas as public sentiments. Ideas must be politically legitimate 
and acceptable in order to get necessary support in the electorate. Public sentiments 
thus restrict what politicians may do. The scope of action is indicated in public opinion 
polls, media reports, interest organizations and so on. Within the area of family policy 
I consider the following ideas important: concerns about child poverty, dominant 
views on gender roles, e.g. the earlier strong view of working mothers in Germany as 
“Rabenmütter” (negligent, selfish mothers),58 single disturbing cases of abuse or 
maltreatment of children, and a more general feeling of lagging behind other countries. 
                                                 
58 While it is probably correct to say that Germany is now going through a similar development as Norway did 
some decades ago, the debate about whether (the youngest) children should preferably be cared for by their 
parents or in institutions is still relevant in Norway. A recent book has sparked a new debate in the media 
(Tveitereid 2008). Borg, Backe-Hansen and Kristiansen (2008) compile and assess existing studies in the area. 
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Table 4.1 summarizes the different kinds of ideas. As I will show in chapters 5 and 6, 
this framework is helpful when analyzing policy ideas of international actors, but the 
categories are not always unambiguous.  
 
Table 4.1: Overview of ideas based on Campbell´s typology (1998, 2002) 
 
Type of idea Characteristics and examples Sources likely to unveil ideas 
Paradigmatic Overall views upon the functions of social 
policies, e.g. public vs. individual 
responsibility for family issues 
Debates in and publications of international 
organizations 
Programmatic Concrete solutions, causal views, e.g. 
childcare to children aged 1-3 years 
Policy briefs, position papers, reports, 
recommendations 
Frames Justification of the chosen policy, e.g. 
freedom of choice 
Speeches, press releases, public statements 
Public sentiments Set the scope for legitimate and acceptable 
options, e.g. “Rabenmütter” 
Public opinion polls, media reports, interest 
organizations 
 
 
My main focus is whether policy makers are familiar with, convinced by, and/or use 
ideas expressed by international organizations. Thus, programmatic ideas, 
paradigmatic ideas and frames are most important. Sentiments are, in my opinion, less 
a category of its own than a kind of barrier that an idea must overcome in order to 
succeed, although this must not be understood as people’s opinions not being 
legitimate input to policy-making.59  
A related problem is that if all levels of policy-making are pervaded with ideas, 
then the distinction between what shall be explained and what explains becomes 
blurred. My intention is to analyze whether foreign ideas shed light on why concrete 
policy reforms happen. When the latter is more or less the same as the former, e.g. as 
in the advice on provision of childcare, then one risks that the explanation and the 
explained are equal. Here one must keep in mind that the research design, described in 
chapter 3, in fact partly relies on such similarity, as it is one sign of ideational 
influence of international organizations through the adoption of advice and 
                                                 
59 Culture and opinions also matter for policy-making even if I do not focus on this. Cf. van Oorschot, Opielka 
and Pfau-Effinger (2008) for a recent analysis applying a cultural perspective on welfare. 
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recommendations (concordance), but we should be aware of possible circular 
reasoning. 
Second, this problem is connected with the question of the power of ideas. I try 
to avoid terms like causality because I consider it impossible to demonstrate that ideas 
have caused reforms. Moreover, ideas and actors are inseparable, in the sense that 
actors and institutions will always matter for the effect of the idea in question. As 
O’Connor (2005) and Béland (2005) argue, ideational influence takes place within 
institutional arrangements and actors must support ideas if they are to become 
influential. What I study are international learning processes that may make it probable 
that country A carries out welfare reforms based on specific ideas.  
 
4.4 Methodological challenges 
 
The concordance method is pretty simple to carry out. In principle, it is no more than a 
comparison between advice and actual policy-making. However, the interpretation is 
complicated by several factors. First, correlation is not causation. This challenge can 
be met by combining the concordance method with process tracing, to try to decide 
whether correlation is causal or spurious (Bennett and George 2006: 183). Second, and 
as Beyeler (2004: 8) and Zeitlin (2005a: 453) argue, ideas promoted by one actor are 
not always exclusive to this actor. Family policy advice from the EU and OECD may 
have been developed by other international organizations or Member/Non-Member 
States. This means that even though a comparison between international 
recommendations and actual reforms reveals a strong degree of consistency, one 
cannot say for sure that reforms happened because of the recommendations in 
question. In other words, and to paraphrase Kuhnle (1981), it is difficult to isolate the 
effects of influence from international bodies from innovative nations or domestic 
macro characteristics (political, economic, and organizational). One must be able to 
identify influential actors who promote the policy in question, but also to “show 
evidence that their promotion increases the likelihood of policy adoption” (Dobbin et 
al. 2007: 457). If, for instance, the IOs have basically the same views toward family 
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policy as Norwegian policy makers, then it does not matter how the IOs argue.60 We 
need evidence of a difference of opinion, or a new awareness of an issue among 
national actors, if IOs are to be credited influence. A description of the family policies 
as they were before the reforms is needed, and party programmes could be one source 
for evidence of changed opinions. This challenge may also be met by analyzing the 
justifications for the reforms. Even though macro characteristics, such as an increasing 
demographic burden, may convince policy makers of the need to act, it is rare that 
only one solution is available.61 Therefore these policy makers´ choices of measures 
will often suggest where they have been inspired, not least in the way they justify their 
choices. 
 This is again connected to what Larsen and Goul Andersen (2007:1) call the 
main problem of studies on the impact of ideas; how to separate the impact of these 
ideas from other determinants of change, like interests and external problem pressure. 
They argue that the trust in ideas matter studies is increased if one can reject 
“objective problems”, and preferences of politicians’ and their voters, as the decisive 
factors behind the policy change (2007: 2). Although I do not think that this is entirely 
possible, as it would force the researcher to analyze only cases where ideas are not 
coinciding with preferences, and where the problem pressure is low or not existing, 
thus excluding highly interesting cases such as the recent German family policy 
reforms, I agree that one should try to isolate the effect of ideas. Ideally, one should be 
able to demonstrate that we would not witness reform X, had not some learning 
activity (from abroad) taken place (Bennett and Howlett 1992: 290). Regarding 
interests, party programmes and newspaper accounts may be useful to this aim. A 
comparison of the family policy reforms with the measures described in party 
programmes, indicates whether the reforms are in line with what could be seen as 
lying in the interest of the party, e.g. keeping promises and pleasing their voters, or 
whether parties changed their mind when gaining power. Press accounts can further 
illuminate this by discussing reactions from the electorate. The problem-pressure 
factor could be considered by analyzing the actual state of affairs; how pressing are 
                                                 
60 But national actor may still draw on international actors for reasons of blame avoidance, legitimacy or 
authority. 
61 Cf. Castles (2004) for a discussion of such factors related to family policy reforms. 
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population ageing, child poverty or female inactivity rates (perceived to be)? However, 
as argued in this chapter, a comprehensive analysis of alternative explanations is 
beyond the scope of my analysis. 
The application of a process tracing approach is vulnerable towards the problem 
of a lack of (visible) links between cause and outcome. One risks understating the 
effect of a variable if “the theory in question leaves no observable signature” (George 
and Bennett 2005: 218). As Fleckenstein (2008: 180) argues, official policy documents 
like draft legislation or ministerial papers for the public, do not always reveal which 
models have been used in the development of reforms. Ideas of the OECD or EU may, 
for instance, turn up in domestic debates without reference to the original source 
(Armingeon 2004: 239). In a study searching for cross-border influences, it is very 
interesting when written or oral sources refer directly to another actor’s advice, and 
say that certain policies are promoted, introduced or implemented due to this advice. 
The data sources presented below include some examples of such direct references, 
but often the link is not that obvious. And even with direct references, one should 
remain critical, because of methodological challenges such as uploading, credit-
claiming, blame-avoidance, and selection bias.  I now treat these challenges in turn.62 
Uploading means that Member States might try to turn their own policies, 
preferences, and proposals into the aim of the EU/OECD objectives and guidelines 
(Zeitlin 2005a: 454). To check whether international advice and national policy are in 
concordance is not convincing proof of foreign influence, if the advice originated with 
the very same country in the first place. The researcher could overrate the importance 
of the international organization in question, and it is rather easy to imagine examples 
of this for both my cases. It could be that Germany would work to make its planned 
measures within the family policy field the aim of the EU´s new European Alliance for 
Families, a forum for the exchange of best practices established under German EU 
Presidency in 2007, described closer in the next chapter, in order to draw on this when 
implementing their own policies. Similarly, one should be aware that, when the OECD 
is issuing a country note identifying challenges, e.g. for Norway´s childcare policies, 
                                                 
62 For further critique of the process tracing method used to analyze the link between ideas and adoption of 
policies, see for instance Yee (1996: 77). 
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this organization, to a large extent, relies on a background report they have asked the 
country under review to prepare (chapter 6 describes this process closer). A more 
general example could be that the EU, at least according to Annesley (2007: 197, 201), 
has integrated much of its Member States´ activation policies in the Lisbon agenda. In 
such instances, the researcher could also face a danger of confirmation-bias; focussing 
on the possible foreign influence could make you blind towards evidence of other 
explanations (George and Bennett 2005: 217). Another problem is that we do not have 
the counterfactual, meaning that we do not know if a country would do as it did even if 
a recommendation was not issued by the EU or OECD. One should also not forget that 
politicians, bureaucrats, and others within the international organizations I study, 
always have a national background. 
If not possible to overcome, one can at least reduce the danger of confirmation-
bias and overrating of foreign influence, by investigating more than just the policy 
documents connected with the reform in question. Interviews with stakeholders and 
consultation of other written sources, such as party programmes, could reveal whether 
the reform was a result of plans going back in time, or is due to foreign influence.63 
Barbier warns us not to rely only on official texts, precisely for this reason:  
 
“The latter (´Brussels` arenas, my addition) potentially provide national governments with 
additional resources for legitimating their policy decisions at home and consolidating them: 
this explains why, despite reluctance from many Member states to accept increased roles for 
the Commission, the EES has continued to function rather successfully, in terms of the states´ 
expectations, and also why they have kept struggling about the ´best` construction of the 
discourse. It is certain that they accept additional resources at EU level to support policies and 
politics at home” (2004: 11). 
 
                                                 
63 Another possible approach to shed light on my research questions would be to exploit daily newspaper 
coverage more. Could, for instance, the extent to which EU and OECD recommendations and advice are used 
and referred to in Norwegian public debates, be measured by searching digital media archives, e.g. by comparing 
the share of articles over time referring to IOs? Marcussen (2002: 194-201) partly draws on such an approach. In 
Norway, ATEKST (http://cdrom.ub.uib.no/web/atekst.htm) would provide one extensive digital media archive 
suitable for this. There is however – to the best of my knowledge - no German counterpart to ATEKST. 
Although sources like Nexis-Lexis (http://www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/home/home.do) allow you to search 
some newspapers, several important newspapers have their own archives where you have to pay for access. 
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Moreover, Weaver (1986) has shown that we should be aware of strategies of both 
credit claiming and blame avoidance when analyzing politics. Zeitlin formulates it like 
this regarding the OMC; “Member States governments may also have political reasons 
for playing up or down the domestic influence of OMC processes in National Action 
Plans and evaluation reports, connected with strategies of blame avoidance and credit 
claiming on the one hand and efforts to present themselves either as “good Europeans” 
or defenders of the national interest against Brussels on the other” (Zeitlin 2005b: 26). 
Sometimes policies inspired from abroad are presented as completely new, in order to 
be nationally acceptable (Jacobsson and Schmid 2002: 89). Yet another problem when 
dealing with public statements is that it is difficult to say whether a reference to 
influential actors is the result of policy learning or ex-post legitimation (Fleckenstein 
2008: 180). Unfortunately, interviewed experts may also answer ex post facto (”after 
the fact”) instead of ex-ante (“before the event”), to rationalize their actions. One way 
of checking the reliability is to compare oral statements with written sources. 
Using only official documents limits the analysis to the final results of political 
negotiations. The analysis of documents should therefore be informed by interviews 
with key actors at the national and international level. Such interviews help ensuring 
that the interpretation of written sources is well-informed. Interviews introduce us to 
processes of policy-making and interaction between actors at the national and 
international level. They may illuminate reasons, rationalizations, and arguments 
informing an actor’s understanding of the theme in question (Poortinga et al. 2004: 
86). Combined with studies of documents, they help us understand the kind of ideas 
these actors are exposed to and how they are influenced by them. 
Interview-research also has its problems. Is there, for instance, an interview-
effect here, in the sense that respondents could mention Norway as an important 
“teacher” because they think this is what the Norwegian interviewer wants to hear? In 
other words, is Norway mentioned more often due to the fact that the interviewer is 
Norwegian? Such issues are important to keep in mind during the analysis. 
Relying on a limited number (30) of expert interviews from four settings (two 
IOs and two countries), I recognize that the number is not big enough to draw too 
many conclusions. They should mainly be seen as complementing other sources. 
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Interviews are also sensitive to peoples´ recollection of incidents, as well as their 
wishes to present themselves as influential, with claims of credit and avoidance of 
blame. This must be considered when interpreting the data.  
Parliamentary debates and related documents, such as white papers, provide a 
basis for analyzing how family policy ideas, proposals, and reforms are created, 
established and changed (Lundqvist 2007: 16). According to Berven (2005: 22, 53), 
there are several advantages with having data material in the form of parliamentary 
debates. They are readily available, they are comprehensive enough to allow 
politicians to explain their views in more detail than in brief TV-debates or newspaper 
interviews, and they have a rhetorical style, where the speaker tries to convince other 
MPs as well as the public. Such debates are among the few sources where politicians 
justify their actions. 
The problem of selection bias involves selection of “extreme cases”, which 
“leads the analyst to focus on cases that, in predictable ways, produce biased estimates 
of causal effects” (Collier and Mahoney 1996: 59). A relationship, established with a 
few cases, may disappear when a more representative sample is studied (Geddes 1990: 
140). If I establish proof that international advice and “pressure” have been an 
important reason behind reforms in my country sample of Norway and Germany, but 
“forget” to consider that ideas cannot explain reforms alone, since not all countries 
receiving such advice conduct reforms, my study could suffer from this weakness 
(Geddes 1990: 140). There is therefore a danger of overestimating the importance of 
explanations found in case studies (Collier and Mahoney 1996: 87). However, as this 
study does not intend to give a full answer of why reforms happened but rather what 
role ideas from IOs played in this process, this objection is not considered crucial. 
Still, it should be noted that my findings contribute more to theory building than 
theory testing. As noted by Crompton, comparative case study research reveals 
similarities and variation that can result in new theories (2001: 173). And, as my 
country sample includes one non-member state of the EU, I have included a country 
where the EU is not supposed to have any direct effect. I have thus introduced a case 
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that could strengthen the assumption of influence of ideas, if even a non-member takes 
EU advice into consideration (Haverland 2006: 135, 140).64 
 This discussion shows that both a high degree of concordance between 
international advice and national policy, as well as explicit references saying that the 
former inspired the latter, must be carefully investigated, before one can conclude 
there is either strong or limited foreign influence. As argued above, one way of 
reducing the danger of confirmation bias, over- or underrating of influence, is to rely 
on several techniques of interpretation. As such, an increased use of methods' 
triangulation, broadly defined as the use of more than one method to support an 
argument, is to be recommended. In my study this is achieved by document analysis, 
parliamentary debates, conducting interviews with people with different perspectives 
(researchers and field experts, politicians representing different political parties, 
bureaucrats), and, admittedly to a very limited degree, analysis of material from 
archives. Still, the question of rhetoric is not solved; are actors really inspired and 
influenced by cross-national ideas, or do we witness instrumental and strategic use of 
external arguments? As Atkinson and Coffey argue (2004: 68), one should not take 
interview transcripts or documents at face value, and one should always remember that 
documents are written for a purpose. Asking who the authors are and why did they 
write what they write or say what they say, is important.65 Radaelli speaks of a pitfall 
he calls ”the benevolent view of learning” (2007: 7); since policy makers prefer to be 
seen as promoters of (positive) change, they might overstate the importance of 
learning and understate the importance of competition, coercion and/or conflict.  
 Sometimes it would be useful to gain access to earlier versions of policy 
documents, like bills or reform plans, to examine whether and why changes were 
introduced and to try to identify controversial issues. My interviews have been used to 
identify possible channels of influence; reviews, meetings, conferences, or reports, 
                                                 
64 However, making yet another reservation, in my approach a non-member cannot serve as a control case 
dismissing alternative explanations for reforms since, as described earlier, the EU influences family policy 
mainly through non-binding advice, and not regulatory or financial means applying exclusively to Member 
States. 
65 The material interest of the writer must always be considered when analyzing documents, especially policy 
documents. As Scott reminds us, actors may have political interests in presenting one and not other views, thus 
“The researcher must always ask what individual or collective interest may have been felt by the authors of the 
documents which he or she studies” (1990: 23). I refer readers further interested in such issues, and criteria for 
assessing the quality of documentary sources, to Scott (1990) or Lincoln and Guba (1985).  
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originating in IOs, study trips abroad, influential research communities, and so on. I 
have then tried to gain access to written sources from such events (preparatory 
documents, minutes), and/or spoken to new persons. This means that, to a certain 
limited extent, I have conducted archive research, but this has been done by getting 
seminar talks, speeches, policy documents, and discussion papers directly from my 
informants. Compared to a full, traditional archive search, my approach is vulnerable 
to the recollection of the interviewees. On the other hand, this approach has the 
advantage that only the material the participants, i.e. my informants, consider 
important, is analyzed. 
Still, as I argue in chapter 3, it is more or less impossible to find the original 
source of an idea. A comment made by a German civil servant emphasizes this 
problem of identifying ”who is the initial mover”: 
 
"We have different working units and in these working units there are experts who read a lot, 
when they developed the Elterngeld for example. Where something flowed in I am unable to 
tell in detail, because that must the individual expert tell. However, regarding the Elterngeld 
reform it is quite obvious that we consulted the Scandinavian countries and had a close look at 
their models, and also tried, as far as possible, to check whether they had already evaluated it" 
(German interview 3, authors translation). 
 
And, as noted by Andresen and Grønlie; “(…) impulses might go in both directions, 
or, even more realistically, they come from several sources, and the object of transfer 
might itself be transformed in the process: negotiated and re-interpreted” (2007: 15). 
Moreover, tracing the origin of an idea is not necessarily the only interesting 
research task. What I take an interest in is what kind of contact there has been between 
countries and organizations in a phase where new policies were developed. Having 
conducted interviews with politicians as well as experts in Germany, Norway and the 
two organizations in question, I feel confident that I have a fairly good overview of 
contacts. I therefore argue that it is sufficient to study information conveyed in 
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interviews in more detail, even though archives research could have enriched the 
analysis.66  
In summary, a research design, seeking to answer questions of ideational 
influence and learning, would ideally involve more detailed process tracing than I can 
offer. George and Bennett (2005: 210) distinguish between four varieties of this 
method, and my approach may be most similar to the more general version, where the 
causal process is not traced in detail. I have not interviews with that many policy 
actors, nor have I had (or tried to get) access to archives where policy documents are 
found in different stages of the process, and I have also not participated in meetings 
and conferences that have been part of the peer review processes. Instead I have relied 
on publicly available documents, parliamentary debates and interviews with a number 
of key actors, such as politicians, independent experts, and civil servants, as well as 
secondary literature. Moreover, I have concentrated on two countries in order to be 
able to devote sufficient time to consult the data required for investigating my 
assumptions on the role of cross border ideas, and to untangle the processes under 
scrutiny (Levy 1994: 309, 310, Campbell 1998: 382, Orenstein 2006: 21). This means 
that I can make no generalizations, but my analysis still has the potential to contribute 
to theoretical progress (Radaelli 2000: 38). I am also aware that in conducting research 
in this way I am not capable of shedding light on all aspects of possible learning. Still, 
I am able to identify several processes that can involve learning and actors who are 
active in these processes. I can also look at the time dimension and compare policies 
before and after. Furthermore, I can illuminate how countries interact and cooperate. 
This can be done by investigating the data sources presented below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 Another way of extending the data material would be to participate in meetings and conferences which are part 
of the peer review processes. Marcussen´s OECD-study partly relies on this approach (2002: 121). This kind of 
observation would, however, be very difficult, especially since my analysis is focussing on at least some reforms 
which took place many years ago. The trend of holding EU family policy conferences might be one forum where 
I, as a researcher, could be allowed to sit in and observe. The EU and OECD peer review processes are not open 
and as such are not possible to observe directly. Here one has to rely on interviews with other participants.  
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4.5 Presentation of data sources 
 
I analyze parliamentary debates, policy documents, such as EU and OECD reports, 
national White Papers and reports by commissions and working groups, and interview 
transcripts. Newspaper articles, e.g. press interviews of key policy-makers, and 
accounts found in academic literature, where this is available, complete the analysis of 
this primary material. 
 
4.5.1 Policy documents  
4.5.1.1 Documents of international organizations 
For reasons of simplicity and space, I concentrate on the main advice and views 
disseminated by the EU and OECD within the two major areas for reconciliation of 
work and family life; infrastructure and parental leave arrangements. EU-documents 
studied encompass commissioned studies, peer review minutes, documents from 
relevant OMC-processes on social inclusion and employment like the European 
Council Recommendations on the EES (European Employment Strategy), and the 
Employment Guidelines. EU Council and Commission Joint Reports on social 
inclusion will be studied, as they also express views on family policies. Proceedings 
from conferences on family policies are also included. The reports, studies, and 
recommendations from the OECD that I examine, comprise Economic Surveys, 
Employment Outlook, the Babies and Bosses series, the Starting Strong reports from 
the Thematic Review on Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC), and working 
papers and other documents made available at the OECD web page on Families and 
Children. Common for all sources is that they contain ideas about what ought to be 
done, and are not part of legislation connected with any sanctions. 
 
4.5.1.2 German Policy documents 
In the German case, I will analyze the Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz (law on the 
extension of day care) from 2005, the Elterngeld reform (parental leave) from 2007, 
and briefly the KiföG reform (law on further extension of day care) from 2008. In 
Germany, explanation of a law is included as part of the draft law, providing a useful 
source (Büchs 2006: 66). Background reports for OECD studies such as Starting 
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Strong, NAPs (National Action Plans), and NRPs (National Reform Programmes) are 
also important. Party programmes of political parties could inform us on changes in 
actors´ previous preferences, as well as the interests of their electorate. Press releases, 
speeches, and publications from the family ministry are also consulted to a limited 
extent. The same goes for the Family Report of the Ministry (Familienbericht), 
prepared every second election period, and similar reports commissioned by the 
ministry. I translate non-English quotes into English and provide an appendix (5.3) of 
quotations in the original German. 
 To illustrate what kind of indicators or criteria I search for in the documents, I 
provide an example from a press release from family minister von der Leyen: 
 
“All parties have in principle taken a positive attitude towards the aim of family minister Ursula von der 
Leyen of preparing another 500 000 childcare places for children less than three years old within 2013. 
Consequently, the European standard on childcare is met, the minister emphasized in connection with 
the decision of the Bundestag” (BMFSFJ 2007, my translation). 
 
4.5.1.3 Norwegian policy documents 
Reports to the Storting (the Norwegian parliament), the bills on the cash-for-care 
reform (kontantstøtteloven) and the decisions to increase childcare coverage, the 
publication series of the Ministry of Trade and Industry on the Lisbon-strategy seen 
from a Norwegian perspective, and background reports for OECD studies such as 
Starting Strong, are among the Norwegian policy documents I study. I also look at 
some press releases and information available at the government’s websites, speeches, 
and party programmes and government declarations. I translate non-English quotes 
into English and provide an appendix (5.4) of quotations in the original Norwegian.  
 
4.5.2 Parliamentary debates 
4.5.2.1 German parliamentary debates 
On the webpage of the Parliament (www.bundestag.de), under Documents 
(Dokumente), one finds the Subject and Speakers´ Indexes (Sach- und Sprechregister 
DIP, http://dip.bundestag.de). DIP means Documentation and Information System for 
Parliamentary Materials (Dokumentations- und Informationssystem für 
Parlamentarische Vorgänge). This database, available only in German, is common for 
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the Bundestag and Bundesrat, containing plenary debates, acts, motions, 
interpellations, and reports. This allows a researcher to follow the process of 
deliberation on a parliamentary item through its various stages, for instance to see who 
is proposing a new law and how they justify it.67 
I have entered the terms “Kifög” (bill on the promotion of children), 
“Elterngeld” (parental leave benefit), and “Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz” (Daycare 
Expansion Act), to identify relevant debate material. For a closer explanation of how 
parliamentary proceedings were identified, and a complete list of documents analyzed, 
see appendix 4. Quotations in the original German language are found in appendix 5.1. 
 
4.5.2.2 Norwegian parliamentary debates 
The website www.stortinget.no allows search for publications from the parliament 
(Storting) and government at the same time (Søk i publikasjoner fra storting og 
regjering). The search includes all proceedings of the Storting (parliamentary records, 
Stortingsforhandlinger), among them the following publications: Minutes of plenary 
proceedings (Stortingstidende), Report to the Storting (Stortingsmelding, White 
Paper), Norwegian Official Report (NOU), Consultations (høring), proposition to the 
Storting (Stortingsproposisjon), bill (Odelstingsproposisjon), and recommendation to 
the Storting (instilling til Stortinget). The documents are only available in 
Norwegian.68 
I have entered the terms “kontantstøtte” (cash-for-care benefit), and 
“barnehage” (childcare). From the results page, I have chosen all documents I consider 
to be relevant. For a complete list of documents analyzed, and information on the 
selection of material, see appendix 4. As for the German case, quotations in the 
original Norwegian language are found in an appendix (5.2).69  
 
 
                                                 
67 The passage of new laws is described in detail at the homepage of the Bundestag (see links via Parliament, 
then Function and role and Adoption of legislation). 
68 The website of the Storting presents English translations of its documents and publications (see Glossary). Cf. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/doc.html?id=439279 for a similar overview for the government.  
69 For a brief overview of decision-making in the Norwegian parliamentary, multiparty system, see for instance 
the web pages of the Storting or Berven (2005: 94-96). 
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4.5.3 Interviews 
The data stems from 30 semi-structured expert interviews made with representatives of 
the EU (February 2007), the OECD (March 2007), Germany (April-May 2007), and 
Norway (October-December 2007).70 Sometimes two informants were interviewed 
together, so that the number of interviewees is higher than 30. The interviewees were 
policy makers, experts, bureaucrats, representatives of interest organizations, and 
stakeholders, involved in the formulation of ideas or debates surrounding family policy 
and other social policy reforms from both a national and international perspective. In 
addition, I have had conversations with academics in both Germany and Norway. 
Being able to speak with people actually involved in the events is of great value and 
preferred to second-hand information. However, as Mason (2002: 60) argues, effective 
generation of data from interviews may be contingent on previous document analysis. 
Thus, I consulted some of the documentary sources when preparing the interviews. 
Many interviews (19) were conducted in cooperation with colleagues working 
on a common research project (the project is described in appendix 1).71 We searched 
official web pages and policy documents to identify the interviewees. All interviews 
were done after first having sent out an informative email asking for permission to 
conduct an interview (see appendix 2 for example of request). Most people said yes, 
but German representatives in international organizations consistently refused to let 
themselves be interviewed and referred us instead to national ministries. Some 
interviewees asked to have a list of questions sent in advance. 
The interviews were conducted in Norwegian, English, or German (cf. appendix 
3), and lasted from 30 minutes to 1, 5 hours at the longest, depending both on how 
much relevant information the interviewees had and how much time they could spare. 
The interviews were audio-recorded with the permission of the respondents, and most 
of them transcribed in detail. Transcription has been carried out as accurately as 
possible, but in a few instances repetitions or unfinished sentences have been left out. 
In this way the transcribing is also part of the analysis (Kvale 1996: 160). 
                                                 
70 Some actors were re-interviewed later. 
71 The total number of interviews conducted within the project is higher than 30. I only refer to the interviews I 
use.  
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Questions were asked face to face, but a few interviews were done by 
telephone, when a personal meeting was impossible to organize (5 out of 30). As well 
as other questions, we asked respondents about their knowledge of international 
initiatives within family policy, questions about how the respondents perceived the 
influence of international actors, and whether they had relied on foreign experiences in 
their policy development. All interviews started with a short presentation of the project 
and ended with giving the respondent the possibility to raise issues he or she thought 
should be mentioned, or to ask questions about the project (see appendix 3 for the list 
of questions). As many interviewees preferred to be anonymous, I provide no list of 
interviews.72 In order to preserve the anonymity of interviewees, citations and 
information are referred to by interview codes. Each reference includes the country or 
organization the interviewee is affiliated to as well as a number, e.g. Norwegian 
interview 5 or OECD interview 1. As with the parliamentary debates, quotes are 
translated into English when the interviews were conducted in Norwegian or German. 
I have strived for word for word translation, but to make the text readable. A few times 
interviewees have read quotes I use and asked for minor language/style-changes. 
 
4.5.4 Newspaper articles  
Daily, and weekly, quality press coverage supplements the primary sources. 
Contemporary press accounts are helpful for a number of reasons. For instance, as 
journalists tend to have access to top-level politicians, press interviews of key policy-
makers may complement my interview data, which does not include people currently 
in charge of a ministry. Moreover, newspapers make it possible to see whether 
politicians use international experiences as a way of justifying their actions to the 
broader public, which again indicates the status such experiences have. Newspaper 
reports also intimate whether criticism from international organizations, on national 
family policy, is known and part of the national agenda. One example of this could be 
taken from an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), one of Germany’s 
                                                 
72 Such a list exists within the project group, but will not be added as an appendix due to the above referred 
anonymity wish. Cf. appendix 3 for further comments. 
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most influential daily newspapers, in connection with the OECD´s presentation of the 
Babies and Bosses series in Berlin: 
 
“The OECD welcomed measures such as the Elterngeld introduced in January 2007 and the 
planned extension of childcare facilities. However, cash benefits like the cash-for-care benefit, 
due in 2013, were criticized. The effects are often ´disastrous`. It disposes of work incentives” 
(FAZ 2007a, my translation). 
 
Newspapers also illuminate how national governments consider their family policy in 
comparison with other countries. For instance, Arni Hole, Director General in the 
Ministry of Children and Equality, says that the policies of the Ministry have become 
an important export article of Norway: ”In fact, the success of private companies is 
now in many ways related to good family policy. Therefore we have become an export 
article on the same level as oil, gas and tourism, says Arni Hole“ (Aftenposten 
13.10.2007). 
Media commentary is also useful in interpreting the reasons for shifts in the 
programmes of political parties. In Germany, especially the Christian Democrats seem 
to have changed their traditional view on family policies and adopted many of the 
ideas promoted by IOs. Newspapers may shed light on whether this is due to such 
recommendations or rather the result of more interest-based reasoning, like the 
preferences of voters.  
I translate non-English quotes into English, and as for the quotations from 
parliamentary debates, I provide an appendix of quotations in the original German 
(5.5) and Norwegian (5.6). 
 
4.5.5 Secondary literature 
From academic literature I have examined the views and interpretations of other 
researchers on the role of cross border ideas. The reforms investigated, partly with the 
exception of the last German reforms on Elterngeld and childcare, have been analyzed 
by many scholars, thus making it possible to consult these contributions. However, as 
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pointed out in the introductory chapter, there are few if any studies of ideational 
influence of IOs in family policy reforms.  
4.5.6 Summary data sources 
 
According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), a mix of different methods is 
advisable to get a broad overview of factors influencing an outcome. Usually, mixed-
methods designs are understood as those combining quantitative and qualitative 
methods (Greene et al. 1989: 256), but Hantrais argues that methodological pluralism 
could also imply the use of different methods within qualitative research (2005: 404). 
In the following chapters this will be done by combining interviews, documentary 
studies and parliamentary debates, to supplement each other and cross-check data. As 
a matter of fact, one could even risk having access to too much data. As Kuhnle (2007: 
93) argues, historical studies of the flow of ideas perhaps had a “research advantage”, 
in the sense that the number of sources was more limited at the time social security 
was introduced, due to the existence of fewer international actors and meeting-places 
and travel and communication possibilities. 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Evans and Davies claim that the existing literature does not provide us with the 
techniques we need to demonstrate policy transfer, and they suggest a checklist of 
factors for this purpose (1999: 381). Building on this, as well as on contributions by 
Karvonen (1981), Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000), Stone (1999), Dolowitz (2000a-
b-c), Radaelli (2007), and Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein (2007), I developed my 
own approach in the first section of this chapter. First, I will check for correspondence 
between the EU/OECD policy and national reforms. Then, if they are in concordance 
with the view of IOs, I discuss whether the EU and/or OECD played a role in pushing 
these reforms forward.  
Moreover, this chapter introduced a framework developed by Campbell, useful 
when analyzing international ideas. Another section discussed different 
  
117
methodological issues and challenges I encounter when relying on this approach. 
Among these are understating or overstating the effect of cross border ideas, 
uploading, credit-claiming, blame-avoidance, selection or confirmation bias, and how 
to separate the influence of different actors when more than one is promoting a certain 
policy. Although these challenges make my approach a demanding undertaking, I have 
argued in the chapter’s last section that relying on comprehensive data material in the 
form of policy documents, parliamentary debates, and expert interviews, help me 
diminish the difficulties of interpretation. With the available means I can analyze 
whether cross border ideas are important for reforms.  
Overall, the conclusion reached in this chapter is that the possible effect of 
family policy ideas of international actors may be investigated empirically. Its 
contribution has been to point out how we can go about checking whether ideas from 
international organizations have had a demonstrable impact upon German and 
Norwegian reforms. The analysis in chapters 7 and 8 will demonstrate the usefulness 
of such an approach. A first step will be to present the ideas of IOs in the two 
consecutive chapters.  
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Chapter 5 The EU as a family policy actor73 
 
“Underlying European Commission documents on social policy is the assumption that, as a 
result of common demographic trends, particularly population ageing, family and household 
change, all member states in the European Union (EU) are facing similar problems, for which 
they might be expected to adopt similar solutions through a process of policy learning and 
diffusion” (Hantrais 2004a: 193).  
 
 
This chapter describes the role the EU can play in the processes of policy learning and 
diffusion that Hantrais refers to in the above quote. I concentrate on the general family 
policy advice of the EU and leave the presentation of country specific advice, when it 
exists, to chapters 7 (Germany) and 8 (Norway). Thus, I shall also use countries other 
than my two cases to illustrate the EU approach to family policy, and I draw on several 
social policy fields to illustrate the EU working mode. Section 5.1 elaborates on EU 
processes for development and dissemination of advice, while section 5.2 describes 
what kind of advice is issued, and organizes these ideas in the framework developed 
by Campbell (1998, 2002), which was presented in the previous chapter. 
The chapter first argues that although the treaties do not provide for competence 
in the field of family policy, the EU´s view of social policy as economically 
favourable (a productive factor, cf. Jacobsson 2004: 360), has resulted in a new 
interest in family issues, where some recommendations74 and targets have been 
developed. Even though these policies are embryonic they have the potential to 
influence domestic reforms in Member States, making it reasonable to study whether 
the EU exercises some kind of reform pressure. Paraphrasing Mosher and Trubek 
(2003: 83), this chapter asks whether the EU provides domestic political actors in 
favour of family policy reform with arguments for the necessity of change, and 
evidence that other countries have reformed successfully. Second, the chapter argues 
that the Union is addressing family policy in a new way, by applying an approach 
                                                 
73 This chapter draws heavily on a working paper on EU family policy (Lindén 2007b), available at 
http://www.rokkan.uib.no/publications/?/notat  
74 The term recommendation is only directly found in the field of employment (and the Stability and Growth 
Pact) where the Council has issued recommendations based on the proposals of the Commission since 1999. 
However, the OECD also uses the term and I use view, advice, suggestion, opinion, or policy idea throughout the 
analysis. In order not to confuse the reader, I specify when recommendation refers explicitly to the EES. 
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similar to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC)75, which increases its potential 
influence in member countries. Two further issues make the topic important: it is 
interesting to examine what kind of policy ideas the EU promotes, and the new way of 
addressing family policy, through conferences and the European Alliance for Families, 
contributes to the debate on how the EU is developing as an institution, e.g. how it 
might be gradually increasing its competence in a new field. This last point sets a 
focus on whether a policy has to be formalized to have influence, or to be a policy at 
all. I consider the potential influence of advice, proposals and recommendations 
regarding national family issues, from unbinding policy-making processes, just as 
important to study as direct regulation. Policy is found in the whole spectre, from court 
rulings to superficial rhetoric. It is important to stress, though, that the EU has no 
family policy which provides services in cash or kind, but is only disseminating ideas 
about national family policies. Throughout this chapter, the term family policy is used 
in this latter meaning of policy ideas.  
Describing an embryonic policy, not constituting an explicit policy, is difficult. 
My solution has been to search for an emerging family policy within other fields of 
social policy. This is a demanding task, since it is not clear which areas and which 
documents within each area one should include. Nonetheless, I identify several policy 
ideas at the EU level which would be classified as family policy at the national level, 
e.g. concerning the provision of childcare and parental leave. 
 
5.1 Development and dissemination of ideas 
 
According to to Hantrais and Letablier, the Commission has adopted a "cautious 
approach" in the area of family affairs (1996: 1). Unlike the website of the OECD 
Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (DELSA), the Commission 
website, listing the policy areas of the corresponding EU body; the Directorate General 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (DG EMPL),76 does not include 
family policies. The fact that the EU “department” working on social policy does not 
                                                 
75 This process, however, is not referred to as an OMC process. 
76 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/index_en.html, retrieved 19.06.2008  
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provide a link on this theme is indicative of the status family policy has in the EU; it is 
not addressed directly as a field of social policy, but rather as part of other fields. 
Instead, for one example, the DG EMPL – website says the following on demography 
and the social situation in the EU: 
  
“The monitoring of demographic trends focuses on the drivers of change, ageing of the 
population and trends in fertility rates and the potential for meeting the challenges posed by 
changes in these parameters. Special efforts are made to monitor developments pertaining to 
the well being of families including the reconciliation of work and family life” (my 
emphasis).77 
 
It is under the broad heading of “reconciliation of work and family life” that the EU 
has developed several policies that affect family affairs. These policies can be found 
both as directives and as non-binding policy advice. The empirical basis for the present 
study consists mostly of official EU documents, such as recommendations, action 
programmes, White and Green Papers, guidelines, National Action Plans (NAPs), 
National Reform Programmes (NRPs), and Joint Reports and Communications, as well 
as of conference proceedings. Conferences are an often-overlooked part of social 
policy development and coordination.  
While the OECD has a social policy unit responsible for issuing family policy 
reports that can be scrutinized in terms of process and content, this is much more 
complicated for the EU, which lacks this important characteristic. This section thus 
cannot discuss the development of a specific family policy report. Instead I discuss the 
Open Method of Coordination, which is the mode of governance applied in the area of 
employment and social protection, where we find some of the traces of an EU family 
policy stance. I go on by discussing a new trend which makes the EU apply an OMC-
similar approach to family policy, namely in the extended use of family policy 
conferences, and a recent German Council Presidency initiative for EU-wide exchange 
                                                 
77 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/demo_and_social_situation_en.htm , retrieved 19.06.2008. One of 
the five key areas that must be addressed is to promote “demographic renewal in Europe through better 
conditions for families and reconciliation”. What the EU is doing within family policy related fields is perhaps 
best gathered and depicted by the DG EMPL – website’s quick guide to EU employment and social policies 
(http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_model/index_en.html, retrieved 19.06.2008. See also 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/gender_mainstreaming/familylife/family_life_reconcilia
tion_en.html, retrieved 30.6.2008). 
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of family policy ideas, called the European Alliance for Families. But, first, I discuss 
an instrument the EU has which the OECD does not have; family policies binding 
Member States in the form of directives.  
 
5.1.1 Directives 
 
While much social policy at the level of the EU is in the form of voluntary policy 
advice, there exist quite a lot of hard laws as well, even for family policy. Directives, 
together with regulations and decisions,78 are legally binding for Member States. 
According to Falkner et al., there were 72 binding social policy acts up till 2003 (2005: 
52). In the same period there were 87 non-binding acts (recommendations, resolutions, 
conclusions, declarations, and communications). The authors conclude that binding 
and non-binding decisions have developed more or less in parallel and that it does not 
appear that soft measures take over from hard measures, despite the new trend 
associated with the OMC (2005: 54).  
 The two directives most relevant for my family policy study, are the directive 
on pregnant workers (1992), and the directive on parental leave (1996), the contents of 
which are described in section 5.2.  The directive on pregnant workers was passed by 
majority voting in 1992, and made possible by the Single European Act from 1987, 
which allowed directives to be based on qualified majority, rather than unanimity 
(Falkner et al. 2005: 43). The directive on parental leave had been proposed already in 
1983, but the Member States could not reach agreement. In the negotiations, some of 
the original characteristics of the parental leave, e.g. the non-transferability of leave 
from men to women, or the other way around,79 were taken out, but it was still not 
possible to agree upon. The directive was finally introduced as a framework directive 
in 1996 (Lohnkamp-Himmighofen and Dienel 2000: 51, 55, Falkner et al. 2005: 142). 
                                                 
78 For an explanation of the different instruments available to the EU, see glossary. 
79 Some authors write that the leave according to the directive is non-transferable (Hantrais 2000: 17, Lohnkamp-
Himmighofen and Dienel 2000: 56, Kaufmann 2002: 476) and other authors claim that this is not correct 
(Falkner et al. 2005). This confusion might result from the fact that directives have both binding and non-binding 
elements. Falkner et al. (2005: 140) present the different parts of the directive in a very clear way: it has seven 
compulsory minimum standards, among them the individual right to leave for both men and women, and nine 
non-binding soft law provisions, among them the recommendation that parental leave should not be transferable. 
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A framework agreement means that workers’ and employers’ representatives, i.e. the 
social partners, reach an agreement that is later given legal force by the EU.  
Since I deal with non-binding policy advice, or family policy ideas, I do not 
focus on directives. Readers interested in this topic are referred to Falkner et al. 
(2005), who conclude that even though the two directives mentioned here in many 
respects provide minimum standards, they brought about some improvements in most 
member countries.80 
 
5.1.2 OMC81  
 
For almost a decade, the EU has addressed social policy through the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC). As explained by Radaelli (2003: 43), “The idea is to use the 
European Union as a policy transfer platform rather than a law-making system”. 
Pestieau defines the OMC as the “process whereby common goals are laid down and 
progress is measured against jointly agreed indicators, while best practice is identified 
and compared” (2006: 162). This new mode of governance was adopted as part of the 
Lisbon strategy, which links economy, employment, and social policy, and is supposed 
to “launch policy-learning processes by ‘naming and shaming’ bad-performing 
governments and by exchanging examples of best practice” (Nauerz 2004: 1). It is 
meant to provide Member States with the necessary knowledge to reform their social 
protection schemes, and puts emphasis on learning (de la Porte, Pochet and Room 
2001: 292). The OMC has, as described in the Lisbon Council presidency conclusions 
(Council of the European Union 2000b: 12), four main characteristics; 
 
“1. fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the 
goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms; 
                                                 
80 Cf. also Linos (2007). The directives are comprised by the EEA – agreement and as such apply also for 
Norway (Dølvik and Ødegård 2004). Although directives are binding, they may also stem from former non-
binding ideas transferred to the EU system by individual Member States. 
81 As there is no real OMC for family policy I do not go into all the details of this mode of governance. The EU 
center at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, hosts an online OMC bibliography very useful for researchers 
interested in this topic; http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/index.htm. From the rich literature on the area, I refer the 
reader to de la Porte et al. (2001), de la Porte and Pochet (2002), Ferrerra et al. (2002), Radaelli (2004), Trubek 
and Trubek (2005a-b), Zeitlin et al. (2005) and Citi and Rhodes (2007). Heidenreich and Bischoff (2008) give an 
up to date overview of the characteristics of the different OMCs. 
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2. establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and 
benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different 
Member States and sectors as a means of comparing best practice; 
3. translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting 
specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional 
differences; 
4. periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning 
processes". 
 
How can learning take place and lead to change by influencing policy-making? In 
chapter 3, I discussed how ideas matter for social policy, but here I only briefly discuss 
this with reference to the OMC-approach.82 Voluntary procedures, such as the OMC, 
bring together national representatives and identify promising policies, best practice, 
goals, and indicators for such goals, as well as a loose review of Member States´ 
progress over time. The OMC may also intensify bilateral contacts and facilitate 
exchange of policies, between what Hantrais (2004a) refers to as lesson exporting and 
lesson importing countries. The OMC process-generated reports, conferences and 
formulation of policy ideas, as they are used by the EU, and similarly by the OECD, in 
developing social policy, are policy instruments which could be studied to see whether 
learning can account for domestic welfare reforms. This would allow us to study the 
role of ideas in a specific development and circumstance (Rueschemeyer 2006: 249). 
Learning presupposes dialogue, and dialogues must be traceable (e.g. preparatory 
documents or governmental documents) if learning shall be ascribed a convincing 
effect. Thus, an analysis of the effects of learning processes should study documents 
related to such processes (chapters 7 and 8).  
Zeitlin (2005a) discusses four different mechanisms within the OMC that can 
shed light on how and why learning happens.83 Peer pressure through naming and 
shaming is one. This mechanism presupposes national sensitivity to policy advice, 
domestic visibility and media coverage. Table 5.1 is taken from a recent 
communication (EU Commission 2007), and illustrates possible EU pressure through  
                                                 
82 See Borrás and Jacobsson (2004) for a rather positive discussion of mechanisms and Keller (2000) for a more 
critical account. 
83 For another instructive overview of how the OMC may bring about change, see Trubek and Trubek (2005a) or 
Büchs (2006).  
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Table 5.1: Example of possible EU peer pressure in the form of ranking 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2007): Promoting solidarity between the generations, p. 15. Eurostat has 
published similar statistics for a number of years. I illustrate the mechanism of peer pressure with reference to a 
recent table, which, of course, is too new to have an influence on the reforms I study in chapters 7 and 8. 
 
naming and shaming, by comparing childcare provision in Europe, including EFTA 
countries like Norway. Socialization and discursive diffusion is a second mechanism, 
resulting in an incorporation of EU concepts in domestic debate. Still, “speaking the 
same language” does not rule out disagreement and differences in actual policies. The 
leverage effect, a third mechanism, emphasizes the strategic use of the OMC process 
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by national governments, “to advance their own domestic political agenda, promote 
desired reforms, and overcome entrenched veto positions“ (Zeitlin 2005a: 480). The 
last mechanism mentioned by Zeitlin is mutual learning, and works through increased 
awareness and self-assessment. Although only this last mechanism refers explicitly to 
learning, they all deal with learning in some way. Zeitlin ends his discussion by saying 
that the mechanisms may be combined, and probably work together at the same time 
(2005a: 482). According to Dostal (2004: 440), both the EU and OECD provide “a 
controlled environment for the creation, development and dissemination of political 
discourse”.84  
The OMC is now applied to a number of different policy fields, e.g. 
employment (since 1997), social inclusion (since 2000), pensions and health care 
(since 2001). The OMC-process is different from field to field (Citi and Rhodes 2007). 
For instance, the OMC inclusion, which has been merged with social protection 
(pensions and health), is a biannual process in which Member States prepare National 
Strategy Reports on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (NSR, until 2006 National 
Action Plans; NAPs) as responses to EU set common objectives. The OMC 
employment is an annual process where National Reform Programs (until 2005 
National Action Plans), which are national policy reports on progress, are compared 
with employment guidelines, set by the EU. Within this OMC, the European Council 
issues country specific recommendations.  
A few comments on the development of recommendations are relevant. First, as 
the term suggests, neglecting them has no legal consequence or sanctions, except for 
the possible “naming and shaming” affect it can produce. Second, recommendations 
are made in close collaboration with the country in question. The Council 
recommendations are based on proposals from the Commission. Recommendations are 
objects of discussion, and negotiations take place before a recommendation is issued 
(Büchs and Friedrich 2005: 254, Schäfer 2006: 80, Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008: 
511). In other words, the final recommendation is not pure “EU expert advice”, but 
rather the result of cooperation and negotiation with national officials. According to 
                                                 
84 See tables in appendix 6 exemplifying how countries could learn about how their systems of social protection 
influence employment patterns compared to other welfare states. 
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Zeitlin (2005a: 478), Germany has been particularly active in this respect. Interviews 
with stakeholders in the EU confirm that recommendations are developed this way, 
and this should be kept in mind when investigating “EU influence” on national social 
policy.85 
 The same very much applies to directives (Stratigaki 2004: 47), and the setting 
of goals in the first place. The Barcelona targets for what level of childcare provision 
Member States should offer, is something the Member States have agreed upon. To 
use an expression from one of my interviewees, such goals may be employed 
strategically as a sort of “ping-pong game”; “I push something forward in the EU, 
which I cannot get through at home, then I refer to the EU and say; “there is a decision 
there”” (German interview 4). 
The national “answer” to such recommendations, as seen from the perspective 
of the EU, should, first of all, come in the form of concrete policy initiatives, e.g. by 
conducting a reform, and, second, through comments in the National Reform 
Programmes. However, just like the recommendations themselves, these reports must 
also be interpreted with caution. Umbach stresses that the NAP is no “policy driving 
document”, and described policies are not developed especially for the OMC-process 
(2004: 122). In order to present themselves as complying with international advice, 
Member States might present themselves as following EU recommendations, when in 
fact the newly introduced policies are the result of national processes and debates 
(Büchs and Friedrich 2005: 262).  
The next step in the OMC process on employment is an evaluation by the EU 
through joint employment reports, which are the employment chapter of the EU annual 
progress reports. This may result in new recommendations. 
One example illustrates the different steps. Since 2001, Germany has been 
advised to increase its provision of childcare places. The German NRPs from 2006 and 
2007 describe plans for how to meet this recommendation. The latest joint 
                                                 
85 I am not the first to question the objectivity of EU advice in the OMC. Citi and Rhodes (2007: 6) put emphasis 
on how the OMC is a two-way, reciprocal relationship, rather than a one-way process and refer to a number of 
studies stressing this (Börzel 2003, Zeitlin 2005c, Trubek and Trubek 2005b, Heidenrich and Bischof 
forthcoming 2006 [actually published in 2008]). Similarly, but less commented upon in the scholarly literature, 
OECD studies on social policy are largely based on consensus and direct funding from countries examined in the 
reports. This suggests that only countries interested in advice are actually reviewed. I elaborate on this in chapter 
6. 
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employment report also discusses childcare, but this report does not have separate 
chapters for separate countries.86 Instead, more overall conclusions are made: 
  
“The issue of reconciliation between work and private life is gaining some impetus in Member 
States, mostly through the commitment to improve the provision of childcare facilities (AT, 
DE, EL, LU, NL, PT, UK). However, many Member States are far from reaching the childcare  
targets and most do not even refer to them in their national strategies” (2008: 9). 
 
As may be expected from this Joint report, which identifies Germany (DE) among the 
countries actually improving the provision, this country is no longer recommended to 
take the same actions to provide more childcare places. Instead the new country 
specific recommendations for 2008 praise Germany for having responded to the need 
for action;  
 
“Among the strengths shown by the 2007 German Implementation Report are: the 
consolidation of public finances; the strengthening of high-class research and innovation; the 
progress in tackling youth unemployment; and the determined approach to increasing 
childcare facilities” (European Commission 2007e: 13). 
 
This example nicely captures the way the process is working, but it might give an 
overstated impression of the impact of the OMC. Although it seems like Germany has 
done exactly what the EU is recommending, this does not mean that the EU 
recommendation is the reason why reforms take place (cf. chapter 4 on methodology). 
Moreover, it may very well be, that Germany considered it useful to be given precisely 
this recommendation on increasing availability of childcare facilities. A statement 
from a high level EU official suggests that Germany has used its membership in this 
way (EU interview 1). He describes Germany as a member which used to be “inward 
looking”, not very keen on contributing to comparisons of Germany and other 
countries´ achievements, and reluctant to participate in special reviews (cf. also 
Duncan 2002: 308). Today this has changed radically: 
                                                 
86 However, part two of the Communication from the Commission to the Spring European Council 2008 gives an 
assessment of the National Reform Programmes, country by country (EU Commission 2008d). 
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“It happens very frequently that (…) different Member States, facing a particular national 
challenge about changing a mind set, as in Germany on family and demographic issues, rely 
on the European framework for facilitating that mind change. So, to supporting their point in 
the national, internal debate with the argument that look, it is not just a matter for us, it is an 
overall recognised important matter by all our partners in the EU” (high level commission 
bureaucrat, EU Interview 1). 
 
Interviewed policy makers in the EU and OECD emphasize how Germany has used 
this arena to get a debate going at home, what Zeitlin refers to as a leverage effect. The 
influence exerted on Germany is then described more as a reinforcement of national 
initiatives, implying that the role of international organizations in this field is better 
depicted as a mediator function. 
Another part of the OMC-process is the peer review.87 This is a mutual learning 
process, where selected policies and good practice are evaluated and is similar to the 
peer review of the OECD (Schäfer 2006). There are different kinds of peer reviews; a) 
committee peer review (thematic peer review seminars), taking place in the 
Employment Committee (EMCO), the Economic Policy Committee (EPC), and the 
Social Protection Committee (SPC), where all Member States participate and discuss 
NRPs, and b) the peer review programme, focussed on a specific topic, taking place in 
one member country and where participation is voluntary (Jacobsson 2004). The aim 
for both is to initiate learning and enhance transferability. I will now elaborate on the 
second kind of peer review. 
One Member State is organising the review. This country either presents a 
national policy thought to be a best practice, or invites countries to give advice on 
which policies the host should implement to meet a goal. One example of an 
interesting peer review, which had a family policy topic, is instructive. In 2004, 
Germany participated in an EU peer review process in Stockholm, on the topic of 
parental leave and childcare, as part of the OMC on employment.88 Nine countries 
discussed the host’s system, as well as the transferability of Swedish experiences and 
                                                 
87 More on peer reviews here: http://www.peer-review-social-inclusion.net/ (social inclusion) and 
http://www.mutual-learning-employment.net/ (EES). 
88 Information available at http://www.mutual-learning-employment.net/peerreviews/2004/04/19-20. Family 
policy related issues are the topic of peer reviews in other OMCs as well. For instance, Germany is organising 
one on assisting women to return to work after having children as part of OMC/inclusion in November 2008. 
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policies to the participating countries. Independent experts wrote reports on each 
country where the possibility and the potential benefits of adopting the Swedish model 
were discussed. For Germany the conclusion was clear: “Given the different 
institutional arrangements, a pure copy of the Swedish experience is not possible, but 
major elements could be integrated in a new German policy” (Maier 2004: 6). This 
kind of meeting and information exchange is an example of how the EU might play a 
role in disseminating ideas.89 
Just as participation in OECD social studies is voluntary, no Member State has 
to take part in EU topical peer reviews (German interview 4). Likewise, the host 
decides the topic and choice of best practice (Zeitlin 2005a: 489). Motives for signing 
up may vary. Countries may want to learn and benefit from best practices in other 
countries (EU interview 7), or to provide best practice to others (EU interview 3). This 
means that countries may participate when it suits them, which, again, tells us that the 
potential naming and shaming effect coming from peer reviews would be limited. 
However, being part of an OMC process designed to identify best practice could also 
mean that countries are exposed to new policy ideas, and start looking for solutions 
before problems exist, contrary to claims of the idea-literature, discussed in chapter 3, 
stating that dissatisfaction or underperformance lead to a search for new policies. This 
contributes to the literature on when ideas succeed.90 How influential such peer 
reviews are is difficult to say, but it may at least “broaden your view”, as one 
interviewee, present in Stockholm in 2004, put it (EU interview 7). However, 
empirical studies cast doubt on whether peer reviews have resulted in policy transfer 
(Jacobsson 2004: 363).  
                                                 
89 Obviously, when studying the possible influence of international family policy ideas, it would be interesting to 
interview people involved in this particular peer review as a small “case study”. The reader would expect this to 
be discussed in subsequent chapters and this has been my aim, but it has proved very difficult. I have tried to get 
in contact with both the Swedes organising the review, and the German participants, but for various reasons I 
have not been able to get to talk to all of them. I managed to identify the right Swedish official, who 
unfortunately turned down my interview request. EU officials refused to give me the name of the German one 
due to concerns of anonymity. Instead they offered to ask the national officials directly and then to inform me if 
the persons agreed, but they could not reach them. I also asked the German Ministry, but was still unable to 
reach the German official participant. I have, however, talked to two other participants, one independent expert 
and one national representative. Consequently, this particular peer review, which is so interesting since it proves 
contact between Germany and Sweden within EU learning processes on family policies, very similar to recent 
German reforms, will not be discussed in depth in chapter 7 on possible German learning through IOs. 
90 According to López-Santana (2006: 491), EU-influence can occur through the definition of domestic problems 
and/or identification of good and bad policies even for countries with relative good results. 
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Some comments on the actors involved in the OMC process are also useful in 
this discussion.91 The three Committees mentioned above are important within the 
OMC: the SPC, EPC and EMCO, which have strong relations with each other (Zeitlin 
2005a). The committees are positioned between the Council and the Commission 
(Borrás and Jacobsson 2004, Jacobsson and Vifell 2007). They prepare proceedings 
and provide advice to the Council and Commission. They contribute in the formulation 
of reports, indicators, and guidelines. An interviewee with the SPC describes the 
function of the Committee like this: 
 
“In practice the committee has become the fore-room, the venue, where member states agree 
with the Commission what will be decided by the Council. This means that, usually unless 
there are mistakes or problems in the process, the opinion of the committee becomes the 
Council conclusions. It’s a way to discuss and reach agreements, (…)” (EU interview 5). 
 
The committees have two delegates from each Member State, and the Commission. 
The Social Protection Committee has an Indicators' Sub-Group supporting the 
Committee in its work. It is relevant to know about these committees, since they are 
described in the literature as having different priorities, some being more socially 
oriented (SPC), and others more economically oriented (EPC) (Pochet 2005, Ervik 
forthcoming 2009), and that policy learning may take place in these committees 
(Nedergaard 2007). The economically oriented players are usually, like in the OECD, 
considered stronger than the socially oriented ones. However, the interviewed member 
of the SPC says their work is characterised by a consensus approach, implying that 
they come up with a wording all participants can accept (EU interview 3).92 
Within OMC-processes, the Council and Commission, as well as the 
committees, are most important while the European Parliament (EP) and the European 
Court of Justice are more or less excluded (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004: 200, de la 
Porte and Pochet 2005: 359, 372). The same could be said about national parliaments 
(Zeitlin 2005a: 460).93 However, regarding the development of reconciliation policies 
                                                 
91 For a discussion of actors involved in the OMC - process, see de la Porte and Pochet (2005). 
92 For more details and a discussion related to pensions, cf. Ervik (forthcoming 2009). 
93 For a discussion of democratic challenges connected to the OMC, as well as possible solutions, see Büchs 
(forthcoming 2009). 
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more generally, a similar point can be made about socially versus economically 
oriented actors. The EU Commission has been much more positive towards taking 
family policy issues than the Council and individual countries: “The Commission has 
had to try to find a balance between the contradictory demands of the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and its margins for manoeuvre have, 
therefore, frequently been constrained” (Stratigaki 2000: 32, cf. also Hantrais and 
Letablier 1996: 124, 140, Duncan 2002: 310, Collins and Salais 2004: 421). And, as 
Hantrais and Letablier note, the European Parliament has obviously tried to make the 
EU Commission engage in a more comprehensive family policy for a long time, but 
their resolutions are purely advisory (1996: 140, Dienel 2004: 295, 2002: 260, 265, 
Gerlach 2004: 301, Hantrais 2007: 104). One well-known report in this respect is the 
Hermange report from 1999 (European Parliament 1999), but it has had limited 
success. Another example is the Bastos report (European Parliament 2004).94 
 
5.1.3 Conferences: family policy moving higher on the agenda 
 
Hantrais stresses how family policy is mainly a national policy field and that ”No 
formal process has been initiated under the OMC to set targets for family policy” 
(2004a: 206). However, the recent trend of countries holding the EU Presidency to 
organize conferences on family policy issues, and the European Alliance for Families 
discussed in the next section, both being instruments to spread national experiences, 
partly qualifies Hantrais´ argument, in the sense that family policy ideas are also 
disseminated at the EU level through OMC-like processes.  
”Families, Change and Social Policy in Europe”, hosted by the Irish EU-
Presidency in 2004, was the first EU Presidency conference on this theme. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly at a conference like this, but still noteworthy, many of the participants 
emphasize how the Union has a say in this policy area. Linda Hantrais, whose work on 
EU family policy has stressed the modest development so far, participated, and said 
                                                 
94 A more recent example is the report adopted by the EP in February 2008, asking the Commission to work 
towards an entitlement to paternal leave within EU parental leave law (European Parliament 2008). Note that 
there are also some nongovernmental organizations trying to make family policy an EU - priority, e.g. the 
Institute for Family Policies or COFACE (Confederation of Family Organisations in the European Union). 
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that some agreement exists among Member States with regard to EU initiatives, to, for 
instance, create a better work-life balance, even though it is not reflected in common 
legislation (2004b: 113). 
 At the same conference, Marieluise Beck, the Parliamentary State Secretary 
Minister of the German Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and 
Youth, refers explicitly to the Lisbon strategy, saying that “The Lisbon agenda have 
given us the specific task of promoting the family unit” (2004: 203) and calls for 
greater cooperation within the field, although her speech makes all the common 
reservations: 
 
“Europe cannot afford not to talk about such important themes on a regular basis. Please, do 
not misunderstand me: I am not thinking about shifting responsibility. Europe does not need 
any authorities for making policies on family affairs. But we do need a forum, in which we 
can discuss our European problems in the area of family affairs. At one stage, a working group 
comprised of government officials from the department of family affairs met regularly with 
the European Commission in Brussels to discuss current problems. We should set up this 
working group again!” (Beck 2004: 207).  
 
Germany organized a similar conference in 2004, and while taking over the EU Presidency in 
2007, it took the initiative to establish an Alliance for families, to enhance the exchange of 
best practice. This has similarities with what Beck referred to above, and has been welcomed 
by the EU Commission (see section 5.1.4). 
 Austria held the EU presidency in the first half of 2006 and organized a conference 
entitled “Demographic Challenge - Families need Partnerships”.95 There are few references to 
a possible common EU family policy at this event. Most participants, spanning from ministers 
and commissioners, to experts and representatives of interest organizations, focus on themes 
like the role of enterprises, changes in family structures, and family in the economy and the 
community, as well as reconciliation of work and family life. There is a strong focus on the 
role of the family in the demographic development, and less on the well-being of families, 
                                                 
95 There exists no report from this conference, but information is made available at 
http://www.eu2006.bmsg.gv.at/cms/eu2006EN/liste.html?channel=CH0602. Unfortunately, these are mainly 
abstracts or shorter summaries in English, German or French, allowing no thorough analysis. By way of 
correspondence with the Austrian Ministry for Social Affairs I have gained access to some of the presentations, 
but the information is still very incomprehensive. This also makes it difficult to make references in a normal 
way, meaning that I have to refer only to participants´ names or page numbers as they occur when printing out 
the documents. 
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though this is touched upon in the official invitation to the conference. The conference is part 
of a comprehensive initiative to bring family related issues higher up on the agenda:  
 
“With this conference the Austrian Presidency wishes to continue the started initiative 
(Dublin, Berlin) and to make a contribution to this important and necessary discussion at 
European level. Results from this conference should flow into the new European Lisbon 
process. (…) We have gathered here to exchange experience and best practice for the 
reconciliation of family and profession. We can learn a lot from each other, without 
renouncing our national strengths. The diversity of Europe is also expressed by varied 
approaches and focal points in the domain of family policy. (…) A common target unites us: 
Family policy requires the further overlapping co-operation of all social fields” (Haubner 
2006).  
 
Thus, these three conferences could be seen as the start of a process whereby the 
Union takes more responsibility for an, until recently, neglected area. From the 
statements of different actors, this seems likely, but in which form this will take place 
is a different question.  
 Hugh Frazer of the DG EMPL provides support for a more modest ambition: 
“From my point of view I felt that most of the issues could well be addressed by 
developing the processes that we already have” (2004: 230). And, at the same time, 
some developments might go in an opposite direction. The European Observatory on 
the Social Situation, Demography and Family, established by the European 
Commission in 1989 in order to monitor and report about developments in the EU 
Member States, was closed down in 2004 (see Hantrais 2007: 120). According to 
Dienel (2004: 293), it dealt with exchange of information and never became very 
important. It has been replaced by The European Observatory on Demography and the 
Social Situation, taking family out of its name. On the one hand, this could be read as a 
sign of how family issues are subordinate to more pressing economic interests. On the 
other hand, the EU today is addressing family issues within the area of demography. 
However, the conference trend continued and the Finnish EU Presidency 
organized an informal ministerial meeting in July 2006, to follow up Austria’s work on 
family policy. The conference’s concluding remarks in relation to the social and health 
policies, focus twice on reconciliation of work and family life, but less directly on 
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family policy measures. Again, family policy seems to be dealt with more as part of 
other fields, e.g. gender equality and non-discrimination, instead of directly as a 
distinct field. Issues like care by men and parental leave for both parents are promoted, 
as well as how women’s participation rates are conducive to higher birth rates.  
 In this respect, the conference does not address family policy in the same 
straightforward way as in Berlin, Vienna, or especially as in Ireland. Family policy is 
treated as a productive factor, which, for instance, prolongs working careers. However, 
sharing of best practice within reconciliation of work and family life is stressed. The 
conference discussed topics like how family policy may promote higher female 
employment, and how high female employment is connected to higher birth rates, 
provided that childcare services are available. Also, but only in a draft background 
document (Finnish EU Presidency 2006), reconciliation policies are discussed more 
thoroughly. It is written by experts carrying no political responsibility, which might 
explain the much more direct advice and normative views included in the report, for 
example, how pension crediting for childcare periods must be improved, gender 
equality in caring work must be promoted, and more balanced sharing of 
responsibilities (increase men’s housework and childcare hours).96  
 During the German Presidency in 2007, two important developments took 
place. First, the Germans organized an informal meeting where, for the first time in an 
EU setting, both family and equality ministers met simultaneously to discuss common 
challenges. As in the conferences described above, focus was very much set on 
learning, and according to the German family minister, the aim was to develop policy. 
Second, the Germans initiated the European Alliance for families, described in section 
5.1.4, to enhance the exchange of best practice. The Alliance for Families could also 
be a permanent equivalent to the conferences. 
The Portuguese Presidency, taking over from Germany, organized the 
conference “Reconciliation of Professional, Personal and Family Life: New 
Challenges for Social Partners and Public Policies”, in July 2007, in Lisbon. 
Thematically, this seems like a continuation of the Presidencies before them, but this 
                                                 
96 The attention devoted to family policy at the conference “EU's Evolving Social Policy and National Models” 
in Helsinki, in November 2006, could also be studied. A book on the Europeanization of social policy was 
published as background information for the conference (Saari 2006, published in 2007 as Kvist and Saari). 
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conference gathered fewer high-level politicians than some of the former ones, and the 
focus on the EU level seems also to have been less stressed. However, some of the 
workshops discussed issues with implications for the EU level, e.g. improving existing 
directives on paternity protection, extension of the Barcelona-childcare targets to 
include a qualitative aspect and not just a percentage goal, and a strengthening of 
reconciliation aims within the Lisbon strategy. 
The Slovenian Presidency following Portugal, did not organize any special 
conferences on family policy. Among the next three countries to follow Slovenia; 
France, the Czech Republic, and Sweden, there are at least two countries which 
historically have been very interested in family policy, and thus it could be 
hypothesized that family policy will be high on the agenda. An interviewed high level 
EU bureaucrat within the DG EMPL, presents France as a country trying to make the 
EU engage more in family policy issues (EU interview 1, cf. also Hantrais 2000: 21).97 
 Should these conferences become annual events, with stronger exchange of 
information, monitoring, and negotiating, they could gradually ensure the EU some 
responsibility for family policy. A German high level bureaucrat confirms that this has 
been discussed with the EU Commission during their Presidency (German interview 
3). According to Barroso, President of the European Commission; “It is not just by 
developing childcare facilities that we can turnround the decline in birthrates; we 
should also be drawing on national “best practices” in terms of parental leave, a 
flexible approach to working time, and social welfare arrangements” (Barroso 2005: 
11). Judging from the six conferences organized so far, they could contribute to the 
building of networks and even epistemic communities, since the same organizations, 
institutions, and people, are represented again and again. Even official representatives 
from non-member countries attend these conferences, like the Norwegian Minister for 
Family Affairs, Laila Dåvøy, in Berlin, in 2004. 
 Overall, the conferences have drawn at least five interesting conclusions: family 
policy must be addressed in a more consistent manner, more child- and family-friendly 
policies are needed, action at the European level is required, exchange of best practice 
                                                 
97 At the time of writing, France is still holding the Presidency and I have not been able to analyze their possible 
family policy related activities in detail. However, in September 2008 they organized an informal meeting of 
family ministers in Paris, inviting both EU and EFTA members to discuss reconciliation of work and family life. 
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is welcomed and European Demography Forum dealing, among other things, with 
family policy issues is to be set up. The issue of family policy is high on the agenda in 
the EU, but this does not mean that it will develop further into a continuous practice 
and take a more formal character.  
 
5.1.4 The European Alliance for Families  
 
The First Forum on Europe’s Demographic Future, called for in the conferences, was 
organized in October 2006. Family policies are addressed directly through discussions 
of reconciliation of work and family life, and the need for modernizing family policies. 
In her opening speech, the German Family minister, von der Leyen, talks exclusively 
about family policy, and refers to measures that her country will implement as it takes 
over the EU presidency in 2007. She refers to a European Alliance for Families, which 
will be established to increase the exchange of information and family-friendly 
policies. The Alliance’s working mode is described in a communication from 2007 
(European Commission 2007c). Stressing the importance of the exchange of 
experiences, von der Leyen says the new German parental leave scheme is a direct 
result of Scandinavian best practice (2006: 5). Commissioner Špidla, in his opening 
speech at the same forum, says the EU should organize a Forum like this every two 
years, and encourages the exchange of good practice through regular meetings of 
government experts.98 Špidla also says that the Union will set up an expert group for 
family issues, with representatives from each country (2006: 3). This underscores how 
family policy through different conferences attracts more and more attention. 
 The European Alliance for Families has many similarities with an OMC; the 
focus is set on the exchange of best practice, learning and unbinding policy advice. 
The background is described as follows; 
 
“The Alliance hopes to create impulses for more family-friendly policies through exchanges of 
ideas and experience in the various Member States and to foster cooperation and fruitful 
                                                 
98 The second European Demography Forum took place on 24-25 November 2008. Family policy and sharing of 
best practice was central at this event, but information was made available too late to be included in my analysis. 
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learning from each other in the European Union. By achieving these objectives, the European 
Alliance for Families can make a substantial contribution towards implementing the Lisbon 
strategy for economic growth and employment, for sustainable population development, for 
stronger social cohesion and for the implementation of the road map for gender equality”.99 
 
A German high level bureaucrat, who worked on the Alliance during the German 
Presidency, describes the background and aims like this: 
 
"The background is that it is difficult to treat family policy at the European level and it must 
be done through the backdoor; through the topic of demographic change, labour market or 
equal opportunities. If not, one cannot include family policy questions because there is no 
competence for family policy. And the idea was that we now use the EU Presidency to make 
the European Alliance for Families a platform for the exchange of opinions and information. 
More than that is it not. It is not about changes in competence, there will be no European 
family policy. We always speak about a European Alliance for families, the use of plural is 
deliberate, and similarly we speak about family policies to stress that different options exist 
and that we still can learn from each other. It is sort of a benchmark, the idea of benchmarking 
lies behind this. We simply want to stimulate exchange of opinions and information and 
during our Presidency initiate and set up a web portal enabling such exchange. The portal does 
not need to be especially good, but a start, which the Commission can take over to improve 
and supervise. And this portal should improve the access to family policy topics which until 
now required tedious labour to collect. I am very careful here, because it is difficult to actually 
keep this up to date and to ensure that something happens, but we have tried to initiate debate 
on demography, birth rates and reconciliation to promote such issues. (...) we hope the 
Alliance gains ground and that it continues in the next years, that it will be kept" (German 
interview 3, my translation). 
 
The website of the Alliance provides an overview of national family policy in all 27 
member states, and studies on family policy issues. It is interesting to note how the 
OECD´s work on family policy is referred to, both their family database and their 
Babies and Bosses series. A seminar on mutual learning tools for more family-friendly 
policies and better childcare provision, organized in cooperation with the OECD, is 
                                                 
99 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/families/european-alliance-for-families_en.html, retrieved 19.06.2008. 
The EU has gathered information on Member States´ family policies before, e.g. through the MISSOC which is 
partly the same as OECD family database (cf. chapter 6). Notice how the European Alliance for Families is 
placed under the policy area demography and the social situation in the EU and not as an area of its own.   
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also presented. Interestingly, the website explicitly uses the term family policy and 
states, for instance, that the aim of the seminar was to “present instruments for the 
exchange of information and experiences in the area of family policies, and to 
illustrate their potential by looking at the area of child care” (my emphasis). Moreover, 
the website identifies best practice. So far, only three examples are given. The Finnish 
home care allowance, which is similar to the Norwegian kontantstøtte, is one. The two 
other best practices presented are the UK Early Excellence Centres, offering high 
quality practice in integrated education and childcare for young children, and the 
German Local Alliances for Families, which are groups of local actors seeking to 
increase family friendliness in their region 
The German Presidency from January to July 2007 set up the website. Since 
then, in line with my informant´s concerns, the website has hardly been updated, and it 
contains very little information. At the time of writing in November 2008, more than a 
year after the Germans passed on the baton to the next EU Presidency country, the 
website is “being updated and developed”, as it says on the website. It is difficult to 
find any sign of how the initiative has resulted in particular measures or actual 
exchange of experiences, except for the mentioned seminar in cooperation with the 
OECD.  
 
5.1.5 A future EU family policy? 
 
What status do these conferences and the Alliance have, then? In an article on the 
OMC, Berghman and Kieke (2002) discuss three conferences, organized by the 
Belgian EU presidency in 2001. According to these authors, “The conferences 
appeared to represent an important example of the open method of co-ordination, 
setting the agenda, discussing the development of indicators, and deliberating on the 
need to expand the powers of the EU into the area of social policy” (2002: 3). 
Although there is no OMC on family policy in the EU, I find it useful to analyze the 
conferences, and the Alliance described above, in the light of this soft mode of 
governance, especially since conferences, at least in the view of Berghman and Kieke, 
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constitute core elements of the OMC. Such an analysis will hopefully shed light on 
how far the Union has actually gone in this field of social policy.  
 Several participants at the conferences emphasize how family policy is fully in 
the competence of the Member States, and there are no direct ambitions expressed to 
create an EU family policy. At the same time, however, it is stressed how family 
policy is of a cross-cutting nature, and how a more consistent policy with action at the 
EU level is needed. Reading reports from the conferences on family policy since 2004, 
leaves the impression that such conferences are based on much of the same logic as the 
OMC. In several statements, actors speak up for employing a similar method 
concerning family affairs. On the Berlin conference, the German family minister, 
Renate Schmidt, speaks up for a system of continuous exchange of experiences, so 
similar to an OMC on family policy that practically only the term OMC is lacking 
(2004b). Jérôme Vignon of the European Commission emphasizes how family life 
interacts with social inclusion and pensions, and that the EU can coordinate policies in 
the area by linking national policies, and see to it that knowledge, research, and 
practices, are exchanged (2004: 223). 
   As will become clear in section 5.2 on the initiatives of the EU on family policy 
related issues, demography and the issues mentioned by Vignon, are, in fact, areas 
where the EU promotes ideas about national family policy. In a way, the conferences 
represent a “truly open method of co-ordination” in having a more bottom-up 
approach, for instance by allowing participation from NGOs. 
 Overall, the conferences on family policy and demographic developments have 
similarities with an OMC-process: participants are exposed to new ideas and views 
upon aims, functions, and set up of social policy fields, and the conference reports 
contain many suggestions to develop a process of continuous exchange of information 
based on best practice. Also, as with other OMC social policy formulations, the ones 
on family policy are coined in economic language, to use a phrase borrowed from 
Barbier (2004: 7). This implies that the underlying reason for action is economic 
growth and sustainability. 
 However, there are also some clear distinctions. For instance, there is (as yet) 
no development of clear objectives or indicators, except perhaps number 18 and the 
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childcare-goal to be discussed in section 5.2, and key OMC-players, like 
representatives of Member States and the Commission, are not present to the same 
degree. Also, Member States have not agreed to make annual reports or start 
monitoring-processes of any kind. The main instrument to achieve the goals of the 
OMC is the development of processes of discussion and interaction between political 
and administrative actors at national and international level (Bisopoulos 2005: 151). 
So far the conferences have not resulted in processes like, for instance, family policy 
peer-reviews.100 The not yet very developed European Alliance for Families may 
change this, but there are no certain signs of it.101 
More research is needed to clarify the status and importance of these 
conferences and whether calls for EU action within family policy are non-committal 
statements or the start of binding cooperation. But with this recent development of new 
modes of addressing family policy, how come family policy at EU level is still only a 
cross cutting field? And why is there no OMC on family policy?  
 Scientists writing on this topic give various reasons why the European Union 
has not (yet) developed its own family policy. The obvious and straightforward answer 
is, in the words of Pfenning and Bahle, that “The EU´s principle of subsidiarity leaves 
social and family policy the responsibility of the member states” (2000: 128). But the 
interesting question is why the EU has not developed more competences within this 
area. Many of the obstacles applying to social policy in general also matter for a 
common EU family policy (cf. Leibfried 2005). A full treatment of this topic is not 
                                                 
100 However, the peer review process in Stockholm on parental insurance and childcare as part of the EES was 
organized in 2004, and similar themes have been addressed in other peer reviews (section 5.1.2). 
101 Furthermore, an indication of the status and importance of the conferences I have referred to is how they are 
treated in scholarly articles discussing the contributions made by Presidency countries. The Journal of Common 
Market Studies provides a special issue called the Annual Review of the European Union. It has, for instance, had 
articles discussing the German (Maurer 2008), Finnish (Ojanen and Vuohula 2007), Austrian (Pollak and 
Riekmann 2007) and Irish (Rees 2005) Presidencies and the authors do not mention family policy and 
conferences at all. Surely, had the conferences and the Alliance been the start of a new policy field for the EU, 
the articles would have discussed this. Instead, the unaddressed issue is indicative of the conferences´ modest 
importance, at least for formal policy development. Another way of answering the question of the role 
Presidency conferences and the new Alliance for Families has played so far, and can play in the future, would be 
to interview those present at the conferences. For the not yet much developed Alliance this is difficult, though. I 
have interviewed some officials representing the EU and OECD at the conferences, as well as the German 
presidency, and they are not very positive. Workshop leaders at the conferences, often referred to as Chair or 
Rapporteur, include scholars who have written on social policy in general and/or family policy specifically, 
among them Joakim Palme, Linda Hantrais and Mary Daly. 
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possible here, but a brief summary of problematic issues, applying more specifically to 
the family policy area, based on previous research, is instructive.  
 There are strong ideological dividing lines in this area, both between and within 
countries (Hantrais 2007: 101). Moreover, family policies are, by many, considered 
private affairs and a non-suitable area for state intervention (2007: 101). And EU 
social protection focuses on workers´ rather than citizens´ rights (Lewis and Ostner 
1995: 177, Hantrais 2007: 101). This leaves the Union little competence in this field. 
Hantrais sums up the argument like this: “Where policy objectives do not coincide 
with values which are widely shared across Member States, the Union is unlikely to be 
able to exert its influence or attempt to shape national policies“ (1995: 75). I would 
agree that the different understanding of what a family policy should include 
complicates the development of its own coherent family policy, but does not stop the 
EU from trying to shape national policies. Instead, while always emphasizing how 
family policies are the exclusive responsibility of the Member States, “the Union can 
still contribute indirectly to their modernisation and success” (European Commission 
2007c: 3). This is often justified by saying that e.g. childcare is instrumental in 
reaching equality between men and women or higher birth rates.  
 In the context of my study, the allegedly special character of family policy is 
interesting. I would like to take issue with two assertions found in the literature on 
family policy and the EU (e.g. Hantrais 2007: 101). First, the very different family 
structures across Europe supposedly make it difficult to find one family model which 
could serve as a model for a common family policy, and to coordinate national policy. 
Does this not make the Open Method of Coordination a natural choice? According to 
Kohl and Vahlpahl (2004: 12), the OMC is particularly suitable when political 
consensus is hard to find, path dependency and interconnectedness of social policies 
are strong, and the potential loss of legitimacy high. Soft law is used exactly in 
political sensitive areas (Büchs 2006: 41).  
 Second, is family policy really so special, with regards to moral questions and 
conflicts of interest involved? This is possible to question. Other areas are also 
difficult, but have still been addressed. Social inclusion, pensions, health, and 
employment, are all important in national budgets and for traditional ideas of social 
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justice (Kohl and Vahlpahl 2004: 12). And, as stressed by Radaelli (2004), learning is 
always a political exercise, irrespective of policy field. Should not the OMC be 
especially suitable for family policy, then? Family policy is much politicized, but has 
few vested interest or institutions linked to it. It is popular with the public, but not as 
important, in terms of spending, as are pensions or health policies.  
 One could argue that agreeing on full employment as a goal is less controversial 
than, for example, whether families or public institutions provide the best surroundings 
for the care of small children.102 Still, family policy seems possible to deal with in a 
more systematic way than has been done up until now. The latest developments of 
conferences on family policy, as well as the increasing understanding of the field as 
important for economy and competition, suggest that this is not totally unlikely. 
Similar focus in other organizations, such as the OECD, could also provide reciprocal 
action, conducive to further coordination at EU level. At the same time, the recent 
streamlining process of creating one single OMC on social protection could mean that 
there will be no individual OMC on this issue, but rather increasing incorporation into 
the established OMCs, or coordination through initiatives such as the European 
Alliance for Families.  This has been suggested in interviews with EU officials (EU 
interviews 1). 
 
5. 2 EU advice within the family policy field 
 
I move forward by looking at the content of the family policy ideas found at the EU 
level. As Daly (2000) argues, other fields of social policy are important for family 
policy, and I thus search the four fields where there is an ongoing OMC-process; 
employment, social inclusion, health, and pensions. I also look at equality (gender) and 
demography, as two less “typical” social policy fields that still have substantial 
implications for family policy. The analysis is thus restricted to six areas, but one 
could probably also find relevant family related policies within other fields. Analyzing 
documents within this area enables me to see different fields in connection with each 
other, perhaps revealing an embryonic family policy otherwise hidden. I present the 
                                                 
102 For more controversial questions and potential conflicts on family issues, see Hantrais (2007: 116).  
  
143
more general family policy advice coming from the EU, with reference to Campbell’s 
framework which was presented in chapter 4. 
 There is barely any European Union social policy,103 and, according to Kari, 
family policy is left more or less untouched by the EU, so Member States have 
developed their own instead (1998: 29, see also Hantrais 2007: 108 or Hantrais and 
Letablier 1996: 143). Based on Abrahamson et al., and their description of the UK 
family policy, or lack thereof, (2005: 209), one could summarize like this: the EU has 
no family policy in the sense of a coherent set of objectives for government activity in 
this policy area, but several policies that affect the situation of families. In other 
words, there is no family policy, but a strong family political commitment. There is no 
commissioner or Directorate-General (“department”) for family affairs (the closest one 
being the Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities). 
When employing a broad approach though, an evaluation will show that the EU has 
developed a few family policy stands, and addressed family affairs more indirectly 
through other policies (Hantrais 2004a: 96). As will be recalled, I use a definition of 
family policy which focuses on families with children, and I thus look for policies 
affecting this group.  
 
5.2.1 Parental Leave 
 
A directive on parental leave was adopted in 1996.104 It guarantees three months leave, 
and according to Falkner et al. (2005: 145), all EU members had to adapt their 
legislation to some extent. This is a clear instance of EU family policy, but it has its 
limitations; the directive does not say that the leave must be paid.   
 Also, there is one important directive with family policy implications in the area 
of health: the pregnant workers directive (1992). This directive resulted in 
                                                 
103 Kowalsky’s study of European Social Policy constitutes an alternative view with its very broad definition of 
European Social Policy: regulative and redistributive measures, as well as relevant effects of other common 
policies like the Monetary Union and even agriculture, are included (1999: 16). In his opinion, the EU does have 
some supranational redistributive policies through the Social Fund, although he admits that the funding is 
insufficient and that it only supplements, and not replaces, national policies (1999: 315). Also, several authors, 
e.g. Leibfried (2005), acknowledge that the EU plays an important indirect role in delimiting what kind of 
policies states can choose, but they still consider the overall EU social policy initiatives weak.  
104 For an overview of EU legislation on parental leave, see:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/gender_equality/legislation/pregnant_en.html  
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improvements in all countries, except Denmark, though some of the changes were 
small, and has been particularly important for maternity leave, as it guarantees a 
minimum of 14 weeks paid leave (Falkner et al. 2005: 78, 91).105 These two directives 
directly influence the daily life of EU citizens, but they are only minimum measures.106  
 Parental leave schemes are not only addressed by the EU through directives. 
The main argument of this chapter, saying that the EU´s view of social policy as a 
productive factor has resulted in a new interest in family issues, where some 
recommendations and targets have been developed, is mainly based on the second kind 
of policy; the non-binding. These can, above all, be found in the OMC-processes 
where there is a strong focus on employability and sustainability of welfare 
arrangements. There are several suggestions for the design of such schemes, 
suggestions which show that the EU expresses views which go beyond simple 
minimum standards, something which is exemplified by the 2003 joint Commission - 
Council report on adequate and sustainable pensions. The report identifies expansion 
of care facilities for children and other dependants, and measures that improve the 
reconciliation of work and family life as a way of securing welfare systems. Also, 
people should gain pension credits for periods of childcare, or care for elderly relatives 
(2003: 88). However, the report is critical towards measures which keep women out of 
work for longer periods:  
 
“A number of countries with less developed nursery childcare facilities offer fairly generous 
support to women who take extended career breaks to care for their children in their first two 
to three years. Naturally, such policies may primarily reflect priorities in family policy. Yet, 
with a view to the impact on employment rates and the difficulties for many women of 
returning to the labour market after a long absence, the question arises whether it would not be 
better to use these resources to invest in a expansion of childcare services to speed up the 
return of women after parental leave” (2003: 45). 
                                                 
105 An EU Commission proposal from October 2008 seeks to create longer and better maternity leave by revising 
this directive (EU Commission 2008a). The minimum period should be extended by four weeks, with a 
minimum pay at the level of sick-pay, but preferably with 100 percent of previous salary. The proposal is sent to 
the EP and national governments for discussion and agreement is expected to be reached during 2009. At the 
same time, the Commission has said that it intends to improve paternity leave. All this illustrates how the EU is 
increasingly taking actions within the area of family policy. It shows how the relevance of reconciliation policies 
to demographic challenges, female employment, social exclusion, and poverty, is recognised and uncontested at 
EU level. A revised directive will be applicable also to EFTA countries like Norway.   
106 See Falkner et al. (2005) for details. 
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People (women) who do not work, because of their family or personal responsibilities, 
are identified as one reason for lower employment rates than are wanted. Therefore, 
shorter leave periods and increased availability of social services could relieve these 
persons and increase employment rates, which, at the same time improve the 
sustainability of pension systems. While family obligations and lack of care services 
are identified among the hindrances to a higher employment rate (SPC 2004: 4-5), 
there are no concrete suggestions for mending this. Instead the strategy seems to be to 
refer to Member States that have developed successful policies in this area, for 
instance the Swedish parental leave system and its father’s quota, and thus indirectly 
give direction (e.g. European Commission 2006b). Still, one understands that parental 
leave schemes associated with a Scandinavian type, where the leave is well paid but 
with incentives to return to work after a year’s time is preferred, being a programmatic 
idea in Campbell’s framework. 
 An expert-report ordered and financed by the European Commission (Plantenga 
and Remery 2005), goes further. In this commissioned report it is recommended that 
the design of the leave arrangements be reconsidered, especially in countries where 
men barely make use of leave facilities. This refers to the duration of the leave, 
eligibility, payment level, and flexibility (2005: 9). Here the Swedish father’s quota is 
for instance presented as a good way of making men take more responsibility 
(programmatic idea). 
Another possible source of influence in the form of commissioned work is the 
report A new Welfare Architecture for Europe, a report ordered by the Belgian EU 
Presidency in 2001, and written by Esping-Andersen and other experts. They 
incorporated much of this report in Why we need a New Welfare State (2002). The 
family is given a central role in this book. Esping-Andersen speaks about the 
importance of institutional, public support (affordable childcare, paid maternity and 
parental leave, and provision for work absence when children are ill) (2002: 94). 
Increasing female participation rates are considered important, since it seems to affect 
birth rates positively, reduces the difficulties of financing the welfare state, constitutes 
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an (often highly educated and skilled) untapped productive factor, and is favourable to 
social inclusion and avoiding poverty.107 
 Also within health, parental leave is described as an important means to 
assuring reconciliation of work and family life, and promoting equality and in the 
Green Paper on demographic change (European Commission 2005b), families and 
family policies are treated very explicitly, and given great importance in confronting 
the challenge of ageing societies (frame in Campbell’s framework): “The low fertility 
rate is the result of obstacles to private choices: late access to employment, job 
instability, expensive housing and lack of incentives (family benefits, parental leave, 
child care, equal pay)” (European Commission 2005b: 5). The Communication on the 
demographic future of Europe from 2006, expresses similar views (EU Commission 
2006c). According to several high level bureaucrats in the EU (EU interviews 1, 5), 
there was a turn during the Hampton Court European Council under the UK 
presidency in the second half of 2005; 
  
“(…) where the European Council urged the Commission to be more active in the field of 
demography, not in promoting family policies, of course not, but in promoting a debate and 
raising awareness on the consequences of population decline and the need to create a more 
family-friendly climate at the level of member states. (…) So we are engaged now, as 
Commission, in a much more systematic approach to encouraging exchange of good practices, 
on how to create a more friendly context for family life, but avoiding to say that an aim of that 
is exclusively promoting fertility. One indirect aim of course is better conditions for fertility” 
(EU interview 1). 
 
The interviewee refers to a more systematic role, but it is still more of a policy 
guidance role and Member States are not so keen on institutionalizing these new 
initiatives. Instead of developing a specific process for families, it could become part 
of the responsibility of an already established committee, e.g. the SPC (EU interview 
1). 
The communication from 2007 on promoting solidarity between the 
generations, deals with family policy in a direct and coherent way, not so common for 
                                                 
107 The EU also fund transnational research projects on reconciliation of professional and private life and publish 
summaries of this research (Collins and Salais 2004: 446, see e.g. European Commission 2007d). 
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the EU. Although it is emphasized at least three times in the first six-seven pages that 
“family policies are the exclusive responsibility of the Member States” (European 
Commission 2007c: 3), it is also said clearly that the EU may have a role in serving as 
a platform for policy exchange. This is the same document as the one describing the 
European Alliance for Families, discussed in section 5.1.4.  
 However, it is still obvious that family policies serve the overarching aim of 
economic growth instead of constituting an important policy field as such (cf. Dienel 
2004, Ostner 2000). This is revealed already in the first paragraphs of the Green Paper 
on demographic change (European Commission 2005b), where it says that families 
must be supported by public policies, in order to reverse the demographic decline. This 
reversion is crucial to avoid that the ageing results in reduced growth. In the same 
manner, incentives like family benefits, parental leave, and childcare, are emphasized 
as possible solutions to the low fertility rate with the clear overall aim of keeping 
people at work (2005b: 5). Reconciling work and family life is justified with regard to 
the demographic crisis, not to individual wants or interests of children (EU interview 
5). Similar signs of the paradigmatic idea that family policy is a productive factor, 
meaning that well designed social and family policies may contribute to economic 
growth, are found in the 2008 Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion. 
Its first key message is the following; ”Social and economic policies can and should be 
mutually supportive” (2008: 2). The same report from the year before refers to this as a 
win-win strategy (2007: 9). An important part of the background for the needed 
reforms, or frames, to use the vocabulary of Campbell, is population ageing and 
increases in life expectancy. Pension systems, healthcare, and social inclusion policies 
must be adapted to this challenge, and getting more people into paid work, made 
possible, among other things, by improved access to childcare, is an important 
measure in this respect (2007: 5).  
 Ostner (2000) and Lewis (2006b) state that work/family policies used to be part 
of equal opportunities policies, and have now become part of employment (the EES). I 
agree, and this will be made clear in the next section on childcare, but I would argue 
that we have recently seen a trend where family policies are treated under the heading 
of demography. Irrespective of where the family policy issues are discussed, Lewis 
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and Ostner (1995) made an important comment, relevant for whether, and how, the 
Union will and can address family policy issues. Policies must pass two ”needle-eyes” 
to reach the agenda and become adopted: at the supranational level, policies must be 
addressed as employment-related, and at the national level, policies must be acceptable 
for the national welfare regimes and gender order. They claim that since EU law 
applies to workers, ”Only the family concerns of continuously employed wage earners 
attract political attention” (1995: 160). The idea of family policy as a possible solution 
to the ageing society, makes the EU not only focus on workers, but they are still the 
main subject for emerging family policy issues, like parental leave and childcare.  
 
5.2.2 Childcare 
 
Creating more kindergartens is the most direct and specific family policy aim of the 
EU. This is one of the objectives set in the framework of the EES, referred to as the 
Barcelona targets:  
 
“Member States should remove disincentives to female labour force participation and strive, 
taking into account the demand for childcare facilities and in line with national patterns of 
provision, to provide childcare by 2010 to at least 90% of children between 3 years old and the 
mandatory school age and at least 33% of children under 3 years of Age” (Council of the 
European Union 2002b: 13). 
 
This is an example of a concrete aim, originating from the Lisbon strategy, which, for 
instance, (western states of) Germany needs to work hard to comply with. To say, 
therefore, that there is no OMC on family policy (Hantrais 2004a: 206) is not 
completely accurate, as the EES includes a very strong focus on reconciliation of work 
and family life (see also Kvist and Saari 2007: 10-11).108 Reviewing documents on the 
EES, one finds references to many of the same family-affairs related issues that turn 
up within other fields of social protection. In Guideline Number 18 (Promote a 
lifecycle approach to work), a better reconciliation of work and private life, and the 
                                                 
108 In October 2008 the EU Commission proposed a package of measures to improve work-life balance in the 
EU. Improved maternity leave (see section 5.2.1) and better childcare are two important parts of this package. 
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provision of accessible and affordable childcare facilities and care for other 
dependents, is emphasized. The indicators developed to monitor the measures of the 
Member States include the employment impact of parenthood, provision of care 
facilities for children, and provision of care facilities for other dependents (ill, 
disabled, elderly relatives).109 The focus is on how such issues restrict higher 
employment rates. Measures of reconciling work and family life to increase the overall 
employment rate, as adopted in the Lisbon strategy, could be interpreted as a sign of 
EU influence on the family policy, since in practice, it promotes female employment, 
and thus stronger parental leave schemes and childcare institutions, as logical next 
steps (programmatic ideas). Increasing care facilities for children and other dependents 
is part of strategies within employment, social inclusion, health, and gender equality. 
Care for other dependents is also legitimized by avoiding the withdrawal of people 
(women) from the labour market, to fulfil care responsibilities. Several of these EU 
publications include tables, or other forms of comparisons and rankings, e.g.: “…, 
research shows that childcare provision for the under-threes varies from 8% in 
Germany, 2% in the Czech Republic to 36% in the Netherlands and 22% in Sweden” 
(European Commission 2007a). Some countries do better than others and the same 
publication stresses the need for mutual learning: 
 
“It is clear that countries that favour family-friendly policies in areas such as equal access to 
employment, parental leave for men and women, equal pay, generally have higher birth rates 
and more women in work. They are also some of the best performing countries in terms of 
jobs and growth. The differences in the way countries manage support for families underlines 
the potential for mutual learning” (European Commission 2007a, see also tables in appendix 
6). 
 
A recent report monitors the implementation of the Barcelona targets in the EU (EFTA 
countries like Norway are not covered) (EU Commission 2008c). Germany is said to 
surpass the objective for children aged 3 and older, but only reach an intermediate 
level of coverage for those under three (2008c: 6). Improving the quality of childcare 
                                                 
109 List of indicators available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/docindic_en.htm 
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facilities (staff numbers and qualifications), and ensuring affordability of childcare are 
also important.  
A similar emphasis on family-friendly policies, and particularly childcare, is 
found in the Commission's 2006 Annual Progress Report on Growth and Jobs. The 
report is very concrete in its criticism, as exemplified by the comment on Germany’s 
NRP and the need for “a more concrete and operational plan to achieve the intended 
increase in childcare facilities” (European Commission 2006a: 5). These 
recommendations, and the NRPs, should be studied closer when evaluating the effect 
of the OMC on national social policy (chapter 7).  
 That the family policy advice of the EU has the potential of influencing 
domestic reforms, is illustrated well in the EES recommendations, which are 
individually tailored and often reiterate a policy problem within a particular country. 
In the 2004 Council recommendation on the implementation of Member States' 
employment policies, the UK is urged to: “improve the access to and affordability of 
childcare and care for other dependants (Council of the European Union 2004: 12).  
 In the European Alliance for Families, good practice is identified. Clearly not 
very comprehensive yet, it presents the Finnish home care allowance, which is similar 
to the Norwegian kontantstøtte, as one good practice or programmatic idea. This is 
partly contradicting what the EU is saying in other documents, since a home care 
allowance is generally thought to delay the return of women to work. This is the 
reason why the OECD is so critical toward it (OECD 2007c). Countries like Finland 
and Norway combine high childcare coverage rates with a home care allowance, but 
there is no doubt that these two policy instruments have partly contradicting aims. As 
such, the conflicting goals between the general EU advice, and the best practice 
offered by the new Alliance, could indicate that the latter is more of a measure listed 
by a Member State, interested in introducing exactly this instrument, and less of a 
common EU advice. I return to this in chapter 7.  
The European Commission Childcare Network, an expert group set up by the 
EU Commission, and coordinated by Peter Moss, studied reconciliation of 
employment and family responsibilities in the period 1986-1996. Its members were 
experts from all EU member countries and the network produced a number of 
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publications proposing increased provision of childcare (European Commission 
Childcare Network 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996a-b, see also Phillips and Moss 1989). I 
will not discuss these publications in detail, but they emphasize how childcare has 
been of interest to the EU for several decades.  
Summing up, the EU has no direct powers in the field of childcare, but the EU 
Commission monitors progress towards the Barcelona targets, provides comparable 
statistics, makes recommendations, and promotes the exchange of best practice. The 
focus on childcare is an important programmatic idea for the EU. We may be seeing 
the first modest results of the increased interest in community action on childcare in 
the last two decades, described by Ross (2001) or Kaufmann (2002). At the same time 
one should not forget that several policy failures exist. A proposed directive on 
childcare provision supported by the Childcare Network, dealing with both level and 
quality, was not adopted, and the recommendation coming in its place in 1992, is not 
binding (Duncan 2002: 308, Mahon 2002: 362).  
 
5.2.3 Child Poverty Prevention 
 
Prevention of child poverty is a third family policy issue which is high on the EU 
agenda and reconciling work and family life is an important idea in the European 
Social Inclusion Strategy. To eliminate child poverty is one of the seven key policy 
priorities in promoting social inclusion (European Commission 2005a). As stated in 
the 2004 Joint Report on social inclusion, all NAPs acknowledge the importance for 
families of managing the balance between work and family life (2004: 36). Among the 
measures that could be useful to achieve this are programmatic ideas such as extension 
of childcare facilities, provision of financial support for families with young children, 
flexible or part-time working arrangement and a review of parental leave and 
maternity schemes (2004: 46, 53). The joint report does not get more specific than this 
with regard to measures. The 2008 Joint Report on Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion emphasizes the importance of paid work and how reconciliation policies can 
contribute: 
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“If children are poor, it is generally because they live in poor households. Improving the 
material situation of children involves increasing family income through measures to facilitate 
the access of both parents to the labour market as well as through direct support – either 
financial or in form of provision of basic social services. Reconciliation between work and 
family life can play a major role, for instance through enhancing the quality and quantity of 
child care and long-term care provision” (2008: 7). 
 
Judging from the joint reports, it seems like the Member States have developed several 
measures targeted at families within the frame of social inclusion. While there are few, 
or none, such targeted measures among the objectives and indicators of the OMC, the 
Member States are convinced that the family constitutes a key role in the fight against 
social exclusion. This is in line with the aim of the OMC; agreeing on goals, but 
leaving the states to decide how to reach them. However, another interpretation is 
possible; it could be that Member States refer to measures developed in completely 
other settings to prove action towards social exclusion. Such an interpretation paints a 
less positive picture of the influence of the EU regarding family policy.110 At least it is 
interesting to see how initiatives targeted at the family are explained by reference to 
EU policies. 
 
5.2.4 Sharing of caring responsibilities 
 
A fourth, admittedly less distinct, family policy issue, or programmatic idea, covered 
by the Union, is the focus on sharing family responsibilities. This means that men, 
encouraged by the provision of financial incentives, should take more responsibility, 
for their children and house work (Špidla 2007). As observed by Daly regarding 
individual European welfare states (2004: 138), it seems also that the Union considers 
it legitimate to recommend a certain type of policy (European Commission 2006b: 8). 
As has been shown in the paragraphs on parental leave, the Union wants to increase 
gender equality, and suggests that men should become more involved in caring. The 
division of labour by gender in a household, used to be a matter left to the couple 
                                                 
110 Since development of family policy is still in its very beginning, it might be illustrative of how Member 
States make their already established policies the subject of future objectives, meaning that the arrow of 
influence goes from member states to the EU and not the other way around.  
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(Ostner and Lewis 1995: 178), but today the EU is clear on its advice that both parents 
should care for their children. Still, according to Lewis (2006b: 429, cf. also Stratigaki 
2004), this focus was even stronger before the EU started to enhance gender equality, 
mainly through the advice of increased female employment. Labour market 
participation may be a conflicting goal to gender equality if the question of unpaid 
work is ignored (Lewis 2006a: 390, see also Rubery 2005: 401). A second stage 
consultation of European social partners on reconciliation of professional, private and 
family life, is currently (2008) being discussed, dealing with possible EU measures in 
this field (European Commission 2007b).111  
 
5.2.5 Summary 
 
In sum, this review of the proposals, guidelines, and actual recommendations at EU 
level, illustrates that the EU encourages its Member States to develop family-friendly 
policies. However, even though the issues of parental leave, childcare, prevention of 
child poverty, and sharing of caring responsibilities, are identifiable in EU documents, 
they still only constitute aims but no binding agreements, except for the few directives 
that exist. Altogether, according to EU discourse, social protection systems must be 
made more conducive to a high level of employment and a better work-life balance for 
families. All EU countries seem to follow this strategy in order to secure their welfare 
systems (the frame of sustainable welfare). There is more and more family policy, but, 
still, more as a means to address issues of demography (population ageing, low 
fertility rates), changing family structures and human capital (decline in skilled labour 
supply), than as an aim to promote the well-being of families. Thus, family policy has 
become more important, but above all, since it is considered to have relevance to 
economic concerns (family policy as a productive factor, cf. Hantrais 2004a: 106, 213, 
                                                 
111 Vladimír Špidla, EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, has suggested 
that there might even come a proposal giving fathers not only strong incentives but even a legal obligation to 
take parental leave (EMMA 2007, Süddeutsche 2007). This would certainly be untraditional EU policy, but this 
is, according to Špidla, part of the discussion with the social partners. The background: women earn less than 
men and this may to a large extent result from career breaks associated with childrearing. Recent Norwegian 
debate on reserving larger parts of the parental leave for the father, in a similar vein as the Icelandic scheme, was 
justified in the same manner.  
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Lewis, Knijn, Martin and Ostner 2008: 262). As Duncan explains, social policy is, 
then, used to change the situation of population ageing and birth decline, through 
reconciliation policies which allows men and women to work and have babies (2002: 
310). Such positive and supportive policies are easier to get approval for than pension 
cuts or increased retirement age. Reconciliation policies are thus acknowledged as 
contributing to the economic goals of the Union. In the words of Hantrais, “The 
interest shown in family matters at EU level has generally been confined to issues 
concerned with working conditions and arrangements that impinge on family life, 
rather than family policies per se“ (2004a: 211). The language, however, is one of the 
OMC: Member States should learn from each other's experiences and build on best 
practice by exchanging data and information. This is perhaps not so surprising since 
the issue is often discussed in the context of the EES. Lisa Pavan-Woolfe, Director for 
Gender Equality, European Commission, used the following phrases in a speech: “At 
European level, we can promote reconciliation in different ways, through the existing 
directives, with the resources of the Structural Funds and within the European 
Processes based on the open method of co-ordination between Member States, in the 
area of Employment, Social Inclusion and Pension” (2002). This emphasizes that 
reconciliation of work and family life is an all-embracing issue which cannot be 
restricted to one field. 
According to Annesley (2007: 196), paid employment for all adults is promoted 
through the Lisbon agenda, and this agenda has a strong social democratic foundation. 
The (admittedly few) family policy comments have similarities with certain national, 
social democratic arguments. The focus on how both parents should work is one 
example. Thus, to claim that the EU is applying economic arguments, while Member 
States are occupied with the well-being of children, is not completely accurate. 
Annesley concludes (2007: 196) that the Lisbon social model is social democratic 
rather than neo-liberal. Annesley also finds that “reconciliation aims feature strongly 
in the EES” (2007: 201). The relation between how IOs and individual countries 
justify policy reforms is an issue I return to in chapter 9. 
 In EU level policy views, there are some signs of defamilisation or at least a 
type of policy usually associated with a Nordic welfare model. While it would be 
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inaccurate to classify EU social policy development as moving in this direction (cf. 
Mahon 2002), it seems to be the case for certain aspects of family policy. The 
following overt or indirect values, found in the different fields, add up to the 
promotion of certain policies which contradict the traditional family policies of at least 
some of the Member States: fathers should take more responsibility, and there should 
be better rewards for accepting caring responsibilities for both women, and men as 
well as the focus on public/private childcare, instead of family, as both parents should 
work. Also, family policy arrangements, in contradiction to other fields of social 
policy, most notably pensions and employment, needs to be extended rather than 
diminished. 
 Summing up the family policy ideas expressed at the EU level in the framework 
of Campbell (table 5.3), short and well-paid parental leave, provision of childcare from 
infants until school age, and making men take more responsibility for childrearing, 
appear to be the most important programmatic ideas. Home care allowances, like the 
Finnish or Norwegian one, is mentioned once, and that is within the not yet very 
developed European Alliance for Families. Moreover, family-friendly policies are 
regarded as having the potential to increase economic growth and mitigate problems 
associated with demographic change. This idea of family policy as a productive factor 
is the most important paradigmatic idea, and the demographic crisis and uncertain 
sustainability of welfare schemes are the most important frames. 
 These themes might have limited impact in terms of creating a distinct EU 
family policy, but must be considered politically important in reflecting the 
recognition of family affairs as one of the main contributors to sustainable welfare 
states. As a main trend, one could say that the EU thinks it has a say, an interest, and a 
legitimate reason to give advice on family related issues. Although no explicit family 
policy exists, policies in this area are recognized as important, and adding all the 
different references of family policies within the different fields of social protection 
addressed by the EU, leaves us with a distinct number of policy ideas. Most of the 
issues (reconciliation, parental leave, childcare) are treated in several areas, since 
social policy is considered a productive factor. The analysis offers several insights 
about an emerging policy, and how the EU expresses views on the aims, instruments 
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and (unintended) effects (distribution, fairness, participation, sex-roles) of national 
family policy. The EU encourages Member States to develop family-friendly policies, 
and there is a discourse on reconciliation of work and family life which dominate all 
documents.  
 
Table 5.2: Overview of EU family policy ideas based on Campbell (1998, 2002) 
 
Type of idea Characteristics and examples 
Paradigmatic Family-friendly policies benefit the whole society; family policy as a productive 
factor 
Programmatic Reconciliation policies; 
Short, well paid parental leave schemes 
Provision of childcare from infants to school age 
Incentives for men to spend time with their children 
Home Care Allowance positive (only in the European Alliance for Families) 
Frames Demographic crisis 
Sustainability of the welfare state 
Sources: EU documents within employment, social inclusion, pensions, health, demography, and gender 
equality. 
 
Reconciliation policies are usually understood as policies for childcare, parental and 
childcare leave, being close to Campbell’s category of programmatic ideas, and this is 
how I have classified them. However, the categories in his model are not clear cut, nor 
entirely mutually exclusive. The idea of the reconciliation of work and family life 
includes a diagnosis of the problem faced by countries, as well as a set of cause-effect 
beliefs and solutions, making it also resemble frames and paradigmatic ideas. These 
comments on Campbell’s framework are developed further in chapter 6. 
 
5.3 Conclusion and outlook 
 
This chapter has discussed the status of family policies in the EU, arguing that family 
policy ideas are emerging. There is a growing interest in, and understanding of, family 
policy as an important issue to address. Further work is needed to determine the 
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conditions under which an EU family policy will develop. So far I draw the following 
conclusions. 
 First, the EU has no family policy in the sense of a coherent set of objectives for 
government activity in this policy area, but several policies that affect the situation of 
families, and ideas about national policy. Family policies are cross-sectoral policies, 
and there exists several traces of family policy in other EU social policy fields. One 
implication of this is that when searching for EU policies on the area, the search 
cannot be restricted to what is narrowly defined as family policies, but must include 
other fields of social policy (Daly 2000). Second, however, these policies must, first 
and foremost, be interpreted as facilitators of the overall aim of economic growth, and 
less as an attempt at developing common family policies across Europe. The way the 
EU concentrates on the family as a remedy for the threats against the welfare state 
(ageing society) is perhaps the most obvious example of this. With reference to 
Hantrais (2007), and Lewis and Ostner (1995), the chapter pointed at strong 
ideological dividing lines, conflicts of interest, and the focus on workers´ rather than 
citizens´ rights, as reasons why there is no distinctive EU family policy.  
 So far the findings of the chapter are in line with earlier research on this topic. 
But in two respects the chapter takes another view than most other contributions, and 
this constitutes the third and fourth conclusions: although the EU does not have a 
family policy unit and the Treaties do not include a stated family policy, the EU´s view 
of social policy as economically favourable (a productive factor), has resulted in some 
recommendations and targets with the potential of influencing domestic reforms in 
Member States. And, based on the recent trend of the holding of special EU 
conferences on family policy, as well as the European Alliance for Families, and, due 
to the commitment to address related issues like demography, I have argued that one 
has already seen, and might witness more EU initiatives affecting family life within a 
short time. In this regard, the chapter has also argued that family policy should not be 
an impossible field into which OMC-similar processes could be applied. This goes 
some way towards challenging the conventional wisdom of family policy being absent 
at EU level, and this new way of addressing family policy issues increases the 
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potential influence on national family policy. I will elaborate on the possible influence 
of EU family policy ideas in chapters 7 and 8. 
 By this I do not mean to present the EU as the main actor in developing family 
policy ideas. Ideas expressed by the EU do not necessarily originate with this 
institution (Bergqvist and Jungar 2000, Threlfall 2000). They could be incorporated 
into existing strategies because Member States, carrying out such policies, seem to 
have successfully dealt with common challenges, like women’s employment rate. 
Kaufmann’s summary some years ago still gives a pretty good description of what the 
EU has, and has not: "there is not yet a family policy on the European level, there is 
only an attempt to structure the field by a comparative description of national policies 
and by programmatic declarations" (2002: 421). 
 However, in addressing questions of potential EU influence on family policy 
reforms, one should study whether Member (and non-member) States conduct similar 
reform strategies, what aspects of the welfare models they question and recognize as 
problems, and which solutions they prefer. Also, attention should be given to the 
information about problems and solutions that is considered relevant and legitimate by 
the policy-makers, and on what grounds decisions are made. Such investigation might 
further challenge conventional wisdom on EU activities and relevance within the 
family area.  
While this chapter has devoted much space to argue that several EU family 
policy ideas exists and identified such traces, particularly concerning parental leave 
and childcare, the following chapter can begin more directly, with discussing OECD 
policy in the area, since this IO actually has a more explicit family policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
159
Chapter 6 The OECD as a family policy actor 
 
“Social policy within one country can no longer be understood or made without reference to 
the global context within which the country finds itself” (Deacon 2007: 3). 
 
 
This chapter asks, first, how the OECD develops and disseminates family policy ideas 
and how autonomous it is in this process (section 6.1)? Second, what kind of ideas are 
developed (section 6.2)? These ideas are organized in the framework developed by 
Campbell (1998, 2002), and used in the previous chapter. The chapter is based on an 
analysis of official documents and interviews with OECD officials. The documents 
studied are mainly the report series Babies and Bosses and Starting Strong. I 
concentrate on the general family policy of the OECD, and, as I did in the previous 
chapter, leave the presentation of country specific advice, when it exists, to chapters 7 
(Germany) and 8 (Norway). Also, as for the chapter on the EU, I use countries other 
than my two cases to illustrate the OECD approach to family policy, and draw on other 
social policy fields when this helps illustrate the OECD working mode. The central 
arguments of the chapter are, first, that the extensive OECD work on family policy 
merits an investigation of whether adaption to OECD standards and advice are part of 
national reform debates. Second, the development of OECD advice is highly 
controlled by national governments, making questions of potential reform pressure 
more complicated to investigate. Third, the content of some OECD family policy ideas 
is close to Nordic family policies and has a strong focus on overall societal benefits 
stemming from comprehensive public childcare and parental leave policies. 
 
6.1 Development and dissemination of ideas: playing the family 
policy idea game 
 
Schulz-Nieswandt and Maier-Rigaud (2007) claim that the OECD itself rarely 
develops the ideas it promotes (2007: 408). This argument could be further elaborated 
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upon by reference to the different roles the OECD can play in the ´idea game`. 
Marcussen (2002) identifies five such roles. The OECD may be an  
x ideational artist (develop new ideas) 
x ideational arbitrator (provide arenas for learning where national policy makers 
meet and exchange ideas)  
x ideational authority (provide legitimacy for certain ideas)  
x ideational agent (spread ideas from individual member states) and  
x ideational agency (produces knowledge Member States are interested in)  
 
Since these roles will be discussed throughout the chapter, I do not elaborate on them, 
but restrict myself to give one example of the fourth role, that of an ideational agent: 
One of my interviewees explains that countries sometimes turn to the OECD to get an 
overview of what other countries have done in a certain field, using the organization as 
a pre-paid consultancy body (OECD interview 2).  
A common denominator for all these roles is the bringing together of policy 
makers and the exposure to particular views of how welfare state policies should be 
designed. The OECD-method par excellence to achieve this is the peer review: 
 
“Among the OECD’s core strengths is its ability to offer its 30 members a framework to 
compare experiences and examine “best practices” in a host of areas from economic policy to 
environmental protection. OECD peer reviews, where each country’s policy in a particular 
area is examined by fellow members on an equal basis, lie at the heart of this process” (OECD 
2007a: 1).  
 
A peer review could be defined as “the systematic examination and assessment of the 
performance of a State by other States (…), with the ultimate goal of helping the 
reviewed State improve its policy-making, adopt best practices, and comply with 
established standards and principles” (Pagani 2002: 4). Apart from the participating 
countries, “OECD staff experts also play an important role in supporting and 
stimulating the process” (OECD 2007a: 2). 112 
                                                 
112 For more information on the actors involved in peer reviews, see Pagani (2002) and OECD (2007a). 
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The Economic Survey is one kind of peer review, and probably the most 
important publication of the OECD. The dissemination of best practice through this 
(and other studies) is a core task of the organization (Armingeon 2004: 226). Every 18 
month, OECD Economic Surveys assess a country’s performance, based on specific 
guidelines, indicators, and benchmarks. Since the 1990s, it has also included some 
social policy issues with economic implications (Armingeon 2004: 226). This is seen 
throughout the survey, but is particularly obvious when the chapter devoted to a 
country specific issue is on social policy. One example is found in the 2007 survey on 
Norway, when labour supply, sickness absence and disability were the topics (OECD 
2007b, chapter four).  
In addition to this kind of peer review on individual countries, the OECD offers 
thematical peer reviews that cover several countries on one topic (Pagani 2002: 5).  
Regarding family life, two such peer reviews are interesting; the Thematic Review on 
Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC), resulting in the reports Starting Strong 
I and II, and Babies and Bosses, published as five volumes.113 The policy ideas the 
OECD promotes in these reports are discussed in section 6.2.  
The peer review process may vary and there are, for instance, differences 
between reviews covering one or many countries. Still, there are some stages that are 
common to all. These are the preparatory phase, the consultation phase, and the 
assessment phase (Pagani 2002: 10). A concrete example from the Thematic Review 
on Early Childhood Education and Care is instructive. The term ECEC, early 
childhood education and care, “includes all arrangements providing care and education 
for children under compulsory school age, regardless of setting, funding, opening 
hours, or programme content” (OECD 2001b: 14). The ECEC homepage114 describes 
the methodology of the study as having four elements (see also Starting Strong I 2001: 
16, Starting Strong II 2006: 233):  
(1) Preparation by participating countries of the background report;  
                                                 
113 Interestingly, the Starting Strong and Babies and Bosses reports do not use the term peer review when 
describing the methodology of the review, but what is described is without doubt a peer review process similar to 
what I presented. Interviews confirm that Babies and Bosses and Starting Strong I and II have a similar working 
method to Economic Surveys (OECD interview 5, Norwegian interview 3).  
114 OECD ECEC homepage, retrieved 22.4.2008, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3343,en_33873108_39418658_1941759_1_1_1_1,00.html  
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(2) Review team visits to participating countries;  
(3) Preparation of the country note; and  
(4) Preparation of the comparative report.  
 
Step two, the fact-finding mission, is not part of every peer review, but is important in 
Babies and Bosses, Starting Strong, and the Economic Surveys. Common to thematic 
and individual peer reviews is a final report that assesses actions taken by the 
countries, identifies shortcomings, and issues recommendations (Pagani 2002: 5). This 
report is based on consensus between the OECD and the Member State, and draws on 
the national background reports. The OECD first presents the draft report to the 
country under review and adjusts it to the feedback it receives (Marcussen 2002, 
OECD interviews 2, 6). Then the report is discussed in the relevant OECD committee, 
depending on the topic. The Starting Strong reports were discussed in the Education 
Committee.115 
The question about whether this OECD working method really matters, and is 
effective, is the topic of chapters 7, on Germany, and 8, on Norway. However, the 
theoretical reasons why peer reviews could have influence are briefly outlined here as 
an elaboration of what has already been laid out in chapter 3. As the “idea game” 
concept catches, the OECD is not able to force states to act in a certain way. The 
OECD cannot exert regulatory or financial pressure (Beyeler 2004: 1). 116  It is all 
about “soft persuasion” or “soft enforcement”. The OECD relies on peer pressure, 
which, to quote Pagani (2002: 5), can be described as three mechanisms: 
(i) a mix of formal recommendations and informal dialogue by the peer countries;  
(ii) public scrutiny, comparisons, and, in some cases, even ranking among 
countries; and  
                                                 
115 For details on the process, see Pagani (2002). The Babies and Bosses volumes were discussed in the 
Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Committee while Country Surveys are discussed in the Economic 
Development and Review Committee (EDRC), where it is again adjusted to comments from the country under 
review or other countries, in such a manner that all parties agree. Contrary to Starting Strong I and II, 
background reports written by the countries, as well as the country notes from the OECD in Babies and Bosses, 
are not available on the OECD webpage (the Australian report is the only one which was published). According 
to my informants the countries were asked, but for various reasons preferred the background reports to remain 
unpublished and not disseminated. This means that I have not had access to this material.  
116 Cf. Bøås and McNeil (2003) for a discussion of organizations which have technical assistance and/or 
programme lending as important roles in addition to giving policy advice. 
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(iii) the impact of all the above on domestic public opinion, national 
administrations and policy makers. 
 
One example of Pagani´s first mechanism of recommendations, which will be 
discussed more closely in section 6.2, is how the UK, in the second volume of Babies 
and Bosses, is advised to; “In line with announced plans, reform “maternity leave” into 
“parental leave” and give fathers the opportunity to share in the use of entitlements” 
(OECD 2003a: 15, see appendix 6 for more examples). Another example of this 
mechanism, emphasizing the importance of dialogue, can be found in one of my 
interviews with officials from DELSA (the Directorate for Employment, Labour and 
Social Affairs). This answer was given to a question on where ideas originate; 
 
"The organization (the OECD, my edition) fosters the exchange of best practices, advertising 
and sharing knowledge among a greater audience. For example, when we went to Austria for 
the second Babies and Bosses review there [was] this "audit" undertaken by a consultancy 
firm that looked at companies to see how they could improve the work life balance of their 
employees and at the same time their own productivity. There was huge interest in that across 
the OECD. So, when at the next ELSAC - meeting (ELSAC = Employment, Labour and 
Social Affairs Committee, my addition) the Austrian delegate spend a lot of time answering 
questions on that very issue. The whole idea spread quite quickly across policy makers 
(OECD interview 5, my emphasis).117 
 
The second mechanism of comparisons and rankings could be illustrated by a figure 
presenting the effect of national social transfers on child poverty (see appendix 6 for 
further examples). Figure 6.1 (1.7) has been copied from Starting Strong II (OECD 
2006a: 34). It shows how social transfers, e.g. income redistribution measures or 
family policies such as child benefits, influence the rate of poverty in OECD countries. 
Look, for instance, at Germany and Norway, and the OECD message is clear. While 
both countries have a child poverty rate, before taxes and transfers, of 16-18 percent, 
Norway is left with only 3, but Germany with 11 percent, afterwards. The 
                                                 
117 The topic referred to in the statement can be found in the volumes of Babies and Bosses as a discussion on 
“the business case of family policy” (cf. section 5.2). This quote also illustrates how the OECD can play the role 
as an ideational arbitrator. 
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effectiveness of German policies to redistribute and avoid poverty is thus not high 
compared to Norway, or the other Nordic countries, for that matter. The point is that 
countries´ performances are collected, making some countries come out as forerunners 
and others as laggards. The latter group can experience a “naming and shaming” 
effect, which again, could provoke new measures or accelerate the implementation of 
already decided reforms. 
 
 
 
Whether policy makers are aware of, and influenced by this, is discussed in chapters 7 
and 8. To anticipate findings, policy makers are particularly familiar with, and focused 
on rankings. According to an OECD official within DELSA, countries are less 
interested in receiving advice on what to do in a field, than in seeing where they stand 
relative to other countries. They want comparative statistics, to see how they come out, 
and then they can draw their own conclusions (OECD interview 3). 
Figure 6.1: Example of potential peer pressure 
Source: Starting Strong II (OECD 2006: 34). Definition of child poverty: “the income available to a child – 
assuming a fair distribution of resources within the family and making allowances for family size and 
composition – is less than half the median available to children growing up in the same society“ (OECD 
2006: 33). The figure shows the perecentage of poor children before and after social transfers. 
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An instance of Pagani´s third mechanism is how the Babies and Bosses volume 
2 (2003) received a lot of public attention in Ireland, because the government used it to 
get a debate going (OECD interview 5). This may have an impact and increased the 
likelihood for reforms (this is further elaborated upon below).118 
Scholarly literature describes the peer review process as a process based on the 
principle of consensus (Marcussen 2002: 207, Pagani 2002: 24, Schäfer 2006: 74, 
Armingeon 2007: 928, OECD 2007a: 5, Ervik forthcomming 2009).119 This has 
relevance for the question of what kind of influence the OECD might have. The focus 
on consensus indicates that only critique that is welcomed by countries under review is 
expressed in the final reports; “This process means there is a government “buy-in” to 
the economic policy advice offered and hence a common ownership of the product” 
(OECD 2007a: 5). One could of course argue that it makes little sense to recommend 
policies which the Member State has no interest in, or intention of following, when the 
OECD has no enforcement mechanism, and relies on persuasion.120 But the consensus 
approach still questions the whole usefulness of studying OECD influence on domestic 
politics. At least it means that researchers should remember how advice is developed 
when asking whether this advice makes countries act in a certain way. As Marcussen 
(2002) argues, OECD ideas provide authority and legitimacy and could thus be used 
consciously by Member States to secure support for decisions already taken.  
Adding that countries to some extent can even order a certain kind of critique 
and recommendation, an important finding from my expert interviews, further 
questions such an approach. For example, just like countries can ask the OECD to 
moderate their critique, they can ask it to sharpen critique when this serves a national 
agenda (OECD interview 6). Then the OECD is more of an ideational agency, 
producing the knowledge Member States are interested in. Or, in the words of 
                                                 
118 Starting Strong 1 (2001: 17-18) and II (2006: 222) describe how the report stimulated debates. Cf. these for 
more information. 
119 Surprisingly, the authors referred to do not discuss this issue in much detail and sometimes this information is 
restricted to a footnote (e.g. Armingeon 2007: 928). Examples of rather comprehensive discussions are found in 
two newspaper articles by Kildal and Kuhnle (2004a, 2007). In my opinion, this fact deserves more attention. 
120 Similarly, it is sometimes argued that politicians must follow what their voters want instead of doing what 
politicians think is the best policy. Otherwise they will loose the next election and thus the possibility of 
contributing to change. See for instance Hantrais (2004: 197) for such an explanation. 
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Marcussen; the organization is trendy more than a trendsetter (2002: 228). Still, the 
different roles the organization plays illustrate how important the OECD is. 
One more important finding that further mitigates the potential OECD effect on 
national policy has been uncovered in my interviews: recruiting countries for thematic 
reviews of social policies is done by self-selection rather than pre-selection by the 
OECD (OECD interview 3, 5). Participation in studies like the Babies and Bosses, the 
ECEC, or the recent disability study (OECD 2006b), is voluntary. They are financed 
by the participating countries. Thus, countries with a particular problem, or an 
intention to do (or not do) something in a special area, might choose to participate (or 
not) due to domestic interest. This would mean that the OECD plays a role 
corresponding to what Marcussen (2002) calls ideational authority, where its 
conclusions are used to justify behaviour. As an example, an OECD official says that 
the Norwegian government wanted them to contribute to the ongoing reform process 
on health issues in Norway, by opening the national debate (OECD interview 3). The 
Norwegian government, however, refers to how the OECD says change must take 
place because many Norwegians, despite comprehensive public policies, and 
compared to other countries, are out of work due to sickness, rehabilitation and 
disability. The reason why Norway is part of the three-country study is not explained 
further than that Norway has a very high level of sickness absence (e.g. White Paper 
2006: 149). That Norway chose to be one of the first three countries participating (out 
of 12 in all) is not mentioned. From this we learn that different policy objectives can 
drive different countries.  
A further issue to consider, regarding the self-selection sampling method, 
becomes clear from this excerpt from an interview with an OECD official working on 
family issues. He says the following on why countries volunteer to participate: 
 
"You should actually ask countries. Some governments participate to show how good their 
policies are, and they want to show that they are doing well in international comparisons. 
There are other countries who specifically sign up with the idea "Let's show our electorate 
how bad we are doing, create a national debate on the issues at hand and create an 
environment for change, in which reforms can be implemented”. This also affects how OECD 
advice can lead to reform” (OECD interview 5). 
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In the Babies and Bosses series one could suspect that Sweden or Denmark enjoyed 
“shining” as providers of good practice, while Southern European countries like Italy 
or Spain appear to be representatives of welfare models poorly represented in the 
series. And Ireland is a country that seems to have made particular use of the OECD 
reports. Referring back to chapter 5, on EU family policy initiatives and how Ireland 
was the first country to organize an EU Presidency conference on family policy, this 
country seems to have made the best possible use of international organizations to 
push domestic debate. Obviously, timing (and even the financial situation since there 
is a fee for countries under review) also plays a certain role, as countries with family 
issues high on the agenda are probably more likely to sign up. Moreover, countries 
may of course participate to gain knowledge about how their social security systems 
are working, without always knowing in advance what the outcome will be, and 
without a hidden, strategic agenda of gaining legitimacy for behaviour already 
planned.121 
Still, while several studies have acknowledged the consensual character of 
OECD peer reviews, this self-selection, which is probably based on either a wish to 
increase reform support or being presented as a forerunner, has hardly been discussed 
before.122 This might be because so many studies have taken the Economic Survey as 
their point of departure, a publication which is carried out on a regular basis (every 18 
months) for all member countries, without any discussions on who should participate. 
These are not run on the basis of project funds, but taken from annual national 
contributions (OECD interview 3). 
Needless to say, this self-selection sampling is open to national or party 
political tactics, and underlines how scholars seeking to investigate foreign influence 
                                                 
121 The suspicion that countries take part for tactical reasons and often know the result in advance, and whether 
the self-selection-bias is as problematic as I claim, should be investigated further. One strategy could be to check 
whether the countries participating voluntarily are always those at the top, wishing to shine as providers of best 
practice (”forerunners”), and those on the bottom (”laggards”) seeking reform support. However, this strategy is 
flawed for several reasons, e.g. the fact that the OECD will do what it can to cover countries representing 
different models and degrees of successful policies. This means that it is not only countries wishing OECD 
support taking part, but still questions the usefulness of studying OECD-influence on national reforms. 
122 According to OECD staff, there is no official OECD document describing how project funded work is carried 
out. Instead, every directorate has its own practices. DELSA works per theme, not per publication. The Babies 
and Bosses project was initiated after the Member Countries had accepted a project proposal presented to them 
in the Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Committee. The work on disability has relied on a similar 
process. This means that the starting up of a new review relies on the interest of the Member States, trends in 
popularity and so on. 
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on national politics must be cautious. Pagani touches on a similar issue when saying 
that “officials of the country may have an interest in peer reviews, as a means of 
stimulating reform in their national policies and practices” (2002: 9). As emphasized 
by one high level official with the OECD, the impact of his organization’s advice 
depends a lot on what a member country wants to do with it and why they signed up 
with the review in the first place (OECD interview 5). I conclude this section by 
repeating what was said in the chapter on methodology; when discussing cross border 
influences in social policy one should ask oneself whether one faces international 
advice or domestic uploaded reform plans. The OECD is not completely autonomous 
in its identification of policy failure and success, and its reports are not a strictly 
objective view from the outside.123 
 
6.2 OECD advice within the family policy field 
 
The OECD issues both general and country specific advice within the area of family-
friendly policies. This section will discuss the views of the OECD in a general way, 
drawing mainly on the Starting Strong (6.2.1) and Babies and Bosses (6.2.2) reports 
that cover many Member States. Working papers and the family database will be 
discussed briefly (6.2.3). Economics Surveys, which are individually tailored, will be 
used more in subsequent chapters. I present the family policy advice coming from the 
OECD with reference to Campbell’s framework, introduced and applied in previous 
chapters. I focus on the issues parental leave and infrastructure, which are the 
corresponding reform areas that will be addressed and analyzed in relation to advice 
from IOs in chapters 7 and 8.124  
 How does the OECD approach family policy? The definition of family-
friendly policies that used to be on the top of the OECD webpage on families and 
                                                 
123 At a first glance this discussion might give the impression that IOs have no autonomy, a view found in much 
theory on international relations (cf. Diehl 2005 and Barnett and Finnemore 2004 for a critical account and 
different view based on seeing IOs as actors with at least some power). However, this is not what I argue. I 
emphasize how, in the processes for developing advice and policy ideas, it is possible for Member States to up-
load their national ideas, meaning that advice from IOs must be treated with caution. However, I do not say that 
IOs cannot act on their own, and pursue their own agenda. They can, something Marcussen´s (2002, 2004) 
different roles in the idea game emphasize.  
124 Mahon (2006) provides a more comprehensive analysis of OECD family policy ideas as well as an historical 
account of its development. She does not, however, discuss the possible impact of this policy. 
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children underlines that it is not family policies, as such, which are proposed, but 
rather policies that intend to increase labour market participation, and thus have some 
family policy implications: 
 
”Family-friendly policies are defined as those employment-oriented social policies that 
facilitate the reconciliation of work and family life by fostering adequacy of family resources 
and child development, favour the parental choice about work and care, and promote gender 
equality in employment opportunities” (my emphasis).125 
 
At the time of writing (November 2008), this definition is not available on the 
webpage anymore. Instead, a new definition is given by the OECD, that is very similar 
to the one it uses in the five volumes of the Babies and Bosses project;  
 
“Family policies are defined as those policies that increase resources of households with 
dependent children; foster child development; reduce barriers to having children and 
combining work and family commitments; and, promote gender equity in employment 
opportunities”.126 
 
According to an OECD official, this definitional change does not reflect any huge 
policy shift, but is rather the result of editing. As such, the reason for the new 
definitions is not to be understood as an answer to criticism or a new priority. 
However, it should be noted that while the Babies and Bosses project has been 
focussing quite a lot on families, in connection with work commitments, a new OECD 
project on children’s well-being is being prepared. This project will for instance focus 
on child development and the conditions children are living under. As such, it is 
probably fair to say that the OECD is extending its interest for families, which is the 
impression one also gets from the definitional change. The following discussion of 
OECD family policy ideas will show how strong they are connected to issues of 
economy and employment, but also, that the advice of the organization is more than 
                                                 
125 http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_34819_1_1_1_1_37457,00.html, retrieved 09.05.2006. 
126 http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3373,en_2649_34819_1_1_1_1_37419,00.html, retrieved 14.05.2008. However, 
the definitions of family-friendly policies also vary from volume to volume. The fourth volume does for instance 
include financial incentives to work for families with children in the definition (OECD 2005a: 11). 
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neo-liberal policy, which is often defined as opposing public intervention and 
promoting only free market-solutions. 
 
6.2.1 OECD family policy ideas expressed through Starting Strong127 
 
Starting Strong I (OECD 2001b) and II (OECD 2006a) focus on aspects such as 
infrastructure, parental leave, women’s labour market participation, and reconciliation 
of work and family responsibilities, but mainly on early childhood education and care. 
They provide a comparative analysis of policies in OECD countries, including Norway 
and Germany, and identify promising strategies. Stated goals are to provide 
comparative information, and to improve policies in member countries (OECD 2001b: 
7, 12). The reports identify trends, main policy developments and issues, in a 
summarizing, non-country-specific way. There is little direct criticism or policy 
advice. Phrases such as “Countries are trying to develop …” are used instead, to 
describe how countries are dealing with challenges.128 The following quote illustrates 
how shortcomings are addressed in a way which does not resulting in individually 
tailored advice:  
 
“Major quality concerns that emerged during the review include: lack of coherence of ECEC 
policy and provision; the low status and training of staff in the social welfare sector; the lower 
standards of provision for children under 3; and the tendency for children from low-income 
families to receive inferior services” (OECD 2001b: 9). 
  
Instead, the report gives examples, not to serve as models, but as “inspiration for 
reflection and discussion” (2001b: 45). This is emphasized several times (e.g. OECD 
2001b: 125, OECD 2006a: 221). However, it is still possible to identify OECD advice 
                                                 
127 This home page contains all documents and provides an overview of how the review was organized; 
http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649_39263231_27000067_1_1_1_1,00.html  
128 The end of the last chapter is instructive in this regard. All (!) countries are praised for their accomplishments 
and what has been done recently is referred to as impressive (OEDC 2001b: 137). The same is said in the 
introduction (OECD 2001b: 12). 
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on national family policy.129 First of all, Starting Strong I identifies eight key elements 
of a successful ECEC policy: 
1. The ECEC policy must have a clear vision for children from birth to 8 years old 
2. A lifelong –learning approach 
3. Universal access to childcare for all age groups  
4. Substantial public investment in services and infrastructure 
5. Emphasis on quality improvement and assurance 
6. Training of staff 
7. Systematic monitoring and data collection – need for more international 
cooperation 
8. More research and continuous evaluation 
 
In the second review, this list is extended to contain ten points. They are rather similar, 
but some have been added. The well-being of children and their early development is, 
for instance, included more directly in the policy areas that OECD countries are 
advised to consider.   
Along with some of these “key elements” (Starting Strong I) or “policy areas 
for consideration” (Starting Strong II), general policy advice is presented, e.g. a call 
for more attention towards kindergarten coverage and parental leave, public 
investments and increase the qualifications of staff. The closing chapter of Starting 
Strong I on “Policy Lessons from the Thematic Review”, elaborates to some extent on 
these comments, but there are still very few policy prescriptions (OECD 2001b: 125-
137). One obvious reason for this is that there exist country notes on each participating 
country, which include country specific analyses, and to some extent policy 
recommendations, although not a distinct section giving specific recommendations. 
Still, by leaving individual countries out of the final report’s policy lessons and by 
avoiding rankings or leagues in this chapter, Starting Strong I increases the unbinding 
character of the report, and may reduce its potential policy driving force. In Starting 
                                                 
129 Most chapters of report II open with an overview of “What did Starting Strong recommend?” (my emphasis). 
This is conspicuous when report I does not use the term recommendation.   
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Strong II this is somewhat different and individual countries are referred to all through 
the report. Drawing on Campbell (1998, 2002), I identify the following ideas.  
 
Programmatic ideas 
 
For the policies I take a particular interest in, parental leave and infrastructure, some 
advice is given in the reports. They provide an overview of the parental leave schemes 
of the countries under review and conclude that:  
 
“Well-paid and job-protected parental leave policies for about a year followed by a guaranteed 
place for children in ECEC seem to be key, rather than long-term, low-paid leave schemes, 
which resemble social welfare payments. The latter schemes are generally taken up by poorly 
educated women, who are effectively excluded from the labour market, and gender 
stereotyping of care and domestic work is reinforced” (2001b: 34). 
 
In other words; it is the Nordic parental leave system that is presented as a model (or 
programmatic idea in the framework of Campbell). Other kinds, e.g. of the long-term, 
but low-paid leave found in Germany at the time of the review, are criticized (see also 
OECD 2006a: 23, 208). The Starting Strong reports also refer to research supporting 
the claim that Scandinavian countries are providing best practice (2006a: 32). 
Regarding childcare, it is said that member countries, particularly, should improve 
coverage for infants (children less than three years old), and, again Scandinavian 
countries serve as best practice, although countries like Norway have some way to go 
before meeting demand (OECD 2001b: 54). The OECD does not identify a percentage 
goal like the EU does in its Barcelona targets (see chapter 5). According to Starting 
Strong II, this is because high coverage is only one of many indicators of a good 
ECEC system, quality being another.130 While these comments on parental leave and 
childcare are referred to as reconciliation policies in the Babies and Bosses project, 
reconciliation of work and family life is hardly referred to in the Starting Strong 
reports. 
                                                 
130 At least this illustrates that the EU and OECD relate their discussions and recommendations to each other. In 
the Starting Strong reports, the Barcelona targets and the EC childcare network are referred to several times. In 
the second report, it is, for instance, said that Norway is one of five countries fulfilling the Barcelona targets 
(OECD 2006a: 78). The Babies and Bosses volumes also make references to the EU. 
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When it comes to reducing child poverty, Starting Strong I shows that the 
Nordic policies are very effective in this respect too (OECD 2001b: 35, cf. figure in 
section 6.1). This is expressed like this; “Countries with low rates of child poverty 
redistribute income to overcome inequality in market income and support female 
labour force participation through generous parental leave policies and publicly-
funded ECEC” (2001b: 36-37). Comments on cash-for-care benefits (kontantstøtte), 
are more or less absent, and not evaluated positively or negatively. Both reports 
emphasize the need for governmental activity and funding; “Without strong 
government investment and involvement, it is difficult to achieve quality pedagogical 
goals and broad system aims (social inclusion, child health and well-being, gender 
equality)” (OECD 2006a: 211). This does not harmonize with the view that the OECD 
is strictly neo-liberal. This might be a new development, with the OECD modifying 
the message of an organization created to analyze economics and employment related 
issues. According to McBride and Williams (2001), Armingeon and Beyeler (2004), 
and Deacon (2007), the OECD had a more neo-liberal approach in the 1980s and 
1990s. It probably also illustrates that there are tensions within the OECD and its 
different directorates. 
 
Frames 
 
How are these recommendations justified and what are the programmatic ideas 
supposed to be a solution for? This involves more overall views on the purpose of 
social policy (paradigmatic ideas), as well as frames helping to make solutions 
acceptable. Beginning with the latter, Starting Strong I could for instance be said to 
include Campbell’s idea category of frames in the following way: 
 
“• Ageing populations, declining fertility rates, and a greater proportion of children living in 
loneparent families are part of the changing demographic landscape. Countries with the 
highest female employment rates are those with higher completed fertility rates, which 
suggests that female employment and childrearing are complementary activities. 
• The sharp rise in dual-earner households, spurred by increased female employment, makes 
ECEC and parental leave policies more important for the well-being of families. Women are 
  
174
more likely than men to work in non-standard employment which carries lower economic and 
social status” (OECD 2001b: 22). 
 
What the report says is that such change must be acknowledged, understood, and 
responded to by governments (cf. OECD 2001b: 125). This use of frames resembles 
the use of globalization in other welfare state debates.  
Although the report is sometimes written in a retrospective manner, by saying, 
for instance, that “governments have invested in ECEC in order to …”, there can be no 
doubt that the OECD seeks to contribute to ongoing debate by presenting its view on 
coming challenges. Starting Strong is thus not only about reporting what has been 
done, but also partly about issuing advice. Starting Strong II explains the need to 
invest in ECEC, by reference to four broad contextual challenges or driving forces 
(OECD 2006a: 20): 
 
”Ɣ The rise of the service economy and the influx of women into salaried employment. 
Ɣ The necessary reconciliation of work and family responsibilities in a manner more 
equitable for women. 
Ɣ The demographic challenges of falling fertility and increased immigration, particularly 
in European countries. 
Ɣ The need to break the cycle of poverty and inequality that begins in early childhood”. 
 
What could be referred to as the discourse on sustainability of the welfare state is a 
representative of Campbell’s frames. The demographic development, with falling 
fertility rates, is seen to challenge future financial foundations of the whole welfare 
state, as the relationship between young workers and pensioners changes gradually. 
Thus, family policies that can reduce this gap are welcomed. 
 
Paradigmatic ideas 
 
ECEC policies are further justified with reference to a number of goals, both child and 
societal goals: to improve children’s cognitive, social, and emotional development, 
reduce social inequality and increase social integration, facilitate reconciliation of 
work and family life, and strengthen life long learning (OECD 2001b: 13). It is 
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interesting to see how poverty and equality issues receive so much attention, since this 
is not directly relating to economic growth or the labour market. This might suggest 
that a new understanding is gaining ground within (parts of) the OECD, which used to 
be expert driven and focussed mainly on economic goals. This would support Kildal´s 
argument (forthcoming 2009), that the EU and OECD are converging, in the sense that 
both organizations recommend similar policies which seek to meet different societal 
interests, although still with a strong emphasis on economic matters. An instructive 
overview of such OECD ideas is found where Starting Strong I lists policy objectives 
to justify public investment in early childhood education and care, because this will be 
(2001b: 38): 
 
“– facilitating the labour market participation of mothers with young children 
and the reconciliation of work and family responsibilities; 
– supporting children and families “at risk” while promoting equal opportunities 
to education and lifelong learning; 
– supporting environments which foster children’s overall development 
and well-being; 
– enhancing school readiness and children’s later educational outcomes; 
and 
– maintaining social integration and cohesion”. 
 
There is a rather strong focus on employability in the two reports, and the sections on 
policy lessons start out with a fairly strong emphasis on reconciliation of work and 
family life, and how ECEC policies can promote not only the well-being of parents but 
also “reduce child poverty, promote gender equity, improve education systems, [and] 
value diversity” (OECD 2001b: 125). Although economic growth and investment are 
not mentioned directly here, this resembles the idea of welfare policies as a productive 
factor: social policy and economic performance as compatible and mutually 
supporting. It emphasizes how social policy can be economically beneficial, for 
instance by raising employment rates, more than it stresses the well-being of children 
(cf. Lister 2006, 2008 for criticism of this approach). As Schulz-Nieswandt and Maier-
Rigaud (2007) argue in their analysis of OECD pension and employment policy, much 
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of the OECD advice comes from the belief that social policy should promote economic 
growth and create strong work incentives (no rights without duties). Social policy is a 
win-win strategy more than an aim in itself. This view could serve as an example of a 
paradigmatic idea in the Starting Strong reports. A clearer expression of the productive 
factor argument is found in this quote:  
 
“In sum, early childhood services deliver externalities9 beyond the benefit of immediate, 
personal interest or consumption. Early education and care contributes to the public good, e.g. 
to the general health of a nation’s children, to future educational achievement, to labour 
market volume and flexibility, and to social cohesion” (2006a: 36-37). 
[footnote 9 page 40 is defining externalities as ”the term used by economists to refer to 
benefits or costs that accrue to someone other than the individual consumer or producer 
making the economic decision, e.g. to enrol a child in an early education centre brings benefits 
to the child, but it also generates benefits for the family (mothers are able to work and 
contribute to the family budget) and for the economy (as the mother’s work contributes to 
economic production, gives rise to extra revenue and taxes, and allows the State to cut back on 
social welfare assistance”]  
 
The productive factor argument is a good example of a malleable idea offering 
something to everybody. This idea, of how ECEC policies will benefit the countries 
introducing them, permeates the reports to such a degree that it is tempting to include 
yet another long quote illustrating this view of having found a universal remedy. Who 
can oppose ECEC policies when such policies bring about prosperity for children, 
families and society at large? 
 
“Governmental domains that benefit from the widespread provision of early childhood 
education and care services are: the national economy (short-term, through the contribution of 
working women, and long-term through more effective human capital formation); health 
(better mental and physical health for children and families, less at-risk behaviours, etc.); 
social welfare and criminal justice (less dependency of families on social welfare; higher 
earnings for families; more gender equality; less family violence, less criminality, etc.); 
education (better integration of young children at-risk into primary school, better grade 
progression, less participation in special education, etc.)” (OECD 2006a: 102-103). 
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The economically oriented investment strategy is impossible to overlook in this, and 
other, sections. However, values such as children’s rights and self-fulfilment, the 
general well-being of families, or equality, are also evident. 
6.2.2 OECD family policy ideas expressed through Babies and Bosses 
 
The last volume of Babies and Bosses is a synthesis report covering all OECD 
countries and, thus, I focus mainly on this report (OECD 2007c). The first four 
volumes review countries that are not part of my case selection.131 I still analyze their 
chapters providing the main findings and policy recommendations, since the reports 
identify good practice and provide general advice on policy direction for OECD 
countries, and not only country specific comments (confirmed in OECD interview 5). 
As Mahon (2006: 180) argues, these are also the parts “most likely to be read by time-
pressed policymakers”.  
All the five Babies and Bosses volumes have “Reconciling work and family 
life” as part of the title. This is indicative of its focus and content; this series is more 
strongly related to what is called family policy in a domestic context, than are the 
Starting Strong reports. In fact, the series is considered a social and welfare issue and 
produced by the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, while 
Starting Strong is the responsibility of the Directorate for Education.132 Furthermore, 
the Babies and Bosses volumes are much more focused on individual countries, as 
each of the first four volumes deal explicitly with three or four countries, and, with the 
exception of volume 1, issue country specific recommendations.133 I will now discuss 
the content of Babies and Bosses based on Campbell’s ideas. 
 
Programmatic ideas 
 
Which policies are proposed in Babies and Bosses? Which programmatic ideas are 
visible in the reports? In short, OECD Member States should;  
                                                 
131 Volume 1: Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Volume 2: Austria, Ireland, Japan, Volume 3: New Zealand, 
Portugal, Switzerland, Volume 4: Canada, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
132 Notice how “education” is placed before “care” in the acronym ECEC; Early Childhood Education and Care. 
Until 2002, the Education Directorate was part of DELSA (Mahon 2007b). 
133 An official with the OECD explains that they started to give country specific recommendations to increase the 
impact of the study (OECD interview 5). 
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1. Introduce well paid parental leave policies of moderate length, understood as 
something between 6 and 12 months 
2. Establish incentives for fathers to use leave arrangements 
3. Provide childcare and out-of-school hours care, especially childcare for 
children under age three and out-of-school care. Childcare should preferably be 
full-time, of high quality and affordable.  
4. Encourage family-friendly workplace practices such as part time work, 
flexible workplace, and the granting of days to care for sick children 
 
The OECD understands these four policies to be reconciliation policies, and the idea of 
reconciliation of work and family life permeates the whole report. Babies and Bosses 
makes clear that a continuum of support for working families throughout childhood is 
important, meaning first parental leave and, then, later, preschool and out-of-school 
care. This programmatic idea is stressed several times (2007c: 18, 119, emphasized in 
OECD interview 5). The Nordic countries provide this and are praised for it (2007: 
98). Nordic countries are in the lead in terms of childcare policy development (OECD 
2007c: 159). 
The existing family policy model that comes closest to this summary of advice, 
which is more or less the same as found in the ECEC, is found in the Nordic countries. 
Although the report says that "the Nordic model is (...) not directly exportable to other 
OECD countries" (2007c: 22), and even if the report is critical towards some aspects 
of Nordic policies, for instance, whether fathers´ quotas really result in more gender 
equitable employment and care outcomes, there can be no doubt that the OECD 
praises many aspects of Nordic family policy. The reason why these are chosen as 
programmatic ideas is that they contribute to many societal goals. The main message 
or the paradigmatic idea is that family-friendly policies of this kind can address a 
number of policy objectives in a way that, with a few exceptions, are compatible with 
each other. This is the argument of family policy as a productive factor. Still, it is more 
than just saying that family policy has benefits for the economy. The OECD 
emphasizes other values as well. That men should participate in childrearing is not 
directly related to economic growth: it is more a question of the equal sharing of 
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opportunities. Thus, the economic language and the presentation of family policy as a 
solution to so many societal problems must perhaps be understood as a strategy of 
selling programmatic ideas. And these programmatic ideas, listed above as four main 
points, are not strictly neo-liberal ones.  
If the OECD does not say directly that the Nordic model is to be preferred, their 
analysis, at least, leaves the clear impression that characteristics of the “social 
democratic” welfare model are to be recommended. The Nordic countries are 
presented as best practice providers: 
 
“There are fewer such recommendations for Sweden and Finland than for Canada and the 
United Kingdom (Box 1.2). This should be no surprise: Sweden and Finland introduced many 
family policies before Canada and the United Kingdom, and have long embraced the ideal of 
having a continuum of supports for parents until children are in their teens. The model 
involves flexible use of paid parental leave entitlements: affordable high quality childcare and 
extensive out-of-school hours care in Sweden, and entitlements to reduce working hours for 
parents with young children” (OECD 2005a: 12). 
 
 Still, this does not mean that Nordic countries are not questioned, and Babies and 
Bosses stresses the need for cost control and sustainable policies in several ways. In 
line with the work-oriented approach of the OECD, cash-for-care benefits are 
criticized for establishing financial disincentives to work. By using the example of 
Finand, the OECD, for instance, argues that this benefit is at odds with the aim of 
increasing female employment rates (OECD 2007c: 113, see also OECD 2005a: 14, 
22). Moreover, in both the country specific advice, and in the synthesis report, phrases 
such as ”make work pay”, ”work incentives” and ”reduce barriers to labour market re-
entry by mothers”, are used to a high degree (OECD 2003a, 2004b). There is a very 
strong emphasis on financial incentives to work (“no rights without duties”, see e.g. 
OECD 2007c: 98 for an instructive example), and some of the Nordic policies towards 
lone parents are, for instance, said to be weak in this respect. This quote moderates the 
impression that Nordic countries are model-countries, by saying that export of policies 
is difficult (see also OECD 2005a: 12, OECD 2007c: 138): 
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“One of the tendencies to which comparative analysts of social policy are particular prone is to 
call for reforms to make such-and-such a country more like some other country. In family 
policy during the first decade of the 21st century, the model countries usually held up as 
deserving of emulation are most often the Nordic countries, especially Denmark and Sweden. 
There is much in the family policies of these countries worthy of copying, but there are limits 
to their use as role models. Nordic family policies are expensive. Nordic countries are 
relatively small, cohesive and egalitarian societies where populations have a high degree of 
trust in their local governments to deliver high-quality childcare, health and education 
services. Because of this, they are willing to bear a relatively high tax burden to sustain a 
universal social policy approach (…). However, electorates in many other OECD countries are 
not willing to sustain a tax burden of similar magnitude, and ways and means are sought to 
curtail public spending” (OECD 2007c: 73-74). 
 
Frames 
 
The reason why reconciliation policies are needed, is explained in a similar way as in 
the ECEC project. Two examples from the 2003 and 2004 reports illustrate this: 
 
“All three countries (Austria, Ireland, and Japan) covered in this review have experienced 
changes in female aspirations and labour force behaviour, while at the same time birth rates 
dropped significantly. For some (potential) parents having children (or having as many as 
desired) and fulfilling labour market aspirations have been mutually exclusive activities. As a 
result, current labour supply is less than what it could be, and human capital is underused. This 
result is not an efficient use of labour market resources, and were this situation to be 
perpetuated, it will limit economic growth relative to potential. At the same time, the declining 
number of children also has obvious implications for the shape of future societies” (OECD 
2003a: 10). 
 
Improving the work/family balance is likely to have implications for the shape of future 
society and the financial sustainability of social protection systems. At the same time, it will 
reduce concerns about future labour supply. If female employment rates and working hours 
were to gradually increase over the next 50 years to match male employment rates and 
working hours, this alone could increase GDP by 15 to 20 percentage points over the same 
period in New Zealand and Switzerland and half that in Portugal. There are thus good 
economic reasons for helping mothers to remain in the labour market (OECD 2004b: 26). 
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The demographic challenge is an important part of the OECD framing activity. In the 
synthesis report, one chapter is reserved for this topic. Another variant of the argument 
that reconciliation policies benefit the whole society, is directed less towards societal 
goals and more specifically towards the private sector: the so called “business case for 
family-friendly policies” (OECD 2002a: 26, OECD 2003a: 20, OECD 2005a: 28, 
OECD 2007c: 24).134 The main thrust of the argument is that firms providing family-
friendly working conditions, for instance, flexible working hours, will benefit from 
this through better motivated employees. 
 
Paradigmatic ideas 
 
The OECD Babies and Bosses series to a large extent focuses on employment-oriented 
goals in combination with many other goals that family-friendly policies are thought to 
reach: 
 
“The reconciliation of work and family life is in part a goal in itself. (…) But in fact the reason 
why the reconciliation of work and family life is increasingly important to so many 
governments is that it is hoped that getting the right balance will promote all sorts of other 
goals of society. Increasing aggregate labour supply and employment (so increasing national 
income); families with more stable and secure sources of income; families better able to stand 
the strains of modern life, and if relationships do break down, better able to move on in their 
lives; better child development outcomes; less public expenditures; higher fertility (or at least, 
enabling families to have their desired number of children) and more gender equity are all 
often primary governmental objectives” (OECD 2002a: 13, my emphasis). 
 
This view permeates all volumes to a larger extent than the ECEC-review (cf. e.g. 
2002: 22, 26). This paradigmatic idea, of mutual reinforcing policy goals, or a win-win 
strategy, what I referred to as similar to seeing social policy as a productive factor, 
dominates the reports. It is not difficult to find expressions of this, and the following 
could serve as one example: 
 
                                                 
134 There is a voluminous literature on this topic. Confer for instance Chinchilla and Torres (2006). 
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“However, governments have many other reasons to invest in family-friendly policies (…), 
and policy has to strike a balance between different objectives, including enhancing equity 
between different income groups, family types, and men and women; promoting child 
development; underpinning economic growth and ensuring future labour supply; and, 
supporting the financial sustainability of social protection systems. Although these objectives 
often reinforce each other, there can be some tension between them, which complicates policy 
development” (OECD 2005a: 10-11). 
 
Mahon has suggested that Babies and Bosses became more occupied with gender 
equity issues after the feminist scholar Janet Gornick had worked with the OECD for 
five months in 2003 (2006: 186, footnote 14, cf. also Mahon 2007a: 18, 2007b: 1). The 
definitional change I discussed in the beginning of section 6.2 could be seen in this 
light, but as already mentioned, an OECD official, working in the area, says this is not 
the case. According to Mahon, the new perspective is also partly due to how OECD-
officials took over some themes and views from the countries under review. This 
interpretation supports my claim, in section 6.1, that much of the OECD advice in 
reality is up-loaded Member State policy. 
 
Summary; comparison between Starting Strong and Babies and Bosses 
 
The overall message of the Babies and Bosses series is the following: absence of 
family-friendly policies will hold back further economic, demographic and social 
improvements, and threaten the sustainability of existing social protection schemes. 
This makes family policies crucial and implies that governments should intervene in 
family life. Other actors, such as private companies, should also take action; there is a 
business case for family-friendly policies. One could argue that this is a very late 
discovery of the OECD. The policies it promotes come many decades after women 
entered the Nordic labour markets. Maybe the impression of a moderated neo-liberal 
stance can be partly explained by how family policy is a new field of social policy to 
international organizations, while it has been a national theme for a long time in many 
European countries. 
In line with Mahon (2006), who has compared Babies and Bosses with Starting 
Strong, I find that the latter directs more attention towards children and their needs, 
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and well-being, than the Babies and Bosses series. This is also stressed in interviews 
with OECD officials (OECD interviews 5, 6). In comparison with the Babies and 
Bosses series, the ECEC-reviews have fewer comments on individual countries, and 
not so many direct policy recommendations. However, what this analysis has 
uncovered makes it difficult for me to fully agree with Mahon. She claims that, in 
Babies and Bosses, family policy is considered much more instrumental (as a means to 
reach other goals) than in Starting Strong which is more occupied with children’s 
well-being. I disagree for two reasons. First, as I have shown, ideas on the 
sustainability of the welfare state, family policy as a productive factor, and a focus on 
employability, are also very much present in Starting Strong. Second, both series 
present Nordic family policy, the welfare regime with the most comprehensive public 
intervention, as an example to follow within family policy. For example, Babies and 
Bosses focuses on how men should take more part in childrearing. My main 
conclusion from the analysis of OECD family policy is, therefore, that OECD work is 
conducted in an economic language, but still contains recommendations that go far 
beyond the neo-liberal agenda that has traditionally focussed on limited public action 
and strong individual self-reliance. For instance, the OECD accepts state-funded 
childcare and asks for increased public spending, a view that is not in line with 
traditional neo-liberal criticism of the welfare state, and the claim that childcare is a 
private responsibility. One possible reason why Mahon (2006) and I draw partly 
different conclusions could be because her analysis does not comprise Starting Strong 
II and Babies and Bosses 4 and 5.135 
Lastly, as discussed in chapter 5 as well, the categories in Campbell’s model are 
not clear cut (this point has been emphasized in other typologies, e.g. by Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993: 10). One example is ideas as frames, which at least in Campbell’s first 
article are thought to be of normative character. This means that when policy makers 
are not appealing to feelings or attitudes, but to “objective developments”, such as an 
ageing society, in order to legitimize public intervention in family life, this would not 
correspond well to frames in Campbell’s typology. In my opinion this example is 
                                                 
135 Two later conference papers by the same author suggest this as they mention a development within Babies 
and Bosses (Mahon 2007a-b). 
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clearly framing, what is called a communicative discourse by Schmidt (2002), and 
should be characterised as such. Campbell’s second article seems to suggest this, by 
opening up for how frames can also be cognitive (2002: 26). 
 
6.2.3 OECD family policy ideas expressed through other documents and 
sources 
 
The OECD also publishes a working paper series which could be said to contain 
general policy advice.136 Although these reports do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the OECD, they are conducted on request from the OECD, to be used in internal 
policy development. They seem to reach similar conclusions as do the 
recommendations in the Starting Strong and Babies and Bosses series. These studies, 
of the effect of different family policies like childcare and leave schemes, focus 
strongly on obstacles to childbearing and fertility rates as well as possible solutions 
(see e.g. Sleebos 2003, d'Addio and d'Ercole 2005). A paper on child poverty 
concludes that a combination of benefits and help to get parents into paid employment 
is important (Whiteford and Adema 2007). Some papers are the result of collaboration 
between the EU and the OECD (Immervoll and Barber 2005). These working papers 
show that the OECD undertakes studies of the effect of different family policies like 
childcare and leave schemes, and thus, at least indirectly, identify ”good policies”.  
Reconciliation of work and family life has also been the topic of the 
Employment Outlook.137 The reports from 1995 and 2001, in particular focus on this 
by having a chapter on parental leave and the work family balance (OECD 1995, 
2001a). These publications are very much in line with Babies and Bosses and Starting 
Strong, but they focus even more strongly on employment issues. The two chapters do 
not have policy recommendations, but their description and evaluation of national 
schemes offer indirect advice which is very much in accordance with the policy ideas 
of Babies and Bosses and Starting Strong. 
                                                 
136 Overview of Working Papers: www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers  
137 For an overview of OECD Employment Outlook and downloadable editions from 1989 onwards, see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3343,en_2649_33927_40774656_1_1_1_1,00.html  
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An OECD Family database was set up in 2006, and has gradually been 
extended. It comprises indicators on family outcomes and family policies for all 
Member States. The database is available on-line through the OECD webpage on 
family-friendly policies.138 Information is structured around four broad headings; a) 
the structure of families, b) the labour market position of families, c) public policies 
for families and children, and d) child outcomes. The database grew out of the Babies 
and Bosses series, as a wish to continue the project by gathering and disseminating 
information, even after the fifth and last volume (OECD interview 5). One interviewee 
also says that future OECD initiatives will focus more on child development in 
addition to work-family issues. This bears witness to how the organization intends to 
position itself as an important actor in the international family policy “idea game”. The 
database could serve as a mutual learning tool for family-friendly policies. 
 Recently, a publication on Modernising Social Policy for the New Life Course 
(OECD 2007d) has added to the OECD´s work on family policy. In this volume, 
Fagan and Walthery (2007) discuss the role of time policies, understood as parental 
leave and part-time hours, for reconciliation of care responsibilities. Similar to the 
Babies and Bosses and Starting Strong, this article emphasizes the win-win strategy of 
family-friendly policies. 
More OECD work discussing family policy or related themes exists, but what is 
mentioned here is sufficient to illustrate the ideas disseminated by the OECD.139 Table 
6.1 gives a short overview of the ideas expressed, based mainly on Babies and Bosses 
and Starting Strong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database  
139 Mahon (2006, 2007a-b) gives an overview of how the OECD work on family policy has developed. See her 
papers for references to other OECD-documents.  
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Table 6.1: Overview of OECD family policy ideas based on Campbell (1998, 2002) 
 
Type of idea Characteristics and examples 
Paradigmatic Positive towards governmental intervention 
Family-friendly policies benefit the whole society; family policy as a productive 
factor 
Programmatic Reconciliation of work and family life; 
Short, well paid parental leave schemes 
Provision of childcare from infants to school age 
Incentives for men to spend time with their children 
A continuum of support important 
Cash-for-care benefits are negative (only Babies and Bosses) 
Frames Demographic crisis 
Sustainability of the welfare state 
Sources: Starting Strong I-II, Babies and Bosses volume 1 – 5. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the OECD as an active player in the family policy “idea 
game”. The first conclusion I draw is that the rather comprehensive set of policy ideas 
promoted by this organization merits an investigation of how countries react to this. 
The chapter has also contributed to what we know about the development of advice, 
and the potential impact on national policy-making, by looking into OECD processes 
for the dissemination of ideas. I have emphasized concrete examples of how the 
OECD might have an impact on national debates. A second conclusion has been that 
OECD advice, in reality, is quite influenced by national interests; an understanding the 
scholarly literature so far has not emphasized strongly enough. I found that whether 
countries are reviewed and receive family policy recommendations in the first place, to 
a large extent relies on voluntary participation from the countries in question, and that 
these reviews are based on financial contributions from participating countries. In 
other words; you are advised when you ask for it. Combined with what we know from 
earlier studies about the OECD principle of consensus, allowing those being criticized 
to comment and sometimes even change the report before it is published (Marcussen 
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2002), this poses the question of how international so called international advice really 
is. This finding is based on information conveyed through expert interviews. 
Moreover, I have presented OECD work on family policy and discussed its 
content. This has mainly been based on scrutinizing the two peer reviews Starting 
Strong and Babies and Bosses, as well as on interviews. The Starting Strong reports 
are written as a large comparative review and the Babies and Bosses as comparisons of 
three or four countries. The former originates in the Education directorate whereas the 
latter is based within DELSA. Relying on a framework developed by Campbell (1998, 
2002), I have classified the family policy ideas from the reports. This classification has 
revealed that among the programmatic ideas promoted by the OECD, parental leave 
schemes and childcare solutions of the Nordic kind enjoy a high degree of OECD 
support. This is surprising since the OECD is so often considered a neo-liberal 
organization. Still, this is not the same as saying that the OECD is promoting a 
Scandinavian welfare state. Regarding ideas as frames, the OECD emphasizes how 
some family outcomes cause concern (the demographic decline, child poverty), and 
how the financial sustainability of the welfare state is dependent on the labour supply 
of parents. The main paradigmatic idea seems to be that family policy can address 
most of these challenges (productive factor argument). The paradigmatic ideas on 
which OECD family policy work relies are strongly employment-oriented and 
focussed on the general benefits such policies provide for the society at large. My third 
main conclusion is that OECD work on family policy is conducted in an economic 
language, but still contains recommendations which go beyond the neo-liberal agenda, 
which has traditionally focussed on limited public action and strong individual self-
reliance. 
A methodological point, and a possible fourth finding of the chapter (and 
chapter 5), relates to Campbell’s analytical framework in itself. From a 
methodological point of view it should be noted that his framework is not 
unproblematic when confronted with a concrete, empirical material, such as policy 
recommendations from IOs. His categories are not entirely mutually exclusive, and the 
analysis shows that the distinction between ideas of a normative or cognitive character 
is not without difficulties. 
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According to Castles (2004), population ageing is one of the most central topics 
today. He says that most countries have already focussed on 1) increasing female 
education, and 2) female employment, to combat low fertility rates. Thus, of the 
“three-parts-remedy” Castles refers to, "(...) the only task remaining is to get across the 
message that family-friendly policy is at least part of the answer to slowing down or 
reversing the extent of fertility decline" (2004: 166). It is in this sense that the OECD 
may be important; this organization, together with the EU, presented in chapter 5, has 
the potential of getting this and other family policy messages across borders. To what 
extent they succeed in this is the topic of the following two chapters. 
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Chapter 7 Germany and the transmission of family policy 
ideas140 
 
„(...) we cannot accept to be in the lead regarding childlessness and the one on the bottom 
across all Europe regarding birth rates and at the same time be the last regarding early 
childhood care, education and child-raising institutions. Therefore the daycare expansion 
should have taken place a long time ago„ (former family minister Renate Schmidt, SPD, 
Bundesrat 2004a: 434). 
 
 
How has German family policy changed recently and can reforms be attributed to 
ideational influence of the EU and the OECD, through learning processes initiated by 
these organizations? Based on official documents, parliamentary debates and 
interviews with key policy actors at national and international level I ask whether 
international organizations (IOs) may serve a mediator function providing the 
knowledge leading to German reforms.  
In this chapter I put forward four assumptions. I assume that social policy ideas 
supported by IOs have greater likelihood of being implemented than ideas not 
enjoying this support since such organizations both may convince political actors of 
the need to reform and provide legitimacy for reformers (Marcussen 2002). For 
instance, Plantenga et al. (2008) claim that EU work on childcare increases national 
ambitions and strengthens the room of manoeuvre for governments in favour of 
reform. I thus expect, first, to find at least some concordance between international 
advice and national policy: The power of ideas is strengthened if they are accepted by 
and further disseminated by influential international organizations. Second, since the 
EU has no family policy in the sense of a coherent set of objectives for government 
activity in this policy area, but rather several policies that affect the situation of 
families, the influence on Germany is probably not very evident. Although OECD 
family policy advice is more coherent, this holds also for the OECD, which, according 
to Zolhnhöfer and Zutavern (2004), is not much referred to in German social policy 
debates. Third, since the German parental leave and childcare reforms described below 
                                                 
140 The following chapter draws on the corresponding chapter of a volume on the internationalisation of social 
policy (Lindén forthcoming 2009). 
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are presented as extension more than retrenchment of the welfare state, the German 
government will most likely claim credit for this reform more than make other bodies 
responsible for the changes. Furthermore, as postulated by ideational theory, policy 
failure often results in a search for new policies abroad. Politicians confronted with an 
unsuccessful policy like the former German parental leave scheme, will search for 
alternatives in politically close environments (Rose 1991). German Christian 
democrats will thus consult conservative sources. In social terms the EU and OECD 
are considered restrictive and rather conservative in giving economy priority over 
social policy and not intervening much in family affairs. My fourth assumption says, 
therefore, that a reason for the introduction of Elterngeld and increase in childcare 
facilities, which is not what one would expect from a Christian Democratic led 
coalition government, could be the idea disseminated by international organizations, 
that such arrangements will have general economic advantages. Accordingly, I expect 
the government to refer to IOs to strengthen their arguments, as for instance Rickardt 
(2004) has found regarding childcare.  
Focusing on possible external influence, this chapter does not discuss domestic 
political factors like change of government, nor socioeconomic trends such as ageing, 
fertility or cultural changes although these of course are important to understand the 
reforms (cf. chapter 2).  
The chapter evolves in four steps: first, EU and OECD recommendations and 
proposals are depicted. Next, German family policy and recent reforms are described, 
and reforms and international advice are compared. I then take a closer look at EU and 
OECD discourse and argumentation in German parliamentary debates on family policy 
reforms. 141 Lastly I discuss whether reforms can be attributed to German participation 
in EU and OECD learning processes. The discussion about influence is guided by 
whether Germany participates in exchange of ideas, timing (whether reforms come 
soon after advice is issued), similarity in arguments, direct references, and consultation 
(interviews) of key actors in the process.  
                                                 
141 Another possible source would be parliamentary debates on NAP/empl or NAP/incl, see Büchs and Friedrich 
(2005) for a discussion of this. They find, however, that such reports hardly are given explicit consideration, an 
indication of their status and importance. De la Porte and Pochet (2005: 360) and Zeitlin (2005a: 460) also report 
that national parliaments are rather uninvolved in OMC-processes.  Altogether Büchs and Friedrich find that 
neither the EES nor the Social Inclusion processes have a direct impact on German policy development.  
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7.1 Family policy advice from international organizations 
 
It is within childcare that we find the most direct policy advice from IOs. In the 
framework of the EES (European Employment Strategy) and the Barcelona-targets 
from 2002, Member States are asked to ensure: „the provision of childcare by 2010 to 
at least 90% of children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age and at least 
33% of children under 3 years of Age” (Council of the European Union 2002b: 13). 
Another aim is to achieve an employment rate of at least 60 % for women. EU reports 
often include overviews of coverage for individual countries (“naming and shaming”). 
One recent example is the report from the EU Commission on the implementation of 
the Barcelona targets (European Commission 2008c) from October 2008. Here 
Germany is shown to have reached the goal for the age group three – mandatory 
school age, but not for those up to three years.  
The focus on childcare is also reflected in the specific employment 
recommendations for Germany which are rather consistent over time with only minor 
changes in wording. In the period 2001-2004 the country has been advised to: “review 
possible tax disincentives to female participation in the labour market; increase 
childcare facilities, especially in the Western Länder, and improve the correspondence 
between school schedules and working hours; (…)” (Council of the European Union 
2004: 5). 
The OECD has specific and coherent recommendations that can easily be 
identified in a particular chapter of the Babies and Bosses reports. Germany is not 
given systematic treatment in the volumes published before or after the reforms I 
discuss and thus cannot be directly measured against OECD-advice. I would still argue 
that the OECD presents views on this country’s policy.142 When OECD-
representatives participate in international conferences and meetings, they present 
overall recommendations very much in line with the recommendations given to 
countries covered by the Babies and Bosses series. OECD officials confirm in 
interviews that advice is meant to apply to more than the country under review (OECD 
interview 5). A recent example of this is provided in the OECD-presentation at an 
                                                 
142 In volume 5, published in 2007 and too late to have influenced the reforms I study, Germany is said to do 
poorly, e.g. within childcare. 
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international conference at ministerial level in 2006 (Durand 2006). Here it was 
suggested to reduce possible disincentives to work in tax-benefit systems, to offer low-
cost, high-quality childcare services, provide relative short parental leaves with job 
guarantees and more family-friendly workplaces.143 It is explicitly said that there is no 
universal solution but that such elements are crucial.  Concerning childcare, the OECD 
Babies and Bosses series says children under three years and older children, after 
school, should be given more attention, just like the EU proposes, and policy should 
make men take more parental leave. 
Starting Strong II (2006) is critical towards parental leave benefits such as the 
German Erziehungsgeld because they are so long that they hinder people (women) 
returning to work, an issue the EU also focus on (EU Commission/Council 2003: 45). 
For the same reasons, the OECD is sceptical towards home care allowances.144 The 
report proposes to increase public investment in services for young children, especially 
for the youngest (0-3 years). The Starting Strong country note on Germany, written by 
the OECD based on the country’s own background report, stresses how there is 
already recognition within Germany that childcare must be expanded and public 
investment increased. The report takes issue with a range of aspects, including training 
of staff and division of responsibility between states and the federal level, issues that I 
do not focus on. Moreover, although the report does not give clear advice, it asks 
whether the legal right to a kindergarten place should be expanded and the parental 
leave should be “shorter but better paid” (OECD 2004a: 43).  
Reports like these have comparisons of national policies and results presented 
as rankings where Germany comes out as a laggard. In this connection, the PISA – 
study should be mentioned too. According to Leibfried and Martens (2008: 10), the 
PISA-schock set the agenda in Germany for a long period after the first report was 
published. This is a good illustration of the possible OECD impact on national public 
opinion, a mechanism identified by Pagani (2002) and described in chapter 6. 
Although mainly focusing on education, PISA also resulted in discussions on childcare 
                                                 
143 Presentation available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/26/36939331.pdf  
144 In November 2007, Wilhelm Adema from the OECD presented the fifth volume of the Babies and Bosses 
series in Berlin. Among other things, the OECD in the press conference commended the expansion of day care 
facilities and the introduction of Elterngeld, but criticized the planned Betreuungsgeld (FAZ 2007). The 
European Alliance for Families, however, identifies the Finnish cash-for-care benefit as best practice.  
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institutions and how children could improve their school achievements when having 
attended pedagogical training from an early age. A quote from the German 
background report written for the OECD Starting Strong II study is illustrative: 
 
“Agreement has been reached among specialists that early, individual promotion of children is 
a precondition for successful development processes. This view, which has for a long time 
been put forward, has found dissemination at political level after the PISA shock. There has 
never been so much public discussion or so many government initiatives on the question of 
care, education and child-raising as in recent years. Initiatives however face resistance when it 
comes to really achieving improvements” (BMFSFJ 2004: 108). 
 
Every 12 – 18 months the OECD publishes Economic Surveys on individual countries. 
This is a kind of regular peer review and these reports have also focused on childcare 
issues. Reading the German Economic Survey summaries partly confirms Kildal and 
Kuhnle´s investigation of Danish and Norwegian surveys in the period 1990-2000. 
Kildal and Kuhnle conclude that there are no recommendations or comments on family 
support policies (2006: 12). And from 1998 to 2002 (OECD 1998a, 1999a, 2001c, 
2002b) there is no German family support recommendation. However, in 2004 
Germany is advised to move from benefits in cash to benefits in kind within childcare 
to increase labour supply (OECD 2004c: 5). And in 2006, more financial support for 
childcare is welcomed to reduce labour force participation obstacles (OECD 2006c: 7). 
It could be read as a sign that issues from the Babies and Bosses series are gradually 
integrated into the more authoritative Economic Surveys. 
So, the issue of childcare is treated very explicitly, and the need for provision 
for infants is emphasized. The EU even identifies targets to be reached within 2010. 
For parental leave systems, the advice is less direct, but both organizations still express 
views upon existing systems and identify some kind of best practice for Member 
States to consider. The EU and OECD are critical towards measures that keep women 
out of work for longer periods.  
In studies, working papers, conferences and EU Presidency initiatives one finds 
more direct and far-reaching advice than the official position of the EU and OECD. A 
recent study prepared for the European Commission, for instance, discusses duration 
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of parental leave, eligibility and remuneration and presents the Swedish father’s quota 
as a good way of making men take more responsibility (Plantenga and Remery 2005). 
 
Table 7.1: International actors´ comments on German family policy since 2001 
 
Scheme/ 
benefit 
OECD EU 
Overall 
advice 
Implement work-friendly family policies Implement work-friendly family policies 
Childcare Move from benefits in cash to benefits in kind, 
more financial support for childcare (Economic 
Survey 2004, 2006) 
 
Increase coverage in childcare facilities, 
particularly for children under three years of age 
(Babies and Bosses 2002-2007, Starting Strong 
II 2006, Starting Strong II country note 2004) 
Increase coverage in childcare facilities, 
particularly for children under three years of 
age (Employment recommendations, 
Barcelona targets 2002, Plantenga and 
Remery 2005) 
Parental 
leave 
Well paid and job-protected parental leave of 
about one year (Starting Strong 2001) 
 
Erziehungsgeld (child rearing benefit) too long 
(Babies and Bosses 2002-2007, Starting Strong 
2001, 2006) 
 
Incentives for men to care for their children 
(Babies and Bosses 2002-2007) 
Well paid parental leave schemes. Equal 
sharing of caring responsibilities (Plantenga 
and Remery 2005, European Commission 
2006b) 
Cash-for-
care  
allowance 
No specific advice for Germany, but express 
worries about cash-for-care allowances that 
keep woman out of work for long periods and 
that hinder the integration of children, particular 
from immigrant families 
Contradictory view: express worries about 
policies that keep woman out of work for 
long periods (EU Commission/ Council 
2003), but refers to cash-for-care allowances 
as good practice (the European Alliance for 
Families).  
 
In sum, this review of the proposals, guidelines and actual recommendations at 
EU level illustrates that the EU encourages its Member States to develop family-
friendly policies. There is a discourse on reconciliation of work and family life which 
seems to dominate most documents and processes, emphasizing in particular the 
importance of childcare and parental leave schemes (work-friendly family policy). The 
focus is on how such policies will increase employability, is favourable to economic 
growth and sustainability of the welfare state and less on the needs of families. Reports 
often include comparisons of national policies, e.g. in the form of tables displaying 
childcare coverage, parental leave benefit periods and female employment rates. 
Similarly, the OECD issues country specific recommendations through Starting Strong 
and Babies and Bosses and more general recommendations through other publications 
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and conferences. The OECD addresses the field more directly than the EU in the sense 
that it has reviews focussing exclusively on family policy. The same discourse on 
reconciliation of work and family life, however, is present in both IOs. Their reports 
also have comparisons of national policies and results presented as rankings. This 
discourse is so strongly integrated at the EU and OECD level that it merits a closer 
inspection of possible influence on national policies. I turn to this now.  
 
7.2 German family policy and recent reforms 
 
In the discussion I treat Germany as one country. However, Germany is more than one 
country for two reasons. First, until two decades ago, Germany was divided in West 
and East and the two states had a very different approach to family policy which still 
has consequences for family policy. The regional differences in childcare coverage is 
one example, citizens´ opinion towards public versus individual responsibility is 
another. Second, Germany is a federal state where the 16 Bundesländer have important 
competences within family policy. For instance, they are responsible for provision, 
finance and administration of childcare (Evers, Lewis and Riedel 2005: 197), and the 
states have been sceptical towards EU initiatives that challenge their competences 
(Büchs and Hinrich 2007: 21). The German family ministry has always had limited 
competences and the federal government limited decision-making authority in the field 
(Kaufmann 2002: 463, 465). This means that family policy programmes vary a lot 
from state to state (Kaufmann 2002: 465). 145 This does not mean, however, that the 
federal government does not have an important role in the field of childcare. It does for 
instance support the states with extra funding when working towards the current 
extension of childcare facilities. Evers, Lewis and Riedel (2005:197-198) argue that 
the federal government has got gradually more responsibility within childcare. 
Esping-Andersen (1990) refers to Germany as a conservative welfare regime 
where the principle of subsidiarity makes the family and church important producers 
                                                 
145 Cf. Dienel (2002: 222) or Gerlach (2004: 123) for an overview of how the federal and the state level share 
responsibility for family policy measures in Germany (exclusive vs competing legislation). For a presentation of 
the family policy of former West and East Germany, see e.g. Federkeil (1997) and Wendt (1997). For more 
information on German family policy, cf. Schulz (1998), Kaufmann (2002), Dienel (2002), Gerlach (2004) or 
Ostner and Schmitt (2008). 
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of welfare while the state is less active. Other main characteristics are the financing 
through social contributions and the preserving of status differentials. Several 
researchers have challenged his typology (cf. chapter 2). Lewis and Ostner (1995) 
present an alternative categorization of welfare regimes based on the gender division 
of work and the strength of the male breadwinner/family wage model. In their 
typology Germany is a strong male breadwinner country. Here women are dependent 
wives with regard to social entitlements: the level of female labour market 
participation is low, women are caretakers and rely on their husbands´ employment for 
welfare benefits. The Scandinavian countries represent the opposite, as weak male 
breadwinner countries. Here women are treated as workers more than wives and 
mothers, and the level of female labour market participation is high. Leitner claims 
that welfare states like Germany, called explicit familialistic in her categorization, 
have scarce public and private provision of services and leaves much to the family 
(2003: 357). Also, parental leave periods are long, parental benefits low, incentives for 
shared parenting few and the financial dependence of women high (2003: 370). These 
descriptions do not fit the situation in the last decade entirely, as women increasingly 
take part in paid work (development towards a dual breadwinner model) (Lewis 2001, 
2006b, Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004).  
However, regardless of classification scheme, Germany is considered a country 
where men work while many women stay home to take care of the children, especially 
during the first years, and the use of public childcare for smaller children is 
uncommon, although there are substantial regional differences. Women often work 
part-time.146 Against this background the recent German reforms involve major 
changes. Here I will describe the reforms to enable a comparison with the EU and 
OECD suggestions and recommendations depicted in section 7.1. 
The black-red coalition taking office in 2005 introduced a new parental leave 
benefit (Deutscher Bundestag 2006d). This parental leave, called Elterngeld, replaces 
the earlier Erziehungsgeld, a parental upbringing allowance, with a 14 months long 
                                                 
146 Norwegian women also work much part-time. However, Germany is one of the EU countries where most 
women work part-time due to family reasons (Eurostat 2005; 2, Pfau-Effinger 2008: 197). German kindergartens 
are for instance often open only parts of the working day. And among European women working part-time, 
German women have the shortest weekly working hours while Norwegian women have relatively high weekly 
working hours (22.2 vs. 17.9 hours) (SSB 2005). 
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benefit granting parents 67 percent of net salary (minimum 300, maximum 1800 € per 
month). Under the earlier Erziehungsgeld it was possible to take three years leave (two 
years paid) with a means tested upper benefit level limit of 300 € a month, meaning 
that the benefit was not coupled to previous earnings and that no former employment 
record was needed. The change to a wage-dependent benefit is actually more in 
accordance with the principle of status maintenance than the former means-tested, 
poverty-focused benefit.147 Those without a work record will receive the minimum 
sum of 300 €. 
Clearly inspired by Scandinavian experiences, especially Swedish, two months 
of the new leave are reserved for the partner who does not stay at home for the rest of 
the period. Should he or she choose not to make use of this right, the parental benefit 
will be reduced accordingly. This is an incentive for shared parenting (lone parents 
will get 14 months). The use of parental leave benefits to change the attitude and 
behaviour of parents (fathers) is new. The main change of the reform is the focus on a 
dual earner and dual-carer model (table 7.2).  
The Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz (TAG, law on the extension of day care) has 
been in force since 1.1.2005 and is supposed to increase care facilities places, 
particularly for smaller children. The need for better infrastructure is highest in the 
former West Germany, where coverage for the youngest children are very low: less 
than 3 percent in the West, almost 40 percent in the East (Deutscher Bundestag 2004h: 
23). The TAG will result in 230 000 new places by 2010, but no numbers for coverage 
in percent is given. A more recent reform initiative known as the 
Kinderförderungsgesetz (KiföG, bill on a further expansion of childcare) goes further 
in promising a 35 percent coverage rate for children aged 1-3 within 2013 as well as a 
legal right to a place in childcare (see section 7.3.3). These reforms represent value 
change as the state becomes much more involved in care. The reforms increases de-
familisation, implying that individual’s reliance on their family is reduced (Esping-
Andersen 1999: 45), and promotes a dual earner, dual carer model as opposed to a 
“traditional gendered division of labour” (Lewis et al. 2008: 269). 
                                                 
147 Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser (2004) argue that the German welfare state has changed and now to a lesser degree 
guarantees the achieved living standard of workers. The Elterngeld partly contradicts this by seeking to secure 
the former living standard. 
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The reforms must be said to be very close to advice from IO. The parental leave 
period is made shorter and better paid, and incentives for fathers to care for their 
children are increased. The provision of childcare facilities is extended and the age 
group 1-3 is given priority. Germany has not been part of all international reviews 
referred to in this and earlier chapters, but the reforms are in concordance with policy 
ideas of EU and OECD reports and recommendations. Some of the reports, e.g. Babies 
and Bosses 5, however, are published so late compared with the timing of the German 
reforms that one must question whether they could have any impact.  
 
Table 7.2 Main characteristics of old and new parental leave scheme 
  
 Erziehungsgeld  Elterngeld 
Main beneficiaries All residents treated equally People with employment record 
Monthly amount Means tested  
(upper limit 300 € ) 
Wage-dependent (67 % of net salary, 
minimum 300 €, maximum 1800 €) 
Time off 3 years (2 years paid) 14 months 
Father quota -   2 months 
View on division of labour 
within the family 
Male breadwinner, female caregiver Dual earner, dual carer (gender 
equality)  
 
In the discussion of how much of the coming Elterngeld and other reforms which can 
be explained by participation in EU and OECD learning processes, one should have a 
look at what has been the traditional policy of the parties in government. To do this I 
turn to party programmes. If international organizations are to be attributed an 
important influence then the parties must have a) changed their mind b) on the basis of 
EU/OECD discourse.  
The coalition that gained power in Germany in the autumn of 2005 consists of 
the social democratic SPD, the conservative CDU and its Bavarian sister party CSU. 
In the party programme from 2005, the CDU and CSU emphasize the importance of 
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tax exemptions and childcare institutions to enable parents to reconcile work and 
family life. There is no reference to the later Elterngeld initiative. The programme of 
the SPD paints a different picture. Here Elterngeld is described and there is also a 
focus on building more childcare institutions where children under three are given 
priority (SPD 2005: 46). The SPD and the Greens worked on a reform in 2004, which 
would have introduced an earnings-related, Elterngeld similar programme, but it met 
little support with the Christian Democrats (Hausding 2006).148 In other words, the 
party programme of the SPD is much closer to both German family policy of today 
and the proposals of the EU and OECD (see below). Going back to the SPD party 
programme of 2002 I find a similar focus on childcare, all day schools and tax 
incentives as in 2005 (SPD 2002: 47, 48), but Elterngeld is not mentioned.  
It is beyond any doubt that today’s policy introduced under the CDU-Family 
Minister von der Leyen is different from the traditional German family policy – 
especially for the Christian Democrats. The reforms described above move Germany 
from a strong family-centred welfare regime, which mainly compensates the costs of 
parenting, towards a weaker family-centred welfare regime, where the state takes 
responsibility for parental leave systems and encourages provision of childcare 
services (de-familisation). The transfer heavy housewife model, where the family is 
seen as the primary provider of social services, is no longer the ideal and the 
scepticism to state interference in private matters is severely reduced. In contrast to 
what ideational or path dependency theory suggest, the German reforms are inspired 
by the policies of a different welfare (Scandinavian) regime rather than countries with 
more similar policies (Simmons and Elkins 2004, Büchs 2006). Field experts have 
called for a study of the reasons behind the change in family policy position within the 
German political parties (Ostner 2006), and research on countries experiencing 
substantial reforms (Leitner 2003). I will address this from the perspective of 
supranational policy advice. I now turn to how the government justifies the reforms by 
mainly investigating parliamentary debates. I discuss childcare, parental leave and 
cash-for-care reforms seperately. 
                                                 
148 See e.g. the speech by former family minister Renate Schmidt from 11.11.2004 or the parliamentary debate 
from 9.9.2004 (Deutscher Bundestag 2004i) as examples of how the former red-green government was preparing 
a parental leave reform.  
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7.3 EU and OECD discourse and German argumentation 
 
7.3.1 Daycare Expansion Act (TAG; Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz) 
 
How do the German reforms relate to the EU and OECD discourse on reconciliation of 
work and family life? As I have shown, the EU is most specific in its view on 
childcare facilities. Both the country specific recommendations for Germany and the 
Joint Reports on Social Inclusion by the Council and Commission (2002, 2004b) 
emphasize the need for more places. The German government’s aim of increasing care 
facilities is supposed to be reached within 2010, which is the same year as the EU 
says, so here there is correspondence between aims, and also measure, since this aim 
can only be reached through building new facilities. As stated above, the OECD 
expresses similar opinions as the EU on childcare, so Germany here acts in 
concordance with this organization’s advice as well. The move from benefits in cash to 
benefits in kind, expressed by the strong focus on childcare, is also in line with the 
EU/OECD discourse. Like the two IOs, the German government focuses on coverage 
for children under three years of age. 
 Parliamentary debates, however, reveal that politicians rarely take the 
Barcelona targets or other EU and OECD set aims as their point of departure when 
discussing the extension of childcare.149 This is in line with my second assumption, 
saying that influence would not be very evident. The debates are, however, full of 
statements of how Germany is a laggard when it comes to offering childcare, 
illustrated here by two quotes from family minister Schmidt;  
 
“We are not only the bottom one in Europe regarding the fertility rate, but also regarding care, 
education and child-raising institutions” (Renate Schmidt, SPD, Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 
11194). 
 
                                                 
149 Lewis et al.  (2008: 269) still argue that the recent extension of childcare provision is done to meet EU 
targets.  
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“I am convinced: we will succeed in changing West-Germany’s position as a developing 
country regarding childcare, and in maintaining the good provision in East Germany” (Renate 
Schmidt, SPD, Deutscher Bundestag 2004m: 12282). 
 
The actual bill is similar in this respect; “Also in an international comparison, 
Germany is limping after the development in comparable industrialised countries. In 
Germany, childcare is an area in which considerable need for modernisation exists” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2004h: 24). This seems very much in line with what Kettunen 
has observed in Finland where “the notion of Finland as a latecomer served as an 
argument for social reforms demands” (2006: 58). As Kettunen argues, international 
comparisons may be crucial for agenda setting and the production and transmission of 
knowledge (2006: 32). While Heclo more than three decades ago could state that 
international comparisons were rare (1974: 8), they are today referred to in public 
debate all the time.  
German debates are abounding of references to international comparisons and 
league tables. However, when German MPs make these international references, it is 
either to individual countries, most often Scandinavian countries and France, or to 
international comparisons within education; PISA, TIMSS (Trends in Mathematics 
and Science Study) or PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study). The 
EU is barely mentioned. Scandinavian countries and France are used by MPs from 
different parties to argue both in favour of and against the TAG-reform. Several MPs 
consider family policy as bringing about many general benefits for the society in large 
and say that with reference to Scandinavia or make similar arguments (e.g. Christel 
Humme and Caren Marks, both SPD, Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 11202 and 11208). 
International experiences are, however, also used to claim that the TAG-reform is 
insufficient. Maria Eichhorn, CDU/CSU, argues that French family policy illustrates 
that cash benefits are important and that such policies must be further developed in 
German (Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 11204). Although the debate is on childcare, 
Maria Böhmer, also CDU/CSU, argues that it is wrong to take the Swedish parental 
leave scheme as evidence that generous leaves result in higher birth rates since the 
Swedish fertility rate has decreased substantially lately, approaching the German level 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 11196).  
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The second way of making international references, the references to the OECD 
PISA study and other school studies, emphasizes how one important argument for the 
extension of childcare is education. For instance, Klaus Haupt, a politician from the 
Free Democratic Party (FDP), argues like this: 
 
“One of the most dramatic results of the most recent comparative studies is for me the fact that 
in Germany more than in any other country the social background decides life and future 
opportunities for children. We are neglecting early childhood education, thus social 
inequalities and curtail the future of our children” (Deutscher Bundestag 2004m: 12296). 
 
Such references to PISA and the emphasis on education are also highly present in 
interviews with key policy actors in Germany (German interviews 2, 4, 6, 7). And 
results from the PISA, TIMSS or PIRLS are used by the opposition when presenting 
suggestions or questions to the parliament (e.g. Antrag Deutscher Bundestag 2004f, 
Antrag Deutscher Bundestag 2004c). There are other references to the OECD in 
parliamentary debates, and sometimes it is unclear which OECD report the MP is 
referring to. At least in some cases it looks like the second Starting Strong report, but I 
cannot conclude with certainty (e.g. Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 11194, Deutscher 
Bundestag 2004c: 2-3). An application by the SPD-Grünen government from 2004 on 
expansion of different forms of childcare encourages all political parties to work 
towards an implementation of the OECD´s advice for Germany in Starting Strong 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2004a: 5). This is the most explicit reference to the report of an 
IO I have found.150  
The TAG-bill is also justified with other arguments than education and 
reduction of social inequality among children. Family minister Schmidt (SPD) is 
concerned with how German family policy is comprehensive, but with modest 
improvements and results. This is in her opinion much because of the stress on cash 
benefits rather than services, which she considers to be the responsibility of the 
Conservatives: “We are spending more money than others and are still less successful 
                                                 
150 The German government is asked to „make the results of the OECD study „Starting Strong“ for Germany 
available for the German Bundestag and to help the Länder, municipalities and providers of services in the 
implementation of the OECD recommendations“ (Deutscher Bundestag 2004a: 5). 
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because we have focused too much on benefits in kind and too little on extending 
infrastructure” (Deutscher Bundestag 2004m: 12283).  
As the literature on ideas assumes, feedback about existing programmes and the 
failure to meet goals increase the probability for a new idea to gain influence. The 
inability to reduce social inequalities, a very low fertility rate combined with low 
female employment rates and inadequate gender equality, are all examples of “failure” 
referred to by German politicians. This failure is particularly alarming since spending 
is so high.  
In the justification of the increase in childcare facilities there is also, as in the 
publications of IOs, a very clear presence of the idea of family policy as a productive 
factor. “Family yields profit” (Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 11193), says Renate 
Schmidt and her colleague Christel Humme justifies the bill by saying that it will 
improve Germany’s competitiveness by making female human capital available and 
improving education and the skills of children (Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 11202). 
Two further quotes illustrate this idea; 
 
“Research proves that the rate of return for every Euro spent for small children is above 
average. Motivated and well-educated workers constitute a benefit for each firm. The potential 
of well-educated young men and women should be exploited. Childcare and early education 
are a locational advantage, both in international comparisons and between municipalities. That 
means economic growth. That is active economic policy, (...)” (Caren Marks, SPD, Deutscher 
Bundestag 2004i: 11208). 
 
“The benefit of childcare facilities and childminders for the economy is similarly underrated. 
Substantial income and savings are to be expected for public budgets if mothers wanting to 
can work due to a better infrastructure of childcare. Second, positions in the area of childcare 
facilities are created and within childminding persons become self-employed. Third, with a 
better infrastructure of childcare lone parents formerly dependent on social assistance can 
work. In West Germany, 70 percent of non-working mothers with children up to 12 years 
wants to work. They fail because of insufficient childcare provision. If we improve 
reconciliation of work and family life we can increase the female employment rate and 
influence the development of births positively through improved conditions for families. An 
increased female employment rate and positive development of births have immediate effects 
on the social security schemes. Just the increased female employment rate to the level of our 
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Scandinavian neighbours would reduce the problems due to the demographic development of 
the pay-as-you-go financed pensions insurance substantially” (Deutscher Bundestag 2004c: 2, 
Antrag FDP). 
 
However, there are some critical remarks from Christian Democratic politicians who 
where then in opposition. Maria Flachsbarth, CDU/CSU, criticizes how children are 
often seen as future workers and tax payers rather than as children (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2004m: 12301, cf. Lister´s (2006, 2008) critique on how children are 
valued as "becomings" rather than "beings"). Maria Eichhorn, CDU/CSU, is worried 
that the focus on childcare is more due to employment-political objectives than for the 
well-being of children (Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 11203). As we will see in section 
7.3.3 and the next chapter on Norway, a Christian Democratic priority would be too 
ensure freedom of choice by granting families more benefits in cash and tax 
reductions. According to Eichhorn, the French family policy is successful precisely 
because it provides this. It should also be said that although both the CDU/CSU and 
FDP voted against the TAG, they several times stressed how they were in favour of the 
content of the reform, but that they thought that it was too imprecise on funding. Also, 
the Conservatives were stressing the benefit of Tagespflege, or childminding, more 
than the government. The argument was that in addition to childcare provision through 
institutions, the state should work for an extension of care by childminders who 
provide care for children, usually at home, while the child’s parents are at work, as an 
alternative to care in an institution. A result of the TAG is that childminders 
(Tagespflegepersonen) are increasingly professionalized (demands of pedagogical 
qualifications, skills in first aid etc). However, the Betreuungsgeld, a cash-for-care 
benefit recently legislated in Germany and discussed in section 7.3.3, was not 
proposed by the Christian Democrats then.151 Apart from this, the debate on childcare 
                                                 
151 One possible explanation for this is that until 1.1.2007 the German Erzieuhungsgeld (child-rearing benefit) 
functioned partly as a cash-for-care allowance by allowing parents to stay home for the first three years after 
birth. Erziehungsgeld is not quite the same as the Betreuungsgeld which is currently discussed, but it has 
similarities (cf. Morgan and Zippel 2003). Yet another reason why Betreuungsgeld has not been higher on the 
agenda could be that the German efforts to extend childcare provision have included both care in institutions 
(Kindertageseinrichtungen) and in private homes (Tagesmütter/-väter). As we know from Norwegian 
experiences with kontantstøtte, quite a few parents chose to use the cash for care benefit to buy private care from 
childminders. As the German government has promoted this for some time, the availability of childminders, who 
are controlled by the government at least to some extent, might have reduced the wish and need for a 
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is in many respects characterised by consensus since all parties wish to extend 
childcare. 
 Plantenga et al. (2008: 40-42) say that the Barcelona targets raise the level of 
ambition and political relevance of childcare. Richardt claims that the Barcelona 
targets “strengthens the federal governments demand for more macroeconomic 
investments and the position of the federal government vis-à-vis the states” (2004: 42). 
If this is correct we should find references to the EU in parliamentary debates, in 
particular in the debates on competing competences where some Länder have argued 
that the federal level is exceeding its competence. However, I find no such references. 
In the two debates in Bundesrat before the TAG-reform was accepted (Bundesrat 
2004a-b) family minister Schmidt justifies the federal initiative e.g. by saying that 
Germany needs to catch up with the rest of Europe and that the government’s bill does 
not exceed their competence. Neither the Barcelona targets nor the individual 
recommendations issued by the EU to Germany are mentioned by Schmidt or other 
speakers.  
 It is still possible that IOs have increased the scope of action available for 
national actors. Leibfried and Martens (2008) argue for PISA and the field of education 
that OECD reviews may nationalise a field in the meaning that a field for which the 
states are responsible is lifted to the national level. Leibfried and Martens show how 
the German Länder lost de facto competence on education through OECD reviews 
which identified problems, best practices, a need for action and initiated a continuous 
debate on quality. This fits the family policy field well: the German government has 
taken several initiatives within childcare which challenge the competence of the 
individual Länder.  
Since the TAG-reform was legislated two years after the setting of EU 
Barcelona targets one might expect to find references to the EU as a way of gaining 
authority. As already said, there are no such references. However, as the TAG was 
expected to reach something between 17-21 percent coverage by 2010 (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2008c: 10),152 that is not even close to the 33 percent goal of the EU, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Betreuungsgeld since an alternative to childcare facilities was already there. The cost connected to the 
introduction of such a scheme might also have hindered the CDU/CSU in proposing it.  
152 See also Deutscher Bundestag 2008b: 6.  
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lacking references are perhaps not so surprising after all. It would have been to justify 
the reform by referring to a goal one did not have expectations of reaching.  
Summing up, the TAG-reform was to a large extent justified by presenting 
Germany as a laggard. This was done by referring to international comparisons, 
successful countries (Scandinavia, France) or education studies. Both the government 
and the opposition relied on this strategy. Other references to the EU or OECD are 
more or less absent. In addition to the laggard-argument, the expected general benefits 
provided by an expansion of public childcare (the productive factor argument), and the 
education argument, are used a lot. As shown in earlier chapters, these arguments are 
stressed by IOs.  
 
7.3.2 Elterngeld 
 
The EU and OECD call upon Member States to review their parental leave schemes 
and look at how they hamper women in returning to work. IOs are less specific in their 
advice in this area than for childcare and thus it is more difficult to judge whether the 
German response corresponds to an EU/OECD measure. However, reports from IOs 
recommend parental leave benefits of about one year with incentives for men to go on 
leave. Moreover, research initiated by IOs identifies parental leave schemes of the new 
German type as beneficial. Also, German position papers justify the Elterngeld-reform 
partly by reference to low female employment rates, a problem stressed by the EU and 
OECD. This could therefore be a result of learning.  
How does the German government argue for their bill on Elterngeld? The bill 
starts out by claiming that the former Erziehungsgeld (childrearing benefit) did not 
fulfil the goals of today: Too few fathers take time off to care for their children, too 
many mothers stay out of work for a long period, and nor does the fertility rate seem to 
be positively influenced. The Elterngeld-programme is introduced to address these 
problems. The government expects that more men will stay home to care for their 
children, that women will return to work earlier and, though not explicitly said in the 
bill, more children will be born.   
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As in the parliamentary debates on childcare, there are very few references to 
IOs in the debates on Elterngeld. The EU Commission is mentioned once, having 
encouraged EU members to promote equality (Deutscher Bundestag 2006e: 3725). 
There are no references to the OECD or its family policy studies. The study most often 
referred to is the Seventh Family Report, a national study I return to below. As the 
literature on ideas suggests, and as seen in the TAG-reform process, policy failure is a 
point of departure for the bill: „Although Germany is in the upper third among 
European countries regarding benefits in cash, these benefits comparatively have not 
had satisfying effects” (Deutscher Bundestag 2006d: 1). This view is also very present 
in the speeches of the MPs from both opposition and government (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2006e: 3711, 3721, 3731, 3732, 3734, 3738, Deutscher Bundestag 2006h: 
5364, 5372). Germany has very many programmes directed at families with children 
and spends a lot of money on such programmes. This problem is often described in 
combination with a reference to other countries where the outcome is better than in 
Germany. The following statement from one FDP MP may serve as an example: 
“Although we in Germany spend and provide more than 100 billion Euro on family 
policy benefits, we have one of the lowest birth rates in Europe” (Ina Lenke, FDP, 
Deutscher Bundestag 2006e: 3711).153 There are some references to individual 
countries and Scandinavia is said to have been a model for the Elterngeld (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2006e: 3731). The father quota is expected to be successful as it has been in 
Sweden (Deutscher Bundestag 2006d: 17).154 Family minister von der Leyen uses 
experiences from West and Northern Europe to argue that the new parental leave 
scheme will result in higher gender equality and less child poverty (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2006h: 5354, see also Caren Marks, SPD, page 5360, or Jürgen 
Kucharczyk, SPD, page 5369, in the same debate). However, opposition politicians 
also refer to Sweden (Deutscher Bundestag 2006e: 3716, 3725, Deutscher Bundestag 
                                                 
153 Actually, this combination of high spending and modest results has made the current family minister von der 
Leyen initiate an evaluation of all family policy measures in Germany by a group of experts referred to as 
Kompetenzzentrum für familienbezogene Leistungen. According to the ministry there exist some 153 different 
benefits regarding family and marriage.  
154 The current German government refers explicitly to Swedish policies when reforming the parental leave 
scheme and childcare system. Several scholars describe the Elterngeld-reform as heavily influenced by 
Scandinavian models and Sweden in particular (e.g. Klammer and Letablier 2007: 675, 687, Schiller and Kuhnle 
2007: 82, 2008: 90, Knijn and Ostner 2008: 99, Lewis et al. 2008: 269, Ostner and Schmitt 2008: 9). 
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2006h: 5368) or France when criticising certain aspects of the new scheme (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2006e: 3736). The idea of family policy as productive factor is definitely 
present (e.g. Deutscher Bundestag 2006e: 3731, 3733, 3734, Bundesrat 2006: 335, 
337, Deutscher Bundestag 2006h: 5354).  
The issue of fertility and increased birth rates as an official aim of family policy 
is controversial in Germany due to its experiences during the Nazi-period. Pro-
natalism and the way policy was used to promote certain types of families make it 
difficult to discuss family policy as a population policy measure. In the draft of the 
Elterngeld reform it is not said explicitly that the new scheme will result in increased 
birth rates. In the parliamentary debates, however, several politicians both express 
their concern for the very low birth rates, as does the draft, and in addition they say 
that the new law will contribute to more births (e.g. MP Ole Schröder, CDU/CSU, 
Deutscher Bundestag 2006e: 3734).155 It is also said that this increase will help 
meeting the demographic challenge where fewer and fewer citizens finance more and 
more pensioners. In this respect the Elterngeld reform is a way of increasing the 
sustainability of the German welfare state; an argument with an instrumental approach 
to family policy. 
Actually, the family policy during the red-green government has been referred 
to as exactly sustainable family policy (Nachhaltige Familienpolitik). Sustainable 
family policy is very similar to what I have referred to as family policy as a productive 
factor in the chapters on the EU and OECD. According to Henninger, Wimbauer and 
Dombrowski (2008: 6), two reports ordered by family minister Renate Schmidt (Rürup 
and Gruescu 2003, Bertram, Rösler and Ehlert 2005) started the debate on sustainable 
family policy in Germany. Key aims are increased birth rates and female labour 
market participation.  As Leitner, Ostner and Schmitt explain, sustainable family 
policy “conceives of children as society’s future assets; it seeks to encourage 
childbearing by supporting parents to balance work and family responsibilities, and 
attempts to reduce child poverty by increasing maternal employment” (2008: 175). As 
a matter of fact, the focus on family-friendly policies by IOs may be one reason why 
population issues are now less difficult to address in Germany. The way Leitner, 
                                                 
155 Henninger et al. reaches the same conclusion (2008: 10). 
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Ostner and Schmitt interpret it; “Not until the OECD and the EU published reports that 
also tackled ´fertility` issues and their relation to issues of women’s educational 
attainment and employment was the term ´fertility` introduced into German public 
debate” (2008: 181). However, the two national reports ordered by the family ministry 
may be just as important. Together with the Seventh Family Report, they constitute 
three sources which were probably important for German politicians. Interviews with a 
SPD MP working on family policy matters and a member of the group writing the 
Seventh Family Report support this (German interview 2, 6). These three reports seem 
to argue in a similar manner as EU and OECD reports. The report by Rürup and 
Gruescu (2003) is particularly economically oriented in its argumentation. All three 
are comparative and to large extents identify Nordic countries as providing best 
practice. There are some references to the OECD (e.g. Bertram et al. 2005: 17, 37). 
They all recommend introducing an Elterngeld scheme and providing more childcare 
facilities. This may be the reason why German politicians in parliamentary debates 
rely on similar arguments as the OECD and EU without referring to these IOs; they 
know national studies better.  
As stated in the 2004 Joint Report on social inclusion, all NAPs acknowledge 
the importance for families of managing the balance between work and family life 
(European Commission and Council 2004b: 36). Several measures that could be useful 
to achieve this are mentioned: extension of childcare facilities, provision of financial 
support for families with young children, flexible or part-time working arrangement 
and a review of parental leave and maternity schemes (2004b: 52). The German bill 
argues in the same way and explicitly says that a new law on parental leave is only one 
of three important parts within family policy. Equally important are childcare 
institutions and a family-friendly working life. 
The bill is remarkably free of references to any source to legitimate the 
expected outcomes. The most specific reference is to „international experiences“ and 
countries like Sweden  allegedly showing that Elterngeld similar arrangements result 
in higher fertility rates and more active men in child caring. There is no particular 
mentioning of the EU, OECD, national research centres or other sources which could 
have strengthened the argument. This seems to be in concordance with an analysis by 
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Zohlnhöfer and Zutavern, saying that the OECD is rarely referred to as justification for 
changes and that the OECD impact on German welfare reforms therefore cannot have 
been comprehensive (2004: 137). Henninger et al. conclude that ”adaptation to EU 
standards was not a dominant topic in the recent reform debate” (2008: 20). I agree, 
and as my second assumption said, neither EU nor OECD advice figure prominently in 
reform justifications. 
Still, there may be several reasons for this lack of references. That the 
government is unaware of such sources must be considered highly unlikely and this is 
also disproved in interviews. More probable and in line with my third assumption, the 
government expects to gain popularity through this reform and thus does not credit 
other sources. Also, the reference to Sweden instead of the EU could be explained by 
the fact that Sweden has a very generous parental leave scheme. This is known among 
researchers and probably also among journalists, other opinion formers and large parts 
of the public. Yet another plausible explanation is the exchange of ideas between 
political (Social Democratic) parties or countries. Bilateral relations could account for 
just as much as the EU or OECD, perhaps even more, and should be investigated. A 
publication of the family ministry called Monitor Familienforschung provides further 
evidence of this as it considers German family policy in light of experiences in other 
countries and states that “Germany follows the Swedish ideal” (BMFSFJ 2006a: 8, my 
translation). 
The following interesting quote from the Family Minister Ursula von der Leyen 
may illustrate how a foreign idea works in the German context: 
 
“Looking at countries like Sweden, where Elterngeld was introduced about ten years ago, one 
must note that childcare facilities also were very incomplete. Only the Elterngeld and the 
connected discussion has given the necessary push towards a comprehensive expansion of 
childcare facilities, and we all know who is primary responsible for that. It was very 
interesting to observe in the last weeks and months, how this discussion in the meantime has 
also started here and with full intensity. It is no longer discussed whether we need childcare 
facilities at all, but instead only how and when we can offer this to all children” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2006e: 3712). 
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As discussed in the theory chapter, convincing policy ideas are sometimes able to 
speed up a reform process by allowing policy makers to jump over the stage of 
persuading people of the need for action and go straight to the stage on how it should 
be done. This is exactly how von der Leyen describes the effect of the idea of a new 
parental leave scheme.  
 In sum, the Elterngeld-reform like the TAG-reform was justified by the need to 
catch up with more successful countries. References to the EU and OECD are not 
present to a high degree. The productive factor is important, but not as often used as 
for the TAG-reform.  
 
 
7.3.3 Further expansion of childcare and the cash-for-care benefit 
 
This chapter is about the reforms on childcare (TAG) from 2004 and Elterngeld from 
2006. However, some recent developments, which shed light on both of these reforms, 
as well as on the possible influence of IOs, should be discussed briefly. The bill on a 
further expansion of childcare, the Kinderförderungsgesetz (KiföG), has relevance for 
my research questions. The federal government guarantees funding for this expansion 
(Henninger, Wimbauer and Dombrowski 2008, cf. the 
Kinderbetreuungsfinanzierungsgesetz – KBFG). Since the bill at the time of writing 
has only just been accepted by parliament and met the approval of the Bundesrat 
(November 2008), a full analysis is impossible. The following discussion must thus be 
considered tentative and incomplete and the data on which I draw is also not very 
comprehensive. 
  The bill is about speeding up and increasing the expansion of childcare 
associated with the TAG reform of 2004. This reform was supposed to result in 230 
000 new places by 2010, in different later documents said to equal something like a 
17- 21 percent coverage rate for children aged less than three years. The KiföG reform 
will result in more places, reaching in total a coverage rate of 35 percent by 2013. As 
part of this reform package the legal right to a childcare place will be given to all 
children from 1 - 6 years in 2013. This right is now restricted to the age group 3 - 6. 
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Moreover, this reform introduces a cash-for-care benefit (Betreuungsgeld). However, 
it is not quite clear what kind of a benefit this is.156 
  This reform is interesting for several reasons. First, the further expansion of 
childcare underlines the paradigmatic change which has taken place in Germany of 
promoting public childcare. Second, the new aim of 35 percent coverage is very close 
to the EU set Barcelona target from 2002, although with a delay of three years. Third, 
the introduction of a cash-for-care benefit is explicitly against the advice of the OECD, 
but in accordance with the best practice identified in the European Alliance for 
Families, initiated by the German Presidency in 2007. It is also in line with the 
reintroduction of such a scheme in Sweden and both Norway and Finland have similar 
schemes. Still, it is a policy instrument which partly contradicts the aim of the reforms 
on childcare and parental leave which explicitly have tried to increase female 
employment participation by reducing the period parents stay home to care for their 
children.  
  Are the now corresponding national and international childcare provision goals 
making MPs and the government relying on the EU to justify further extension? It is 
not. There is one reference to the Lisbon-strategy in the debates on the new law, but it 
is not explicitly about childcare (Caren Marks, SPD, Deutscher Bundestag 2008d: 
17194). The same goes for the OECD and a reference to Starting Strong (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2008d: 17195). The European Alliance for Families is never mentioned. 
  The bill is imprinted with the idea of family policy as a productive factor, able 
to solve many societal goals. The language is rather economical, saying for instance 
that offering the childcare coverage people ask for is central for German 
competitiveness: 
 
“Only common standards across the country enable the mobility expected from parents in 
today’s working life. Therefore, an offer of qualified childcare meeting demand all over the 
                                                 
156 The bill formulates it like this: “From 2013 a monthly payment, for instance a cash-for-care benefit, will be 
introduced for parents who do not want to or cannot let their children be cared for in a day care institution” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2008c: 3). The bill focuses mainly on childcare and Betreuungsgeld is only mentioned 
twice in the draft. Amount and eligibility criteria are not specified. This means for instance that we do not know 
whether parents receiving Betreuungsgeld will be allowed to work and buy private care, as it is possible to do in 
Norway, or whether parents have to stay home themselves like Finnish recipients must.  
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Federal Republic of Germany is a central prerequisite for the attractiveness of Germany as an 
industrial location in today's globalised economy” (Deutscher Bundestag 2008c: 12). 
 
 Since family policy to a large extent is a responsibility of individual states in 
Germany, there exist many regional differences. The coverage rate for childcare for 
children under three years is perhaps the most well known, varying for instance 
between more or less full coverage in former East German states like Thüringen or 
Sachsen-Anhalt and less than ten percent in former West German states. The 
difference between east and west regarding half-day or full-day kindergarten places is 
another. Other differences exist as well. The Erziehungsgeld, now substituted by the 
Elterngeld, gave parents a monthly amount for two years. Some Länder, however, e.g. 
Baden-Würtemberg, paid an additional year (Landeserziehungsgeld). For my 
discussion of the KiföG, yet another regional difference is relevant: In Thüringen, a 
cash-for-care benefit has existed for some time. 
  Knowing that the OECD is not in favour of the Betreuungsgeld one should not 
assume to find references to this IO in official documents. But what about the EU and 
the European Alliance for Families? And are experiences from Thüringen and 
countries like Norway, Finland or Sweden used in parliamentary debates and 
justification of the bill? 
 Since the Finnish home care benefit was identified as good practice within the 
European Alliance for Families during German EU Presidency in 2007, only months 
before the family minister proposes a similar scheme in Germany, it is natural to ask 
whether this was part of a conscious strategy to legitimize later national reforms (up-
loading strategy). As mentioned in the theory chapter, Europeanization can both 
change actors´ beliefs and alter domestic opportunity structures, and Member States 
have a large say in the development of advice. However, von der Leyen was initially 
against the introduction of this scheme, something the opposition points out in 
parliamentary debates (Deutscher Bundestag 2008e: 19238, 19257). Moreover, in 
newspaper interviews she said explicitly that she was against the benefit (e.g. Der 
Spiegel 2007b). This means that the up-loading explanation is less likely. Perhaps the 
cash-for-care benefit is depicted as good policy by the Alliance was because the 
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country holding the EU Presidency before Germany was Finland and that this country 
was part of the “Troika”?157 
  In parliamentary debates, there is one explicit reference to Sweden. Markus 
Söder, in the Bundesrat, the second chamber of the German parliament, uses the 
Swedish reintroduction as a proof in itself that a cash-for-care allowance is a good 
instrument:  
 
“When a country like Sweden from July this year is providing support in the amount of 
approx. € 300 for families which care for children between one and three at home – no one 
would claim that Sweden is a backward country or a country without social political 
responsibility – then this shows us that we are on the right way with our Betreuungsgeld” 
(Bundesrat 2008: 180). 
  
Opponents to the scheme, e.g. Ingolf Deubel (SPD) in Bundesrat (179) or Ekin 
Deligöz (Greens) (Deutscher Bundestag 2008d: 17196), use the same arguments as are 
used by the OECD and MPs in Norway who are against the scheme: It reduces female 
labour market participation, keeps children, particularly migrant children, out of 
childcare facilities, thus depriving them of a good preparation for school and so on. 
Although arguments are similar, there are no references to the OECD. In an 
application from the FDP where they ask the government to drop the whole cash-for-
care benefit, Norwegian experiences are used to justify this proposal. In Norway, 
according to the FDP, children from low-income families are excluded from important 
social integration because their parents chose the cash-for-care benefit instead of 
sending their children to a childcare facility. Miriam Gruß, an MP from the FDP, relies 
on this argument and refers to Thüringen and Norway as proof in the last debate before 
the bill was approved (Deutscher Bundestag 2008e: 19238). This means that one out of 
15 speakers refers to Norway. Marlene Rupprecht, SPD, says quite openly that the 
SPD has accepted the Betreuungsgeld as part of the childcare extension reform, but 
that they are not happy with it. In fact, the SPD hopes that this instrument will never 
become reality because the Christian Democrats might be persuaded to do otherwise 
                                                 
157 What is called the EU “Troika” (or Trio presidency) is made up of representatives from the current 
Presidency of the European Union, the future presidency, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers 
and sometimes the last the Member State holding the Presidency. 
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before 2013 (Deutscher Bundestag 2008d: 17199).158 It is likely that the SPD had to 
make a compromise in this matter. Two sources suggest this. First, a press release 
from the SPD themselves is very direct, using the OECD as an authority (SPD 2007). 
According to the press release, the OECD´s Babies and Bosses confirms that the two 
measures promoted by the Social Democrats; extension of childcare and the new 
parental leave scheme, are of the right kind of family policy. However, to introduce a 
cash-for-care benefit would create incentives for women to stay home and be 
disadvantageous for immigrant children who should benefit from visiting a childcare 
facility, again with reference to the OECD. Second, newspaper coverage clearly shows 
how Social Democrats are against the cash-for-care benefit (e.g. Tagesspiegel 2007c). 
A German newspaper has claimed that combining extended childcare provision 
with a cash-for-care benefit is as logic as detoxification centres providing free beer 
(Tagesspiegel 2007b).159 Critics of the benefit often refers to it as “Herdprämie” 
(literally stove bonus, that is kitchen award or award for women staying at home) or 
“Schnappsgeld” (literally booze allowance), suggesting that it will favour a traditional 
gendered division of labour and risk being wasted on other purposes than children. 
Whether such characteristics are a useful contribution to the debate could be 
questioned, but it is true that this new scheme can be seen as contradictive to other 
policies. On the other hand it may be seen as consistent in the sense that offering both 
public childcare and support for those who prefer other arrangements ensures real 
freedom of choice. Anyway, as suggested in chapter 2 with reference to Duvander et 
al. (2008: 22), states sometimes add new policies to older ones instead of replacing 
them, thus “generating models with seemingly contradictive elements”. The 
Betreuungsgeld is a good example and the critique from the journalist above stresses 
this by pointing at the combination of promoting a dual earner and dual carer model at 
the same time as one is improving possibilities for parents who chose a more 
traditional model. What consequences this new benefit has for the German welfare 
model is questionable. Being rather similar to the former Erziehungsgeld and 
                                                 
158The SPD strategy seems to be to make this an issue in the elections in 2013 and to make sure the 
Betreuungsgeld is never implemented if they should win the elections (cf. the two SPD MPs Caren Marx and 
Kerstin Griese, Deutscher Bundestag 2008e: 19254, 19257). 
159 "Krippenausbau und Betreuungsgeld - das passt so gut zusammen wie Entziehungsklinik und Freibier" 
(Tagesspiegel 2007b). 
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representing familisation, that is encouraging care within the family over formal care, I 
argue that it is not contradictive to traditional German family and social policy.  
One probable reason for what might seem contradictive, but which in fact also 
is common practice in countries like Norway, Finland and Sweden, is the need for 
compromise between parties with different priorities. Newspaper coverage supports 
this interpretation, saying that the cash-for-care benefit is a bonus for the traditional 
voters of the Conservative Christian Parties, especially CSU (e.g. Tagesspiegel 2007b-
c, Der Spiegel 2008). 
This also sheds light on the importance of policy ideas. The Christian 
Democrats have contributed to the introduction of public childcare and a new and 
shorter parental leave scheme which might have been so difficult for their core voters 
to accept that they now feel that they have to compensate in the form of a 
Betreuungsgeld. This suggests that ideas about the importance of family policy are 
sometimes so important that policy makers are willing to break with traditional, 
“safer” policies, although within limits, and that such ideas rather than interests have 
motivated the acceptance of Elterngeld and public childcare among Christian 
Democrats. The Betreuungsgeld, however, might be an example of learning without 
action. As discussed in the theory chapter, ideas may convince actors but domestic, 
economic or bureaucratic constraints may still prevent implementation of learning 
(Levy 1994: 290). 
The way the SPD uses the OECD in their critique of the cash-for-care benefit 
shows that German politicians are aware of IOs policy recommendations. As we will 
see in the following chapter on Norway, this particular family policy instrument 
illustrates how countries draw more on national politics and considerations than 
international advice. Even if it the OECD clearly criticizes kontantstøtten for 
contradicting aims of female employment, gender equality, and children’s integration 
and development, the German government introduces a scheme like this and Norway 
has kept its. It will be interesting to follow the fate of the Kifög and the introduction of 
Betreuungsgeld in German politics. 
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7.4 Reforms as the result of EU and OECD policy advice? 
 
The analysis of parliamentary debates has not rendered IOs much influence on German 
reforms. Do other sources confirm this picture? 
To isolate the effect of the influence of international organizations is difficult if 
not impossible. Interviews reveal several different sources that informed the reform 
process.160 However, a main impression from written and oral sources is that Germany 
has developed its new family policy based on Scandinavian experiences. This supports 
assumption two saying that the EU and OECD influence would be difficult to find due 
to the non-coherent policy they offer. 
Another potential source which can shed light on the latest reform initiatives in 
Germany is the National Action Plans (NAPs) and National Reform Programmes 
(NRPs). These reports present individual Member States´ actions and future plans 
regarding objectives and guidelines. Thus, one may find arguments for the reforms 
here and if one should expect to find references to EU influence then this should be the 
most likely source. Since the TAG, the first reform I analyze, was initiated by the SPD 
in 2004, I restrict the search to the NAPs and NRPs of 2004-2007. 
Which information about problems and solutions is considered relevant and 
legitimate by German policy-makers in these reports? On what grounds are decisions 
made? The German NRP and NAP (or more accurately the Implementation Report on 
National Action Plans on Social Inclusion 2003-2005) from 2005 are very similar in 
their argumentation within family related issues.  The themes covered are childcare 
and all day schools, reconciliation of work and family life, poverty and female 
employment rates. The documents report that 230 000 new care places for children 
under three years will be provided in the western Länder by 2010 (NAP 2004: 33, 46, 
NAP 2005: 26, NRP 2005: 8, see also NSR 2006: 19). In this respect, Germany has 
developed a national target, but based solely on number of places. According to the 
NRP, this will double the available places. However, as stated by Richardt (2004), 
since it does not give any percentages of coverage, it is difficult to relate it to the 
Barcelona targets. As in EU or OECD documents, the focus on reconciliation of work 
                                                 
160 E.g. conferences held by political organizations such as the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation; "Eltern-
Kinder-Geld" Deutsch-Schwedisches Dialogforum, 26.4.2006.  
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and family life is legitimized by reference to the economic issues and increasing birth 
rates (NAP 2005: 5, NRP 2005: 50-51). A clear statement of this is the following 
quote: “Family friendliness is a substantial positive growth factor” (NRP 2005: 50, 
author’s translation). This supports my fourth assumption, saying that the expected 
economic effects of new family policies, just as much as the policy in its own rights, 
can explain why they are proposed. However, somewhat different from the 
assumption, I find no final evidence that the argument about the advantages of a new 
family policy approach is originating with the international organizations alone, but 
rather that such policies in other EU/OECD – countries have proved beneficial. 
In the NAP 2006, childcare for children under three is again emphasized and 
according to the report, coverage was around 11 percent in 2004 (2006: 13-14). Since 
then new places have been opened, but what the coverage is now we are not told and 
there is no discussion directly connected with the EU goal of 33 percent. However, to 
prevent social exclusion of children from disadvantaged homes, the government is 
prepared to take actions to achieve the goal of offering children less than three years 
childcare (2006: 19). Later discussions about further increasing coverage for children 
up till three years has revealed that Germany will reach a rate of approximately 33 
percent in 2013, three years after the Barcelona-target. This is included in the NRP 
from 2007, but not discussed with reference to the targets set by the EU.  
There are several references to the new Elterngeld-scheme as a way to improve 
the work-life balance and increase the female employment rate (NAP 2006: 7, NSR 
2006: 23, NRP 2007: 80) and this reform is justified by reference to the OMC on 
social inclusion. The new Elterngeld is presented as an instrument for preventing 
social exclusion and to reach the goals set in the OMC of ensuring participation in 
society and strengthening social integration: 
 
(…), the employment rate of women in Germany has risen continuously in recent years and 
the Lisbon Strategy target of at least 60% by 2010 has almost been reached. A further increase 
in women’s participation in paid employment decisively depends on better ways of combining 
families and careers. The Federal Government wants to improve the general conditions for 
women to take part in paid employment to secure their livelihoods. The planned further 
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expansion of institutional childcare and day care and the planned introduction of parental 
benefit and better consideration of childcare costs will all help with this (2006: 33).  
 
According to Büchs and Friedrich, “in the NAPs, policies and policy changes are 
mainly presented as responses to the requirements of the EES, not as outcome of 
debates and struggles among domestic policy forces“ (2005: 262). The NAP and NRP 
from 2005 partly contradict this. These reports mostly do not refer to EU 
recommendations or proposals as reasons for their action. However, this is hardly 
needed when EU processes are the point of departure and the whole intention of the 
reports is to present progress so far and measures that will be introduced. Still, there 
are some explicit references to EU goals when it comes to women’s employment and 
childcare institutions (NAP 2005: 15), and the NAP and NSR from 2006 are 
presenting family policy reforms as responses to the EU OMC inclusion and OMC 
employment. However, the policies presented are not developed solely for the OMC 
(Umbach 2004, Büchs 2006). 
By investigating EU/OECD advice, German reforms and their timing, I have 
established more than just circumstantial evidence of a connection.161 In the early 
1990s, international organizations were more sceptical towards the welfare state and 
did not consider social policy as economically favourable as they do today (Kildal and 
Kuhnle 2006: 18). Germany’s policy has been static for a long time and suddenly 
changed in a period where IOs took a greater interest in family issues. This is 
suggestive of international influence and this discussion leads to the main conclusion 
of the chapter: that international organizations have contributed to the introduction of 
                                                 
161 The timing issue needs some qualification. According to the OECD ECEC country note on Germany, the 
awareness of challenges like ageing and low birth rates and the need for policy action, e.g. to provide more day 
care facilities for children under three and more full time kindergarten places, was already present when the 
review team visited Germany in June 2004 (OECD 2004a: 22). During this period the TAG-reform was for 
instance discussed and legislated. This means that neither the perception of a need to reform nor specific 
measures did come as a result of learning processes initiated by an OECD peer review process and that policy 
ideas must come from other national or international sources. One possible such source is the PISA study, which 
the OECD itself describes as having had substantial impact on German debate, a fact the German background 
report also stresses (BMFSFJ 2004: 51, 53, 73, 109) resulting in an understanding of how day care facilities may 
play an educational role. However, even though Germany was not evaluated until 2004, the ECEC project started 
in 1998 and policy ideas from the project may have transmitted to Germany during this early phase.  Moreover, 
as the German background report suggests, the report might result in further self-ascertainment and link the 
national debate to the international debate bringing about new perspectives (OECD 2004a: 6). This illustrates 
also the methodological challenges connected to studies of ideational influence.  
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German family policy reforms, but that domestic actors and relations are decisive for 
their final design. I will elaborat on this now. 
Correlation and causality are two different things and the former is not 
sufficient to prove a relationship between proposals and actual policies. Still, the 
picture painted in interviews with key actors at national and EU/OECD level supports 
the assumption that international organizations play a role for domestic family policy. 
Knowledge of the studies, advice and recommendations described in section 7.1 is 
confirmed and it is evident from the interviews that this is initiating or at least giving 
momentum to domestic debate. Section 7.2 has illustrated that similar policies could 
be interpreted as the result of learning through OMC processes - generated reports, 
conferences and policy ideas or as a combination of the mechanisms described earlier; 
participation in EU-level discussions and soft pressure through policy advice. 
However, a research design comparing the degree of similarity between EU and 
OECD proposals and national action faces several difficulties. The question of 
uploading is one (Zeitlin 2005a). Member States might try to turn their own policies, 
preferences and proposals into the aim of the EU/OECD objectives and guidelines. 
This would mean that there is little external advice at all since it in large parts 
originates with the Member State itself and then it would make less sense to study the 
impact of international organizations. If Member States make their already established 
policies the subject of future objectives instead of developing common EU objectives, 
then it is possible that the effect of the supranational level is overrated. This could 
represent a big problem for interpretation when relying strongly on official texts 
(Barbier 2004: 11, 14, 15). It would, however, indicate that IOs are thought to give 
legitimacy for action.  
Then, can shifts in the policy thinking of Germany be (partially) attributed to 
their participation in learning processes in international organizations like the EU or 
OECD? The clearest indication of this would be direct references to EU/OECD 
recommendations and proposals and statements that said explicitly that the reforms are 
meant as direct answers to this (de la Porte and Pochet 2002: 48). Not surprisingly, 
such statements and references are scarce. This does not prove that there has been no 
influence from international organizations. On the contrary, since the analysis above 
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has shown that there is a rather strong correspondence between what is expressed at 
the international level and how the German governments argue for their reforms, we 
do face indication of some influence. The lack of specific references to the EU or 
OECD as a place of inspiration is in agreement with my third assumption and could be 
explained by the terms credit claiming and blame avoidance (Weaver 1986). 
Governments are likely to take the honour for matters the public welcome and deny 
responsibility for less popular actions: “Governments, particularly member states of 
the EU, may have political reasons for over/understating OMC impact e.g. blame 
avoidance/credit claiming, self-presentation as good Europeans or defenders of 
national interest against Brussels” (Zeitlin 2004). Similarly, OMC-policies might be 
disguised to be nationally acceptable (Jacobsson and Schmid 2002: 89). In other 
words, the fact that there are few explicit references does not prove anything. Also, 
statements from the German Family Minister in newspaper interviews supports this 
interpretation: “I don't think that we should transfer social competences from the 
national area to Europe because we would only be complicating things but let's not 
underestimate the power of European discussions and their influence on national 
policies" (EUobserver 2007).  
Several policy makers in the EU and OECD emphasize how Germany has used 
this arena to get a debate going at home, what was referred to as a leverage effect in 
chapter 5. The influence exerted on Germany is then described more as a 
reinforcement of national initiatives, implying that the role of international 
organizations in this field is best depicted as a mediator function. As one OECD expert 
expressed it, his organization’s impact largely depended on what a country wants to do 
with their advice and how interested they are in dealing with an issue (timing) (OECD 
interview 5). Recommendations, best practice and comparisons are not connected with 
any sort of sanctions. German interviewees confirm that international studies are used 
when fitting the national agenda. This means that policy ideas from abroad have most 
likelihood of having impact when the national climate is “favourable”. 
Here a few comments on the development of recommendations are also 
relevant. They are made in close cooperation with the country in question. Comparing 
for instance the challenges identified by the German family ministry in its background 
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report to the OECD Starting Strong review (BMFSFJ 2004) with the policy advice of 
the OECD´s country note (OECD 2004a) reveals a very high level of consistency. The 
OECD raises some new issues, but they are partly posed as questions and not clear 
recommendations (see e.g. OECD 2004a: 43). Governments may even ask for a 
sharpening of critique if they need to do unpopular things (OECD interview 6) and 
may prefer “to [have] uncomfortable messages passed by the OECD” (OECD 
interview 2). Thus, reports are based on consensus and the arrow of influence can go 
both ways (see e.g. Mahon 2007a). A similar issue is the initiative by the 2007 German 
EU Presidency to launch an Alliance for Families which will be a framework for the 
exchange of family policy best practice. This is illustrative of a very different attitude 
than what was present among German policy makers some years ago, as well as of 
how the government hopes to ride on the crest of a wave in national debates. Still, 
some causation must be exercised when interpreting such initiatives or statements in 
an EU-context. The comment by the German family minister at a recent meeting of 
European family and equality ministers about how Germany’s latest decision to 
increase childcare facilities was an answer to the Barcelona targets, must for instance 
be taken with a pinch of salt since holding the EU presidency obviously could colour 
such statements (von der Leyen 2007). The analysis of parliamentary debates has for 
example found hardly any references to the EU or OECD. Still, there is no doubt that 
German governmental reports do consider family policy in the light of experience in 
EU Member States and with reference to EU goals. 
Interviews indicate that comparisons of Member States´ policies are taken very 
seriously at the national level and used in the development of policy. A Flemish 
ministry official who participated in the Swedish peer review on childcare policies 
presented in chapter 5, underscores the role of the EU and OECD in providing this 
information, stressing at the same time that the basis for best practice is always found 
at national level, implying that the EU is not necessarily the “initial mover” (EU 
Interview 7). Interviewed members of the German Social (SPD) and Christian (CDU) 
Democratic Party also cite rankings as an important stimulus for national debate 
(German Interview 2 and 6), and references to rankings or comparisons appear in all 
interviews conducted in Germany. In these rankings, Germany is presented as a 
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laggard when it comes to childcare and female employment. As the analysis of 
parliamentary debates and interviews show, MPs are very well aware about how 
Germany fares in such comparisons. According to the interviewed CDU – 
representative, the acceptance of certain demands is increased through such 
international studies and this makes it a bit easier in Germany to address and gather 
support for (German interview 6). This sounds very much like the peer pressure, 
leverage effect and awareness and self-assessment – mechanisms described in chapter 
5 on the EU. It can be safely assumed that both the EU and OECD play an important 
role and exert some influence within family policy in offering these comparisons. The 
search for solutions, however, seems to be more directed towards individual countries 
rather than the international organizations. An interview with former family minister 
Renate Schmidt (SPD) indicates how European goals were useful in argumentation, 
but less important for actual policy-making, referring instead to Sweden as a main 
instigator (German Interview 1). She says that the Elterngeld was more or less a copy 
of the Swedish parental leave system. There are in general many indications that 
individual countries and Sweden in particular has played a more important role for 
policy learning than IOs. The many similarities between the German and Swedish 
leave and childcare policy is one indication, statements in interviews another (German 
interview 2, 4). It is also possible to find many studies commissioned by the German 
family ministry which either discuss the transferability of Swedish policy to Germany 
(e.g. Prognos AG 2005) or are very comparative in general (e.g. Rürup and Gruescu 
2003, Bertram et al. 2005, Seventh Family Report 2006). Several authors support the 
interpretation that Scandinavian, particular Sweden, played an important role as an 
ideal (section 7.3.2).  This is hardly surprising, as these organizations do not have a 
family policy of their own and their recommendations and advice is limited. Börzel 
and Risse (2003) and Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001) argue that a misfit between 
national and international (European) advice trigger change, the pressure to change 
depending on how big the mismatch (“goodness of fit”) is. In the case of EU family 
policy this misfit - condition is partly lacking as there is little official EU family 
policy. The EU and OECD thus identify and increase awareness on weak points and 
direct attention towards successful countries through best practice, while the actual 
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learning of concrete arrangements may occur through bilateral exchange (mediator 
function). Key German policy actors refer to Scandinavia and sometimes France as the 
main source of inspiration for the new parental leave scheme and childcare policy. 
Still, the motive behind these references to individual countries could be that IOs are 
often viewed as bureaucratic and unpopular in the population, whereas experience 
from single countries is more easily understood. The exchange of best practice may 
not have happened by bilateral contact to the same extent without the initial EU and 
OECD reviews.  
Ideas have an independent meaning for decision-making processes, but they 
still rely on actors and/or institutions willing to defend and promote them. The 
influence of ideas from international organizations seems to depend on the political 
climate. This can explain why Germany has only recently paid attention to the EU 
level. To make sure that the influence of the EU and OECD is not overrated and 
misunderstood: it is important only in as far as national actors are interested in 
reforming. German family policy may thus be an instance of what Mark Thatcher 
(2002) has shown to be the case for telecommunications. EU regulation in this field is 
almost absent and does not put a lot of pressure on the Member States, but countries in 
the process of reform have still benefited from European policy to justify and 
legitimize reforms.  
 
7.5 Conclusions 
 
To sum up, my analysis shows two important points regarding the family policy ideas 
promoted by the EU and OECD. First, German policy makers rarely refer to these IOs 
when explaining the need for new measures. Second, the ideas the German policy 
makers rely on when claiming that change is necessary, and the kind of policies they 
want, are rather similar to how the EU and OECD argue. The very same ideas 
dominate debates and policy documents. It thus seems reasonable to borrow a phrase 
from Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser (2004: 150) and say that „Without the infusion of new 
ideas into the policy discourse, the overall change would not have happened“. Bleses 
and Seeleib-Kaiser further argue that when policy actors accept that one faces new 
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challenges, they start searching for new policies (2004: 151). The kind of causal ideas 
offered by the EU and OECD are helpful here and it is this kind of arguments German 
politicians have relied on. However, as mentioned already, there are few signs 
supporting the claim that these IOs have been crucial and I have no indications that the 
political parties changed their mind solely due to EU and OECD discourse. The 
clearest sign is the awareness of Germany’s inefficient policies made visible through 
league tables and comparisons. This function played by IOs is well documented (e.g. 
Trubek and Trubek 2005a: 92, Zeitlin 2005a: 477-478, Büchs and Friedrich 2005: 
264). Instead it seems like individual countries and national policy reports and expert 
communities have been the main suppliers of input. There are many references to 
individual countries like Sweden and an important source for German politicians are 
probably recent national family policy studies like the Seventh Family Report. The 
latter is a special kind of report in the sense that it is a regular publication which the 
government should prepare every second election period and present it to the 
parliament for discussion (see BMFSFJ 2006c: XXIII for more background 
information). A regular report which is submitted for parliamentary debate has better 
chances of being known among MPs than international studies by IOs.  
The comments on methodological challenges connected to this chapter’s 
approach show that I cannot fully answer the question of whether shifts in the policy 
thinking of Germany should be attributed to their participation in learning processes in 
international organizations. To trace ideas, however, is more than causal analysis. It is 
interesting per se to see how different actors use concepts, argue and justify policies. 
Concerning the findings of the chapter, it seems like my assumptions are partly 
supported by the analysis. To claim that ideas supported by IOs have greater likelihood 
of acceptance than other ideas is probably correct, but there are few references to 
international advice to support national reform proposals. The EU/OECD-influence on 
German policy is not quite clear, something which, in accordance with the second 
assumption, can be explained by the lack of a distinct EU/OECD family policy, but 
also by methodological challenges. The issue of family policy reforms was not raised 
by the EU or OECD alone. It has probably gradually become important due to 
socioeconomic trends and cultural changes, factors this chapter has not addressed. The 
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two organizations play a role, though mainly by providing information and arguments, 
and especially the comparisons they bring are influential. As such, their monitoring 
and distribution of information rather than their policy development and advice is 
important (mediator role). This interpretation contrasts with much of the earlier 
research on EU and OECD’s roles in family issues (see e.g. Pfau-Effinger 2008: 200). 
Still, bilateral learning is more influential. Somewhat paradoxically, family policy is a 
field with little developed formal and systematic exchange of best practice as there, for 
instance, is no OMC for this field, but traces of learning are still very evident for 
Germany. A huge interest in learning is present among both politicians and 
bureaucrats. Also, the German government claims credit for this reform probably 
because the reforms are rather popular with the public.  
Lastly, it seems plausible to argue that one of the main reasons behind the 
reforms, which are not traditional Christian Democratic family policy, is, as argued by 
the EU and the OECD, the overall economic advantages they are expected to bring 
about. The interviews and documentary sources do not provide final evidence for this, 
but the reasons given for the reforms clearly supports this interpretation. Interviewed 
representatives of the OECD regard coupling of issues to be one of the organizations 
main contributions to national debate; e.g. how ageing cannot be solved through 
pension reforms alone, issues such as fertility must also be included (OECD Interview 
2). 
The fourth assumption might seem to contradict the argument of ideational 
influence and rather imply that interests constitute the crucial part. However, what the 
assumption really says is that the impact of the idea is strengthened and made even 
more attractive by the fact that it has proved to be beneficial for employment rates of 
women, fertility rates and sustainability of the welfare state. According to an SPD-
interviewee, the need for family reforms in Germany first gained momentum when 
family-friendly policies were understood to be economically important (German 
Interview 2). This interpretation is disseminated at the level of international 
organizations. As such, German reforms may be an instance of how ideas can create 
interests and override earlier interests, as opposed to how ideas merely justify interests 
that were already present (Hochschild 2006). Family policy is a less institutionalized 
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field, open to new ideas, and as the German reforms entail a multiplicity of 
justifications almost everybody could find an interpretation with which one would 
agree, be it politicians from the SPD, CDU or CSU.162 
 Evidence does not support a claim that IOs were key arenas for the 
development of the consensus that reconciliation policies such as the Elterngeld and 
extension of childcare were necessary. However, this does not mean that the 
theoretical approach relying on ideas has not been useful. First, foreign lessons have 
been important both for the direction of reform as well as for the actual design of the 
parental leave scheme, which is very close to Scandinavian schemes, particular the 
Swedish version. As López Santana (2006: 492) argues; if a national actor already 
perceives a policy as good, an IO can reinforce this through soft pressure. This is 
probably a better description of what happened in Germany than that the EU and/or 
OECD redefined the views of policy makers. Second, foreign policy ideas seem to 
have moved the debate in Germany from whether reform is needed to the next stages 
of how reforms should be carried out. Third, policy ideas are only influential when 
actors use them to promote change, as has happened in Germany. Lastly, my analysis 
supports the claim that ideas gain influence when there exist some kind of 
dissatisfaction (policy failure) and that ideas able to solve many problems at the same 
time (malleable ideas) have good chances of acceptance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
162 I owe this suggestion to a discussion with Sigrid Leitner, who, however, should not be held responsible for 
the way it is used here. 
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Chapter 8 Norway and the transmission of family policy 
ideas 
 
“Primarily we are missionaries” (Norwegian interview 4). 
 
 
How domestic is domestic family politics really? What is Norway’s role in the ´idea 
game` (Marcussen 2002, 2004) of collecting, formulating and transferring family 
policy ideas? Is Norway best described as an exporter or importer of family policy 
ideas, or is it a mere spectator, neither providing lessons nor drawing on experiences 
from abroad?  
Recent feature articles by Kildal and Kuhnle (2004b, 2007) or Østerud (2007) 
have claimed that in Norway, the governments accept critiques and recommendations 
of international organizations (IOs) without much debate. Analysis of Norway’s 
response to OECD recommendations on employment, pensions, health and education 
concludes that Norway is amenable to ideas from the OECD, partly as a result of the 
close collaboration between national authorities and the OECD in the development of 
such recommendations (Kildal and Kuhnle 2004a-b, 2007). This work suggests that 
Norway is open towards foreign ideas and inclined to follow the advice of 
international organizations. As in chapter 7, I thus assume that social policy ideas 
supported by IOs have greater likelihood of being implemented in Norway than ideas 
not enjoying this support, as IOs both may convince political actors of the need to 
reform and provide legitimacy for reformers (Marcussen 2002). I expect to find at least 
some concordance between international advice and national family policy reforms 
and my first assumption is that the power of ideas is strengthened if they are accepted 
by and further disseminated by influential IOs. 
For countries that traditionally leave most welfare responsibility to families 
themselves, e.g. South European countries, international actors may push for a family 
policy aiming at security and flexibility for families with young children and for 
gender equality. However, Norway is well known for its highly developed welfare 
state in general (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987, Moene 2007) and family - and 
women - friendly welfare arrangements in particular (Saraceno 1997, Ellingsæter and 
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Leira 2004, Berven 2005, Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen 2006, 2007a, Haavet 2006, 
Kildal and Kuhnle 2006). At least on the surface Norway appears in line with most 
experts´ views on ´good policy`.163 Moreover, in a new study of Norway (and 
Denmark), Kildal and Kuhnle (2006) investigate EU advice and OECD economic 
surveys from 1990-2000. They find few international recommendations or comments 
on family support policies and conclude that neither the EU nor the OECD can be seen 
as having influenced the development of policies in this field. Thus, I do not assume 
that policy ideas from IOs play a crucial role for the development of Norwegian family 
policies. My second assumption is that Norway is more of an exporter of ideas than an 
importer, as there has been less need for the import of policies to Norway during the 
last two decades due to an acknowledged position as a forerunner country. 
However, since other countries, particularly Sweden, are thought to be an even 
stronger paradigmatic representative of the “social democratic” welfare state (Carlson 
1990, Esping-Andersen 1990) and since Norway is not part of the social policy 
initiatives in the European Union such as OMC-processes, this export role is not 
assumed to be very comprehensive. My third assumption is that Norway is not a core 
“teacher” to other countries since it is not a member of the EU and thus at least partly 
decoupled from an allegedly important arena for learning and exchange of ideas.164 
These three partly compatible assumptions guide the analysis. Evidence consistent 
with assumption one and three would support the claim that IOs are important in the 
transmission of ideas also within family policy, whereas evidence consistent with 
assumption two would be more in line with earlier research (e.g. Hantrais 2007) giving 
the EU and OECD little competence and impact in this field. 
The main question in my analysis is how ideas from IOs on national family 
policy are spread and whether they have an impact. This chapter focuses on the role of 
international organizations (IOs) and Norway’s possible role as a participant in the 
cross-border exchange or “trade” of ideas. Rather than attempting to explain why 
                                                 
163 A term to be understood as sucessful in contributing to gender equality, high female employment rates and 
birth rates and low child poverty rates. 
164 The OMC strategy is not included by the EEA agreement, but it is still of importance to Norway and it is 
allowed to take part in some programmes (e.g. combat of poverty) and working groups (e.g. OMC on education) 
(NHD 2004: 15). Norway finances national experts working with the EU Commission on OMC-issues and 
Norwegian politicians are also often invited to meetings of the EU (see below).  
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certain reforms happened in Norway, 165 it intends to shed light on one possible source 
of influence in these reform processes; advice from IOs. A study of why the reforms 
developed as they did would need a more comprehensive analysis, including 
contextual factors and the historical background (Ellingsæter 2003: 423, Ellingsæter 
and Gulbrandsen 2007a: 655). Like the previous chapter, this chapter does not focus 
on such issues. Instead, I consider it interesting in itself to see how IOs evaluate 
Norwegian family policy and how national policy makers deal with this. The chapter 
will also discuss Norway’s possible role as an exporting country. Norway, like many 
other countries, likes to present itself as a country leading the way in social policy. Is 
this role confirmed or disproved when reading international reviews and reports?  
I shall first describe what kind of critique and advice Norway faces from the EU 
and OECD on its family policy. Then I present Norwegian family policy and reforms. 
Sections 8.3-8.5 discuss whether Norway is best depicted as an exporter or importer of 
family policy ideas or a “non-participant” in the international transmission of ideas. 
 
8.1 Family policy advice from international organizations 
 
Since non-binding policy ideas and recommendations naturally can transmit also to 
non-members, I briefly present the EU´s position on family policy and how Norway 
responds. Moreover, Norwegian policy makers are more or less always invited to EU – 
meetings on related subjects like gender equality and childcare. Investigating whether 
Norwegian key actors are influenced by developments in the EU thus makes sense.166 
Since 2003, the Ministry of Trade and Industry has published a report that gives 
a Norwegian perspective on the Lisbon strategy of the EU.167 The EU cooperation 
within this strategy is, as alluded to, not included by the EEA agreement, but it is of 
importance to Norway and it takes part in some programmes and working groups. In 
                                                 
165 Readers interested in Norwegian family policy debates and the position of different political parties are 
referred to Bay (1988), Berven, Hansen and Wærness (2001), Berven (2005), Hatland (2001) or Håland (2001). 
166 For instance, Norwegian ministers and ministry officials have participated at EU conferences in Berlin in 
2004 and 2007 and Heidelberg 2007 where family policy was on the agenda (Lindén 2007b, Norwegian 
interviews 5, 6).  
167 There exist four such reports. In the introduction in the last report (2007), it is said that this report is the fifth 
(page 5), but the ministry has confirmed by email that there are only four. 
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the words of one former Minister, Odd Eriksen, “We include Norway in the statistical 
material, and apply the indicators to Norway in order to compare our performance to 
that of the EU countries” (NHD 2006: 3).168 
The EU has two important directives within family policy: the parental leave 
directive of 1996 and the pregnant workers directive of 1992 (cf. chapter 5). These are 
minimum standards that Norway fulfils with a clear margin.169 Apart from directives, 
the most explicit family policy ideas of the EU are found within childcare and parental 
leave. The Barcelona targets of 33 percent childcare coverage for children under three 
years and 90 percent coverage for children 3- 6 years, is perhaps the most direct aim. 
Countries that fail to meet these goals, e.g. Germany, are constantly reminded of this 
goal in EU studies.  
Being a member of the EEA means that Norway is often included in studies of 
family policy, although more often as a reference point than as a country advised to 
conduct certain policies. For instance, in a commissioned study, Plantenga and Remery 
(2005) compare reconciliation policies of all EU Member States, EEA countries and 
some candidate countries. For the availability of childcare facilities, Norway fails to 
comply with the Barcelona target for children under three years, but reaches the goal 
of 3- 6 years (2005: 33-34).170 The graphs and rankings presented in such reports show 
that Norway is a leading country for both female employment rates and fertility rates 
(cf. chapter 5 and appendix 6). Views on national family policy are, obviously, more 
direct in such commissioned studies than in official documents. 
In the European Alliance for Families, the EU presents the Finnish home care 
allowance, which is similar to the Norwegian kontantstøtte, as one good practice. The 
EU has expressed concerns about policies that keep women out of work for long 
periods (EU Commission/Council 2003), somewhat in contradiction to naming the 
Finnish home care allowance a good policy, and seems to advocate short, well-paid 
                                                 
168 One could argue that this in itself shows an impact of the EU on governments, which, since the first report, 
have included anti-membership parties. 
169 New relevant Community legislation is incorporated into the EEA agreement and due to the agreement, the 
two directives apply to Norway. However, as Norway already fulfilled these minimum standards it had no 
practical importance (Dølvik and Ødegård 2004). 
170 As my presentation of Norwegian family policy reforms will show and according to Ellingsæter and 
Gulbrandsen (2007a: 667), the target for children under three was also reached in 2005. Plantenga and Remery 
(2005) rely on numbers from Eurostat in 2004 and this could explain the discrepancy. Cf. Plantenga et al. (2008) 
for a discussion on the reliability and comparability of statistics on the provision of childcare. 
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parental leave schemes. Making men take more responsibility for their children is also 
considered an important goal (European Commission 2006b).  
The second international actor thought to have potential influence on Norway is 
the OECD. Babies and Bosses is the most recent OECD study of families. Norway is 
not treated directly in the four first volumes of the Babies and Bosses series (OECD 
2002a, 2003a, 2004b, 2005a).171 The last volume (OECD 2007c) includes Norway, but 
this volume constitutes more of an overview of earlier publications supplemented by 
secondary resources. As it is also published too late to have had any influence on the 
period I cover I will only briefly depict what it says about Norway.  
Norway generally performs well, with high levels of gender equality, female 
employment and high birth rates. Norway provides support to families in all phases 
(e.g. around birth, childcare facilities, out-of-school hours) and of the “right kind”: 
well-paid parental leave, perhaps a bit too long in the view of the OECD, but with 
sensible incentives for fathers to spend more time with their children.172 Childcare 
coverage is high and the quality good. The OECD sees no reason why Norway should 
not continue to spend much money in this sector (2007c: 138). However, the Nordic 
model also relies on very high taxes, in fact to such an extent that it is unlikely that 
other countries could easily copy it (2007: 22). Babies and Bosses also criticizes the 
cash-for-care benefit heavily. Although this is done with regard to Finland and not 
directed specifically at Norway, the same arguments used in the Norwegian Economic 
Surveys, that I will discuss below, appear in addition to a new one: The benefit makes 
employers reluctant to hire women or promote their career, as they assume that many 
women will leave work for long periods (2007: 113).173  
The Norwegian Economic Surveys make several references to family policies. 
The first five surveys following the introduction of the cash-for-care benefit in 1998 
                                                 
171 There may be different reasons for this. One interviewee noted that three other Nordic countries were already 
among the 13 states in the study (OECD interview 5). Another interviewee believes that the study may have 
fallen inbetween the responsibilities of two ministries (Norwegian interview 6).  
172 The Norwegian arrangement can still be criticized for lacking incentives. It does not offer all men full wage 
compensation due to the income ceiling, meaning that men often lose more than women when taking leave.  
173 Research on the effect of the cash-for-care allowance shows that it has not had such a strong influence on 
parental actions as many thought or feared. Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen conclude that the reform had only a 
very modest negative impact on female employment rates (2007a: 661, 2007b). The analysis of Rønsen (2005) 
concludes that it had a somewhat more negative effect on the employment rate than Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen 
(2007a-b) say, but still not a large impact. Daugstad (2006) has shown, however, that immigrants use the cash-
for-care benefit more often than other families. Cf. Morgan and Zippel (2003) for a comparative perspective. 
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(surveys in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004) criticize this benefit. It is described as a 
too generous scheme and a work disincentive that has lowered the labour supply of 
women (OECD 2000b, 2001d). The benefit was assessed to have a negative impact on 
(female) employment participation even before parliament adopted it (OECD 1998b: 
57, 60), and in the following report the OECD says explicitly that the reform is going 
in the wrong direction and is not in line with earlier OECD advice (1999c: 57, 59). The 
OECD also expresses concerns about how the cash-for-care benefit reduces “the 
cognitive development and social integration of children” (2002c: 14). The OECD is 
very sceptical towards the effect this may have on certain parts of the population: 
 
“The childcare cash benefit has also created strong incentives for low-income parents to quit 
their jobs, which may make their return to the labour market difficult, to care for their children 
at home. (…) As a result, children from less educated and immigrant families are more likely 
to be the last to enter formal childhood educational and care facilities, reducing their 
development opportunities and their knowledge of the Norwegian language” (2002c: 85). 
 
In the same year, the OECD also judges the parental contribution to kindergarten costs 
to be too high, again especially for low income families (2002c: 83), and the 
kontantstøtte is mentioned as a threat to further expansion of childcare facilities 
(2002c: 85). The following survey mentions briefly that the division of work between 
men and women at home is negatively influenced by the cash-for-care benefit (2004d: 
127). The Economic Surveys of 2005b and 2007 have no comments on family policies 
at all.174 
In 1998 the OECD launched the Thematic Review of Early Childhood 
Education and Care Policy (ECEC), which resulted in two reports: Starting Strong I 
(2001) and II (2006). As described in chapter 6 on the family policy ideas of the 
OECD, countries participating in such reviews first write a background report 
describing national family policy; laying out challenges, and including existing 
research and statistics. The second step is a visit by the OECD review team, and the 
third is its report (the country note). The fourth and final step is the comparative report 
                                                 
174 Asked about this, OECD officials could not give a clear answer to why the critique of the cash-for-care 
benefit was suddenly left out of the report (OECD interview 6). 
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(e.g. Starting Strong I 2001).175 The OECD country note on Norway (OECD 1999d) 
expresses the same concerns about the effect of the cash-for-care benefit that the 
Economic Surveys do (gender equality issues, withdrawal from the labour force, 
development of children, especially vulnerable groups like immigrants) and the same 
comments upon high parental contribution in the funding of early childhood services. 
The report welcomes further building of childcare centres, and this particular review, 
more than other OECD reports, stresses the importance of qualifications of staff (i.e. 
too few pedagogues in childcare institutions).  
Starting Strong I does not include country specific recommendations but instead 
gives advice to all OECD countries, with the note that different national contexts also 
should allow diversity in response (OECD 2001b: 125). The report, not surprisingly, 
includes many of the same issues found in the Economic Surveys and Starting Strong 
country note on Norway. Eight key elements of a successful ECEC policy are 
identified (see chapter 6 for details) and advice referred to as policy lessons include the 
following: increase coverage in childcare facilities, particularly for children under 
three years of age, provide paid and job-protected parental leave of about one year, 
focus on development of children from all groups including immigrants, provide 
substantial governmental funding of childcare institutions, and focus on quality and 
training of staff.  
Starting Strong II (2006) draws many of the same conclusions. In addition, it 
also includes a kind of stock-taking, implying that the report discusses developments 
in Norway since the first report. According to this review:  “Since 2001 substantial 
adjustments to legislation and funding processes have been underway as Norway 
moves towards universal access to ECEC services for all children under 6 years” 
(OECD 2006a: 399). The OECD seems quite pleased with the development and the 
actions planned by the new government.176 However, as discussed in chapter 6, the 
OECD has a very consensual way of developing its advice and the evaluated Member 
                                                 
175 As part of this review the Norwegian Ministry of Children and Family Affairs hosted a meeting in on 
“Expanding access for young children from low-income or minority backgrounds” (Oslo, 6-7 June 2002, see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/42/0,3343,en_2649_39263231_1941738_1_1_1_1,00.html  This illustrates that 
Norway has been an active participant and even organized a workshop. See also Leseman (2002). 
176 It is somewhat unclear on what information this section on developments is based. Is it merely a report from 
the new government sent to the OECD, or has the OECD checked other and more objective sources as well?  
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States may largely decide what is included in the reports. This fact must inform 
discussions of possible influence.  
 The advice from the EU and OECD is summarized in table 8.1. I have included 
advice on parental leave as well, because it is relevant for the later discussion of the 
possible Norwegian export of family policies and because it is an important part of 
family policy, with strong connections to both the cash-for-care and childcare issues. 
 
Table 8.1: International actors´ comments on Norwegian family policy since 1998 
 
Scheme/ 
benefit 
OECD EU 
Overall 
advice 
Implement work-friendly family policies Implement work-friendly family policies 
Childcare “Building new public and private childcare 
centres and introducing a ceiling for fees in 
publicly-funded ones” (Economic Survey 
2004: 137) 
 
Increase coverage in childcare facilities, 
particularly for children under three years of 
age (Starting Strong 2001) 
Increase coverage in childcare facilities, 
particularly for children under three years of 
age (Barcelona targets, Plantenga and Remery 
2005) 
Parental 
leave 
Well paid and job-protected parental leave of 
about one year (Starting Strong 2001) 
 
Nordic parental leave perhaps a bit too long 
(Babies and Bosses 2007) 
 
Incentives for men to care for their children 
(Babies and Bosses 2007) 
Well paid parental leave schemes. Equal 
sharing of caring responsibilities (Plantenga 
and Remery 2005, European Commission 
2006b) 
Cash-for-
care  
allowance 
´(…) reconsider the childcare cash benefit, 
which contributes to damping the supply of 
labour and may be less conducive to the 
cognitive development and social integration 
of children than the provision of formal 
educational and care services` (Economic 
Survey 2002: 88) 
Contradictory view: express concerns about 
policies that keep women out of work for long 
periods (EU Commission/Council 2003) but 
refers to cash-for-care allowances as good 
practice (web portal of the European Alliance 
for Families).  
 
 
8.2 Norwegian family policy and recent reforms 
 
As Sainsbury (2001), Leira (2002) and Skevik (2004) state, Norway is a Nordic 
laggard within reconciliation policies. Skevik (2004: 95) further argues that Norway is 
neither a clear male-breadwinner nor a dual-breadwinner country due to its mix of 
family policies, which encourages both parents to work and care for their children 
(parental leave schemes, father quota, childcare coverage), and which also provide 
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opportunities for a more traditional division of work between the sexes (cash-for-care 
benefit). This chapter covers two such seemingly contradictory family policies; the 
cash-for-care benefit (kontantstøtte) introduced in 1998 and the extension of childcare, 
especially since 2005. The choice is justified as follows: the previous chapter showed 
how both types of reforms are highly debated in contemporary Germany, and thus 
invites a comparison of arguments and possible learning between the two countries 
(chapter 9).177 Kontantstøtten is one of the most contested family policies in Norway 
(Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen 2007b, Grødem 2008), while the extension of childcare 
has been on the agenda in Norway for at least 30 years and in 2008 finally seems to be 
solved. The cash-for-care benefit was characterised by a strong left-right conflict while 
increased childcare coverage is something all parties support. Common for both issues 
is that there are few vested interests or strong organizations involved, a situation which 
is very different from fields such as pensions or employment, implying that there 
might be a larger room for foreign experiences to make themselves heard.178  
The cash benefit allows parents to stay home with their children for another two 
years following the parental leave benefit-period. The benefit covered one-year-olds 
from the start and two-years-olds from 1 February 1999. It was introduced by a centre 
coalition minority government headed by the Christian People’s Party (KrF). The 
benefit is not only meant to let parents spend more time with their children by enabling 
one parent to stay at home but also to increase parents´ freedom of choice as to who 
should care for their children by allowing them to buy private daycare. The allowance 
is paid to parents of 1-3 year old children who do not attend a childcare centre. Parents 
may let their child go to a childcare centre for only a few hours and have the cash 
                                                 
177 One could discuss whether an increase in childcare facilities qualifies to be called a reform in Norway, having 
been gradually extended for decades and thus not really representing a new policy. For simplicity, I refer to the 
recent efforts as a reform to use the same vocabulary for similar policies in Norway and Germany. In Germany, 
the recent decision to extend childcare beyond doubt is a reform, as it represents a whole new approach in the 
Federal Republic to children’s upbringing and mothers´ attachment to the labour market. 
178 A more practical reason for the selection of these reforms is that focussing on other important reforms, e.g. 
the extension of parental leave schemes and introduction of the father’s quota in 1993, would mean that I would 
have to go even further back in time, thus making it more difficult to contact the key actors interviews. The 
father’s quota was extended by one week in 2005 and 2006. A further extension is discussed, alternatively 
reserving more of the existing parental leave for the father in line with the system in Iceland. This debate takes 
place after my period of investigation, but would be an interesting example of travelling ideas worth closer 
analysis, as the debate is explicitly about the introduction of a foreign model of parental leave. In the state budget 
proposal presented in October 2008, the government proposed that from July 2009 the father´s quota will be 10 
weeks. Two of these are taken from the mother´s leave, two more are added, making the total parental leave 
period 46 or 56 weeks. 
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benefit reduced accordingly. The benefit is thus conditioned on non-use or limited use 
of state subsidised childcare centres (Skevik 2005). The allowance of € 400 (3300 
NOK) a month (full rate) is not taxed.  
The second reform I study is the extension of childcare facilities. As Skevik and 
Hatland argue (2008: 96), what constitutes full (sufficient) coverage is hard to say, but 
if the 75 percent threshold of the Norwegian Ministry of Children and Family Affairs 
is used, Norway fulfilled this criterion already in 1999. However, judging from the 
heated debate on childcare, which continued in the new millennium, Norway had some 
way to go before full coverage was reached in reality. Moreover, coverage for the 
cildren aged 1-3, the age group for which parents can draw on kontantstøtte, was far 
from satisfying the demand (Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen 2007a: 653, Skevik and 
Hatland 2008: 96).   
Taking office in October 2005, the new red-green majority coalition of the 
Labour Party (DNA), Centre Party (SP), and Socialist Left Party (SV), promised to 
achieve full childcare coverage by the end of 2007, presenting this goal as one of the 
government’s most important. At the time the coalition came to power, the coverage 
was about 50 percent for 1 to 2 year-olds and around 88 percent for 3 to 5-year-olds 
(table 8.2). The government could not reach its aim of full coverage in time, and in 
January 2008, 10 percent (42) of the municipalities were still unable to offer all 
children a place. Of these, all but four municipalities expected to reach the goal during 
2008 (Asplan Viak 2007b).  
The government declaration from 2005 (the Soria Moria Declaration) mentions 
several aims for childcare in addition to full coverage: price reduction (maximum 
monthly rates),179 a legal right to a place in kindergarten, and changing the whole cash-
for-care benefit when full coverage is met. A legal entitlement to childcare for children 
aged 1-6 will be in force from August 2009. So far, not much had happened to the 
cash-for-care benefit, but in 2006 it was reduced from € 445 to € 400 a month 
(3657/3303 NOK) and the period cut by one month. However, the party programmes 
                                                 
179 From 1.1.2006, the maximal allowed fee per month for kindergarten attendance (makspris barnehage) was 
reduced from €335 to €275 (2750/2250 NOK). However, this was not a decision made by the new government 
alone but part of an agreement reached already in 2003 (Barnehageforliket). See Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen 
(2007a: 662, 2007b: 177) 
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of the three government parties show that the Labour and Socialist Left Party wish to 
abolish it completely while the Centre Party, which was also in government when the 
benefit was introduced in 1998, wants to keep it, although it has also become more 
open to changes.  
While the cash-for-care benefit is (partly) unpopular with the EU and OECD, 
other Norwegian family policies must be said to be close to advice from these IOs. 
Like Germany, Norway has not been part of all international reviews discussed here, 
but reforms are in concordance with policy ideas of EU and OECD reports and 
recommendations. Some of the reports, however, are published too late to have any 
impact on the reforms I investigate. 
 
Table 8.2: Summary of changes after October 2005 
 
 ĸ October 2005 October 2005 ĺ 
Cash-for-care benefit 
(kontantstøtte) 
Benefit period: 24 months 
Monthly amount: € 445 (full 
rate) 
Benefit period: 23 months 
Monthly amount: € 400 (full 
rate) 
Childcare coverage by 
20.9.2005 and 31.12.2007 
Children aged 1-2: 50,2 % 
Children aged 3-5: 88,3 % 
Children aged 1-2: 69,2 %  
Children aged 3-5: 94,3 % 
Numbers for childcare coverage are from Asplan Viak (2006, 2007a) and SSB (2008). 
 
 
8.3 Norway as importer of family policy ideas  
 
Have internationally disseminated ideas played a role in public debate and policy -
making? The following analysis will investigate whether international actors have 
influenced national reforms. The term “influence” is problematic (cf. chapter 4). Here 
I am interested in whether international advice has left traces in different sources and 
resulted in or figured in debates. As outlined in chapter 4 on data and methods, this 
will be done by searching for direct evidence such as statements confirming foreign 
inspiration, comparing national reform arguments with international advice and 
consulting (interview) key actors. The cash-for-care and childcare issues will be 
discussed separately.  
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8.3.1 Cash-for-care benefit 
 
The argumentation used in parliamentary debates on the cash-for-care benefit can be 
studied in different phases.180 I will focus on four phases: a) around the not-adopted 
proposal to introduce the benefit in 1996, b) the actual decision on the introduction of 
the benefit in 1998, c) the evaluation in 2002, and d) the minor changes made in 2005.  
In the first phase, kontantstøtte was not adopted when proposed by 
representatives of KrF, SP and V (Venstre, the Liberal Party) in 1996. The cleavage 
between the left and the right about cash benefits versus services was very prominent 
in these parliamentary debates (St.tid.1996-1997a-b). This conflict dimension is old in 
Norwegian (and international) family policy discussions (Håland 2001). This issue is 
much more discussed than international experiences, which only 3 out of 17 speakers 
refer to. As could be expected, since these debates took place before the EU or the 
OECD really became involved in family policy, there are no references to these actors 
here. Those who refer to experiences abroad argue that Norway fares well 
internationally in cash benefits for families, but that Nordic neighbours and France 
have substantially more support for services (childcare institutions). In the words of 
former Minister of Children and Family Affairs, Sylvia Brustad: “We are actually on 
the top in Europe regarding benefits in cash and we will not abolish such 
arrangements. But what we have said in the acknowledgement that we are almost at 
the bottom regarding services in kind, (…), is that our priority towards year 2000 must 
be (…) the provision of childcare to an affordable price” (St.tid.1996-1997b: 1813).181 
The second phase is around the introduction of the benefit in 1998. Here many 
references to international experiences appear, but none to international organizations. 
In the proposition to the Storting on the introduction of the cash-for-care benefit 
(St.prp. nr 53 1997-1998), the Finnish Hemvårdsstöd is presented. The characteristics 
of the benefit, as well as its similarities to and differences from its Norwegian 
counterpart and some of the consequences, are discussed. No direct expressions of 
influence or inspiration appear drawn from Finland. The proposition briefly mentions 
                                                 
180 The Christian People’s Party suggested a sort of cash-for-care benefit called omsorgsbidrag (similar to the 
Swedish vårdnadsbidrag) already in 1984 (Bay 1988: 41). 
181 See also Karian Lian’s speeches in the same debate (St.tid.1996-1997: 1811) for similar arguments.  
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Swedish and Danish arrangements, but for a number of reasons it concludes that they 
are not relevant for the Norwegian situation. Moreover, it is mentioned that some 
Norwegian municipalities have introduced cash-for-care benefits, but as these were 
mostly small, rural municipalities, their experiences are not regarded as very relevant 
for a national scheme.  
The proposition also discusses the possible negative consequences of the new 
scheme, such as disincentives to work, reduced female employment participation, 
vulnerable groups (e.g. children from immigrant families) or gender equality concerns. 
However, the government opposed most of these. For instance, the gender equity issue 
(how the new scheme could strengthen the traditional division between male work 
outside and female work inside the household) is met by the claim that it represents a 
renewal of gender equality policy by acknowledging former unpaid domestic work. 
Furthermore, the government emphasizes how the new scheme gives freedom of 
choice and that gender equality does not mean that everyone must make the same 
choices. As in the debate following the non-successful proposal to introduce 
kontantstøtte in 1996, the conflict between benefits in kind and cash is prominent. It is 
also important to say that the advocates of the cash-for-care scheme still pursue the 
goal of full childcare coverage. Anyway, this shows that the critique later levelled 
against Norway from the OECD was not first raised by this organization.  
In the main parliamentary debate on the introduction (St.tid.1996-1997a) and 
the recommendation from the Committee on Family and Cultural Affairs (Innst.S.nr. 
200), there are extensive references to Finland and its experience. Out of 40 speakers 
in the debate, eight emphasize different sides of the Finnish Hemvårdsstöd. Some 
references are factual, e.g. the mentioning of how the family committee visited Finland 
(and Sweden) to learn about its cash-for-care models and childcare (St.tid. 1997-1998: 
3437, MP Aarrestad, SP) or how Finland served as a model for the Norwegian scheme 
(Innst.S.nr. 200). However, most speakers use the Finnish experience to justify or 
criticize the scheme. Typically, opponents underline how the Finnish scheme is 
supposedly better because Finland combines it with a legal right to a place in a public 
childcare facility and lower parental contributions for childcare institutions, two 
important features that the defenders of the Norwegian cash-for-care benefit were 
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unwilling to introduce. While positive about these Finnish arrangements, opponents 
still criticize the Hemvårdsstöd for resulting in reduced female employment and the 
maintenance of traditional sex roles. Advocates take Finnish developments as proof 
that the negative developments that critics´ expected in Norway will not materialise as 
the projected withdrawal from the labour market in Finland has not been as radical as 
opponents feared.  
In 2002 (the third phase), the Labour government evaluated the cash-for-care 
benefit (St.meld nr. 43 2000-2001). In the debate following the government’s report to 
the Storting, only one reference is made to how “international experiences” allegedly 
show that active public policy is needed to achieve quality in care, shared parenting 
and reconciliation of work and family life, and that the cash-for-care scheme, in the 
view of the government, is not consistent with this goal (St.tid 2001-2002a: 2340, MP 
Trond Giske, DNA). A more or less identical reference is made in the report itself 
(St.meld nr. 43 (2000-2001): 44). There are no comments about feedback from 
international actors. This is after the benefit had been criticized heavily by the OECD 
several times in their Economic Surveys as well as in Starting Strong I and as such 
surprising. The report does not include the OECD comments, nor is the EU ever 
mentioned in the argumentation for or against the benefit.182 
The fourth phase is when the current government chose to reduce the cash-for-care 
benefit by a month and decrease the monthly amount. In this phase I find no comments 
on international advice or critique to credit or discredit the cash-for-care benefit. 
Although the advocates of the scheme opposed this change, it does not seem to have 
caused a huge debate (St.tid 2005-2006), perhaps because the change is essentially too 
small. Should the government, as discussed in its government declaration from 2005, 
abolish or reform the scheme more fundamentally, it is likely to result in harsh 
debates. 
                                                 
182 The only time EU and/or EEA is mentioned is regarding the question of whether foreign workers´ children 
living outside Norway have a right to kontantstøttte or not. In early reports this question is not clarified (e.g. 
Innst. S. Nr. 94 2001-2002: 2). In the end, however, this right also included this group. Today, children of for 
instance construction workers from new EU members working in Norway have a legal right to the cash-for-care 
benefit (see www.nav.no for more information). On this issue we seem to witness a development in the 
understanding of how the EEA Agreement also has consequences for national welfare schemes. Another 
example of how the EEA agreement has such consequences is the right to receive child benefit Cf. also Leibfried 
and Pierson (1995: 55). 
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Overall, the analysis shows that references to IOs are absent while “international 
experiences”, most prominently developments in Finland, are used to a considerable 
extent. There may be different explanations for the non-use of IOs in debates. As 
Berven (2005) suggests, it could be too early and IOs may simply not be regarded 
relevant at the time of the debates. The use of and references to IOs is probably more 
likely the longer international advice has been issued and within family policy this is 
still rather new. The analysis suggests that politicians, probably with some 
justification, consider Norway to be a forerunner in terms of gender equality and 
provision of family policy arrangements (e.g. Norwegian interview 7).183 As such, it is 
natural that they frame the debate as an ideological left-right conflict rather than a 
“compliance with international standards” debate. Contrary to what my first 
assumption says, one could also ask whether referring to IOs as a way of strengthening 
one’s argument would be useful for Norwegian politicians in a domestic welfare 
context. Neither the EU nor the OECD is known to have much social policy, so it is 
questionable whether actors would improve their position among Norwegian voters by 
quoting organizations often considered to be neo-liberal or even anti-welfare (Deacon 
2007). And governments divided in the issue of European integration and future 
membership, as the current government is, are probably less likely to refer to the EU 
(Hay and Rosamond 2002). Here it may be relevant to repeat that opponents of the 
cash-for-care benefit were on the political left wing, i.e. parties usually not expected to 
defend what many consider neo-liberal IOs. This indicates the multidimensionality of 
these family policies. Moreover, while the childcare issue has been treated in several 
specific reviews with later publications, the cash-for-care scheme has mainly been 
criticized through the Economic Surveys. Although the Economic Surveys are more 
authoritative, it may be that family policy related criticism “drown” in a survey 
focussing mostly on economics. And, as in Germany, interviews show that bureaucrats 
are more familiar with the reviews and advice by international actors than politicians 
(Norwegian interview 6, 7 and 9). 
                                                 
183 Other sources which underline this are the debates on gender equality. There exists at least two such debates: 
(Barne- og familieministerens redegjørelse om likestillingspolitikk i 1997 and 1999). The following quote from 
another debate says the same; “(…) other countries practically flock to Norway to see and learn what we have 
done within gender equality” (Espen Johnsen, DNA, St.tid. 2007-2008: 1380). 
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If the current government’s policy of reducing the cash-for-care benefit is not 
thought to be a result of international critique, can the introduction of the benefit itself 
ten years ago be seen as a result of learning from foreign experiences? More research 
is needed to decide conclusively on these issues of how Finland and Norway may have 
learned from each other, and that would be beyond the scope of this analysis. I may at 
least conclude that if there was any foreign influence on the introduction of, and later 
changes in, the Norwegian cash-for-care benefit, it was the result of bilateral 
connections, not advice from IOs.  
 
8.3.2 Childcare 
 
An analysis of the childcare issues could take many phases for its point of departure. 
Full coverage has been a goal across party lines for years, perhaps with the exception 
of the Progress Party (FrP) (Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen 2007b: 176). The years 
2000, 2003, 2005 and 2007 have all been pointed out as the year when this goal was to 
be met. Former Minister of Education and Research, Øystein Djupedal, calls the full 
coverage aim the oldest political promise in Norway (St.tid. 2006-2007: 1384). The 
difference between the parties is more on the means used for achieving this goal and 
what should be prioritised: full coverage first and then price reduction or both at the 
same time. This high degree of political consensus within childcare, e.g. the wish to 
reduce parental payment and increase the numbers of pedagogically educated 
personnel, might be one reason why the OECD (as I will show) is not used much to 
justify critique of governments or reform proposals. There is no need to convince the 
opposition, or the public for that matter, which in opinion polls stress the need for 
more childcare, when all are agree upon the aims. Moreover, while the OECD is very 
critical towards the cash-for-care benefit, it is mainly positive towards Norwegian 
childcare institutions. However, there are still possible entry points where politicians 
could gather legitimacy from international sources to argue for a specific view. 
Since the focus on childcare has been such an important political issue over a 
long period, I analyze documents from 1999 onwards, not only those from around the 
recent extension from 2005 presented in section 8.2. This encompasses the period 
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following the first OECD study on childcare (ECEC launched in 1998) and allows me 
to see whether international recommendations are known, used in debates, and taken 
into consideration when policy makers develop policy. Moreover, this period includes 
some of the most important reforms on childcare. According to a report to the Storting, 
the implementation of the settlement on childcare (barnehageforliket) from 2003, 
which aims at creating more and cheaper childcare places, is the most comprehensive 
reform within childcare ever in Norway (St.Meld. nr. 28: 5). 
 The practice appears to be that when preparing official studies, regulations, 
propositions and reports to the Storting, the ministry includes an overview of possible 
international obligations, and foreign law and international experiences that could be 
relevant for the Norwegian law. Interviewed bureaucrats confirm this assessment 
(Norwegian interview 5 and 6). One example of this is the Daycare Institutions Act 
(Ot.prp. nr. 72 (2004-2005): Om lov om barnehager),184 which has a section over three 
pages providing an overview of childcare practices in the EU and in OECD countries, 
as well as advice in reports from the OECD, the Council of Europe, the UN, and 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The bill says that there have been several working 
groups in the EU on the issues of childcare,185 but that Norway has not taken part in 
their discussions. The goals identified by the EU are briefly mentioned (Barcelona 
targets), showing an awareness of what is going on in this field in the EU; however 
later discussions in the bill are not related to EU developments. Interviewed officials 
confirm that Norway reports to the EU on indicators such as childcare coverage 
(Norwegian interview 6). Actions by the OECD, however, are given both more space 
and closer consideration in the bill. The OECD´s Thematic Review of Early Childhood 
Education and Care Policy is described and its view on Norwegian policy is 
presented. The bill mentions later national reforms, implicitly saying that Norway has 
now improved some of the areas criticized by the OECD earlier, for instance reduction 
of parental fees, increase in the number of available places, and initiation of more 
research on childcare (Ot.prp. nr. 72 (2004-2005): 20). The OECD criticism of 
Norway for having too few pedagogues in childcare institutions is the single point 
                                                 
184 Ot.prp. nr. 76 (2002-2003): Om lov om endringer i lov 5. mai 1995 nr. 19 om barnehager (The changes in the 
Daycare Institutions Act) constitutes a similar example. 
185 On the European Commission Childcare Network, see Leira (2002).  
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most discussed, and in several parts of the bill this criticism is the point of departure 
for the discussion: 
 
“The report calls attention to how Norway has a substantially lower number of pedagogues 
than countries which are natural to compare with. In Sweden, Denmark and Finland two thirds 
of the employees are educated pedagogues whereas the corresponding number in Norway is 
about one third (Early Childhood Education and Care in Norway, Country Note, OECD 
1999)” (Ot.prp. nr. 72 (2004-2005): 98). 
 
All in all, the bill pays close attention to comments by international actors such as the 
OECD, the Council of Europe and the UN, as well as to some characteristics of 
neighbouring countries´ childcare policies. The same can be said about a committee 
appointed by the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs to discuss quality in 
childcare institutions as a way of helping the ministry in preparing the bill (BFD 
2005). The committee report includes a chapter on international obligations and 
recommendations, presenting the views of international actors such as the UN, EU, 
OECD and Council of Europe. This as well as characteristics of Swedish, Danish and 
Finnish family policy are used extensively throughout the report. The experts argue 
that 
 
“International regulations and recommendations must be taken into consideration in 
Norwegian childcare policy. (…) the education-political trends we witness in the EU, OECD 
and in Europe, must have consequences for our childcare policy and our control of and 
attention to the childcare sector” (BFD 2005: 22). 
 
Such international advice has clearly both served as a point of departure and guided 
the work of the committee. However, when discussed by the Parliamentary Committee 
on Family Affairs, references to the UN and other Nordic countries are most common. 
And although the plenary discussion on the bill (St.tid. 2004-2005a) discussed the 
issues in the written documents, there were no references to the OECD and few to 
international experiences at all. 
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 Thus Norwegian politicians make fewer references to reports from international 
actors than do researchers and ministry officials writing preparatory documents for the 
MPs. This finding is not surprising since the latter need to be updated on international 
developments as part of their work. The finding is also in line with my findings from 
Germany (chapter 7) and for the debates on the cash-for-care benefit. Another 
difference between politicians and the bureaucrats and experts is that the former refer 
more often to the UN and less to expert organizations like the OECD. The UN enjoys 
an exceptionally high standing in Norway; nobody seems willing to question its 
decisions or recommendations (Østerud 2007).  
For other policy documents, it varies even more. In the Reports to the Storting 
(St.meld/White Paper), the difference in number of references to and discussion of 
OECD studies is striking. Of the five White Papers on childcare issues between 1999 
and 2007, two do not refer to the OECD or other international experiences at all 
(St.meld. nr 28 2003-2004, St.meld. nr. 28 2004-2005b). The one from 2003 (St.meld. 
nr. 24 2002-2003) has some references, but they are only gathered in one short section, 
while the two from 1999 and 2006 (St.meld. nr. 27 1999-2000, St.meld. nr. 16 2006-
2007) have a number or at least use the OECD reviews throughout the report. The 
following excerpt illustrates how OECD reviews are used actively in the 2006 report:  
 
“Norway and the other Nordic countries are reviewed positively by OECD experts. (…) 
However, in the opinion of the OECD, Norway has high parental fees, no age groups are 
entitled to free places, many still have no childcare place, the proportion of trained teachers is 
low and there is little long term research (OECD 1999). Furthermore, it is presumed that the 
Christian objects clause could be a challenge for children with a different religious 
background. Since 1999 many more children have received a childcare place, the 
municipalities are obliged to provide childcare places, the parental fee is reduced with the 
maximal price, and research is strengthened. Moreover, the objects clauses of the Day Care 
Institutions Act and Education Act are being evaluated by the Bostadutvalg (Bostad-
commission, my addition). Norway and other Nordic countries are also reviewed positively in 
the OECD-report Starting Strong II (OECD 2006d). At the same time it is commented that 
Norway is the only Nordic country without a legal right to childcare places” (St.meld. nr. 16 
2006-2007: 19, my translation). 
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As the report, from which the excerpt is taken, is about lifelong learning, it focuses a 
lot on OECD comments on education and tests such as PISA. Still, the childcare 
reports are also discussed intensively. 
The specific themes of White Papers cannot be the reason for this uneven 
variation in references to international experiences. All the reports deal with childcare 
issues that the OECD has criticized, so there should be no reason for not relating a 
presentation of Norwegian childcare policy to the OECD. One difference that may be 
significant is that the two reports taking the most direct issue with the OECD studies 
are the ones published in the same years as the OECD reports. The country note on 
Norway was published in 1999, and the final report from the Starting Strong project in 
2006. Recent studies probably have greater chances of being used by national actors 
than older ones. A press release from 2006 on the Starting Strong II report is indicative 
of this (KD 2006b). It is entitled: “OECD-review commends Norwegian childcare 
policy”. Lisbet Rugtvedt, state secretary in the Ministry of Education and Research, is 
quoted saying: “This shows that our childcare promise emphasizing full coverage and 
quality in kindergartens is right. There are still challenges, but it is reassuring to see 
that Norway is in the lead within childcare” (KD 2006b, see also KD 2006a). 
 The same pattern is evident for the parliamentary debates accompanying the 
five White Papers just mentioned. Politicians in the meetings in June 2000 (St.tid. 
1999-2000, discussing St.meld. nr. 27 1999-2000) and April 2007 (St.tid. 2006-2007a, 
discussing St.meld. nr. 16 2006-2007) refer much to the OECD, experiences from 
other Nordic countries, and other international experiences. In the debates 
accompanying the three other reports (St.tid. 2002-2003, St.tid. 2003-2004, St.tid. 
2004-2005b), there are no OECD references, although they also deal with issues that 
the OECD has criticized; coverage and parental fees for childcare places. These last 
three debates include some references to Sweden, a country whith a maximum limit on 
parental contributions.186 
                                                 
186 I have not extensively analyzed ordinary debates on budgets. However, a first impression is that there are not 
many MPs who refer to the policy advice from IOs or individual countries. There could be a trend where there is 
a growing use of this from none in 2000 (St.tid. 2000-2001b) to almost half of the speakers in 2007 (St.tid. 2007-
2008), but I cannot conclude with certainty. As an example, in the debate on 12.12.2007, Minister of Education, 
Bård Vegar Solhjell, confirms that he to pays great attention to foreign experiences when drawing conclusions 
on childcare issues (St.tid. 2007-2008: 1383). 
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Foreign experiences appear used particularly in two situations. First, as 
discussed, bills have a section on international issues. Second, MPs suggesting new 
policies often refer to experiences which other countries have had after having 
introduced policies of the kind the MP is proposing in Norway. The following 
statement by Øystein Djupedal, Socialist Left Party, is illustrative: 
 
“The maximum price is inspired by a similar arrangement in Sweden, which has been an 
outstanding success. Here all Swedish parents and parties take a positive attitude towards the 
maximum price and would not think of removing it. Our hope and belief is that using a 
maximum price in a couple of years will be just as obvious in Norway as it is in Sweden 
today, simply because this is the only guarantee that parents profit from our efforts” (St.tid. 
2002-2003: 3277). 
 
In debates on proposals for reducing the price level by introducing a maximum price, 
proposed for instance by the Socialist Left Party (St.tid. 2000-2001a) and by this party 
together with the Progress party (St.tid. 2001-2002b), the use of foreign models is very 
evident. Four out of six and six out of 17 MPs refer to the Swedish arrangement, using 
their experiences as an argument either in favour of or against the introduction of a 
Norwegian equivalent. Documents connected to these debates, e.g. the treatment of the 
proposal in the Parliamentary committee on family affairs (Innst. S. nr. 238), also refer 
to Sweden. Here the government also says directly that it is looking at the solutions in 
the Nordic countries on how to reduce parental contributions.187  
 
8.4 Norway as exporter of family policy ideas 
 
An interesting finding in chapter 7 is that Norway is barely mentioned or studied 
directly by Germany in their justification for reforms, even though Norwegian family 
policy is similar to Sweden’s. Norway should be particularly interesting for Germany 
                                                 
187 Another concrete example of how individual countries´ arrangements are used to argue for the need for an 
equivalent Norwegian reform, is the proposal from MP May-Helen Molvær Grimstad from 8. June 2006 (St.tid. 
2005-2006: 2572). The MP from the Christian Peoples Party wants Norway to take inspiration from the Swedish 
snabbhetspremie, which makes sure that women giving birth to child number two shortly after the first one, will 
still receive parental leave allowance as if they had been working inbetween. Her proposal was not adopted. 
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since Norway´s family policy does not conform to only one model, but combines 
pieces from different models, both “conservative” and more “social democratic” 
characteristics. Ellingsæter (2003) refers to this as a dualistic family policy or a hybrid 
family policy model (see also Leira 1998, Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen 2007b, Skevik 
2004). The cash-for-care benefit in Norway has been surrounded by arguments of 
“free choice” for parents. As Morel argue, this rhetoric “fits well with this principle of 
subsidiarity” (2007: 621), a main characteristic of a Bismarckian welfare state like 
Germany. German interviewees refer often to Scandinavian or Nordic experiences and 
sometimes to Norway (German interviews 2 and 3), but when being country specific, 
Sweden is most often mentioned. This could lead to the assumption that Norway has 
little influence on development of policy elsewhere and that Norway is not a core 
teacher or export country. One explanation could be that Norway does not participate 
to the same extent as Member States in EU social policy discussions (assumption 3). 
Another reason could be that many books and studies take the EU as their point of 
departure. Non-Members like Norway are thus more seldomly described and analyzed 
than Sweden, Denmark and Finland. However, this picture is not complete and the 
following analysis does not confirm such an interpretation.  
Interviewed representatives from the Ministry of Children and Equality speak of 
an enormous interest for Norwegian family policy and that “(…) all countries wish to 
learn from Nordic countries, particularly Norway, which was the first to introduce a 
father’s quota” (Norwegian interview 5). A booklet giving an overview on the rights of 
parents of small children in Norway is presented as the biggest export article of the 
ministry – and of Norway. The ministry reports many visits from foreign groups which 
want to learn more about the Norwegian model, at least 20 high level delegations each 
year in addition to the invitations to Norway to visit the same or other countries (Hole 
2007). While this picture relies on information from actors who have an interest in 
presenting their work as important, it illustrates that Norwegian experiences are 
considered valauble by other countries. In the following, I focus on German initiatives 
since this country is of particular relevance for my study.  
The latest example of contact between Norwegian and German authorities 
within family policy is the conference in October 2007 on the economic benefits of 
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equality and family policy.188 The conference was organized together with the German 
Ministry of Family Affairs and took place in Berlin. The focus of the conference was 
how the two countries could learn from each other and promote the “win-win-strategy” 
of economic growth and better terms for families. The conference gathered high level 
politicians and bureaucrats from both countries. Arni Hole, Director General in the 
Ministry of Children and Equality, who also spoke at the conference, is quoted in a 
newspaper interview saying that “Germany wishes to adopt our vision; redistribution 
of work, care and power between the sexes” (Aftenposten 13.10.2007). 
In June 2005 Norway hosted a visit from the German president and his 
delegation.189 Exchange of experiences and to learn about reconciliation of work and 
family life was the purpose of the visit. Norwegian family policies such as the parental 
leave scheme, the father’s quota, the cash-for-care benefit, childcare centres, gender 
equality policies, and new legislation on gender in boards, were among the topics 
being discussed. Challenges, such as a high level of part time work among Norwegian 
women and the highly gender segregated labour market, were also debated. One 
central goal seems to have been to describe the benefits of the Norwegian policies in 
terms of higher birth and female employment rates as well as economic productivity. 
The year after another German delegation visited Norway to inform themselves about 
Norwegian family policies (Gerhardsen 2006). The delegation, consisting not only of 
MPs from different political parties, but also representatives of the Family Ministry 
and the Chancellor's Office, had meetings with the Equality and Anti-discrimination 
Ombud, the Family Committee of the Storting and the Norwegian Family Ministry. 
Other examples of the interest in Norwegian family policies from German 
family policy actors are the contributions by Norwegian officials in meeting initiated 
by non governmental organizations. At the request of the Association of Catholic 
Families (Familienbund der Katholiken), Merete Wilhelmsen, Minister Counsellor at 
the embassy in Berlin, held a more informal speech at a seminar on cash-for-care 
benefits. The speech gave an overview of Norwegian experiences and was later printed 
                                                 
188 ”Bedriftsøkonomisk suksess med likestillings- og familiepolitikken”/ ”Frauenförderung + 
Familienfreundlichkeit = Firmenerfolg”. 
189 With assistance from some of my interviewees I have gained access to documents produced in connection 
with this visit.  
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in their newsletter (Stimme der Familie).190 A similar meeting was organized by the 
Willy-Brandt Foundation in Berlin in 2004, where, among others, the Norwegian 
Family Minister of that time, Laila Dåvøy, gave a speech on how “gender equality 
brings more children – future with job and family”.  
 What kind of exchange of experiences and learning is this suggesting? Is it 
rational and purposeful or incidental? Is it open or tactical? One could ask whether we 
witness a search for the best policy options offered by other actors (rational problem-
solving) or more incidental as it can be when solutions wait for problems (Cohen, 
March and Olsen 1972, Kingdon 1995). I would argue that this looks like rational 
learning in the sense that the amount of information gathered by German actors is 
comprehensive, it is collected by different actors, and takes place over time. At the 
same time it does not seem to be used directly in argumentation for the need for 
reforms, but more as background information in Germany. Knowing that German 
policy makers informed themselves so much on Norwegian family policies, but as 
shown in the previous chapter, ultimately introduced a parental leave scheme more 
similar to the Swedish system, one could perhaps conclude that Swedish experiences 
were explicitly used while Norwegian experiences contributed to the direction. 
The discussion above is meant to offer examples of how Norway has exported 
family policy ideas to Germany. Irrespectively of how important Norwegian lessons 
have been to Germany, it is interesting per se that the Ministry uses terms such as 
“export” specifically, e.g. in press releases or information at the Ministry webpage; 
“gender equality as export article” (BLD 2007a). Having established in earlier chapters 
that Germany has adopted a Scandinavian kind of family policy, I have considered it 
particularly interesting to depict efforts to export policy ideas to this country. 
However, many other examples could be mentioned of how Norway is trying to “sell” 
its policy to other countries, not only in Europe, but Asia and Africa alike. By 
conferring the web pages of the Ministry of Children end Equality one can get a quick 
overview of the most recent activities. Ministry officials have spoken on family policy 
in individual countries all over the world, in meetings of the UN, Council of Europe, 
                                                 
190 Über Norwegische Erfahrungen mit dem Betruungsgeld. Familienbund der Katholiken. Berlin 11. September 
2007. See also webpage www.familienbund.org: Familiebund der Katholiken (2007): Stimme der Familie, 54. 
Jahrgang, Heft 5-6/2007. 
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Nordic Council and EU, to name but a few organizations. One way of illustrating this 
could be to describe some of these contacts in more detail. However, a perhaps better 
way of doing this is to have a look at the strategy on Europe (“Europa-strategi”) 
developed by the Ministry of Children and Equality (BLD 2007b, only available in 
Norwegian). This policy document describes the aims, means and reasons for the 
Ministry’s involvement in European processes within family and gender equality 
policies.  
 First of all, it is made explicitly clear that the Ministry has an ambition of 
shaping the agenda and policies of the EU-countries (BLD 2007b: 3). The strategy 
document regards Norwegian policies on reconciliation of work and family life and 
gender equality to be products in demand which can be exported to the EU (BLD 
2007b: 6). An overview of existing policies in the EU is given and it is said that some 
of the gender equality directives have made Norway change its policies as well, but 
generally Norway is depicted as a forerunner. EU-programmes and working methods 
are presented and it is emphasized how Norway must become part of these processes, 
to as large a degree as the EEA-agreement allows. The following quote sums up how 
interesting the Ministry thinks Norwegian policies are for the EU and how Norway can 
benefit from stronger cooperation:  
 
“In general, it is an interesting characteristic of the development that the EU seeks good 
practice for the establishment of a sustainable “European welfare state” which at the same 
time ensures competitiveness and where the combination of high employment, social security 
and high fertility is possible. The Nordic countries stand out positively. Norway is an 
interesting case and a potential conversation partner for policy development. This has allowed 
the minister to participate in the political debate during the informal ministerial meetings with 
colleagues from member countries, applicant countries and EFTA/EEA countries. The debate 
is interesting and useful in itself, but at the same time it gives good profiling and good 
reputation for Norway as a country leading the way. Speaking from experience; the better 
prepared, the better results in terms of being able to ensure that our interests are taken 
seriously, gain influence for our ideas, establish new connections and collaborators, be 
consulted later in the process and regarding future participation in EU informal ministerial 
meetings” (BLD: 2007b: 23).191 
                                                 
191 There are a couple of ambiguities in the original source, see translated quote in the appendix. 
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It could also be mentioned that as part of the Norwegian government’s strategy on 
Germany (UD 2007b) one wish to further develop the collaboration on family and 
gender equality policies. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD) has also 
initiated a Norwegian Public Diplomacy Forum (“Omdømmeforum”) that “is a 
concrete follow-up on the strategies for enhancing Norway’s image abroad”. 
According to the ministry’s webpage; 
 
”A good reputation is important for a country, and can create ripple effects that have 
consequences for everything from trade and tourism to investment and influence. A good 
reputation will enhance our chances of attracting tourists to Norway, improving Norwegian 
companies’ market access, gaining acceptance for our political views and presenting 
Norwegian culture” (UD 2007c). 
 
I will not follow this thread any further. The point is simply that there is a clear 
conception among the authorities that a positive image increases Norwegian influence 
and that export of family policy ideas is one way of strengthening Norway’s image.192  
Relating the discussion of Norway’s role as an exporter of family policies to the 
advice of the EU and OECD sheds light on the influence of international organizations 
in an interesting way. Germany is planning to introduce a cash-for-care scheme within 
2013 against OECD-advice. This shows that even direct and crystal clear advice of the 
OECD not to introduce a certain allowance is ignored. Instead, it might illustrate how 
policy is shaped when developed as a compromise between political parties. The 
German coalition government decides to pass reforms on childcare, parental leave and 
cash-for-care almost at the same time, by researchers seen as contradictory. Sweden is 
doing a similar thing by introducing a kontantstøtte many fear will lead to a stronger 
traditional division of work between men and women and at the same time a gender 
equality bonus (tax benefit) to make parents share the parental leave period more 
equally. A very rational reason may explain this seemingly contradictory and 
paradoxical policy development; the effort to satisfy both parties to the right and left. 
                                                 
192 Cf. Marcussen (2002: 212-213) for a short discussion on how Denmark also wishes to be seen as a forerunner 
and model to others in order to gain general influence. 
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This interpretation is supported by newspaper articles (e.g. FAZ 2007b).193 In Norway, 
whether the state should support a dual earner or the more traditional one-income 
family model has been a cleavage for many decades as a left-right disagreement (Bay 
1988, Håland 2001). And the disadvantages of introducing a cash-for-care benefit are 
definitely known among German policy makers. As shown in chapter 7, Norwegian 
experiences were referred to in the debates on the introduction of the scheme in 
Germany. Interviewed Norwegian Ministry officials also confirm that information 
about this welfare arrangement has been conveyed through mutual seminars and study 
visits in Oslo and Berlin (Norwegian interview 5). The German press has also 
discussed the Norwegian benefit, e.g. Tagesspiegel (2007a), concluding that mainly 
immigrants and low-income families use this benefit and that it has negative effects for 
gender equality.  
Admittedly, as stated in section 8.1 on international family policy advice, the EU is 
different from the OECD and names the Finnish cash-for-care benefit best practice. 
The EU may in this instance be equated with Germany; the whole European Alliance 
for the Family was invented during their Presidency and this leads to the question of 
whether the German family minister here may have tried to have the EU make way for 
another German reform. In the words of one high level EU bureaucrat on Germany’s 
actions during its presidency in the first half of 2007; “(…), we have a very activist 
Germany who wants to benefit from the European debate in order to also encourage 
change in its own constituencies” (EU interview 1). However, as established in the 
previous chapter, the family ministry originally opposed this scheme and can thus 
hardly be accused of up loading national policy priorities to the EU.  
Overall, although data is patchy, the German study trips, the Norwegian 
contributions in meetings and conferences around the world including the EU, the 
presentation of Norway in the OECD Babies and Bosses series (volume 5) and EU 
studies as examples to follow and interviews and analysis of Norwegian policy 
documents, make assumption three seem less plausible. Not being a member of the EU 
does not decouple Norway totally from EU learning arenas and still allows this 
                                                 
193 „Angela Merkel tries to calm critics to her left and right by giving something to all: Yes to extension of day-
care. Yes to a legal right for a day-care place. Yes to a cash-for-care benefit for families preferring to raise their 
children at home. Stop nagging – there is enough for all, is the slogan“ (FAZ 2007b, my translation). 
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country to serve as an example to follow. Asked directly about this, one 
knowledgeable respondent confirmed that this is more in line with her understanding 
(Norwegian interview 5). From this analysis it seems clear that Norway is an important 
“teacher” to other countries. This might indicate that EU and OECD are still too weak 
to be real mediators within family policy. Individual countries such as Germany are 
aware of and still go directly to well known countries representing best practice more 
than to organizations.  
 
8.5 Import and export of cross border ideas 
 
What does an analysis of recent reforms and Norwegian efforts to export its policy 
lessons tell us about the importance of the OECD and the EU for national policy – 
making in Norway? Although interviewed bureaucrats and politicians confirm that 
they are aware of the policies of international actors, they do not describe them as 
influencing Norwegian family policy (Norwegian interview 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). For 
the EU, MPs say that they use the good arguments they find (Norwegian interview 4). 
This means that EU reports are sometimes drawn upon to support an argument, and 
that IOs are used to confirm ideas already present among policy makers. However, 
interviewees strongly emphasize how the international aspect is always considered; 
“Regardless of what we are working on, we have an eye to international law, all 
conventions, legislation of Nordic countries, EU directives and other countries´ 
practice” (Norwegian interview 5). 
All political parties make use of international advice, critique and experience to 
justify and legitimize their own view. The government sometimes cites the OECD in 
support of their own policy. For instance, Former Minister of Education and Research, 
Øystein Djupedal, emphasizes the OECD´s positive evaluation of Norwegian childcare 
policy. He does not mention, though, that the OECD has been critical of some of the 
weaknesses criticized also by Norwegian opposition parties, e.g. lack of educated 
personnel (St.tid. 2006-2007b: 1384). Instead, he merely says that the government will 
focus on the qualifications of those working within childcare. Perhaps somewhat 
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surprising, no MPs from opposition parties refer to OECD reports when criticising the 
government for the lack of skilled persons in public childcare institutions.  
Furthermore, I have been unable to find any instances where politicians 
question the reviews of, critique of and advice on Norwegian family policy made by 
international actors.194 In the scholarly literature, international bodies are sometimes 
criticized for having an instrumental and economic approach to family policy (e.g. 
Lister 2006, Mahon 2006), something with which national politicians could have taken 
issue. But as said above, representatives of all political parties rely on the OECD, as 
well as other international sources. In St.meld. nr. 16 (2006-2007), the Norwegian 
Government’s White Paper on early intervention for lifelong learning, the government 
accepted all challenges that the OECD identified. How the government is working to 
address these challenges is also presented. These challenges are treated one by one in 
chapter 6 of the report and the solutions are in line with OECD suggestions.195 
However, as discussed in the chapter on OECD, this organization to a large extent 
relies on background reports written by the reviewed countries when issuing 
recommendations.  
 It is difficult to give a clear account of the extent to which international advice, 
critiques, and experiences are used in Norwegian family policy-making. Counting the 
numbers of references in a debate, for instance, does not really capture the importance 
that international relations have played. How should one count? Should one compare 
the numbers of speakers referring to such sources with the number of speakers not 
referring to them as I have done several times in this chapter and in the one on 
Germany?196 Or could the number of references perhaps be compared with the number 
                                                 
194 There are probably some examples of this in other fields, e.g. the OECD advice to cut the benefit levels for 
sick and disabled and the wish to introduce tuition fees in institutions of higher education. See for instance 
St.meld. nr. 16 (2006-2007): 89. However, the role as an ideational authority could be exemplified by reference 
to the PISA-study. While the disappointing results for Norwegian pupils have been heavily discussed, few have 
questioned the study in itself (Lindbekk 2008, Christie 2008). In this way IOs may help reformers step over the 
discussion on whether reform is needed and start discussing how and when questions instead. 
195 A power point presentation by a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Education and Research from 26.9.2008, gained 
access to through an interview, supports this. Here the challenges identified by the OECD are presented together 
with the government’s plans. The consistency is almost 100 percent.  
196 One example of this would be Nedergaard´s (2006) study of learning processes in the EU and Nordic Council 
of Ministers where he awards each country one point each time it is mentioned as a tutor by respondents filling 
out a questionnaire. Although I recognize that problems of interpretation are less critical when points are 
assigned on the basis of written, specific questions on which countries have been most important tutors, I find it 
unfortunate that Nedergaard does not discuss possible challenges when drawing conclusions based on such 
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of references to more national sources, such as commissioned studies or independent 
research?197 To quantify in this way would give only a limited picture, as frequency is 
not the same as significance (Scott 1990: 32). I have thus reported this kind of figures 
a few times only to give the reader an impression of what I mean when saying that 
international experiences are used a lot or a little in a certain report or debate.  
It is even more difficult to find proof of actual influence on policy-making. 
While developments in the EU and OECD, as well as their critique and praise, are well 
known, they do not seem to have had a big impact on actual policy. When asked which 
organizations have had influence, politicians mention the Nordic cooperation through 
the Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) and the Council of 
Europe (Norwegian interview 4, 7, 8). These organizations were especially important 
in the early developments of Norwegian family policy in the 1970s and onwards, i.e. 
long before the recent reforms of the cash-for-care benefit and full childcare-coverage 
that I focus on. However, as interviewees refer to these organizations as influential, I 
will now present them briefly. 
Nordic cooperation enjoys great support among the electorate. Norwegians will 
probably have a positive attitude towards experiences drawn from neighbouring 
countries. This might partly explain the more extensive reference in debates and 
documents to Sweden, Denmark and Finland than to international organizations. But 
there can be no doubt that Norway has always been truly inspired by neighbour 
countries. According to one interviewee, Norway has copied Swedish arrangements 
since the 1970s. It was very customary and marketable at that time to refer to Sweden 
and its policies and experiences (Norwegian interview 4), and my analysis of 
documents and parliamentary debates shows that the trends continue. These references 
to Sweden are not surprising, as Norway has learnt a lot from Sweden within other 
social policy fields (Ervik forthcoming 2009, Haavet 1999a, Kuhnle 1978, 1996, 
Pedersen 2004, Stjernø 2005).  
                                                                                                                                                        
numbers, although he admittedly mentions that one could learn from multiple countries (2006: 429). I argue that 
being mentioned most times in a parliamentary debate at least is no final evidence of being the most central 
tutor. Bleses, Offe and Peter (1997) is another example of a study counting and classifying arguments. 
197 Lundqvist (2007) provides an example of a study of the role of knowledge and ideas introduced through 
national expert commissions in development of national family policy. She concludes that such commissions 
played a crucial role for the shaping of Swedish family policy, a role much more important than the OECD and 
EU may be said to play in the Norwegian context.  
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Nordic cooperation has a long history.198 The Nordic Council is a forum for 
Nordic parliamentary cooperation, in which MPs from the five Nordic countries and 
three autonomous areas (the Faroe Islands, Greenland, the Åland Islands) have met 
regularly since 1952. Twenty Norwegian MPs are members of this inter-parliamentary 
body. In all, 87 representatives, reflecting the political composition of their national 
parliaments, work together in cross-border party groups, with meetings five times a 
year. The Council has five committees, also meeting five times a year, and some of 
them deal with family affairs. The Nordic Council of Ministers has been the 
correspondent body for governmental cooperation since 1972. In reality, it consists of 
several individual councils of ministers, responsible for instance for gender equality 
and social affairs, who usually meet twice a year. All decisions must be unanimous. Its 
working mode is partly similar to that of the OMC in the EU; it focuses primarily on 
the exchange of best practice and learning without sanctions (see also Nedergaard 
2006). The Nordic Council initiates a lot of research on family policy and gender 
equity issues, and has for instance funded projects on fertility and reconciliation of 
work and family life.199  
The Council of Europe200 is organized partly like the Nordic cooperation. It has 
a Committee of Ministers, which is the decision-making body, and a Parliamentary 
Assembly with 636 representatives from 47 national parliaments. There are ten 
committees (each MP is member of one), e.g. on Social, Health and Family Affairs 
and on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men. Like the Nordic Council, the MPs 
reflect the political composition of their national parliaments. Norway has 10 
members, five representatives and five substitutes. Also similar to the Nordic mode of 
cooperation, the Council of Europe has cross-border party groups for the MPs.  
Both the Nordic Council and the Council of Europe are organizations in which 
MPs meet, while the OECD is more of an expert organization. This difference might 
influence politicians when asked about which organizations play a role in Norwegian 
family policy development. Naturally, they may both remember and know better when 
                                                 
198 This presentation is based on information available on the website of the Nordic Council/Nordic Council of 
Ministers; http://www.norden.org. For an academic approach, see e.g. Petersen (2006) or Solem (1977). 
199 See Carlsen (1998) for an example of the role of the Nordic Council as mediator and forum for discussion. 
200 This presentation is based on information available on the website of the Council of Europe; www.coe.int See 
Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs (1997: 82-84) for a short scholarly introduction to this organization.  
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ideas are transmitted across borders through these forums. One interviewed politician 
says that since Nordic countries are so similar, it is easy to exchange experiences. The 
benefit of the Nordic Council, according to the same interviewee, is that one is brought 
up to date on knowledge and expertise; “We update each other at every meeting of the 
Nordic Council, on what is going on in the different countries. Of course, this 
influences us” (Norwegian interview 8). In this politician’s opinion, the Nordic 
Council has a much larger impact on Norwegian discussion and development of family 
policy than the EU and OECD. While this assessment might describe historical 
development of social policy particularly well, interviewees also consider these 
organizations to be important today. This is interesting as discussions on globalization 
and the EU have included concerns about the decline of the Nordic welfare states and 
a coming non-importance of bodies such as the Nordic Council. As my analysis 
shows, Norwegian politicians and bureaucrats actually listen to fellow Scandinavians 
more than to the EU and OECD.201 Nonetheless, as one politician succinctly says; “We 
use the OECD cynically when it fits the policy” (Norwegian interview 8). While this 
response illustrates a tactical use of foreign policy advice, it says little about the real 
influence of the OECD. Other interviews suggest that this is more uncertain: 
 
“After we had a team here, they issued their so called country note where they pointed at some 
challenges they meant Norway had. We ourselves had also pointed at some challenges in the 
background report. We quote them in official documents such as budgets and propositions to 
the Odelsting (odelstingsproposisjoner, my addition). We include their view in the 
argumentation. The OECD is an organization the Norwegian government listens to. That does 
not necessarily mean that one follows all their advice in national policy-making, but it is clear 
that the OECD is a “heavy” organization” (Norwegian interview 6). 
 
                                                 
201 This is based on a limited number of interviews. My informants ascribe little importance to the EU and 
OECD and some to the Nordic Council and Council of Europe, but this is not the same as saying that the latter 
two were very important. According to Hantrais and Letablier, EU documents did not mention families until 
1974. The Council of Europe, however, did this more than a decade earlier (1996: 139-140). Moreover, EU 
advice on family policy is much more recent, less than a decade. In other words, the EU, and I could add the 
OECD, are latecomers in the field of family policy, and it is thus not strange that Norwegian interviewees hardly 
refer to these two organizations as influential. It could also be mentioned that the NCM has had activities in 
Germany. In 2005 NCM organized a seminar in Berlin on the topic of “Can Working Life and Family Life be 
Combined to Promote a Sustainable Economic and Social Development in the Nordic Countries and Germany?” 
(cf. http://www.norden.org/internationellt/uk/nmr_tyskland.asp?lang=6 ). More research and interviews could 
shed light on this interesting aspect. 
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The same interviewee says that OECD recommendations can support an argument, but 
is uncertain whether these recommendations have made the government do anything it 
would not otherwise have done (Norwegian interview 6). When asked about the 
impact of OECD reports, an interviewee with the OECD gave a similar statement, 
saying that it depends a lot on how a country wants to use them (OECD interview 5). 
A Norwegian interviewee says that the existence of a lot of national studies and 
evaluations might reduce the need for consulting international studies. Moreover, 
Norway has moved towards a family policy based on full coverage of childcare for 
such a long period that it is not something policy makers need to justify to the voters 
(Norwegian interview 6). The only direct reference to a study by an international 
organization from a politician is the PISA and PIRLS studies. This politician refers to 
the way in which such studies justify the policy of full coverage of childcare centres, 
as childcare has a positive effect on reading skills (Norwegian interview 9).202 
 While there are more or less no references to the EU in written documents, and 
especially not in parliamentary debates, interviews reveal that Norway is involved in 
some of the EU family policy meetings (Norwegian interview 5 and 6). That the 
interviewees are well aware of the aims set at the level of the EU is clear (Norwegian 
interview 6). Still, this does not mean that these aims influence Norway. In an 
interview focussing on social politics in general and avoidance of poverty and social 
exclusion more specifically, the interviewee says that it is not accurate to say that 
Norway is heavily inspired by the EU countries, mostly because Norway is a step 
ahead of them (Norwegian interview 3). Paraphrasing López-Santana (2006: 488), 
international actors should not have the power to frame family policy problems 
because Norwegian policies already are largely compatible with EU and OECD 
identified goals. There is little misfit, to use the vocabulary of Börzel (2003), also 
because the EU has so little official family policy. This supports assumption two, 
saying that Norway is more of an exporter than importer of family plicy ideas. 
                                                 
202 Here it should be said, though, that this interview was conducted within two weeks of the publishing of one of 
these reports, something which might have made the respondent think of exactly this report. However, this is a 
general problem when conducting interviews, and the same argument, but without the reference to OECD-tests, 
was made several times in the parliamentary debates. 
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 A similar impression comes from the reports from the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (NHD) on Norway’s relations with the Lisbon strategy. In general, the reports 
say that Norway and the other Nordic countries have been successful in reaching 
economic growth and a high level of welfare at the same time (NHD 2007). Just as 
family policy does not enjoy the most prominent place in the OMC reports, Norwegian 
policies in that area also take a back seat in the ministry reports. That this ministry is 
responsible for the report could be read as a sign that neither family nor social policies 
in general are its main concerns.203 However, the reports include these policies and 
discuss Norway’s status on EU-identified goals, e.g. in the area of female employment, 
which is said to be achieved by a good margin (NHD 2007: 40, 161). The report says 
full childcare coverage is an important way of promoting female employment, and 
although the Barcelona targets are not mentioned directly, the reports give the 
coverage rate for different age groups (2007: 47-48). The 2003-report mentions the 
Barcelona targets in a presentation of the EU goal setting but with no discussion of 
Norway’s goal attainment (2003: 57). High birth rates are also emphasized, again in 
comparison with EU countries (2006: 20, 2007: 46), and the same with parental leave 
schemes (NHD 2007: 48). The importance of having a well-developed family policy is 
illustrated and justified by means of a comparison of reasons for not being in the work 
force (NHD 2007: 166). The conclusion is clear and worth quoting at length: 
 
“One may analyse the high employment rate more closely by looking at reasons for non-
participation in the labour market. The difference in non-participation in the labour market 
between the Nordic region and the EU is primarily associated with female nonparticipation in 
the labour market, and hereunder mainly with non-participation referable to personal reasons, 
family responsibility or other reasons that are not related to illness. At the same time, the 
Nordic region has been at the forefront in facilitating the combination of childcare and 
working life through, among other things, government day-care centres and paid parental 
leave schemes. All the Nordic countries are operating flexible working life schemes to 
facilitate the combination of working life and family life. A report from the Nordic Council of 
Ministers refers to Nordic experience with paternal leave, and the consequences thereof in 
terms of promoting equal opportunities, (…) and concludes that, in particular, the paternal 
                                                 
203 The reports have little or no information on the process of making the reports. Obviously, the Ministry for 
Trade and Industry is in charge, but to what extent other ministries or bodies are involved is unclear and would 
be an interesting question to pursue. Has for instance the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a role here?  
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leave schemes for fathers in the Nordic countries have played a positive role in equal 
opportunity terms” (NHD 2007: 165, my emphasis). 
 
The report says that Norway is cooperating with the EU in gender issues, and mentions 
some family policy related aims briefly, such as shared responsibility for care and 
housework (2003: 20). It stresses that when Norway and the EU carry out similar 
policies, it is not the result of the Lisbon Strategy, but more of shared political 
objectives: “Employment, environment and macroeconomic stability have all been on 
the Norwegian agenda since long before the EU formulated its strategy”  (NHD 2004: 
18, also 2003: 7). Moreover, the reports do not have the character of a policy-driving 
document but rather of a report on what has been done independently of the EU 
initiatives. Still, they prove that Norwegian governments are both informed of, and to a 
certain extent use, work by the EU to compare and evaluate national social policy. 
That this is an important aim of the report series is beyond doubt: “(…) parts of the 
text of the present report may be used to compare Norwegian policy with the measures 
adopted by the EU countries under the Lisbon Strategy” (NHD 2007: 23). 
 As emphasized here and in other chapters, one must not forget that the OECD 
adjust its reports to what it thinks is needed not to have its advice rejected: “(…) they 
(the OECD, my addition) are attentive, they are not stupid, they want to be an actor” 
(Norwegian interview 3, confirmed also in OECD interview 2, 5 and 6). This is 
perhaps expressed most clearly in this statement from an OECD official; “We sit 
together with x (name taken out in order to preserve anonymity) and her staff and we 
go through the whole draft and a lot of it is factual corrections, but also some different 
way of expressing things, but we come to a mutual agreement, so it's really their report 
which we've drafted, but the government stands by the report” (OECD interview 6). 
Later, the same interviewee says “Well, if somebody has a problem with this survey, 
we can't publish it”. Similarly, the OECD can be used by the country under review, as 
another expert said in an interview on poverty and pensions policy; ´especially the 
Ministry of Finance uses this (OECD-reports, my addition) as the devil's advocate to 
say what they are not allowed to say` (Norwegian interview 1, also confirmed in 
OECD interview 6 and indicated by Kildal and Kuhnle 2004a). The interesting 
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question is perhaps not “how domestic is domestic politics?” (Kayser 2007). The 
question remaining is rather “how international is international advice really?” The 
discussion above suggests that the Norwegian debates on family issues are oriented 
mainly towards national issues. When an issue is politicised, such as the cash-for-care 
benefit, it is unimportant what IOs such as the OECD says. Ideas spread, but the extent 
to which they manifest themselves in concrete policy, depends on the national context. 
This seems to be the case also for family policy, even though veto players and vested 
interests are less dominate in this than in other social policy fields.  
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
As chapters 5 and 6 argue, EU and OECD initiatives are comprehensive enough to 
influence national reform processes. In this chapter, I set out to investigate the 
potential impact on Norwegian family policy, more precisely the cash-for-care benefit 
and extension of childcare. The analysis was guided by some assumptions. The first 
stated that the power of ideas is strengthened if they are accepted by and further 
disseminated by influential IOs and I expected to find at least some concordance 
between international family policy ideas and national policies. My analysis showed 
that policies were in concordance, but not because of the international advice and the 
cash-for-care benefit illustrates that national politics are more important than 
international policy ideas. The second assumption said that policy ideas from IOs did 
not play a crucial role for the development of Norwegian family policies and that 
policy export was more pertinent that policy import. This was confirmed in my 
analysis. Third, not being a member of the EU and thus at least partly decoupled from 
an important arena for exchange of information, I assumed this export role to be 
modest. This was partly rejected, as for instance Germany paid close attention to 
Norwegian policies before reforming their own. I now elaborate on these findings. 
While the high degree of correspondence between the advice of IOs and 
Norway’s family policy could give the impression of IO influence, most national 
actions and setting of targets precede the international advice. The building of new 
childcare facilities and the goal of a childcare place for all is an old goal, towards 
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which different governments have worked with different deadlines. Similarly, the 
analysis has shown how the critique of the cash-for-care benefit is not something first 
raised by international actors. Two of the current parties in government, Labour and 
the Socialist Left Party, strongly opposed the reform when it was legislated some ten 
years ago. These parties had already raised issues such as setbacks for gender equality, 
reduced female employment, or a further disadvantaging of immigrant children. If 
there has been any influence in this case, it is probably that the political left has made 
the OECD aware of this critique. To say that the political left parties in Norway 
influence the OECD, however, would be inaccurate. To the OECD it is above all a 
question of economic incentives and effectiveness, coinciding here with issues like 
integration. Left-wing parties are in addition sceptical towards a traditional 
conservative family model. Thus, left parties and the OECD (often considered neo-
liberal) have coinciding critiques, but with partly different motives. 
All in all, and contradictory to my first assumption of how IOs should 
strengthen the power of ideas, Norwegian policy makers barely refer to such 
organizations. This could indicate that the OECD is not thought to bring more 
legitimacy or support for the policies in question. Moreover, comparing interview 
statements and national background reports with the policy lessons of the OECD, 
indicates that the OECD largely relies on the information, analysis and interpretations 
of the national government. One could thus ask whether the OECD recommendations 
are really national priorities, given increased authority by sending them via an 
international organization (uploading).  
It is an interesting finding that Norwegian actors keep their policies despite 
clear advice from the OECD to change the cash-for-care allowance. Countries like 
Germany and Sweden seem to disregard the same advice. There is obviously room for 
national politics in a globalized world (Kildal and Kuhnle 2007). Still, with the 
exception of the harsh and consistent critique of the cash-for-care allowance, the IOs 
seem to be rather pleased with Norwegian family policies. Since Norway in many 
regards has good social policy and best practice, finding proof of strong international 
influence on recent Norwegian family policy reforms is difficult. This interpretation is 
very much in line with the second assumption: that Norway is more of an exporter 
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than an importer since there has been less need for the importing of policies to Norway 
the last two decades.  
Still, claiming that international organizations and experiences have been 
without importance for Norway is not correct. Although the EU and OECD have not 
played a major role in the development of Norwegian family policies, learning and 
organizations still matter. Interviews with Norwegian politicians and civil servants 
reveal that the Nordic Council and Council of Europe have been more important than 
EU and OECD, particularly in the earlier phases of the development of family policies. 
The establishment of meeting places for the “like-minded” creates a sort of “cognitive 
dynamics”.204 In other words, ideas are formulated, evaluated and transmitted. 
Although the effect of this is hard to measure, ideas are nonetheless continuously put 
into circulation and may have an impact. Policy makers have probably always learned 
from each other, but the new arenas for mutual exchange within IOs systematize this 
learning process.  
That politicians regard Nordic cooperation and the Council of Europe as more 
influential than the EU and OECD is interesting. Denmark and Sweden are pioneers 
within family policy, with Norway following later (Leira 1998: 365, Sainsbury 2001, 
Ellingsæter 2003: 424, Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen 2007a: 651, Grødem 2008: 14). 
For instance, childcare coverage, particularly of children less than three years old, has 
been substantially lower in Norway than in Denmark and Sweden (Sainsbury 2001: 
114, Ellingsæter 2003: 438, Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen 2007b: 172). However, in 
the last 20 years, Norway has moved towards policies that help parents reconcile work 
and family life, including shared parenthood, as opposed to the traditional one-income 
family (Grødem 2008). Whether this “catching up” and “Scandinavian convergence” 
(Ellingsæter 2003: 439) partly results from Scandinavian best practice and learning 
through the Nordic Council or other bodies is a subject for future research.205 Some 
traces of influence, however, are evident. The maximum parental payment for 
childcare is inspired by Sweden (Ellingsæter 2003: 439, St.tid. 2000-2001a, 2001-
                                                 
204 This term is not my own and is used both in psychology and political science, though in different ways. See 
for instance Mondak (1993).  
205 Haavet (2006) briefly mentions such issues. According to her, Norway took the lead in family policy in the 
first decades of the 20th century while Sweden obtained hegemony from the 1930s onwards. 
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2002b). Precisely how large the impact of Swedish family policy upon Norway has 
been historically is less clear.206 There is also widespread knowledge of and interest in 
international trends within the Norwegian bureaucracy. Like in Germany, this applies 
not so much to politicians, but for administrative personnel it is the case.  
Assumption one, saying that the power of ideas is strengthened if they are 
accepted by and further disseminated by influential IOs, has been almost completely 
disproved in the Norwegian case as the EU and OECD are barely used to defend or 
attack family policies.  Assumption two, however, saying that Norway is more of an 
exporter of ideas than an importer, has been correspondingly confirmed in the sense 
that Norway seems to have imported few, if any, family policy ideas from these 
organizations. This interpretation has been somewhat moderated by the Nordic 
Council and the Council of Europe, neither of which I study in detail, but where more 
in depth research is needed. What about the last assumption about the degree of 
export? 
Not being a member of the EU means that Norway is not participating in 
learning processes to the same extent as Member States. As suggested by my third 
assumption, this could mean that Norwegian “lessons” are not exported even though 
Norway scores high on indicators such as fertility or female employment rates. My 
empirical findings contradict this assumption; although Norway is not referred to very 
often in German policy documents, I have shown that Germany is well aware of 
Norwegian experiences. 
What does the analysis tell us about the analytical value of the idea perspective 
and focus on voluntary advice from IOs? First, that ideas from the EU and OECD do 
not seem to have had an influence on Norwegian family policy does not mean that 
such ideas are unimportant. The need for importing ideas was small, as Norway’s 
policies were more or less already compatible with EU and OECD advice (the cash-
for-care benefit being the one important exception). These organizations even present 
policies of the Norwegian kind as best practice. Indeed, the EU and OECD have 
learned from Nordic countries, not the other way around. Thus, Norway is not a case 
                                                 
206 For literature on how Norwegian family policy historically has developed under influence of foreign models, 
see for instance Hinnfors (1992), Haavet (1999a-b, 2006), Stjernø (2005), Lundqvist (2007). 
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well suited to illustrate policy transfer from IOs, but rather an interesting potential 
policy exporter. The process whereby characteristics of Nordic family policy became 
the best practice of IOs would be interesting to study in itself. Moreover, both 
bureaucrats and politicians reveal that they have been made aware of foreign policy 
arrangements through other international organizations, namely the Nordic Council 
and Council of Europe, as well as individual countries like Sweden. International 
advice on family issues might become an important source for learning in some years 
when the advice has been issued longer and perhaps gained a stronger position. 
Second, interviews and parliamentary debates have shown that ideas developed 
in one context are applied in another (cf. Dolowitz 2000a-b). Such learning is visible 
when MPs propose new measures that have already been introduced abroad. Whether 
they use these ideas to legitimize their own policies, or whether they actually propose 
new policies out of genuine conviction, is difficult to assess. If the former is right, then 
interests are the important factor, not ideas. As Bennett argues, ´The interests of the 
importer dictate the nature, timing and origins of evidence injected into policy debate` 
(1991: 31).  
Third, and as already alluded to, politicians and bureaucrats use foreign ideas 
tactically, something that puts further emphasis on interest. Interviewed politicians 
openly say that they use international advice when it serves their purpose. According 
to other interviewees, bureaucrats also (mis)use the IOs in this way. Thus, it is hardly 
surprising that politicians refer to positive evaluations when it could give them credit. 
Relatedly, the strategy papers of different ministries clearly signal that Norwegian 
family policy and a general good reputation could be a means to improve our influence 
and gain acceptance for national political views. This is a clear expression of how 
interests are central. It adds to the idea-literature focussing on when ideas matter. This 
literature usually focuses on how characteristics of the idea itself or of the 
surroundings matter for the reception of an idea, above all focussing on when ideas are 
imported (e.g. Hall 1993, Stone 1999, Linos 2007). These authors barely discuss when 
ideas are exported. As shown in this chapter, ideas are not only exported to benefit the 
importing societies, but also tactically from a self-interested agenda in the exporting 
country. It is obviously important for Norway to be seen as having an innovative and 
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effective family policy; to “shine” and assert itself internationally. Interviewed 
representatives of the OECD suggest that several countries have such motives (OECD 
interview 5). 
Today, a more recent trend could strengthen the wish of being considered a 
forerunner abroad. While welfare tourism has been seen as a big threat to national 
welfare states, countries such as Norway seem to have shifted fundamentally in their 
view on this.207 Foreign workers who use welfare schemes like parental leave, child 
benefits or cash-for-care benefits are not seen as enjoying rights without contributing. 
To the contrary, these generous arrangements are actively used to attract foreign 
workers and their families. The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Organisation (NAV) 
has made advertisement films in English, German and Polish describing such 
arrangement to attract these workers. The reason for the paradigmatic change is to find 
in a fear of lack of workers (BT 2007).  
Some of the early Norwegian social insurance programmes were developed 
under the heavy influence of Germany, e.g. the paid maternity leave included in the 
health insurance act from 1909 (Kuhnle 1987: 81, Sainsbury 2001: 122, 127, 
Johansson 2003: 204-205). As the above discussion has shown, Norway learned a lot 
from neighbouring countries in the 20th century as well (Stjernø 2005, Haavet 2006). 
However, it seems that we have now come full circle in the sense that Germany is 
currently, at least to some extent, importing Norwegian lessons (Kuhnle 2007, Lindén 
2007b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
207 Off course, there are still critical voices. The Progress party (FrP) is for instance usually very sceptical 
regarding the potential misuse of Norwegian welfare schemes. For an outline of the welfare tourism argument, 
references and evaluation, see for instance Kvist (2004) or Dølvik and Eldring (2005). 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion: summary, findings and outlook 
 
"The policy music is composed in Paris (OECD) and played - with some adjusted European 
notes - in Brussels (EU)" (anonymous source within the German Federation of Trade Unions, 
DGB). 
 
 
I have investigated the development, the content and transfer of the family policy ideas 
of two major international organizations. I have raised three sets of research questions: 
First, from a theoretical and methodological perspective, how and why can ideas 
matter for national family policy reforms? Second, how much and what kind of family 
policy ideas exist in IOs? Moreover, how do such IOs arrive at their prescriptions and 
how are these ideas transmitted to national policy makers? Third, to what extent can 
the reforms in German and Norwegian family policy be understood as being the result 
of the ideas promoted by IOs? How are international family policy ideas received and 
with what impact?  
Studying the role of ideational factors in decision-making processes, I have 
taken foreign advice into account in the discussion of family policy reforms in 
Germany and Norway. While acknowledging the problem of measuring the influence 
of ideas, I have developed an approach allowing me to study this issue. Ideas are 
operationalized as the unbinding advice and views spread by the international 
organizations, the EU and the OECD. I have compared this advice with actual reforms 
(concordance method) and searched for traces of influence in policy documents, 
parliamentary debates and interviews with key actors (process tracing).  
This concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and how these 
contribute to existing theory on policy change, social policy in international 
organizations, and national family policy reforms (section 9.1). This summary is 
organized around my three sets of research questions listed above. Furthermore, this 
chapter elaborates and develops some aspects of the findings. Section 9.2 contains a 
few reflections on my research design, while section 9.3 addresses questions I have not 
dealt with in detail and which I also suggest as topics for future research. 
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9.1 Summary of findings 
 
My point of departure has been that family policy reforms could be particularly 
appropriate for the study of the impact of ideas. Family policy is a fairly “new”, less 
saturated field in a phase of expansion rather than retrenchment (Bleses 2003, Gatenio-
Gabel and Kamerman 2006, Kamerman and Gatenio-Gabel 2007, Lundqvist 2007, 
Morel 2007), and thus is less likely to be understood by exclusively focussing on 
economic constraints or predetermined paths. It is less institutionalized than areas like 
pensions, implying for instance that there are few interest organizations or other veto 
players in this area. However, family policy reforms have rarely been studied from an 
ideational perspective, although it is now increasingly applied in studies of family 
policy reforms (e.g. Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004, Larsen 2005, Kübler 2007, 
Krüger 2007, Stiller forthcoming 2009). Hardly any of these pay attention to 
international organizations. An idea-based approach is particularly pertinent when 
there is only voluntary exchange of ideas and no negative sanctions involved, as is the 
case regarding family policy advice from IOs. Moreover, as my study includes the EU 
non-member Norway, it is of particular interest to study to what extent, and 
prospectively how, ideas spread across borders independently of membership of 
organizations. Family policy is furthermore a field characterised by much change and 
continuous development of new arrangements, and has gained steadily more 
importance in elections and everyday politics (Dienel 2002). It is very interesting to 
investigate whether IOs such as the OECD and EU, traditionally seen as being without 
competence and importance in the area, now play a role in their Member States´ search 
for optimal domestic policy. To what extent has my investigation been able to move 
beyond previous research in the field? 
 
First, how can my analysis of the family policy ´idea game` improve our 
understanding of the relationship between ideas and policy-making? 
 
The analysis bears out that ideas should be incorporated into studies of welfare 
reforms because this perspective improves our understanding of decision-making 
processes which institutionalist accounts (path dependency), functional explanations 
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(internal and external problem pressure), and political factors (parties matter) cannot 
explain alone. The paradigmatic reforms of German parental leave and childcare will 
definitely result in increased social policy spending. Another issue which has recently 
been high on the agenda, illustrating that family policy reforms have not been about 
cost reduction, is the debate between the Social and Christian Democrats about 
whether to increase the child benefit by € 10 or to reserve the same money for further 
expansion of childcare facilities. The conflict between benefits in cash and kind is an 
important conflict dimension in both Germany and Norway and shows that the debate 
has focussed on how to use, rather than whether to use, public finances in family 
policies. Moreover, that a German government led by the Christian Democrats both 
increases the number of public childcare facilities and develops a new parental leave 
scheme, designed to speed up the return of women to work after childbirth and give 
men incentives for childrearing, tells us that “parties matter” theory just like problem 
pressure, is insufficient to understand the reforms. In the Norwegian case we witness 
the same openness towards increased family policy spending, especially within 
childcare, but leftist parties favour the expanding of benefits in kind more than 
bourgeois parties. 
But is there a contradiction between crisis-driven reforms for retrenchment and 
reforms for a new and extended role of the state driven by ideas? One should note that 
an important point with focussing on ideas is how ideas may give policy makers a new 
understanding of the scope for action. The policy advice and views coming from IOs 
or other sources may convince policy makers that reform is necessary. The frame of a 
demographic crisis and the sustainability of the welfare state identified in chapters 5 
and 6 are two examples. This means that there might have been no “objective problem 
pressure” to start with strong enough to make politicians reform social policy 
programmes. I would argue that reforms inspired by ideas rather than pure necessity 
are found in the field of family policy. Politicians are willing to increase budgets in 
this area in order to cope with challenges such as low fertility rates and to improve 
gender equity and child fostering. As such, it is different from retrenchment – reforms 
which aim at cutting spending. I argue that it makes sense to distinguish between 
crisis-driven reforms and reforms driven by ideas in the form of foreign policy advice. 
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Through the example of globalization, Hay and Rosamond explain why this is a 
relevant distinction: 
 
“Does it matter, then, whether the effects frequently attributed to globalization are direct 
products of the demonstrable ‘material reality’ of globalization or of more or less accurate 
constructions of globalization’s assumed imperatives or of an entirely duplicitous appeal to 
globalization’s convenient exigencies? While in one sense it may not (the immediate outcome, 
after all, is the same), in another the difference is extremely significant. In one account we 
identify an inexorable logic of economic compulsion operating beyond the control or purview 
of political actors whom we might hold accountable for its consequences. In the other two we 
have an open-ended, contingent and – crucially – political dynamic to which potentially 
accountable agents might be linked. Differentiating between the effects of globalization, on 
the one hand, and the effects of dominant discourses of globalization and the use made of such 
discourses, on the other, is, then, an integral aspect of restoring notions of political 
responsibility and accountability to contemporary political and economic dynamics” (2002: 
150). 
 
Focussing on learning partly overcomes the difficulty in “ideas matter” studies of 
distinguishing the effect of interests and problem pressure from ideas since the 
learning literature identifies conditions for when learning should take place, which 
includes interest seeking actors as well as actual problem pressure. This literature 
claim that ideas that can combine innovative programmes with solutions to 
acknowledged problems, and at the same time strengthen the position of those who are 
learning, have the best chances of being implemented. This may appear to be an 
inherent lack of logic in ideational theory; the theory first claims that ideas have an 
independent effect on policy-making, and then identifies policy failure, problem 
pressure, and supportive powerful actors as important for the success of the very same 
ideas. However, I understand independent as implying that ideas add something that 
interests or problem pressure alone cannot deliver. As shown in the analysis; it does 
not make sense to say that only ideas change policies. The possible success of ideas 
depends on actors and their role. My analysis shows that politicians and bureaucrats 
use foreign ideas tactically, something which puts further emphasis on interests. Policy 
makers interviewed openly say that they use international advice when it serves their 
  
273
purpose. It is hardly a surprising finding that politicians refer to positive evaluations 
when it could give them credit. Still, it is obvious that ideas have been adopted not 
simply because they coincide with the importer’s ideological perspectives. 
Ideational approaches identify conditions beneficial for the success of ideas. 
While my work has relied on theoretical insights from other scholars, I wish to briefly 
highlight some features of my work that contribute to the theory on ideas and the 
welfare state, especially on debates on how and when ideas matter, an aim set out in 
chapter 1. Along with existing literature, I have found that policy failure is an 
important condition (and argument) for reform, and that government turnover and 
change in power relations are conducive to new policies. However, my analysis in 
chapters 5 and 6 suggests that peer review processes initiated by IOs may expose 
countries to new policy ideas and make them start looking for solutions even before 
problem recognition. It seems that what Bøås and McNeil (2004) call malleable ideas, 
that is ideas that are capable of “killing many birds with one stone”, have particularly 
good chances of success. My analysis complements their research by pointing out how 
the example of the idea of family policy as a productive factor, where particular family 
policies are presented as beneficent for families, gender equality, the general economy, 
and the sustainability of the welfare state, is spread by IOs like the EU and OECD. 
Although it is not clear whether this idea originates in these IOs, this idea has been 
important in Norway and Germany and for the preparation of recent reforms.  
In line with existing ideational theory is also the finding that governments are 
more likely to introduce policy changes when there is a consensus among experts, 
international organizations as well as national research communities, on which kind of 
policy is most efficient. As I have shown, Nordic family policies are praised by 
German and international researchers and by the EU and OECD. This consensus has 
probably made it easier to carry out the paradigmatic German reforms in the direction 
of Nordic family policies.  
While Germany has been depicted as an importer of family policy ideas, 
Norway appears to be a family policy export country (though historically it has 
definitely imported family policy ideas from its Nordic neighbours). Policy documents 
from different ministries indicate that Norwegian family policy and a generally good 
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reputation are considered means to improve Norwegian influence and gain acceptance 
for national political views in other circumstances. This is a clear expression of how 
interests and ideas are coupled. Moreover, it adds to the ideas-literature by focussing 
on when ideas matter. This literature usually focuses on the characteristics of an idea 
itself, or of how the surroundings matter for the reception of an idea, above all 
focussing on when ideas are imported (e.g. Heclo 1974, Rose 1991, Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993, Hall 1993, Kingdon 1995, Stone 1999, Berman 2001, Blyth 2002, 
Marcussen 2002, Simmons and Elkins 2004). These authors barely discuss when ideas 
are exported. As shown in the chapter on Norway, ideas are not only exported to 
benefit the importing societies, but also tactically from a self-interested agenda in the 
exporting country. The wish to “shine” in international comparisons and improve its 
international position and image could be one reason.208 Interviewed representatives of 
the OECD suggest that several countries have such motives. I find it interesting why 
Norway is so preoccupied with appearing as an example to follow within family 
policy. From where and why does the wish of having a family policy to export come 
from? This expressed wish and interest to export policies to other countries could be 
an interesting topic for a future study.  
 
Second, has my analysis of international family policy ideas and their development 
challenged established knowledge on the social policy role played by IOs? 
 
Until now, there have been few attempts to link the study of family policy reforms 
with that of international organizations. As such, my study of the relation between 
international organizations and domestic governments within family policy is new, and 
fills a gap in the literature. We have lacked systematic comparative knowledge on the 
role of international organizations in this field, especially the OECD. My analysis 
contributes to the literature on social policy, ideas and international organizations by 
emphasizing that the EU and OECD are becoming increasingly important actors. The 
                                                 
208 Research on the discourse on goodness by Loga (2005) might be of relevance here. Loga has for instance 
written about politics based on moral authority and an image as being “good”. The reason for presenting this 
“goodness image” could be a wish to be seen in an advantageous light which makes it easier to reach other 
political goals. 
  
275
EU addresses family policy through new initiatives such as conferences and the 
European Alliance for Families while the OECD has special family policy review 
series. The argument I developed is that the family policy ideas of the EU and OECD 
add up to a rather comprehensive set of policy recommendations, especially within 
parental leave and childcare, with the potential of influencing national reforms, even in 
a field where they have no formal competence. While we have been accustomed to 
investigating social policy developments in a national perspective (Deacon 2007), we 
increasingly need to take international ideas into account when studying future social 
policy reforms, also in the field of family policy. 
This view is at odds with scholars who claim that family policy is completely a 
national domain (e.g. Pfau-Effinger 2008). However, this finding should not be 
overestimated. International organizations, particularly the EU, still do not have a 
family policy but rather ideas on national family policy. Also, the influence of these 
ideas is, as shown and as will be returned to below, so far rather limited. As 
Armingeon argues, policy proposals have influence only when they do not conflict 
with the position of major domestic actors (2004: 236, 239). Still, my study challenges 
existing literature by showing that both organizations, to an increasing degree, take an 
interest in, and issue advice on family political issues.  
 Regarding the content of their family policy stance, I relied on the classification 
scheme developed by Campbell (1998, 2002). Although not without difficulties, this 
framework enabled me to give an overview of what kind of family policy views exist 
within the two IOs. I showed that the two IOs in question have a clearly instrumental 
approach to family policy, implying that they, in reality, address a number of issues 
when they refer to reconciliation of work and family life, or family-friendly 
arrangements. As stated above, a malleable idea has higher likelihood of gaining 
support and the programmatic family policy ideas disseminated by IOs definitely fit 
this picture: parental leave schemes of the Scandinavian type, combined with childcare 
coverage at the level of demand, appear to contribute to better competitiveness, 
sustainable welfare states, less child poverty, and more gender equality. Still it would 
be wrong to claim that IOs exclusively focus on economic issues. Especially, the 
OECD ECEC study focuses on the well-being of children and questions like the 
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quality of childcare institutions. Also, the positive attitude towards Scandinavian 
parental leave schemes and the advice on increased public spending on childcare are 
more welfare state friendly than, for instance, what the OECD is often associated with 
(Deacon 2007). How different national and international justifications for family 
policies really are is a question I find important and return to in section 9.3. 
One question remaining after having outlined the development of family policy 
advice within IOs is “how international is international advice really?” Two issues are 
important here. First, the consensual approach of IOs means that the countries under 
review have a strong influence on which recommendations are given, as well as how 
they are formulated. Earlier research has discussed this aspect to some degree (e.g. 
Marcussen 2002, Zeitlin 2005a, Schäfer 2006, Armingeon 2007). Second, and this 
applies mainly to the OECD and is particularly important for family policy studies 
which are not part of regular and compulsory studies like OECD Economic surveys, 
whether a country is reviewed or not to a large extent depends on whether this country 
wants to be reviewed. This also applies to at least some EU peer reviews. This second 
finding has hardly been discussed in existing literature on IOs. Both points illustrate 
the possibility for strategic use of international advice, and mean that researchers must 
be cautious when interpreting possible evidence of foreign influence on national 
politics. 
 
Third, to what extent are national reforms and debates influenced by international 
advice?  
 
The present thesis has offered an extensive analysis of the impact of IOs on national 
family policy. Ideas from abroad have played an important role in Germany. Facing 
problems of an ageing population, low employment rates among women, and child 
poverty, foreign solutions became interesting even to political parties originally 
reluctant to interfere in family relations. This could probably best be described as a 
combination of different factors; problem pressure, ideas, and interests. International 
organizations have promoted reconciliation policies in this period. However, they 
seem to have been part of a unanimous research community; individual Member 
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States, institutions and researchers at the national level have all promoted similar 
policies. Thus, it is difficult to say that IOs were more important than other actors, but 
they definitely contributed to the consensus that abolished any doubt about what to do. 
And in some respects the IOs seem to have played an important role; their rankings 
and comparisons have triggered policy learning and the view that actions must be 
taken. 
The perception that Germany must reform to catch up with other countries 
relies on comparisons with other welfare states. It is not always clear who has 
provided these comparisons, as policy actors often simply refer to “comparisons” or 
“comparative studies”, and both national and international studies include such 
comparisons. However, my interviews clearly show that the work of IOs plays a role, 
as national actors are familiar with, for instance, the Barcelona targets on childcare.209 
Although references to the EU and OECD are few, the arguments policy-makers rely 
on are similar to those used by the IOs. The Elterngeld reform is, for example, 
described as bringing about several general economic benefits. 
The chapter on Norway suggests that the Norwegian politics on the family is 
mainly a national debate. This could be because Norwegian family policy is 
considered well developed and efficient in regard to fertility and gender issues, and 
neither the EU nor the OECD have had much influence on Norwegian family policy. 
Interviewees mention the Council of Europe and Nordic Council as more important, 
but not as crucial.210  
Both for Norway and Germany bilateral learning has been more important than 
IOs in the change of national family policy. However, it is very likely that the bilateral 
learning is strengthened through international forums and studies. What then about 
Norwegian influence on German reforms? As shown in chapter 7, German sources 
confirm that they are familiar with Norwegian experiences and policies, but Sweden 
seems to be the main provider of cross-border ideas. However, the fact-finding 
                                                 
209 My interview with a SPD MP illustrates this. Before answering my question on whether she knew the aims 
set by IOs within childcare, she rose from her chair, went to her desk, picked up a report, came back and showed 
me a figure on childcare coverage across the EU where countries were placed below or above the coverage level 
of the Barcelona targets. She then asked me whether this was the kind of work my question referred to. 
210 This is an interesting finding as such organizations usually are not credited much importance, but I have too 
little data to go into depth here. Although their influence was probably more important for the early development 
of Norwegian family policy, the role of these IOs merits further research.  
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missions to Norway and collaboration in other ways still suggest that it is imprecise to 
say that Norway is an unimportant exporter of family policy ideas due to Norway’s 
non EU membership. My analysis has further uncovered how Norway is well aware 
of, uses and compares itself, with work by the EU, for instance through the regular 
report The EU Lisbon Strategy – A Norwegian Perspective.  
One family policy programme, the cash-for-care benefit, illustrates how IOs 
have still not become strong authorities within family policy (or social policy for that 
matter). Despite the OECD´s clear advice and the EU´s reluctance to programmes 
keeping women out of work for a long time, both Norway and Germany introduce 
such benefits. Admittedly, the EU has identified the Finnish home care allowance as a 
best practice through the Alliance for European Families, but this is so new and little 
developed that it can hardly have been influential. German and Norwegian policy 
makers are aware of the critique and as such the introduction of cash-for-care might 
illustrate “learning without action”. 
Although I find little evidence of IO´s decisive impact on national family policy 
this does not mean that my theoretical perspective is not useful. There are many traces 
of ideational influence in the form of bilateral learning and the idea perspective 
provides insights into when foreign advice matters. Thus, despite the absence of 
support for comprehensive IO influence, the analysis clearly indicates that these 
organizations and policy ideas play a role. Family policy ideas spread by IOs gain 
additional authority. What I argue is that international organizations are important, 
regarding information flows and transmission of ideas, but of course not that they 
decide what countries can do.211 Table 9.1 summarizes the assumptions that have 
guided my analysis. 
A few words on other explanations are needed since ”international ideas” are 
not sufficient to understand the reforms. First of all this study did not intend to give a 
full answer to why reforms happened in Germany and Norway, but rather what role 
ideas promoted by IOs played in this process. Without expecting to uncover causal 
mechanisms between international advice and national policy I set out to describe in  
                                                 
211 This finding could be different from different policy fields. Cf. Ervik, Kildal and Nilssen (forthcoming 2009) 
for a study of different social policy fields, showing that the degree of influence may vary.  
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Table 9.1: Summary of assumptions 
 
Assumption Result of analysis Status (same, new or refined 
assumption) 
For Germany and Norway:   
The power of ideas is strengthened if 
accepted by and further disseminated 
by influential international 
organizations 
Confirmation and refinement Especially rankings and 
comparisons receive attention, 
but national politics still more 
important 
For Germany:   
Since the EU has no family policy in 
the sense of a coherent set of 
objectives for government activity in 
this policy area, but rather several 
policies that affect the situation of 
families, the influence on Germany is 
probably not very evident. This holds 
also for the OECD even though its 
family policy statements are more 
coherent 
Confirmation Some references to “international 
comparisons”, but scarce 
evidence of EU or OECD impact 
 
National and international policy 
makers rely on similar arguments 
Since the German parental leave and 
childcare reforms are presented as 
extension more than retrenchment of 
the welfare state, the German 
government will most likely claim 
credit for this reform more than make 
other bodies responsible for the 
changes. 
Confirmation and refinement Some references to “international 
comparisons”, but scarce 
evidence of EU or OECD impact 
 
Extensive references to Sweden 
One reason for the introduction of 
Elterngeld and increase in childcare 
facilities, which is not what one 
would expect from a Christian 
Democratic led coalition government, 
could be the idea disseminated by 
international organizations that such 
arrangements will have general 
economic advantages 
Confirmation and refinement General economic advantages 
were important 
 
Malleable ideas have greater 
chances of acceptation than other 
ideas 
For Norway:   
Norway is more of an exporter than 
an importer since there has been less 
need for import of policies to Norway 
during the last two decades due to an 
acknowledged position as a 
forerunner country 
Partly confirmation and 
refinement 
Scarce evidence of EU or OECD 
impact, but other IOs have been 
important (Nordic cooperation, 
Council of Europe) 
 
Awareness of and comparison 
with EU and OECD policies 
Norway is not a central “teacher” to 
other countries since it is not a 
member of the EU and thus 
decoupled from an important arena 
for mutual learning 
Rejection Non-membership is not a 
hindrance to export of policy 
ideas. Such export is deliberately 
used to gain general influence 
and acknowledgement 
This table has been inspired by Nedergaard (2007) who develops a similar table to sum up his findings on policy 
learning in EU OMC committees.  
 
depth family policy ideas as a possible source of attitude change on the need of 
reforms. As such, it is not surprising, nor a crucial objection to the approach of the 
study, that reforms happen for a number of reasons and international advice is only 
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one, and not the most important reason. What other reasons can be identified? Without 
once more opening up the discussion about ideas, interests, actors and institutions, it 
must be stressed how both socio-economic and political factors shed light on German 
and Norwegian family policy-making. I still contend that public budgets or socio-
economic constraints cannot explain why reforms have been carried out, since the 
reforms represent cost increases rather than cost containment. However, the analysis 
has shown that economic issues have been important. The reforms are, in accordance 
with the idea of social policy as a productive factor, considered to bring about 
economic and other benefits in the long term. Higher birth rates, reduced child 
poverty, and higher female labour market participation rates in particular strengthen 
the sustainability of the welfare state. Interests matter; as I have shown for both the 
Norwegian and the German reforms, governments have of course considered which 
electoral consequences their reforms might have. These are among other things, 
connected to societal change in views on sex roles, female employment and 
responsibility for the upbringing of children. In Germany, a government change 
probably contributed a lot in making former opponents of the Elterngeld-reform part 
of the governmental coalition, implying that institutional and partisan veto players has 
also had some importance. This indicates that parties matter, but not in the way 
postulated by “parties matter” theory: the former government led by the Social 
Democrats was unable to carry this reform through. Having the CDU/CSU as part of 
the government made it possible to gain sufficient support for this reform. This might 
be understood by reference to Ross (1997, 2000a-b), who argues that a perceived 
guarantor of a certain (family) policy is able to carry out reforms other parties cannot. 
All of these factors, combined with the recommendations spread by a more or less 
unanimous expert community, IOs like the EU and OECD included, made Nordic 
family policy seem the obvious solution in Germany. This both underlines how causes 
are seldom unicausal but rather multicausal in the social sciences, and it stresses how it 
makes little sense to think of ideas in vacuum, and neglect problem pressure, interests, 
and actors. Current research is now looking into issues like the importance of 
educational paradigms, and cultural traditions and values, to understand childcare 
reforms (Jensen 2008b, Pfau-Effinger 2008), as well as more actor centred approaches 
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(Krüger 2007). These perspectives will, similarly, not be able to explain family policy 
reforms alone. As my study has made clear, however, studies of such individual 
explanatory variables shed light on why and how reforms are carried out. Theoretical 
perspectives complement each other and current research is proposing a synthesis of 
ideas, interests and institutions in a sort of multi-theoretical account to overcome the 
problems one approach cannot explain alone (e.g. Hudson, Hwang and Kühner 2008).  
 
9.2 A note on methodology 
 
To what extent is my methodological approach capable of answering the research 
questions, and does this approach involve an improvement compared with earlier 
studies? I have developed a methodological approach based on existing studies of the 
possible impact of international organizations and ideas. I have compared international 
advice with actual national reforms (concordance method) and have searched for 
traces of influence in a number of sources (process tracing). The benefit of this 
approach is not so much that it is new, several studies have used similar approaches 
(e.g. Armingeon and Beyeler 2004), but rather that I have collected more data sources, 
which can inform the research questions. Instead of relying on policy documents 
alone, I have extended the data material to include parliamentary debates and 
interviews with key actors as two important new sources.  
 How helpful this method is for answering my research questions is debatable. 
The comprehensive discussion of methodological challenges in chapter 4 suggests that 
it is impossible to deliver final answers. However, I argue that my approach, combined 
with sensitivity to issues like blame avoidance, credit claiming or up-loading, to 
mention just a few challenges to the interpretation of written and oral statements, 
improves the reliability of my study. From my analysis it is clear that the study of 
ideas and IOs benefits from relying on interviews and parliamentary debates in 
addition to policy documents, something earlier studies of IOs have done sparingly. 
Still, a critical view on the research design and some reflections on my approach are 
appropriate. These reflections concern data sources, particularly interviews. 
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 The obvious question of getting to talk to the “right” people should be 
addressed. Throughout the analysis I have anonymized my informants. To mention 
actors I have tried to interview, but been rejected by or not received an answer from at 
all, is thus not an option, because it would function almost like making a list of who I 
actually have talked to. However, one obvious critique against the conduct of 
interviews is that it is somewhat incidental who you get to talk with and what 
information is revealed. One example may illustrate this. The fact that there had been 
extensive contact and several delegations visiting Norway in the years before the 
recent German family policy reforms was not emphasized by my German 
interviewees, and was partly unknown to me before I conducted my Norwegian 
interviews. This may be interpreted in different ways. A first and practical point is that 
turnover in a ministry may influence the answers you get. Moreover, obviously, 
Norwegian actors may have an interest in presenting themselves as important suppliers 
of terms for European reforms while German actors may have a similar incentive not 
to refer too much to foreign influence. Furthermore, if the Norwegian influence was 
not as important as for instance the Swedish, then it would make sense not to speak all 
that much about the contact between German and Norwegian authorities, even if it has 
been comprehensive. Still, it must be admitted that not having heard about these 
contact points from the German side, not only suggests that the Norwegian influence 
has been limited. It is also a reminder that one should not rely too much on 
information conveyed in a small number of expert interviews. This is why interviews 
could only be one of the sources on which to base this study. To conduct interviews 
with more actors involved in the development of international advice, and the 
corresponding national actors receiving the advice, could have enriched my thesis. 
 
9.3 Unresolved questions and future research 
 
In bringing together the findings from the four empirical chapters, some new questions 
arise. First, the analysis of the cross border influence, and the instrumental 
characteristics, of family policy ideas, poses the question of whether national and 
international actors have a completely different way of understanding and arguing for 
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the need for reform. One could start by asking whether international and national 
arguments differ, or have they been similar all the time? If the argumentation is 
converging, a second question is why? Is it because IOs become more social policy 
oriented or because national actors become more focussed on economic issues?  
The justification of national family policy and international advice could have 
been compared in more detail, to question what I consider to be a mistake in some 
literature on global social policy, namely, that international advice is so much more 
instrumental and economically justified than at the national level. If this is not said 
explicitly, then the international level is at least criticized for having an instrumental 
approach, implicitly saying that this is negative for the Member States if they 
incorporate such an approach. Lister, for instance, states that the new welfare policy 
paradigm of investing in children rather than promoting good childhood is strongly 
advocated by the OECD and EU Commission (2008: 384), while especially the Nordic 
countries balance ideas of investment and good childhood better (2008: 393). Lister 
(2006, 2008) argues that in a “social investment strategy” social policy is given an 
instrumental role, where life quality and the securing of children’s rights are 
subordinate to the focus on children as future workers. She does not restrict this 
attitude to international organizations and is worried about how “… children are now 
at the heart of social policy as the objects of both investment and regulatory policies. 
(…) children appear to matter more for their potential and future productivity as 
citizen-workers than as children in the here and now“ (2006: 62).212 Some of the 
scholars arguing that the EU and OECD do not have family policies, say that all these 
two organizations have are employment policies with a touch of family-friendly 
policies that contribute to the employment policies (Mahon 2002, Stratigaki 2004, 
Lewis 2006b, Lewis et al. 2008). According to Lewis et al.:  “Work/family policy at 
EU level and in Member States are thus increasingly regarded as employment rather 
than family policy issues, which is in turn part of the broader shift to employment-led 
social policy“ (2008: 262). I only partly agree. I consider EU and OECD family policy 
advice to be employment oriented, directed towards a number of social and economic 
                                                 
212 See also Schulz-Nieswandt and Maier-Rigaud (2007: 416-418) or Grødem (2008) for a critique of this 
approach.  
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societal goals and with a strong emphasis on incentives to work. However, I argue that 
that there exists quite a lot of advice from international organizations on family policy 
and not everything is instrumental and neo-liberal. Moreover, I do not consider an 
instrumental view of family policy to be exclusive to international actors. It may very 
well be that it is precisely these expected economic advantages of a domestic family 
policy that have made international actors engage in what is for them a rather new 
area, but I do not consider domestic actors to focus less on such instrumental issues, 
either historically or contemporarily. 
Historically, Lundqvist (2007) has shown how Swedish policy makers argued in 
a very instrumental way early in the 20th century. Going back to this period when the 
Nordic welfare states started to develop their family policy, which later has become 
famous as path-breaking with regard to birth rates and gender equality, much of the 
motivation can be found in economic challenges and sustainability issues. For 
instance, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal’s famous book from 1935, which inspired the 
Swedish approach, was entitled Crisis in the Population Question (Kris i 
Befolkningsfrågan). As Hantrais and Letablier argue (1996: 149), “The origins of 
family policy in the 1930s in Sweden were also associated with concerns about 
demographic issues”. Family and population policy figured high on the agenda in 
many European countries during this period. 
And contemporary policy is also discussed to a high degree with reference to 
the same goals, and is justified instrumentally. As became clear from chapter 8 on 
Norway’s role in the “idea game”, the Norwegian political left and the OECD, 
arguably stemming from two very different ideological traditions, rely on more or less 
the same arguments when criticizing the cash-for-care allowance. The scheme is, for 
example, considered bad for female employment.  
I do not disagree with the claim that when recommending reconciliation 
policies the EU and OECD in reality are encouraging both parents to work, knowing 
that this will have benefits for the overall economy and sustainability of the welfare 
state. What I say is that individual countries also argue along the same lines. It is thus 
not an adequate description to say that the EU and OECD, in contrast to its Member 
States, are promoting reconciliation of work and family life from a neo-liberal agenda. 
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For instance, the EU is not that different from individual countries when proposing 
short parental leave schemes and increased childcare coverage. In a discussion of the 
EU Lisbon strategy, Annesley (2007) takes issue with how this agenda is accused of 
being neo-liberal. She finds, first, that central aspects of the policies, now promoted by 
the EU, originated in its Member States, the EES being for instance quite Nordic, and 
second, that there is no difference between how the EU and individual Member States 
justify policies. She concludes that the model is social democratic rather than neo-
liberal.  
I thus interpret the family policy advice of international actors differently from 
some of the other scholars referred to. I consider the “family-friendly” policy 
recommendations of the EU and OECD to be quite similar to those of their Member 
States, both in actual design and underlying reasoning. Who influenced who is more 
dificult to decide. To present these international actors as means-end focussed, while 
national actors are more willing to think of the well-being of citizens, is in my opinion 
not accurate. However, my interpretation is not necessarily one in which international 
organizations are regarded very positively; it is more an interpretation which questions 
the view that Member States are more generous or “kind” when offering family policy 
arrangements such as parental leave or kindergartens. For instance, the parental leave 
schemes of Nordic countries, which are now increasingly being recommended by the 
EU and OECD, link the level of payment one receives while on leave to former 
employment record. Paid leave is conditioned upon a former employment record, 
implying that inactive residents will get substantially lower benefits than people who 
have been, or are, employed. Actually, one of the main reasons why the EU and 
OECD commend Nordic policies is exactly their apparent ability to bring about higher 
employment rates and fertility rates.  
Kildal (forthcoming 2009) argues that the national and international goals of 
welfare policy might be converging, departing from former normative justifications of 
social policy, such as solidarity or social justice. I welcome studies comparing the 
justification of family policy at the national and international level. I suspect that such 
an undertaking would reveal that the claim that, while countries have real family 
policy, international actors have no such thing, but only instrumental employment-
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oriented social policies with certain impacts on family policy, is at best incomplete. 
International actors have been very late to put family policy on the agenda, but now 
they have at least some kind of family policy advice and much of this is adapted from 
their Member States.  
 An interesting question is why the instrumental approach and economic 
language is so dominant among national and international actors promoting family 
policy reforms. My interview data sheds some light on this. Several German 
interviewees underline how the use of an economic language, e.g. the business case for 
family-friendly policies, is deliberate tin order to reach the private sector and convince 
them to cooperate (German interviews 1, 4, 6). The economization of the debate is 
thus part of presenting family-friendly policies as a productive factor and a malleable 
idea; by introducing family-friendly policies one addresses a number of challenges at 
the same time. Barbier (2005: 437) notes that those who want the EU to engage more 
in social policy must make use of an economic language to be convincing. Lister notes 
how an instrumental approach to children’s policy could be useful at the level of the 
EU, where social policy is subordinated to employment economic goals (2008: 402). It 
is probably crucial to use this economic language in order to receive sufficient 
attention, both at the national and international level. This is expressed directly by 
former family minister Renate Schmidt in a speech some years ago:  
 
”I have spoken about family policy in a distant manner and from an economic perspective. I 
do that because I want to liberate family policy from the dubious reputation of a soft, female 
topic. I do that because companies in difficult times are best convinced by hard economic 
facts. Family policy is the central topic, an important educational and economical topic, in one 
word: Family policy is politics for the future” (2004a: 5, my translation). 
 
Bøås and McNeil (2004) ask what makes an idea attractive for international 
organizations. In my case, the anticipated economic benefits associated with Nordic 
family policy have probably been crucial, underlining how ideas, interests, and context 
work together. The process whereby Nordic family policy characteristics became 
adopted and later disseminated as best practice by the EU and OECD should be 
studied further. And, if my analysis is correct, one should be careful in criticizing 
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international actors for having an instrumental approach to and economic perspective 
of family policy. Instead, if one finds such an approach unfortunate, one should 
criticize its Member States. Ostner and Schmitt (2008) and Gupta et al. (2006) offer 
discussions of whether Nordic family policy is a model other countries should import. 
They point at how women still are still the main carers in these countries, something 
the rather low take-up rates for men’s parental leave, the highly gendered labour 
market, and the considerable gender pay gap, illustrate.213 Reconciliation policies may, 
according to Hantrais, dilute the family dimension of policy by focussing too much on 
work issues (2004a: 169). I find it just as interesting to discuss such questions as 
whether IOs are presenting neo-liberal ideas or not. 
Furthermore, and continuing the critical undertaking, I question what is a 
central premise in both the publications of international actors like the EU and OECD, 
but also for national governments reforming their family policies; is public policy 
really the crucial factor which will change citizens’ attitudes and behaviour towards 
the aims of policy makers? Although some of the OECD reports mention the 
uncertainty connected with the effect of public policies on, for instance, fertility rates 
(e.g. OECD 2003a: 26, Sleebos 2003), the reports rely on a fairly strong belief in how 
public intervention and provision of benefits and services will result in the wanted 
policy objectives. As one example, the OECD emphasizes again and again how 
financial incentives are crucial in making parents act “the right way” or avoid “the 
wrong one”. Without engaging in a long discussion, I will mention that it is rather easy 
to find examples of how countries without generous state support have experienced 
high birth rates (Ireland, USA, Turkey), while inhabitants enjoying a more family-
friendly governmental policy have not always responded in the same way. In Sweden, 
fertility rates have increased and decreased in concordance with the economic situation 
and labour market prospects. Similarly, inhabitants in the eastern part of Germany, 
which was the German Democratic Republic until 1990, enjoy substantially higher 
childcare coverage than their fellow countrymen in other parts, but still do not have 
higher birth rates. And female labour market participation in Norway has been high for 
                                                 
213 In Norway, an Equal Pay Commission (Likelønnskommisjonen) recently issued its report on how to narrow 
the wage gap between men and women. A restructuring of central family policies like parental leave was one 
topic in this report. Cf. the webpage http://www.likelonn.no/in-english.72942.no.html  
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decades and long before the supportive family policies were introduced (Ellingsæter 
2003: 423).  
The reasons why people in these countries have acted like they have are 
numerous, as, for instance, both cultural attitudes and the general economic situation 
matter a great deal. Research in this area is still uncertain and does not allow for 
definitive conclusions (e.g. Hantrais and Letablier 1996, Strohmeier 2002, Hantrais 
2004a, Lappegård 2007, Rønsen and Skrede 2007, Knijn and Ostner 2008).214 These 
considerations could, in my opinion, have been given more space in OECD and EU 
reports.215  
A few words on the possible convergence between Norwegian and German 
family policy are in order. As discussed in chapter 7, there can be no doubt that the 
German parental leave and childcare reforms are heavily inspired by Scandinavian 
arrangements. And the planned introduction of a cash-for-care benefit is similar to the 
Norwegian kontantstøtte. While Germany has a substantially lower parental leave 
benefit (67 vs 80 or 100 percent income replacement) and childcare coverage for 
children aged less than three, compared with Norway, Germany has taken the front 
seat in other ways. The father’s quota is longer than the Norwegian counterpart and 
perhaps more important; Germany has introduced an individual right to leave, whereas 
Norwegian men still rely on the employment record of their spouses. If Germany has 
learned from Norway and other Scandinavian countries, these last characteristics of 
German family policy could be imported by Norway.216  
A topic for future research is the role of experts in welfare state reform. This is 
not a new topic; in Germany it has, for instance, been addressed by Lutz (1998) for the 
period until Unification, and Knijn and Smit (2007) and Lister (2008) have briefly 
looked at this in an EU perspective. However, within the family policy sphere this 
                                                 
214 Whether family policy has an impact on demographic trends, family formation, living standard, living 
arrangements, the family – employment relationship etc has been studied by several scholars. See Hantrais 
(2004) for more references and useful overviews.  
215 One obvious question regarding the reforms I have studied then is ”did they work?” The question is 
particularly interesting for the recent German reforms since the effect of the Norwegian cash-for-care has been 
studied already (see chapter 8, section 8.2) and the extension of childcare is about increasing already high 
coverage rates. However, this is beyond the scope of my analysis and I refer the reader to the Federal Statistical 
Office (Destatis 2008), Henninger et al. (2008), Kluve, Schmidt, Tamm and Winter (2008) or Klose 
(forthcoming 2008) for more information. 
216 As the Norwegian government coalition presented its state budget for 2009, a plan to increase the father’s 
quota by four weeks from July 2009, reaching a total of ten weeks, was stated.  
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could be interesting to scrutinize further. An influential scholar like Esping-Andersen 
has played an important role at the international level. The 2001 Belgian EU 
presidency asked him, together with colleagues to write a report on welfare 
arrangements in Europe. The report A new Welfare Architecture for Europe is 
definitely a possible source of influence on EU and national family policy. Esping-
Andersen et al. incorporated much of this report in the book Why we need a New 
Welfare State (2002), where the family is given a central role. Esping-Andersen has 
also served as an expert for individual European countries like Spain. In Germany, a 
scholar like Bertram has played an important role through his participation in 
governmental commissions and the writing of commissioned reports, like the Seventh 
Family Report and one on sustainable family policy (Bertram et al. 2006). 
Interestingly, Bertram has also worked for international bodies. In 2006 he wrote a 
report on children’s well-being and poverty in Germany for the UNICEF. Peter Moss 
is a third example of a scholar who has been active at the international level, e.g. 
within the EU childcare network in the 1990s, and in the OECD in the last years as 
part of the ECEC study and review teams.  
The way scholars like Esping-Andersen, Bertram and Moss are part both of a 
national and international epistemic community, to use Haas´ (1992) term, probably 
gives them great influence in the development and diffusion of national and 
international family policy ideas. I think this warrants a study, perhaps in combination 
with the role of welfare commissions. Many European countries have witnessed the 
establishment of such commissions in the preparation of welfare reforms. 
Governments have appointed them to evaluate welfare schemes and lay the basis for 
reforms. Some of these commissions have dealt specifically with the challenges of an 
ageing society (e.g. the Norwegian and the UK Pensions Commissions), while others 
have been given a broader mandate (e.g. the German or the Danish Welfare 
Commissions). The rationale for the establishment of such expert commissions can be 
a combination of needs for expertise, legitimacy of subsequent governmental reforms, 
and the depolitization of public debate. The role of such commissions has received 
some attention in welfare research (e.g. Kropp 2003, Borchorst and Goul Andersen 
2006, Ervik 2006, Immergut, Anderson and Schulze 2007), but hardly from a family 
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policy perspective. Welfare commissions have been one important supplier of terms, 
and to shed light on their, and individual experts like Esping-Andersen’s, function in 
the reform processes of different countries would be a significant contribution to the 
field of family policy reforms. My work could thus be taken a step further by a study 
of the role of such internationally oriented experts. Such a study could also add to our 
understanding of whether an international family policy is emerging, e.g. within the 
EU and OECD.  
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Appendix  
 
 
Appendix 1: Description of the project Policy Discourses, 
International Actors and National Welfare Policy. Norway in a 
Comparative Perspective. 
 
The following presentation is taken from the webpage of the Rokkan Centre 
(http://www.rokkan.uib.no/projects/?/$present&id=198, accessed 22.10.2008): 
Policy Discourses, International Actors and National Welfare Policy. Norway in a 
Comparative Perspective. 
2005 - 2008 / Prosjektnummer 800306 
This project asks how welfare policies are shaped by the interaction of international and 
national actors. It explores what consequences the discourses of international 
organisations (the discourses on `rights and duties´, `targeting´, `active aging´ and 
`the sustainability of the welfare state´) have on national welfare systems. Selecting 
discourses that encompass the interrelationship between welfare and work as a common 
denominator, and providing a comparative framework of analysis will increase our 
knowledge about the connection between the economy and the means of welfare policy.  
 
The project will shed light on this topic by applying a combination of two different 
approaches: Firstly, a macro- perspective that scrutinizes how overarching processes 
such as globalization and Europeanization (of discourses) frame policy-making in four 
countries, with primary emphasis on Germany and Norway, and including to a varying 
degree Denmark and the UK as secondary comparative cases. Secondly, an institutional 
perspective stressing the significance of national constellations of historically established 
work, welfare, and social partnership institutions in shaping the potential for welfare 
policy stability and reform.  
 
Project employer  
o The Research Council of Norway  
Project leader  
o Nanna Kildal (Senior Researcher, Mag. Art.) 
 
People working on the project  
o Rune Ervik (Senior Researcher, Dr. Polit.)  
o Aksel Hatland (Senior Researcher in supplementary position, Dr.philos.)  
o Stein Kuhnle (Professor, Cand. Polit.)  
o Tord Skogedal Lindén (PhD Candidate, Master)  
o Even Nilssen (Senior Researcher, Dr.polit.) 
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Appendix 2: Interview request 
 
I used similar versions of the letter template translated into German and Norwegian when 
contacting informants in the two countries. 
 
Interview request regarding research project on Policy Discourses, International 
Actors and National Welfare Policy 
 
 
 
Dear Mr/Ms. XXX 
 
 
In connection with an ongoing project titled ‘Policy discourses, international actors and 
national welfare policy’ we are planning to conduct a series of interviews with central experts 
and policy actors within the welfare policy area at international (European Union and OECD) 
and national levels. Therefore we now contact you to ask if you would agree to participate in 
an interview on this occasion. Your help would be highly appreciated. 
 
Our research project is conducted at the Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, University of 
Bergen and is financed by the Norwegian Research Council within the research program on 
Welfare.  
 
In our project we ask how domestic welfare policies are shaped by the interaction of 
international and national actors. It explores what consequences the discourses of 
international organisations within the areas of social inclusion, labour market, pensions and 
family policy, have on national welfare systems. Selecting discourses that encompass the 
interrelationship between welfare and work as a common denominator, and providing a 
comparative framework of analysis, a main  aim is to increase our knowledge about the 
connection between the economy and the means of welfare policy. 
 
The interview will last a maximum of 1-1.5 hours. During this time we will ask a series of 
questions about economic and social policy ideas, policy processes and possible policy 
outcomes. With your permission, the interview will be recorded. However you can be assured 
that the information will be treated confidentially. You may also withdraw from the interview 
at any point.  
 
The interviews will preferably be conducted during week 6 and 7 in 2007 (06.02.2007-
19.02.2007). If you agree to be interviewed please indicate a date and time suitable for you 
within this time schedule. If this period is not possible please suggest a more suitable date and 
time for you. 
 
For your information, we provide the link to our research project below: 
http://www.rokkansenteret.uib.no/projects/?/$present&id=198 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
XX 
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Appendix 3: Interview guide and informants 
 
I conducted the interviews in English and German without relying on intermediaries. The 
interview guide below from an interview with an OECD official serves as one example of 
which questions I posed. The interview guides were adjusted to each interview. Interviews 
and transcription were conducted in Norwegian, English and German. Selected transcripts, 
used in the analysis in the form of quotes, were later translated into English. I thus avoid 
filtered and selective access (Hantrais 2003b: 9). However, questions were developed within 
the larger research group and/or with the help of native speakers in order to make sure that 
questions were asked in a proper way. We focussed on ensuring clarity and avoiding leading 
questions (Kvale 1996: 12). And particularly for the German interviews (interview 
transcripts) I asked a native speaker to check my translations. This goes also for quotations 
from other German sources (parliamentary debates, policy documents and newspapers). 
An important challenge when conducting interviews is the issue of anonymity and the 
reader’s possibility to check information based on such interviews. Many textbooks on 
methodology stress how the researcher must maintain the confidentiality and privacy of 
interviewees (e.g. Widerberg 2001, Ryen 2002, Mason 2002, Grønmo 2004). Several studies 
underline how they ensure confidentiality and anonymity by referring to interview codes 
instead of real names (e.g. Büchs and Friedrich 2005, Falkner et al. 2005), but few discusses 
that this could also be problematic (exceptions provided for instance by Smith 1990, Mishler 
1991, Kvale 1996, Kvale and Brinkmann 2008, Kvale 2008). However, there is a potential 
conflict between norms of scientific research and the wish to protect confidentiality (Kvale 
1996: 115, Kvale and Brinkmann 2008: 72). Hiding the identity of your interviewee makes 
intersubjective control and reproducing of findings impossible.217 Smith (1990: 262) asks how 
other scholars can check research “if no one knows exactly who is who, and where and when 
the events took place" (1996: 115). I consider this to be an important objection that is under 
researched in existing literature on interviewing. Can you trust people who only want to talk 
“off the record”? To what extent are interviewees representative of a field of study? The 
trustworthiness of a study would increase if all informants were referred to by full name and 
position. The problem is, of course, that it is more difficult to get people to participate if they 
are not guaranteed anonymity.218 
                                                 
217 Within journalism the use of anonymous sources is debated regularly and this reflects the same dilemmas. 
218 Mishler discusses other aspects of confidentiality. He does not recommend a general identification of 
informants, but draws attention towards ethical dilemmas, for instance that confidentiality is not always in the 
interests of interviewees who are then partly “deprived of their voice” (1991: 125).  
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Although some of my interviewees have allowed me to refer directly to them, I rely on 
interview codes in my presentation. The only exception is a former minister of family affairs, 
Renate Schmidt, who I name since such top politicians are used to give interviews and usually 
have no problems with being identified. I think that my solution is somewhat unfortunate, not 
the least since I have talked to several high level bureaucrats, politicians and researchers 
whose names most likely would increase the readers trust in my analysis. However, it would 
be even more unfortunate not to get to speak to these informants.  
 
 
Interviewguide OECD representative 
 
 
Presentation of project, permission to tape the interview, questions of confidentiality etc. 
 
Thank you very much for agreeing to help us with our research conducted at the Stein Rokkan 
Centre for Social Studies, University of Bergen. Our project is financed by the Norwegian 
Research Council within the research program on Welfare. In our project we ask how welfare 
policies are shaped by the interaction of international and national actors. It explores what 
consequences the discourses of international organisations, within the areas of social 
inclusion, labour market, pensions and family policy, have on national welfare systems. 
Selecting discourses that encompass the interrelationship between welfare and work as a 
common denominator, and providing a comparative framework of analysis the aim is to 
increase our knowledge about the connection between the economy and the means of welfare 
policy. 
 
Warm up 
 
1. What are your responsibilities in the OECD? 
 
2. How did you get this position?  
Academic/professional, career path 
 
Family policy in the OECD 
 
3. What does the OECD do in the field of family policy?  
 
4. Since when and why does the OECD take an interest in this policy field? Which actors 
want more family policy? When did these issues emerge on the policy agenda?  
 
5. How is family policy recommendations developed in the OECD and who are the actors in 
this process? 
 - Do individual countries try to influence the direction etc? OMC-similar processes or?  
- Are there any conflicts between policy actors pushing forwards proposals and competing 
policy views? 
 
6. Do individual countries deliver input in this process? Does Norway? Germany? What kind 
of national experts do you work with; bureaucrats or politicians? (Epistemic communities) 
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7. Do the economically-oriented players or the socially-oriented players dominate the debate 
about family policy arrangements?  
 
Regarding the Babies and Bosses series: 
 
8. Who choose which countries are studied?  
 
9. Does the OECD give advice to countries not scrutinized in the reports? Are the identified 
problems and solutions offered thought to apply also to other member states than those treated 
directly by reports?  
 
10. Which status do reports like Babies and Bosses have in comparison with Economic 
Surveys, Economic Outlooks and so on? Are they read, considered and answered by national 
governments? Are they influential and authoritative?  
 
11. How would you assess the impact/influence of OECD in the field of family policy?  
- ideational arbitrator (disseminate policies) or artist (develop policies)? 
 
12. Is family policy used/included in other OECD-publications such as Economic Surveys or 
Economic Outlooks and used by other departments and directorates? 
 
Reading the Economic Survey of Norway of 2005 and February 2007 I can find no references 
to family policies at all and in the Survey on Germany in 2006 there are only a few comments 
on family issues regarding labour supply. Does this mean that family policy is not considered 
important enough by the OECD to be discussed and evaluated in Economic Surveys?  
 
Cooperation with other countries and organisations: 
  
13. Do the OECD and EU cooperate within family policies? How?  
 
14. How do you consider the role of the EU in family policy compared with the OECD?  
 
15. Two views seem very prominent on the agenda nowadays; 
d) Reconciliation of work and family life; 
e) Family policy as a productive factor (fertility, human capital, securing welfare) 
Would you say that this discourse originates with national governments or do they come from 
the international level or from somewhere else?  
 
16. Can you tell us about future initiatives planned by the OECD in the field of family policy?  
 
17. Are there any comments you would like to add or are there any specific issues you would 
like to elaborate? 
 
18. Do you accept that we make references to this interview in future publications?  
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Appendix 4 Closer on parliamentary debates in Germany and 
Norway and list of debate material analyzed 
 
Germany 
In Germany, new laws must pass three readings before they are accepted. For both the 
Elterngeld and TAG-reform I therefore analyze the minutes of plenary proceedings 
(Plenarprotokoll) of these three readings. It is common for the opposition to propose 
amendments to or changes of the original bill in the form of an application (German: Antrag) 
and I include such documents when they are discussed together with the bill in parliament. In 
addition, I analyze the actual reform proposals (Gesetzentwurf) which in Germany have 
explanatory statements. These explanations of draft laws have some of the same functions as 
white and green papers (Büchs 2006: 66). 
In practice, I have used the search engine of the Bundestag (DIP; Documentation and 
Information System for Parliamentary Materials) to identify the minutes of plenary 
proceedings of the three readings by searching for “Elterngeld” and 
“Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz”. The front pages of these documents have a table of contents 
listing the topics and documents discussed in the debates as well as the MPs participating. I 
have then printed and analyzed these debates and the other documents listed in the table of 
contents.  
This approach has one obvious limitation: As I rely on documents discussed during the 
Bundestag´s three readings of the bill, I do not gain access to the proceedings of the Federal 
Council (Bundesrat). Being a federal state, the Federal Council, which is representing the 
interests of the states, must approve new laws which affect the states. Both the reforms in 
question were discussed in this chamber and I thus should include debates from the Bundesrat 
as well. This is done by simply entering the terms “Elterngeld” and 
“Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz” in the search engine and then print and analyze the 
corresponding debate to the readings in the Bundestag. Due to a technical problem with the 
DIP, the information service department of the Bundestag sent me the Bundesrat minutes of 
plenary proceedings for the TAG-reform. 
This sample means that not all documents connected with the reforms are analyzed. 
For instance, the opposition might have sent questions and comments to the government 
based on what they know about the bill under preparation before the government makes their 
bill public. Also, there may be discussions after the bill is approved, e.g. if smaller changes to 
the new law is made. However, by including the minutes of plenary proceedings of both 
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houses, questions and amendments proposed by the opposition discussed during the readings 
as well as the draft law itself and the main debates in the Bundesrat I have a comprehensive 
material suitable for my search for traces of foreign influence on the reforms. 
While the Elterngeld and TAG-reform constitute the main reforms to be studied, I also 
include one later reform; the further extension of childcare and the introduction of a cash-for-
care benefit (Kifög; Kinderförderungsgesetz). Since this reform is of secondary interest and 
was approved by the Bundesrat as late as 7 November 2008, I pay less attention to it. 
Therefore I have not conducted a full search for documents and simply relied on a couple of 
documents that gives a hint at what is going on. This makes sense since the final treatment of 
the bill has not taken a place and a full search would be impossible. However, this also means 
that I must be extra careful when interpreting this material since it is not complete. 
Regarding references to the material, I rely on English translations of the German 
parliamentary expressions (cf. glossary; the translations from Germany are based on the 
official translations provided by the home page of the Bundestag). Original German quotes 
translated into English in the main text are gathered in appendix 5.1. Page numbers are given 
to make it easier if the reader should wish to check a quote or read a larger excerpt. 
 
 
List of debate material and documents referred to in the dissertation  
 
Document for TAG (Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz): 
 
Bundesrat (2004a): Plenarprotokoll 803. Stenografischer Bericht 803. Sitzung. Berlin, Freitag, 
den 24. September 2004.  
 
Bundesrat (2004b): Plenarprotokoll 806. Stenografischer Bericht 806. Sitzung. Berlin, 
Freitag, den 26. November 2004.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004a): Drucksache 15/2580. Antrag der SPD und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE 
GRÜNEN, Ausbau von Förderungsangeboten für Kinder in vielfältigen Formen als zentraler 
Beitrag öffentlicher Mitverantwortung für die Bildung, Erziehung und Betreuung von 
Kindern, 03.03.2004. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004b): Drucksache 15/2651. Antrag der CDU/CSU, Ausbau und 
Förderung der Tagespflege als Form der Kinderbetreuung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
09.03.2004.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004c): Drucksache 15/2697. Antrag der FDP, Faire Chancen für jedes 
Kind - Für eine bessere Bildung, Erziehung und Betreuung von Anfang an, 11.03.2004.  
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Deutscher Bundestag (2004d): Drucksache 15/3035. Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 
Ausschusses für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend zu dem Antrag der Abgeordneten 
Maria Eichhorn, Dr. Maria Böhmer, Antje Blumenthal, weiterer Abgeordneter und der 
Fraktion der CDU/CSU: Frauen und Männer beim Wiedereinstieg in den Beruf fördern. 
03.05.2004. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004e): Drucksache 15/3036. Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 
Ausschusses für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend – zu dem Antrag der Abgeordneten 
Caren Marks, Christel Humme, Sabine Bätzing, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der 
SPD sowie der Abgeordneten Ekin Deligöz, Irmingard Schewe-Gerigk, Jutta Dümpe-Krüger, 
weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion des BÜNDNISSES 90/DIE GRÜNEN: Ausbau von 
Förderungsangeboten für Kinder in vielfältigen Formen als zentraler Beitrag öffentlicher 
Mitverantwortung für die Bildung, Erziehung und Betreuung von Kindern, 03.05.2004. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004f): Drucksache 15/3488. Antrag der CDU/CSU, Elternhaus, 
Bildung und Betreuung verzahnen, 29.06.2004. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004g): Drucksache 15/3512. Antrag der FDP, Solides 
Finanzierungskonzept für den Ausbau von Kinderbetreuungsangeboten für unter Dreijährige, 
01.07.2004.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004h): Drucksache 15/3676. Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zum qualitätsorientierten und bedarfsgerechten Ausbau der 
Tagesbetreuung und zur Weiterentwicklung der Kinder- und Jugendhilfe 
(Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz – TAG). Berlin, 06.09.2004.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004i): Plenarprotokoll 15/123. Stenografischer Bericht 
123. Sitzung. Berlin, Donnerstag, den 9. September 2004.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004j): Drucksache 15/1590. Antrag der FDP, Tagespflege als 
Baustein zum bedarfsgerechten Kinderbetreuungsangebot - Bessere Rahmenbedingungen für 
Tagesmütter und -väter, Eltern und Kinder, 24.09.2004.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004k): Drucksache 15/3986. Unterrichtung durch die 
Bundesregierung Entwurf eines Gesetzes zum qualitätsorientierten und bedarfsgerechten 
Ausbau der Tagesbetreuung und zurWeiterentwicklung der Kinder- und Jugendhilfe 
(Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz – TAG) – Drucksache 15/3676 – Stellungnahme des 
Bundesrates und Gegenäußerung der Bundesregierung, 20.10.2004. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004l): Drucksache 15/4045. Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht 1 
Ausschuss für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 27.10.2004. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004m): Plenarprotokoll 15/135. Stenografischer Bericht 
135. Sitzung. Berlin, Donnerstag, den 28. Oktober 2004.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2004n): Drucksache 15/1983. Antrag der CDU/CSU, Frauen und 
Männer beim Wiedereinstieg in den Beruf fördern, 11.11.2004. 
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Documents for Elterngeld: 
 
 
Bundesrat (2006): Plenarprotokoll 827. Stenografischer Bericht 827. Sitzung. Berlin, Freitag, 
den 3. November 2006.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2006a): Drucksache 16/1168. Antrag der FDP, Flexible Konzepte für 
die Familie – Kinderbetreuung und frühkindliche Bildung zukunftsfähig machen, 05.04.2006. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2006b): Drucksache 16/1673. Antrag der BÜNDNIS 90/DIE 
GRÜNEN, Kinder fördern und Vereinbarkeit von Beruf und Familie stärken – 
Rechtsanspruch auf Kindertagesbetreuung ausweiten, 31.05.2006.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2006c): Drucksache 16/1877. Antrag der LINKE, Elterngeld sozial 
gestalten, 20.06.2006. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2006d): Drucksache 16/1889. Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der 
CDU/CSU und SPD, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung des Elterngeldes. Berlin, 
20.6.2006.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2006e): Plenarprotokoll 16/40. Stenografischer Bericht 40. Sitzung. 
Berlin, Freitag, den 22. Juni 2006.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2006f): Drucksache 16/2785. Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht, 
27.09.2006. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2006g): Drucksache 16/2788. Bericht des Haushaltsausschusses (8. 
Ausschuss) gemäß § 96 der Geschäftsordnung, 27.09.2006. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2006h): Plenarprotokoll 16/55. Stenografischer Bericht 55. Sitzung. 
Berlin, Freitag, den 29. September 2006.  
 
 
Documents for Kifög (the new expansion of childcare and the introduction of a cash-for-
care benefit): 
 
Bundesrat (2008): Plenarprotokoll 845. Stenografischer Bericht 845. Sitzung. Berlin, Freitag, 
den 13. Juni 2008.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2007): BT-Drucksache 16/6596. Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der 
CDU/CSU und SPD, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Errichtung eines Sondervermögens 
„Kinderbetreuungsausbau“, 09.10.2007. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2008a): BT-Drucksache 16/8406. Antrag der FDP, Faire Chancen für 
private und privat-gewerbliche Anbieter bei der Kinderbetreuung – ohne weiteres Zögern 
Entwurf des Kinderförderungsgesetzes vorlegen, 05.03.2008. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2008b): BT-Drucksache 16/9049. Unterrichtung durch die 
Bundesregierung Bericht der Bundesregierung über den Stand des Ausbaus für ein 
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bedarfsgerechtes Angebot an Kindertagesbetreuung für Kinder unter drei Jahren für das 
Berichtsjahr 2007, 30.04.2008. 
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2008c): BT-Drucksache 16/9299. Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der 
CDU/CSU und SPD, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Förderung von Kindern unter drei Jahren in 
Tageseinrichtungen und in der Kindertagespflege (Kinderförderungsgesetz – KiföG), 
27.05.2008.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2008d): Plenarprotokoll 16/163. Stenografischer Bericht 163. Sitzung. 
Berlin, Donnerstag, den 29. Mai 2008.  
 
Deutscher Bundestag (2008e): Plenarprotokoll 16/180. Stenografischer Bericht 180. Sitzung. 
Berlin, Freitag, den 26. September 2008.  
 
 
Norway 
 
For my German case, I have analyzed material in connection with the introduction of three 
laws in 2004, 2006 and 2008. For my Norwegian case, I analyze two family policy 
programmes in several phases (e.g. introduction/non-introduction, evaluations, 
extension/reduction). This is possible as the laws have existed for some time while the 
(approximately) corresponding German laws are rather new.  
For both the kontantstøtte and barnehage-reforms I analyze the minutes of plenary 
proceedings (Stortingstidende, St.tid). Like in Germany, it is common for the opposition to 
propose amendments to or changes of the original bill in the form of an application (e.g Dok 
8-forslag) and I include such documents when they are discussed in parliament. In addition, I 
analyze the actual reform proposals submitted to the parliament as Odelstingsproposisjon 
(proposition to the Odelsting; Ot.prp) and Stortingsproposisjoner (proposition to the Storting). 
I also study white papers (Stortingsmeldinger) and Recommendations to the Storting 
(Innstillinger til Stortinget). The term Stortingsforhandlinger (parliamentary records) contains 
all the documents referred to here. 
In practice, I have used the search engine of the Storting (Søk i publikasjoner fra 
storting og regjering) to identify the documents by searching for “kontantstøtte” (cash-for-
care benefit) and “barnehage” (childcare). The “list of hits” provides an overview of all 
parliamentary records (Stortingsforhandlinger) where these terms occur. I have then printed 
and analyzed the most relevant debates and the other documents listed in the table of contents.  
Regarding references to the material, I rely on English translations of the Norwegian 
parliamentary expressions (cf. glossary; the translations from Norwegian are based on the 
official translations provided by the home page of the Storting and government). Original 
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Norwegian quotes translated into English in the main text are, as the German equivalents, 
gathered in an appendix (5.2). Page numbers are given to make it easier if the reader should 
wish to check a quote or read a larger excerpt. 
It is important to note that the Storting changed its website and search engines 
substantially on the 29 October 2008. Since then, search options have been improved, making 
it easier to find the relevant texts and with more information in English. For instance, the 
whole process of deliberation on a parliamentary item through its various stages is now made 
more visible. However, this might confuse a reader trying to follow the steps of the approach 
described here. 
 
 
List of debate and documents material referred to in the dissertation 
 
 
Documents for kontantstøtte (cash-for-care benefit) 
 
 
Innst. O. nr. 19 (2005-2006) (recommendation to the Storting): Innstilling fra familie- og 
kulturkomiteen om lov om endringer i kontantstøtteloven mv. 
 
Innst.S. nr. 200 (1997-1998) (proposition to the Storting): Innstilling fra familie-, kultur- og 
administrasjonskomiteen om innføring av kontantstøtte til småbarnsforeldre. 
 
Innst.S. nr. 94 (2001-2002) (proposition to the Storting): Innstilling fra familie-, kultur- og 
administrasjonskomiteen om evaluering av kontantstøtten. 
 
Ot.prp. nr. 56 (1997-98) (proposition to the Odelsting): Om lov om kontantstøtte til 
småbarnsforeldre (kontantstøtteloven) 
 
Ot.prp. nr. 71 (1998-99) (proposition to the Odelsting): Om lov om endringer i 
kontantstøtteloven og folketrygdloven. 
 
St.tid (1996-1997a): Parliamentary debate, 21. November 1996, Sak nr. 1 - Innstilling fra 
familie,- kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om bevilgninger på statsbudsjettet for 1997 
vedkommende Finans- og tolldepartementet, Kulturdepartementet, Sosial- og 
helsedepartementet, Barne- og familiedepartementet og Administrasjonsdepartementet, og 
forslag fra stortingsrepresentant Erling Folkvord på vegne av Rød Valgallianse, vedrørende en 
støtteordning for norske multimediaprosjekter, oversendt fra Stortinget 31. oktober 1996. 
St.tid (1996-1997b): Parliamentary debate, 18. December 1996, Sak nr. 14 - Innstilling fra 
familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om forslag fra stortingsrepresentantene Valgerd 
Svarstad Haugland, Solveig Sollie og Lars Sponheim om et omsorgstillegg til barnetrygden 
(kontantstøtteordning). 
 
St.tid (1997-1998): Parliamentary debate, 10. June 1998, Sak nr. 1 og 2 - 1) Innstilling fra 
familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om innføring av kontantstøtte til 
småbarnsforeldre 
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St.tid (2001-2002a): Parliamentary debate, 18. April 2002, Sak nr. 8 - Innstilling fra familie-, 
kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om evaluering av kontantstøtten. 
 
St.tid (2005-2006): Parliamentary debate, 13. December 2005, Sak nr 2 - Innstilling fra 
familie- og kulturkomiteen om lov om endringer i kontantstøtteloven mv.  
 
St.tid (2007-2008): Parliamentary debate, 12. December 2007, Sak nr. 1 - Innstilling fra 
familie- og kulturkomiteen om bevilgninger på statsbudsjettet for 2008, kapitler under Barne- 
og likestillingsdepartementet, Kultur- og kirkedepartementet og Kunnskapsdepartementet 
(rammeområdene 2 og 3). 
 
St.meld. (White Paper) nr. 43 (2000-2001): Om evaluering av kontantstøtten. 
 
St.prp. nr. 53 (1997-98) (proposition to the Storting): Innføring av kontantstøtte til 
småbarnsforeldre. 
 
St.prp. nr. 29 (2005-2006): Om lov om endringer i kontantstøtteloven mv. 
 
 
Documents for barnehage (childcare): 
 
 
Innst.S. nr. 238 (2000-2001) (proposition to the Storting): Innstilling fra familie-, kultur- og 
administrasjonskomiteen om forslag fra stortingsrepresentantene Kristin Halvorsen og Ågot 
Valle om maksimalgrenser for oppholdsbetaling i barnehage og skolefritidsordning og rett til 
barnehageplass for alle barn. 
 
Ot.prp. nr. 72 (2004-2005): Om lov om barnehager (barnehageloven). 
 
Ot.prp. nr. 76 (2002-2003): Om lov om endringer i lov 5. mai 1995 nr. 19 om barnehager 
(barnehageloven). 
 
St.tid. (1999-2000): Parliamentary debate, 9. June 2002, Debatt i Stortinget - Møte fredag den 
9. juni kl. 9 2000 Sak nr. 2 - Innstilling fra familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om 
barnehage til beste for barn og foreldre.  
 
St.tid. (2000-2001a): Parliamentary debate, 31. May 2001, Sak nr. 7 - Innstilling fra familie-, 
kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om forslag fra stortingsrepresentantene Kristin Halvorsen 
og Ågot Valle om maksimalgrenser for oppholdsbetaling i barnehage og skolefritidsordning 
og rett til barnehageplass for alle barn. 
 
St.tid. (2000-2001b): Parliamentary debate, 13. December 2001, Sak nr. 1 - Innstilling fra 
familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om bevilgninger på statsbudsjettet for 2001 
vedkommende rammeområde 1 Arbeids- og administrasjonsdepartementet, Finans- og 
tolldepartementet og Sosial- og helsedepartementet, rammeområde 2 Barne- og 
familiedepartementet og rammeområde 3 Kulturdepartementet. 
 
St.tid. (2001-2002b): Parliamentary debate, 17. June 2002, Sak nr. 9 - Innstilling fra familie-, 
kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om forslag fra stortingsrepresentantene Carl I Hagen, 
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Kristin Halvorsen, Siv Jensen og Øystein Djupedal om maksimalsats for oppholdsbetaling i 
barnehager. 
 
St.tid. (2002-2003): Parliamentary debate, 16. June 2003, Sak nr. 60 - Innstilling fra familie-, 
kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om barnehagetilbud til alle - økonomi, mangfold og 
valgfrihet. 
 
St.tid. (2003-2004): Parliamentary debate, 2. April 2004, Sak nr. 5 - Innstilling fra familie-, 
kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om søskenmoderasjon i foreldrebetalingen m.m. 
 
St.tid (2004-2005a): Parliamentary debate, 10. June 2005, debatt i Odelstinget – møte fredag 
den 10. juni kl. 11.42. 2005, Sak nr. 1 - Innstilling fra familie-, kultur- og 
administrasjonskomiteen om lov om barnehager (barnehageloven).  
 
St.tid. (2004-2005b): Parliamentary debate, 10. June 2005, Sak nr. 2 - Innstilling fra familie-, 
kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om evaluering av maksimalpris i barnehager 
 
St.tid (2005-2006): Parliamentary debate, 8. juni 2006, sak nr. 4, Interpellasjon fra 
representanten May-Helen Molvær Grimstad til barne- og likestillingsministeren. 
 
St.tid (2006-2007a): Parliamentary debate, 16. April 2007, Sak nr. 1 - Innstilling frå kyrkje-, 
utdannings- og forskingskomiteen om ... og ingen sto igjen. Tidlig innsats for livslang læring  
 
St.tid (2006-2007b): Parliamentary debate, 13. December 2006, Sak nr. 1 - Innstilling fra 
familie- og kulturkomiteen om bevilgninger på statsbudsjettet for 2008, kapitler under Barne- 
og likestillingsdepartementet, Kultur- og kirkedepartementet og Kunnskapsdepartementet 
(rammeområdene 2 og 3). 
 
St.tid (2007-2008): Parliamentary debate, 12. December 2007, Sak nr. 1 - Innstilling fra 
familie- og kulturkomiteen om bevilgninger på statsbudsjettet for 2008, kapitler under Barne- 
og likestillingsdepartementet, Kultur- og kirkedepartementet og Kunnskapsdepartementet 
(rammeområdene 2 og 3). 
 
St.meld. (White Paper) nr. 27 (1999-2000): Barnehage til beste for barn og foreldre 
 
St.meld. (White Paper) nr. 24 (2002-2003): Barnehagetilbud til alle - økonomi, mangfold og 
valgfrihet 
 
St.meld. (White Paper) nr. 28 (2003-2004): Om søskenmoderasjon i foreldrebetalingen m.m. 
 
St.meld. (White Paper) nr. 28 (2004-2005): Om evaluering av maksimalpris i barnehager 
 
St.meld. (White Paper) nr. 16 (2006-2007): … og ingen sto igjen. Tidlig innsats for livslang 
læring 
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Appendix 5: Quotations in original language 
 
Appendix 5.1: Quotations in original German language from 
Parliamentary proceedings 
 
Chapter 7: 
 
“(...) we cannot accept to be in the lead regarding childlessness and the one on the bottom across all Europe 
regarding birth rates and at the same time be the last regarding early childhood care, education and child-raising 
institutions. Therefore the day-care expansion should have taken place a long time ago” (family minister Renate 
Schmidt, SPD, Bundesrat 2004a: 434). 
 
“(…), wir dürfen uns nicht damit abfinden, weltweit Spitzenreiter bei der Kinderlosigkeit und europaweit 
Schlusslicht bei der Geburtenrate zu sein und gleichzeitig Schlusslicht bei den Kinderbetreuungs-, Erziehungs- 
und Bildungseinrichtungen. Deshalb ist der Ausbau der Kinderbetreuung für die unter Dreijährigen überfällig“ 
(family minister Renate Schmidt, SPD, Bundesrat 2004a: 434). 
 
“We are not only the bottom one in Europe regarding the fertility rate, but also regarding care, education and 
child-raising institutions” (Renate Schmidt, SPD, Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 11194). 
 
“Wir sind nämlich nicht nur Schlusslicht bei der Geburtenrate in Europa, sondern auch bei Betreuungs-, 
Bildungs- und Erziehungseinrichtungen für Kinder“ (Renate Schmidt, SPD, Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 11194),  
 
„I am convinced: we will succeed in changing West-Germany’s position as a developing country regarding 
childcare, and in maintaining the good provision in East Germany” (Renate Schmidt, SPD, Deutscher Bundestag 
2004m: 12282). 
 
“Ich bin überzeugt: Wir werden es schaffen, dass West-Deutschland nicht Entwicklungsland in Sachen 
Kinderbetreuung bleibt, und den guten Versorgungsstand in Ostdeutschland erhalten“ (Renate Schmidt, SPD, 
Deutscher Bundestag 2004m: 12282). 
 
“Also in an international comparison, Germany is limping after the development in comparable industrialised 
countries. In Germany, childcare is an area in which considerable need for modernisation exists” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2004h: 24). 
 
„Auch im internationalen Vergleich hinkt Deutschland hinter der Entwicklung in vergleichbaren Industriestaaten 
her. Die Kinderbetreuung ist ein Feld, auf dem in Deutschland ein erheblicher Modernisierungsbedarf besteht“ 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2004h: 24). 
 
„One of the most dramatic results of the most recent comparative studies is for me the fact that in Germany more 
than in any other country the social background decides life and future opportunities for children. We are 
neglecting early childhood education, thus social inequalities and curtail the future of our children” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2004m: 12296). 
 
“Eines der dramatischsten Ergebnisse der internationalen Vergleichsstudien der jüngsten Vergangenheit ist für 
mich die Tatsache, dass in Deutschland wie in keinem anderen Land Europas die soziale Herkunft über die 
Lebens- und Zukunftschancen eines Kindes entscheidet. Wir vernachlässigen frühkindliche Bildung, 
zementieren so soziale Ungleichheiten und verengen damit die Zukunftsperspektiven unserer Kinder“ (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2004m: 12296). 
 
“We are spending more money than others and are still less successful because we have focused too much on 
benefits in kind and too little on extending infrastructure” (Deutscher Bundestag 2004m: 12283).  
 
„Wir geben mehr Geld als andere aus und sind dennoch weniger erfolgreich, weil wir zu sehr auf materielle 
Leistungen und zu wenig auf den Ausbau der Infrastrukturen gesetzt haben“ (Deutscher Bundestag 2004m: 
12283). 
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“Family yields profit” (Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 11193). 
 
„Familie bringt Gewinn” (Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 11193) 
 
„make the results of the OECD study „Starting Strong“ for Germany available for the German Bundestag and to 
help the Länder, municipalities and providers of services in the implementation of the OECD recommendations“ 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2004a: 5). 
 
„die Ergebnisse der OECD-Studie „Starting Strong“ für Deutschland dem Deutschen Bundestag und der 
Öffentlichkeit zeitnah zugänglich zu machen und zusammen mit Ländern, Gemeinden und freien Trägern an der 
Umsetzung der OECD-Vorschläge mitzuwirken“ (Deutscher Bundestag 2004a: 5). 
 
“Research proves that the rate of return for every Euro spent for small children is above average. Motivated and 
well-educated workers constitute a benefit for each firm. The potential of well-educated young men and women 
should be exploited. Childcare and early education are a locational advantage, both in international comparisons 
and between municipalities. That means economic growth. That is active economic policy, (...)” (Caren Marks, 
SPD, Deutscher Bundestag 2004i: 11208). 
 
„Wissenschaftlich ist belegt, dass sich gerade bei den Kleinkindern jeder eingesetzte Euro überdurchschnittlich 
rentiert. Motivierte und gut ausgebildete Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter sind ein Gewinn für jede Firma. Das 
Potenzial gut ausgebildeter junger Frauen und Männer ist gleichermaßen zu nutzen. Kinderbetreuung und frühe 
Förderung sind ein Standortvorteil, und zwar sowohl im kommunalen als auch im internationalen Vergleich. Das 
bedeutet Wirtschaftswachstum. Das ist aktive Wirtschaftspolitik, (...)“ (Caren Marks, SPD, Deutscher Bundestag 
2004i: 11208). 
 
„The benefit of childcare facilities and childminders for the economy is similarly underrated. Substantial income 
and savings are to be expected for public budgets if mothers wanting to can work due to a better infrastructure of 
childcare. Second, positions in the area of childcare facilities are created and within childminding persons 
become self-employed. Third, with a better infrastructure of childcare lone parents formerly dependent on social 
assistance can work. In West Germany, 70 percent of non-working mothers with children up to 12 years wants to 
work. They fail because of insufficient childcare provision. If we improve reconciliation of work and family life 
we can increase the female employment rate and influence the development of births positively through 
improved conditions for families. An increased female employment rate and positive development of births have 
immediate effects on the social security schemes. Just the increased female employment rate to the level of our 
Scandinavian neighbours would reduce the problems due to the demographic development of the pay-as-you-go 
financed pensions insurance substantially” (Deutscher Bundestag 2004c: 2, Antrag FDP). 
 
”Der volkswirtschaftliche Nutzen von Kindertageseinrichtungen und Tagespflege wird ebenfalls unterschätzt. 
Erhebliche Einnahme- und Einspareffekte für die öffentlichen Haushalte sind zu erwarten, wenn erstens 
erwerbswillige Mütter dank einer besseren Kinderbetreuungsinfrastruktur einer Erwerbstätigkeit nachgehen 
können. Zweitens werden im Bereich der Kindertageseinrichtungen Arbeitsplätze geschaffen oder in der 
Tagespflege selbständige Existenzen gegründet. Drittens können bisher auf Sozialhilfe angewiesene 
Alleinerziehende ebenfalls bei besserer Kinderbetreuung erwerbstätig sein. InWestdeutschland wünschen sich 
fast 70 Prozent der nichterwerbstätigen Mütter mit Kindern bis zu 12 Jahren die Aufnahme einer 
Erwerbstätigkeit. Sie scheitern am mangelhaften Kinderbetreuungsangebot. Wenn wir Vereinbarkeit von Familie 
und Erwerbsarbeit verbessern, können wir die Erwerbsquote von Frauen erhöhen und durch die Verbesserung 
der Rahmenbedingungen für Familien tendenziell positiv auf die Geburtenentwicklung einwirken. Die Erhöhung 
der Frauenerwerbsquote wie eine positive Geburtenentwicklung haben unmittelbare Wirkung für die sozialen 
Sicherungssysteme. Schon allein eine Steigerung der Frauenerwerbsquote auf das Niveau unserer 
skandinavischen Nachbarn würde die mit der demographischen Entwicklung verbundenen Finanzprobleme in 
der umlagefinanzierten Rentenversicherung spürbar abschwächen” (Deutscher Bundestag 2004c: 2, Antrag 
FDP). 
 
„Although Germany is in the upper third among European countries regarding benefits in cash, these benefits 
comparatively have not had satisfying effects” (Deutscher Bundestag 2006d: 1). 
 
„Obwohl Deutschland mit den finanziellen Leistungen für Familien im oberen Drittel der Rangfolge der 
europäischen Staaten liege, hätten diese Leistungen im Vergleich keine zufrieden stellende Wirkung entfaltet“ 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2006d: 1).  
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“Although we in Germany spend and provide more than 100 billion Euro on family policy benefits, we have one 
of the lowest birth rates in Europe” (Ina Lenke, FDP, Deutscher Bundestag 2006e: 3711). 
“Obwohl in Deutschland mehr als 100 Milliarden Euro für Leistungen für Familien ausgegeben und erbracht 
werden, haben wir in Europa eine der niedrigsten Geburtenraten“ (Ina Lenke, Deutscher Bundestag 2006e: 
3711). 
 
“Looking at countries like Sweden, where Elterngeld was introduced about ten years ago, one must note that 
childcare facilities also were very incomplete. Only the Elterngeld and the connected discussion has given the 
necessary push towards a comprehensive expansion of childcare facilities, and we all know who is primary 
responsible for that. It was very interesting to observe in the last weeks and months, how this discussion in the 
meantime has also started here and with full intensity. It is no longer discussed whether we need childcare 
facilities at all, but instead only how and when we can offer this to all children” (Deutscher Bundestag 2006e: 
3712). 
 
„Wenn man sich Länder anschaut wie Schweden, wo das Elterngeld vor rund 10 Jahren eingeführt worden ist, 
muss man feststellen, dass die Kinderbetreuung damals auch dort noch sehr lückenhaft war. Erst das Elterngeld 
und die Diskussion darüber haben den entscheidenden Schub zu einem flächendeckenden Ausbau der 
Kinderbetreuung gebracht, von dem wir alle wissen, wer für ihn die primäre Verantwortung hat. Es war ganz 
interessant, in den letzten Wochen und Monaten zu beobachten, wie diese Diskussion inzwischen auch bei uns 
eingesetzt hat, und zwar mit voller Vehemenz. Es wird gar nicht mehr darüber diskutiert, ob wir überhaupt 
Kinderbetreuung brauchen, sondern nur noch, wie und wann wir sie für alle Kinder ermöglichen können“ 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2006e: 3712). 
 
“From 2013 a monthly payment, for instance a cash-for-care benefit, will be introduced for parents who do not 
want to or cannot let their children be cared for in a childcare institution” (Deutscher Bundestag 2008c: 3). 
 
„Ab 2013 soll für diejenigen Eltern, die ihre Kinder von ein bis drei Jahren nicht in Tageseinrichtungen betreuen 
lassen wollen oder können, eine monatliche Zahlung (zum Beispiel Betreuungsgeld) eingeführt werden“ 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2008c: 3). 
 
“Only common standards across the country enable the mobility expected from parents in today’s working life. 
Therefore, an offer of qualified childcare meeting demand all over the Federal Republic of Germany is a central 
prerequisite for the attractiveness of Germany as an industrial location in today's globalised economy” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2008c: 12). 
 
„Nur einheitliche Basisnormen im Bundesgebiet schaffen die Voraussetzungen für die Mobilität, die von den 
Eltern heute im Arbeitsleben erwartet wird. Deshalb ist ein bedarfsgerechtes Angebot an qualifizierter 
Tagesbetreuung in allen Teilen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland heute eine zentrale Voraussetzung für die 
Attraktivität Deutschlands als Wirtschaftsstandort in einer globalisierten Wirtschaftsordnung“ (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2008c: 12). 
 
“When a country like Sweden from July this year is providing support in the amount of approx. € 300 for 
families which care for children between one and three at home – no one would claim that Sweden is a backward 
country or a country without social political responsibility – then this shows us that we are on the right way with 
our Betreuungsgeld” (Bundesrat 2008: 180). 
 
“Wenn ein Land wie beispielsweise Schweden ab Juli dieses Jahres Familien, die Kinder im Alter zwischen 
einem Jahr und drei Jahren zu Hause betreuen, mit ca. 300 Euro monatlich unterstützt – niemand wird sagen, 
dass Schweden ein rückständiges Land sei oder ein Land ohne hohe sozialpolitische Verantwortung –, dann zeigt 
das, dass wir mit der Verankerung des Betreuungsgeldes genau den richtigen Weg gehen“ (Bundesrat 2008: 
180). 
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Appendix 5.2: Quotations in original Norwegian language from 
Parliamentary proceedings  
 
Chapter 8: 
 
“We are actually on the top in Europe regarding benefits in cash and we will not abolish such arrangements. But 
what we have said in the acknowledgement that we are almost at the bottom regarding services in kind, (…), is 
that our priority towards year 2000 must be (…) the provision of childcare to an affordable price” (St.tid.1996-
1997: 1813). 
 
”Vi ligger faktisk også på europatoppen når det gjelder kontantstøtte, og vi har ikke tenkt å fjerne den ordninga. 
Men det vi videre har sagt i erkjennelsen av at vi ligger nesten på bunnen når det gjelder overføringer til tjenester 
- i dette tilfellet barnehager, (…) er at vår hovedprioritet fram mot år 2000 nå må være å greie å sikre alle 
foreldre, (…), et tilbud om barnehageplass til en pris som folk har råd til å betale” (St.tid.1996-1997: 1813). 
 
“(…) other countries practically flock to Norway to see and learn what we have done within gender equality” 
(Espen Johnsen, DNA, St.tid. 2007-2008: 1380). 
 
“(…) andre land nærast valfartar til Noreg for å sjå og lære av kva vi har gjort på likestillingsområdet, …” 
(Espen Johnsen, DNA, St.tid. 2007-2008: 1380). 
 
“The report calls attention to how Norway has a substantially lower number of pedagogues than countries which 
are natural to compare with. In Sweden, Denmark and Finland two thirds of the employees are educated 
pedagogues whereas the corresponding number in Norway is about one third (Early Childhood Education and 
Care in Norway, Country Note, OECD 1999)” (Ot.prp. nr. 72 (2004-2005): 98). 
 
”Rapporten påpeker imidlertid at Norge har en betydelig lavere pedagogtetthet enn land det er naturlig å 
sammenlikne seg med. I Sverige, Danmark og Finland er to tredjedeler av personalet utdannede pedagoger, mens 
det tilsvarende tallet i Norge er omtrent en tredjedel (Early Childhood Education and Care in Norway, Country 
Note, OECD 1999)” (Ot.prp. nr. 72 (2004-2005): 98). 
 
“International regulations and recommendations must be taken into consideration in Norwegian childcare policy. 
(…) the education-political trends we witness in the EU, OECD and in Europe, must have consequences for our 
childcare policy and our control of and attention to the childcare sector” (BFD 2005: 22). 
 
”Internasjonale føringer og anbefalinger må vurderes og tas hensyn til i den norske barnehagepolitikken. (…) de 
utdanningspolitiske trendene som vi ser i EU, OECD og i Europa for øvrig, må få konsekvenser for vår 
barnehagepolitikk og vår styring av og oppmerksomhet om barnehagesektoren” (BFD 2005: 22).   
 
“Norway and the other Nordic countries are reviewed positively by OECD experts. (…) However, in the opinion 
of the OECD, Norway has high parental fees, no age groups are entitled to free places, many still have no 
childcare place, the proportion of trained teachers is low and there is little long term research (OECD 1999). 
Furthermore, it is presumed that the Christian objects clause could be a challenge for children with a different 
religious background. Since 1999 many more children have received a childcare place, the municipalities are 
obliged to provide childcare places, the parental fee is reduced with the maximal price, and research is 
strengthened. Moreover, the objects clauses of the Day Care Institutions Act and Education Act are being 
evaluated by the Bostadutvalg (Bostad-commission, my addition). Norway and other Nordic countries are also 
reviewed positively in the OECD-report Starting Strong II (OECD 2006d). At the same time it is commented 
that Norway is the only Nordic country without a legal right to childcare places” (St.meld. nr. 16 2006-2007: 19, 
my translation). 
 
”Norge, og de øvrige nordiske land, har fått god omtale av OECDs eksperter. (…) Etter OECDs syn hadde 
Norge imidlertid høy foreldrebetaling, ingen aldersgrupper har rett til gratis tilbud, mange hadde fortsatt ikke 
barnehageplass, det er lav pedagogtetthet og lite langsiktig forskning. Videre ble det antatt at den kristne 
formålsbestemmelsen kunne være en utfordring når det gjelder barn med en annen religiøs bakgrunn. Siden 1999 
har mange flere barn fått barnehageplass, kommunene har fått en lovfestet plikt til å sørge for barnehageplasser, 
foreldrebetalingen er blitt lavere med maksimalpris, og det blir satset mer på forskning. Videre blir 
barnehagelovens og opplæringslovens formålsbestemmelser vurdert av et nylig nedsatt utvalg, Bostadutvalget. 
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Norge og de øvrige nordiske landene får også god omtale i OECD-rapporten Starting Strong II. Det pekes 
samtidig på at Norge er det eneste landet i Norden der det ikke er lovfestet rett til barnehageplass” (St.meld. nr. 
16 2006-2007: 19). 
 
”Dette viser at Barnehageløftet med satsning på full dekning og kvalitet i barnehagene er riktig. Det finnes 
fortsatt utfordringer, men det er betryggende å se at Norge er i tet på barnehageområdet” (KD 2006b). 
 
“This shows that our childcare promise emphasizing full coverage and quality in kindergartens is right. There are 
still challenges, but it is reassuring to see that Norway is in the lead within childcare” (KD 2006b). 
 
“The maximum price is inspired by a similar arrangement in Sweden, which has been an outstanding success. 
Here all Swedish parents and parties take a positive attitude towards the maximum price and would not think of 
removing it. Our hope and belief is that using a maximum price in a couple of years will be just as obvious in 
Norway as it is in Sweden today, simply because this is the only guarantee that parents profit from our efforts” 
(St.tid. 2002-2003: 3277). 
 
”Maksimalprisen er inspirert av en tilsvarende ordning i Sverige, som har vært en enestående suksess. Der står 
alle svenske foreldre og alle partier bak maksimaltaksten og vil ikke tenke på å ta den bort. Vårt håp og vår tro er 
at maksimalpris som virkemiddel i løpet av et par år vil være akkurat like selvfølgelig i Norge som den i dag er i 
Sverige, simpelthen fordi det er den eneste garantien vi har for at foreldrene får gevinsten av den satsingen vi 
gjør” (St.tid. 2002-2003: 3277). 
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Appendix 5.3: Quotations in original German language from official 
documents 
 
Chapter 4: 
 
“All parties have in principle taken a positive attitude towards the aim of Family minister Ursula von der Leyen 
of preparing another 500 000 childcare places for children less than three years old within 2013. Consequently 
the European standard on childcare centres is met, the minister emphasized in connection with the decision of 
the Bundestag” (BMFSFJ 2007). 
 
„Im Grundsatz haben sich alle Parteien hinter das Ziel von Bundesfamilienministerin Ursula von der Leyen 
gestellt, zusätzliche 500.000 Betreuungsplätze für die unter Dreijährigen bis zum Jahr 2013 bereitzustellen. 
Damit lasse sich der europäische Standard beim Angebot an Krippenplätzen erreichen, betonte die Ministerin 
anlässlich des Bundestagsbeschlusses“ (BMFSFJ 2007). 
 
 
Chapter 7: 
 
“Family friendliness is a substantial positive growth factor” (NRP 2005: 50). 
 
”Familienfreundlichkeit ist ein wesentlicher positiver Wachstums-faktor“ (NRP 2005: 50). 
 
“Germany follows the Swedish ideal” (BMFSFJ 2006a: 8). 
 
“Deutschland folgt damit dem schwedischen Vorbild” (BMFSFJ 2006a: 8) 
 
 
Chapter 9: 
 
”I have spoken about family policy in a distant manner and from an economic perspective. I do that because I 
want to liberate family policy from the dubious reputation of a soft, female topic. I do that because companies in 
difficult times are best convinced by hard economic facts. Family policy is the central socio-political topic, an 
important educational and economical topic, in one word: Family policy is politics for the future” (Schmidt 
2004a: 5) 
 
„Ich habe jetzt die ganze Zeit sehr distanziert und vor allem aus der ökonomischen Sicht über Familie 
gesprochen. Ich tue das, weil ich Familienpolitik aus dem Ruch eines WW - eines weichen Weiber-"Themas" - 
befreien möchte. Ich tue das, weil in schwierigen wirtschaftlichen Zeiten Unternehmen am besten durch harte 
ökonomische Fakten zu überzeugen sind. Familienpolitik ist das zentrale gesellschaftspolitische Thema, ein 
wichtiges bildungspolitisches und ein wichtiges ökonomisches Thema, mit einem Wort: Familienpolitik ist 
Zukunftspolitik“ (Schmidt 2004a: 5). 
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Appendix 5.4: Quotations in original Norwegian language from official 
documents 
 
Chapter 8: 
 
 
“In general, it is an interesting characteristic of the development [a mistake in the original source; “exchange” 
(utveksling) is written instead of “development” (utvikling)] that the EU seeks good practice for the 
establishment of a sustainable “European welfare state” which at the same time ensures competitiveness and 
where the combination of high employment, social security and high fertility is possible. The Nordic countries 
stand out positively. Norway is an interesting case and a potential conversation partner for policy development. 
This has allowed the minister to participate in the political debate during the informal ministerial meetings with 
colleagues from member countries, applicant countries and EFTA/EEA countries. The debate is interesting and 
useful in itself, but at the same time it gives good profiling and good reputation for Norway as a country leading 
the way. Speaking from experience; the better prepared, the better results in terms of being able to ensure that 
our interests are taken seriously, gain influence for [a mistake in the original source; “gets” is written instead of 
“for”] our ideas, establish new connections and collaborators, be consulted later in the process and regarding 
future participation in EU informal ministerial meetings” (BLD: 2007b: 23). 
 
”Generelt er det et interessant utvekslingstrekk [a mistake in the original source; “exchange” (utveksling) is 
written instead of “development” (utvikling)]at EU søker etter gode eksempler for innretningen av en bæredyktig 
"Europeiske velferdsstat", som samtidig ivaretar konkurranseevnen og hvor kombinasjonen av høy sysselsetting, 
sosial sikkerhet og høy fertilitet er mulig. De nordiske land peker seg positivt ut. Norge utgjør et interessant case 
og en potensiell samtalepartner for politikkutvikling.  Dette har medført at statsråden har kunnet delta i den 
politiske debatt under de uformelle ministermøtene med kollegaer fra medlemslandene, søkerlandene og 
EFTA/EØS-landene. Debatten er i seg selv interessant og nyttig, men gir samtidig god profilering og godt 
omdømme av Norge som et foregangsland. Erfaringen viser at jo bedre forberedt vi er - jo større er vårt utbytte 
når det gjelder - å kunne medvirke til at våre interesser blir tatt alvorlig, få gjennomslag får [a mistake in the 
original source; “gives” is written instead of “for”] våre ideer, få nye kontakter og samarbeidspartnere, bli tatt 
med på råd senere i prosessen og når det gjelder deltagelse på fremtidige uformelle ministermøter i EUs regi” 
(BLD: 2007b: 23).  
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Appendix 5.5: Quotations in original German language from newspapers 
 
Chapter 1:  
 
“Family is in. Reading the newspaper or watching television, it is almost impossible to avoid the flood of ideas 
which are presented, considered, rejected and presented again. Parental leave benefit. Cash-for-care. Childcare 
coverage. Tax splitting” (Der Spiegel special 2007a: 7). 
 
”Familie ist in. Wer die Zeitung aufschlägt oder vorm Fernseher sitzt, kann dem Schwall der Ideen, die 
vorgestellt, begutachtet, verworfen und neu präsentiert werden, kaum entgehen. Elterngeld. Betreuungsgeld. 
Krippenplätze. Ehegattensplitting“(Der Spiegel special 2007a: 7). 
 
Chapter 4: 
 
“The OECD welcomed measures such as the Elterngeld introduced in January 2007 and the planned extension of 
childcare facilities. However, cash benefits like the cash-for-care allowance, due in 2013, were criticized. The 
effects are often ´disastrous`. It disposes of work incentives” (FAZ 2007a). 
 
”Die OECD begrüßte zugleich Maßnahmen wie das im Januar 2007 eingeführte Elterngeld und den geplanten 
Ausbau der Kinderbetreuung. Transferleistungen wie das für 2013 geplante Betreuungsgeld werden dagegen 
kritisiert. Die Effekte seien „oft desaströs“. Sie zerstörten die Anreize zur Arbeitsaufnahme” (FAZ 2007a). 
 
Chapter 8: 
 
„Angela Merkel tries to calm critics to her left and right by giving something to all: Yes to extension of 
childcare. Yes to a legal right for a childcare place. Yes to a cash-for-care benefit for families preferring to raise 
their children at home. Stop nagging – there is enough for all, is the slogan“ (FAZ 2007b).  
 
 „Angela Merkel versucht die Kritiker zu ihrer Linken und Rechten zu beruhigen, indem sie allen nachgibt: Ja 
zum Ausbau der Krippenplätze. Ja zum Rechtsanspruch auf einen Betreuungsplatz. Ja zum Betreuungsgeld für 
die Familien, die ihre Kinder zu Hause aufziehen wollen. Nicht drängeln - es ist genug für alle da, lautet das 
Motto“ (FAZ 2007b). 
 
Appendix 5.6: Quotations in original Norwegian language from 
newspapers 
 
Chapter 4: 
 
”In fact, the success of private companies is now in many ways related to good family policy. Therefore we have 
become an export article on the same level as oil, gas and tourism, says Arni Hole“ (Aftenposten 13.10.2007). 
 
"Det er faktisk sånn nå at bedriftsøkonomisk suksess på mange måter henger sammen med god familiepolitikk. 
Derfor er vi blitt en eksportartikkel på linje med olje, gass og turisme, sier Arni Hole" (Aftenposten 13.10.2007). 
 
 
Chapter 8: 
 
“Germany wishes to adopt our vision; redistribution of work, care and power between the sexes” (Aftenposten 
13.10.2007). 
 
“Tyskland ønsker å adoptere vår visjon; omfordeling av arbeid, omsorg og makt mellom kjønnene” (Aftenposten 
13.10.2007). 
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Appendix 6: Examples of possible EU and OECD peer pressure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 EU: Example of mechanism 1 and 4: peer pressure and learning 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2007) Promoting solidarity between the generations, p. 14.  
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Chapter 5 EU: Example of mechanism 1 and 4: peer pressure and learning 
 
Inactivity rates of women, in %, 2006  
   25-54 years old  
 15-64 years old 
15-24 years 
old Total 
Due to family 
responsibilities 
55-64 years 
old 
EU27  37.1  59.4 23.6 10.2  62.9 
Belgium  40.5  68.1 23.0 10.1  75.4 
Bulgaria  39.8  73.6 20.6 7.7  66.1 
Czech Republic  37.7  70.8 18.7 12.4  66.0 
Denmark  23.0  30.7 14.6 2.3  43.3 
Germany  30.5  52.2 18.6 9.9  52.7 
Estonia  30.7  69.4 14.3 8.5  39.5 
Ireland  38.7  52.2 29.5 23.1  59.2 
Greece  45.0  71.3 30.9 18.8  72.0 
Spain  40.0  55.9 28.8 18.2  69.6 
France  35.9  65.4 19.8 4.9  63.0 
Italy  49.2  73.1 35.7 15.2  77.5 
Cyprus  36.2  61.7 22.6 18.3  62.2 
Latvia  33.4  66.4 17.1 8.8  48.4 
Lithuania  35.4  76.9 16.2 7.1  52.4 
Luxembourg  41.8  75.0 26.3 21.7  71.5 
Hungary  44.5  76.6 27.1 11.6  71.8 
Malta  61.7  50.9 58.9 45.9  88.4 
Netherlands  29.7  31.6 20.4 8.3  60.7 
Austria  33.0  44.9 19.1 12.8  73.1 
Poland  43.2  69.3 24.6 12.0  79.7 
Portugal  31.6  61.3 17.3 8.7  54.9 
Romania  43.4  74.1 27.4 11.7  65.2 
Slovenia  33.2  63.6 13.0 3.9  78.6 
Slovakia  39.1  69.1 18.8 11.4  79.1 
Finland  25.0  39.2 14.6 6.2  42.8 
Sweden  23.7  48.1 13.7 2.1  30.4 
United Kingdom  30.8  41.6 22.1 1.9  49.9 
Croatia  43.1  68.4 24.8 11.0  73.1 
Turkey  73.9  76.3 71.5 62.6  83.2 
Iceland  16.6  19.7 15.2 3.2  18.8 
Norway  25.2  42.1 16.7 2.7  37.8 
Switzerland  25.3  32.9 18.8 13.7  41.4 
1.  
Inactive persons are persons who are neither employed nor unemployed. Inactivity rate is the share of 
the inactive population as a % of the total population (living in private households) in the same age 
group.  
2.  Family responsibilities may include marriage, pregnancy, childcare, serious illness of another member 
of the family, long vacation. Own illness is not included.  
3.  Eurostat, Statistics in focus, 122/2007 "People outside the labour force: the downward trend continues”. 
Available free of charge in PDF format on the Eurostat website.  
Source: Eurostat news release (2007): Women outside the labour force in 2006: One woman in ten aged 25-54 
in the EU27 is inactive due to family responsibilities. 169/2007 - 6 December 2007. My own emphasis of 
Germany and Norway.  
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Chapter 6 OECD: Example of mechanism 1: Country recommendations 
 
Box 1.2. Family-friendly policy recommendations for Canada, Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom (cont.) 
Finland 
The simultaneous provision of a childcare guarantee and Home Care Allowance 
payments to parents who do not use municipal childcare support, increases choice 
to parents with children not yet 3 years of age. However, given the level (some 
municipalities provide additional payments) and duration of payments, it is no 
surprise that many parents of very young children, usually mothers, are not in paid 
work. This reduces female earnings profiles and hampers the pursuit of gender 
equity objectives. Moreover, the system of Home Care Allowances holds back 
labour supply growth, while projections point to emerging labour supply concerns. 
For these reasons, policy should consider reform options limiting benefit payments 
and/or duration.  
To contribute to the long-term financial viability of the childcare system, maintain 
where possible, the role of family day-care services as such services are less costly 
than centre-based care services. Explore opportunities to extend out-of-school-
hours care entitlements to children aged 9-10. 
To encourage part-time work, reform the current partial care payments for parents 
with children up to school age into a part-time work entitlement of two years, and 
use current funding to finance benefit payments during this period. 
Sweden 
To contribute to the long-term financial viability of the childcare system, maintain 
where possible, the role of family day-care services, as such services are less costly 
than centre-based care services. 
Take measures aimed at reducing the differences in the use of parental leave 
between men and women by, for example, granting a bonus to parents who equally 
share parental leave entitlements, increasing the duration of leave periods that are 
non-transferable between the parents, and/or increasing information to both parents 
about fathers’ rights to parental leave. 
To give employers due notice on the return of their employees, consider increasing 
the notice period for parents on parental leave to approximately two months. 
 
Source: OECD 2005: 14 
 
  
358
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 OECD: Example of mechanism 2: A figure comparing Norway’s 
achievements on several family policy related indicators with other OECD members;  
 
Figure 1: Babies and Bosses - Key Outcomes of Norway compared to OECD average 
Send Print  
 
 
Source: Key Outcomes of countries compared to OECD average, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/45/0,3343,en_2649_34819_39651501_1_1_1_1,00.html, retrieved 
10.05.2008.  
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Chapter 6 OECD: Example of mechanism 2: Ranking of childcare participation 
rates; 
 
Chart 6.2. For children aged three and over childcare participation rates are generally high 
 
 
Countries are ranked in descending order of 3 to 5 year old enrolment rates 
      
Source: OECD Family database and OECD Education database.  
      
   3 - 5 years 0 - 3 years  
  France  101,9 28,0  
  Italy 100,3 6,3  
  Belgium  99,6 33,6  
  Spain  98,6 20,7  
  Iceland  94,7 58,7  
  New Zealand  92,7 32,1  
  Denmark  89,7 61,7  
  Hungary 86,9 6,9  
  Sweden  86,6 39,5  
  Japan  86,4 15,2  
  Czech Republic  85,3 3,0  
  Norway  85,1 43,7  
  United Kingdom  80,5 25,8  
  Germany  80,3 9,0  
  Portugal 77,9 23,5  
  Austria  74,0 6,6  
  Slovak Republic  72,4 17,7  
  Luxembourg  72,3 14,0  
  Australia  71,5 29,0  
  Netherlands  70,2 29,5  
  Ireland  68,2 15,0  
  Mexico  64,9 3,0  
  United States  62,0 35,5  
  Korea  60,9 19,5  
  Greece  46,8 7,0  
  Finland  46,1 22,4 
revised figure (February 
2008) 
  Switzerland 44,8   
  Poland  36,2 2,0  
  Turkey 10,5   
  Canada m 19,0  
 
Source: Babies and Bosses - Reconciling Work and Family Life (Vol. 5): A Synthesis of Findings for OECD 
Countries. Selection of tables and charts available at www.oecd.org/els/social/family, retrieved 05.05.2008. 
Year of data is not given, but the ranking seems to be a combination of two charts relying on data mainly 
from 2004. I have emphasized my two cases are in red.  
